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Abstract 
This study presents a theory about dynamic game characters within a broader character ecology in 
which characters are constantly produced and reproduced in a variety of media. Characters do not 
appear only in games, they migrate from one medium to another. They are independent from any 
medium in particular: a character does not require a specific medium to come into existence. 
Authoritative forces try to shape the overall interpretation of circulating characters transmedially in 
comics, television series, films, games and more through different venues of control, such as 
authorship, canonisation and ownership or intellectual property. This study addresses the struggle 
for interpretive authority by explaining how the player constructs the identity of dynamic game 
characters in digital games, and by discussing how dynamic game characters connect to and 
influence other character manifestations within a broader media ecology in which characters 
circulate. 
The research question of this study is: What are dynamic game characters? Through reader-
response theory adapted for cybermedia phenomena such as games, this study approaches 
characters as a player-constructed phenomenon, in which the game character needs the player in 
order to be invoked, but the game encourages the meaning-making process with different means 
to different effects. Dynamic game characters are those game characters whose development 
structures branch into different outcomes, each of which are undetermined until the player 
actualises one or more possibilities that steer that direction onto distinct paths with a specific 
outcome.  
Dynamic game characters have become a phenomenon that challenges practices of 
(trans-)media control. A theory of dynamic game characters tells us about the migration of entities 
via different works, and how the perceiver comes to understand them within a context saturated 
with characters, stories and a variety of media platforms. Digital games are just one of the many 
media platforms that participate in this character ecology, and they allow characters to challenge 
the idea that within a single piece of work the character must maintain a linear, continuous and 
coherent identity that stretches the understanding of characters as authored and predictable within 
a single work. 
This study argues that dynamic game characters are a type of quasi-person in digital games 
whose development consists of multiple outcomes. Digital games accelerate a dynamic game 
character’s identity within a single work, unlike non-cybermedia in which a character’s identity is 
constructed over multiple works. They challenge venues of control, because the player has creative 
agency over the dynamic game character’s characterisation process within a single work. However, 
once dynamic game characters transfer to other works, authoritative institutions break the player’s 
participation in the dynamic game character’s development. These transfers sacrifice player 
participation to create the illusion of a coherent identity between the manifestations of the 
character over multiple works. 
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Resumé 
Denne afhandling præsenterer en teori om dynamiske spilkarakterer, som er situeret i et større 
økosystem af karakterer og derfor konstant produceres og reproduceres i forskellige medier. 
Karakterer figurerer ikke kun i spil, da de migrerer fra et medium til det næste. De er uafhængige af 
specifikke medier, hvilket betyder, at en karakter ikke kræver et specifikt medium for at kunne 
eksistere. Autoritetsfigurer prøver at styre den overordnede fortolkning af karakterers transmediale 
cirkulation mellem tegneserier, tv-serier, film og spil m.m. gennem forskellige kontrolpunkter, 
såsom forfatterskab, kanonisering, ejerskab og immaterialret. Dette forskningsværk adresserer 
striden om fortolkning ved at forklare, hvordan spilleren konstruerer dynamiske karakterers 
identiteter i digitale spil, og ved at diskutere, hvordan dynamiske spilkarakterer kobler sig på og 
influerer andre karaktermanifestationer i den overordnede karakterøkologi, hvor karaktererne 
cirkulerer.  
Problemformuleringen for denne afhandling er: Hvad er dynamiske spilkarakterer? Gennem 
receptionsteori tilpasset cybermediale fænomener såsom spil, griber dette forskningsværk 
karakterer an som et spiller-konstrueret fænomen, hvor spilkarakteren har brug for spilleren, for at 
blive fremkaldt, og hvor spillet inspirerer en fortolkningsproces med forskellige midler, der har 
forskellige virkninger. Dynamiske spilkarakterer er spilkarakterer, hvis udviklingsstruktur fordeler sig 
i forskellige slutscenarier, som ikke afgøres før spilleren aktualiserer en eller flere muligheder der 
styrer udviklingen hen imod specifikke retninger med specifikke udfald.  
Dynamiske spilkarakterer er blevet til et fænomen der udfordrer etablerede praksisser for 
(trans-)medial kontrol. En teori om dynamiske spilkarakterer informerer os om migrationen af 
enheder via forskellige værker, og om, hvordan modtageren kan forstå dem i en kontekst der er 
fyldt af karakterer, historier og et væld af forskellige medieplatforme. Digitale spil er kun en ud af 
mange medieplatforme som medvirker i denne karakterøkologi, men spil lader karakterer udfordre 
den grundlæggende idé om, at en karakter skal fastlåses til en lineær, kontinuerlig og 
sammenhængende identitet indenfor et isoleret værk, og den åbning udvider den nuværende 
forståelse af karakterer som værende forfattede og forudsigelige indenfor et enkelt værks rammer. 
Denne afhandling argumenter for, at dynamiske spilkarakterer er en slags kvasipersoner i 
digitale spil, og at deres udvikling kan munde ud i flere forskellige udfald. Digitale spil accelererer en 
dynamisk spilkarakters identitet indenfor et enkelt værk, i modsætning til ikke-cybermedier, hvor 
en karakters identitet konstrueres henover flere forskellige værker. Spil udfordrer gængse 
kontrolpraksisser, fordi spilleren har kreativ autoritet over den dynamiske spilkarakters 
karakteriseringsproces indenfor det enkelte værk. Når dynamiske spilkarakterer overføres til andre 
værker, træder toneangivende instanser dog ind og bryder med spillerens deltagelse i den 
dynamiske spilkarakters udvikling. Under disse overførsler, ofres spillerens deltagelse for at skabe 
illusionen om en sammenhængende identitet iblandt karakterens manifestationerne i forskellige 
værker.  
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Part I 
Introduction, Theory, and Method 
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Chapter One 
Introducing the Dynamic Game Character 
 
1. Why Study Game Characters? 
This is a dissertation about dynamic game characters. Not only about games, not only about 
characters. This dissertation can be called a work about characters in games, or a work about games 
with characters, but I think that both descriptions do not exactly get to what I imply with ‘dynamic 
game characters’. The combination of those three words tell precisely what the topic of this entire 
work will be: as much as it will be about games, it will also be about characters. And more specifically, 
they will be dynamic, meaning that I talk about game characters that are characterised by a constant 
change over a specific process. 
 
Characters in Contemporary Transmedia Practices 
Characters do not appear just in games, they migrate from one medium to another. They are 
independent from any medium in particular: there is no single medium that a character requires to 
come into existence. But, at the same time, the character does need representational material to 
come into existence. The character is always already a representation of itself. Game characters are, 
from that perspective, just that: characters realised into existence through games. A character that 
appears in a game might as well appear in a comic, a television series, an animation series, a musical 
play, a film, and more. Characters from the Mass Effect series (BioWare 2007–2012) appear in 
comics, characters from the game Persona 5 (P-Studio 2016) are placed in an anime (Japanese 
animation) series, as well as in a manga (Japanese comics), as figurines, on stickers, etc. Even 
characters whose first manifestations were not in games, but in a different medium, appear in 
games as well. Superheroes like Wonder Woman, Buffy the Vampire Slayer, Superman, Batman, 
Spider-Man, and I could continue to name a few, regularly make their appearance in digital games. 
Researching game characters asks for an approach in which a broader picture of the media 
ecology in which characters and games reside should be taken into consideration. Characters—and 
also games—do not exist in a vacuum in which they develop independently from characters in a 
different medium, and I do not consider it wise to approach game characters as if they were 
completely distinct from characters in other media platforms. 
Characters are an important aspect in today’s media practice, which is actually transmedia 
practice, described by Christy Dena as “the employment of multiple media platforms for expressing 
a fictional world” (2009, i). Fictional worlds can be interesting, but they need characters to become 
interesting. Additionally, characters do not necessarily need worlds nor stories per se. They are 
bound to a specific world or a specific story as little as they are bound to a specific media platform. 
Theorists of Japanese popular culture engage with the conceptual distinction of a character 
between a character and a kyara. The former refers to a person-like being inhabiting a (story) world, 
and the latter refers to the visual representation of a character detached from any specific story 
world (Azuma [2001] 2009; Itô 2005; 2011; Sadanobu 2015; Steinberg 2012; Wilde 2018; 2019). 
According to Hiroki Azuma ([2001] 2009, 38 - 54), kyara mediate a ‘grand non-narrative’, “a realm 
that exists behind small narratives but lacks any form of narrativity”, where consumers consume 
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characters independently from any particular grand story in which they were originally placed. 
Within today’s media practice, Jens Eder (2015, 67 - 68) distinguishes between four different 
academic discourses, of which he considers adaptation studies to be the oldest. Adaptation studies 
focuses mostly on transferring the content of one artwork to another artwork (Hutcheon 2006). The 
second discourse uses concepts such as intermediality, transfictionality, and inter- or transtextuality 
(Ryan 2013), as it focuses on the complex relationship between an artwork and its medium-specific 
affordances. The third discourse, and the most recent one at that, is dominated by discussions of 
the “structures and the production of transmedial multitexts mostly franchises centered on fictional 
films or series” (Eder 2015, 68). This discourse is commonly known as ‘transmedia storytelling’ 
(Jenkins 2006; 2007), ‘transmedia world-building’ or ‘transmedial worlds’ (Klastrup and Tosca 2004; 
2011; 2014; Tosca and Klastrup 2020; Wolf 2012), transmedia practice (Dena 2009), or in Japanese 
contexts: the ‘media mix’ (Azuma [2001] 2009; 2007; Itô 2005; 2011; Lamarre 2009; 2018; Ôtsuka 
1989; [1989] 2010; Saitô [2000] 2006; 2014; Steinberg 2012). It operates under the phenomenon of 
media convergence in which content flows across a variety of media (McLuhan 1964; Bolter and 
Grusin 1999; Jenkins 2006). Finally, Eder (2015, 67 -68) locates the fourth discourse in 
communication studies and economics. This discourse looks at journalism and marketing in terms 
of cross-media and convergence. 
My book is located within Eder’s third discourse, which operates under names such as 
transmedia storytelling, transmedia world-building, or transmedia practice. For pragmatic reasons, 
I call this discourse ‘contemporary transmedia practices’, because it consists of multiple but similar 
practices that emphasise different aspects within a media ecology in which a variety of works is 
connected to each other effectively forming a network whose configuration changes and shifts. I 
will explain my perspective on contemporary transmedia practices over the course of this 
dissertation. 
 
Motivation for the Study: Why Game Characters? 
Why would someone research game characters, and specifically dynamic game characters, as a topic 
at all? The answer in the broadest sense is that I look at media literacy in contemporary transmedia 
practices; that is, the meaning attached to recurring cultural and textual patterns, and how these 
patterns manifest and transform via different communicative media platforms, with a focus on 
games as a means to communicate characters, in current Western and Japanese society defined by 
consumerism and capitalism. 
Characters, proposed by John Frow (2014, x) as “patterns of transtextual repetition which 
organize textuality into meaningful units”, play a fundamental role in the construction of stories via 
transmedia storytelling or the strategies of a media mix. While this might sound as if I discuss 
exclusively the impact of characters in our understanding of (fictional) stories, I would like to stress 
that characters also shape our understanding of reality. Not only because characters are used as 
means to have users consume media entertainment on a global scale, but also because characters 
can and have been used to affect readers’ mental imagination of their own community. 
Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1983) describes how two media platforms, the 
novel and the newspaper, create imagined political communities within society. According to 
Anderson, the affordances of the novel and the newspaper provide the technical means to 
represent the imagined community that we know as a nation (1983, 24). The novel allows readers 
to construct the idea of simultaneity: ‘homogeneous, empty time’ (25) in which events and 
characters move at the same time. The newspaper is the ‘extreme’ form of the novel, since it is 
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printed every day en masse, meant to be consumed by hundreds and thousands of persons, and 
tells of events and persons who these readers have never even met nor might ever meet at all. The 
thousands of copies of a single newspaper, printed in daily intervals, also ensures readers that these 
events are rooted in everyday life (35). As a result, the readers of these platforms come to imagine 
that they are all part of the same nation, belonging to the same political community through their 
own imagination. 
Although Anderson’s focus was on media platforms, I would like to point specifically to the 
role of characters in Japan during the Second World War (WWII) propaganda that created, through 
different and similar means, the effect of an imagined community. Eiji Ôtsuka (2018; 2019) argues 
that the origins of the current media mix in Japan originates from audience-participatory 
propaganda techniques during the WWII by the Japanese government. Such techniques enabled the 
government to promote Japanese nationalism to create a monolithic nation via the creation of 
derivative works made by its citizens. I will go into more detail in chapter four, ‘The Immaterial 
Character’. 
These brief examples demonstrate that already at the onset of modern transmedia practices, 
characters have been playing a powerful role in influencing readers’ perception of their own socio-
political society. Authority forces try to shape the overall interpretation of circulating characters 
transmedially in newspaper, comic or weekly magazine formats via means of censorship, or actively 
using characters to impose a certain political ideology on the readers. Characters are therefore not 
only important to discuss because they move as textual patterns via stories and narratives, but their 
movements throughout different media also reflect the current ideological practices by which our 
current societies shape and influence the perception of ‘reality’. 
The answer for why it is relevant to study dynamic game characters in a smaller sense is that 
games provide the player the opportunity to engage in participatory culture (Jenkins 1992). Joost 
Raessens applies participatory culture to games, calling it the active attitude that “makes special 
demands concerning the interpretation, reconfiguration, and the construction of computer games” 
(2005, 383). A focus on dynamic game characters puts under scrutiny the friction in this participatory 
culture of games between the player’s construction of the characters’ identities and authority 
figures, manifesting primarily as franchises and big corporations, that police the interpretation of 
the identities of characters. These authorities can be considered invisible hands (Backe 2012), 
institutions that collaborate on the construction of a characters official identity “through calculated 
measures” (Winko 2002, 11). Through different strategies, venues of control such as canon, 
intellectual property (IP), and the author function, these invisible hands attempt to control the 
interpretation of a character’s identity for their own benefits instead of leaving the interpretation 
of a character’s identity in the hands of each individual reader. 
I am not the only one who noticed this struggle for interpretative authority within 
participatory culture. Ebony Elizabeth Thomas (2019) argues: 
 
Shifting cultural attitudes toward texts—and the contemporary struggle for interpretive 
authority over them—characterize meaning-making. While theorists from Roland Barthes to 
Michel Foucault would point out the historical nature of this struggle (and the longtime 
absence of the author), the question of the reader-author struggle must be revisited, given 
that in this digital age, more people than ever before are writing for work and during leisure, 
readers connect with one another in powerful networks, lines between readers and writers 
blur, definitions of what counts as text are negotiated and reconfigured in hybrid multimodal 
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and multilingual constellations, and texts and people circulate across asymmetrical 
trajectories (154) 
 
I attempt to revisit this reader-author struggle, or, rather, the current struggle for interpretive 
authority via the definition of, the construction of, and the challenges that the dynamic game 
character brings to the meaning-making process in contemporary transmedia practices in which 
games require a specific set of demands of their, as Raessens states, “interpretation, reconfiguration, 
and the construction of computer games” (2005, 383). Already in 2009, Jan-Noël Thon states that, 
to his knowledge: 
 
There exists no developed theory or typology of characters in computer games yet, but such 
a theory and/or typology would probably be necessary to further develop the notion of 
ideological perspective structure with regard to computer games. Such a theory of 
characters in computer games would also have to describe in more detail the relation 
between the player, the avatar and the other characters in a game. (2009, 291) 
 
A little bit before Thon, Rune Klevjer (2006) grounded the theory on the avatar as an agent through 
which the player can act in the game world, “the embodied manifestation of the player’s 
engagement with the game world” (10). Kristine Jørgensen (2010) describes how companion 
characters in the Mass Effect series (2007–2012) play a narrative role in the construction of the 
game’s story. And, in 2015, Daniel Vella coins the term ‘playable figure’, the entity that 
simultaneously embodies the player and the character, thereby becoming the player-character in a 
heterocosm, the represented world of the game. In addition to their research, my research on 
dynamic game characters relocates the sole focus on a locus of agency within a single entity, like 
the avatar or player-character, to an agency in which the player influences a web of characters. 
My theory on dynamic game characters addresses the struggle for interpretive authority by 
explaining how the player constructs the identity of dynamic game characters, and by discussing 
how dynamic game characters connect to and influence other character manifestations in a broader 
media ecology in which characters circulate, which I call in this dissertation a ‘character ecology’. I 
look at the role of digital games as one of the primary communicative platforms that presents 
characters in contemporary transmedia practices. By looking at games specifically, it extends the 
role of game characters as currently thought of in game studies and beyond, because it becomes 
possible to point to how games shape characters, how they contribute to our understanding of 
reading and interpreting characters, and what role games in general play within contemporary 
media practices. 
 
2. The Aim of this Research 
This section discusses the overall goal of the research. The first section introduces the research 
questions that guide the analysis of game characters throughout this research. 
 
Research Questions 
The aim of this work is to create a theory about a specific kind of game character, the dynamic game 
character within a character ecology. I aim to define a theory about dynamic game characters and 
analyse their constitution as a certain type of game character. A theory of dynamic game characters 
allows discussion on how digital games communicate and present characters, and helps to 
6 
 
differentiate the means by which games enable players to consider game entities as characters. I 
will demonstrate that dynamic game characters cause friction in the larger character ecology in 
which forms of control attempt to police the reading and interpretation of the works in which 
characters appear. 
I base my research question and sub-questions on Henriette Heidbrink’s (2010) general 
notion of theory and her explanation about the position of characters within theory: 
 
A theory, in the broadest sense, builds a model or draws a set of descriptive explanatory 
propositions that claim a systematic relation to a defined object of interest. Therefore, the 
first steps mostly include a description or a definition of the object and further terms and 
distinctions that build on this basis in order to explain the functional integration of the object 
within given context. The research on characters displays these issues by repeatedly asking 
what characters are (ontology), how they can be defined (definition), what they are made of 
(components/elements/segments), how they are constructed 
(construction/characterization), what functions they fulfil within different media contexts 
(e.g., theatre/film/prose fiction), and how to explain the coherence-effect that characters 
reveal (synthesis). (Heidbrink 2010, 85) 
 
My research question is therefore: 
 
 What are dynamic game characters? 
 
A broad question that requests a description or definition leads to a set of sub-questions that drove 
me to research and establish terms and distinctions about dynamic game characters that explain 
their integration within a game. I adopt a constructive point of view where I consider it useful to 
perceive certain game entities as characters and ask how they are characters. I will explain this in 
more detail in chapter three, ‘On Method’. This point of view provides me the possibility to explain 
the variety of means by which games communicate characters. In this research, I specifically ask 
what constitutes dynamic game characters, how the identities of these type of characters are 
constructed, how they are integrated within games, and how they are integrated outside of games 
in a general character ecology. The sub-questions therefore are: 
 
1. What is the distinction between game characters and characters in other media? 
2. What are the different means by which a game entity turns into a character? 
3. What constitutes dynamic game characters? 
4. How is the identity of a dynamic game character constructed? 
5. How does a dynamic game character influence the character ecology? 
 
Scope of the Research 
There are, in my awareness, three major limits to the scope of my research: the omission of a 
typology, the exclusion of fan fiction, and the absence of empirical players. I explain the limits to the 
scope of my research here. 
The perceptive reader will notice that the main research question seems to require at first 
glance an ontological answer. After all, ontology allows for the creation of a set of concepts and the 
relations between them, which partially answers the question as to what a (dynamic) game 
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character is. However, I do not think that an ontological answer is what this question needs, since 
the main question consists of multiple sub-questions that do not require nor will be answered in 
detail by an ontological answer. As I will explain in detail in chapter two, ‘Theory’, and chapter four, 
‘The Immaterial Character’, the concept of character is so ambiguous that any attempt at defining 
the concept is always incomplete in the sense that it will exclude more forms of characters than that 
it includes. 
Since I do not attempt to provide an ontological answer, the goal of this research is not to 
create a typology or taxonomy, by which I mean a systematic classification or categorisation of 
different kinds of characters and their exact relations between each other. Mieke Bal (1979, 3) 
explains that character classification should not be a goal an sich, but that if we want to say 
something significant about a specific character, it has to be compared to other characters implicitly 
or explicitly. This means that a taxonomy could useful if we want to talk about a certain kind of 
character and compare it to all other kinds of characters out there, but for its own sake the existence 
of a classification is unnecessary. 
The more interesting matter of a classification is not necessarily the taxonomy itself and how 
to make one, but who creates one and for what purpose.1 A taxonomy is not simply a model of the 
real world, but a constructed, systematic model that shows how someone perceives relations 
between concepts. Even if the creation of that model is well justified, there is still power who 
determines what is related to what and how. Ultimately, a taxonomy is a question of power. 
However, since I talk about a specific type of character, a dynamic game character, which 
implies that non-dynamic game characters also exist, I am aware that a typology cannot be 
completely avoided. As Frow (2014, 106) argues, all descriptions of characters are in a sense 
typological: they classify concepts as certain types in order to describe the relations between these 
types. At the very least, some sort of typology is required if one wishes to say something significant 
about any character at all. I therefore cannot avoid entirely a taxonomy nor a typology, because I 
need a working definition of the terms character, game character, and dynamic game characters. A 
discussion about dynamic game characters can only exist on the premise that I distinguish between 
dynamic game characters and non-dynamic game characters, which is in turn rooted in a distinction 
between characters and game characters. The purpose of the definition and typology as I present it 
here is therefore a pragmatic one. It is not necessarily that I suggest it as the only way to discuss 
characters, rather it gives me the chance to formulate a description that I can present to others. 
As I will explain in more detail in chapter three, ‘On Method’, I maintain a reader-response 
approach to my study, but I do not include empirical players in the research. 
I also narrow down the research to digital games. Again, I will explain this in more detail in 
chapter three, but here I will only state that for this study, I exclude non-digital board games and 
play-activities such as hide-and-seek. I use the word ‘game’ to refer to ‘digital games’ unless 
specified otherwise. 
This study does not have a story-centric approach to characters in games. Despite the fact 
that characters are often associated with stories, as I will explain in more detail in chapter four, ‘The 
Immaterial Character’, characters do not appear exclusively in stories. That said, I do not exclude 
stories either. By maintaining a character-centric approach to characters, stories will often be 
present in the background of what I discuss, but they are not the sole focus or topic. 
Furthermore, I will refrain from studying fan fiction or other kinds of derivative works. Since 
 
1 For this explanation, I thank James Manning who pointed out to me that it is also of importance to consider who is 
creating a taxonomy and has the power to shape what and how concepts are related. 
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I do not look at empirical players’ engagement with the struggle for interpretative authority, 
empirical fans and their practices are not the focus of my research. However, over the course of my 
research, I have attempted to keep my theory what I would call ‘fan-studies friendly’. The 
multiplicity model that I introduce in chapter four, for example, is intended to include all kinds of 
works in which a character appears into consideration. Fan fiction and other derivative works belong 
just as much to the multiplicity model as the works by authoritative institutions do. 
For that matter, my study also does not include interviews with authoritative institutions. 
The means of control that I discuss in chapter five, ‘The Challenge of Manifestations and their 
Identities’, are based on a combination of prior studies by scholars in the fields of reader-response 
theory, literary studies, game studies, fan studies and popular culture studies. I discuss these works 
extensively over the following chapters. 
Limiting the scope of my research in such a way allows me to discuss how the player engages 
with the friction between the creative agency they have over a dynamic game character’s identity 
in a game, and the (lack of) agency they have over that character’s identity in other kinds of works 
within contemporary transmedia practices. It enables me to narrow the focus to create a theory 
about the concept of the dynamic game character, and the means by which this type of character 
comes into being. 
 
This Dissertation’s Argument 
Identity is an important—if not the most important—aspect of characters, inherently intertwined 
with the existence of a character. The moment that one recognises the manifestation of a character, 
that character obtains an identity. But who determines that identity is a question of power, similarly 
to the question of who creates the categorisation. It is a question that identifies the official version 
of a character as it moves between different media platforms. No character appears in a vacuum, 
and therefore the theory I propose will have a transmedial aspect as well. As I argue over the course 
of this book, dynamic game characters become especially interesting when one places them within 
a broader character ecology, and juxtaposes them to their manifestations in different media. 
The answer to what a dynamic game character is consists of many varied layers, which I will 
describe, analyse and explain over the course of this dissertation. What needs to be addressed in 
order to reach a proper answer is not only the distinction between characters, game characters and 
dynamic game characters, but also layers that include explanations for how characters manifest in 
a transmedial character ecology, how they manifest in games, and layers that provide discussions 
about who is creating and maintaining these characters and identities. 
To answer the main research question, I use Frow’s description of his argument on 
characters and persons (2014, vi) as inspiration. The argument of my dissertation can be briefly 
stated as such: 
 
Dynamic game characters are a type of quasi-person in digital games whose development consists 
of multiple outcomes. Digital games accelerate a dynamic game character’s identity within a single 
work unlike non-cybermedia in which a character’s identity is constructed over multiple works. They 
challenge venues of control, such as the author-function, ownership, and intellectual property, 
because the player has creative agency over the dynamic game character’s characterisation process 
within a single work. However, once dynamic game characters transfer to other works, authoritative 
institutions break the player’s participation in the dynamic game character’s development. These 
transfers sacrifice player participation to create the illusion of a coherent identity between the 
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manifestations of the character over multiple works. 
 
My argument is not entirely new. The identities of characters are not rigid, but malleable and fluid, 
and always have been (Frow 2014, vi). Yet, dynamic game characters become interesting once the 
mode of existence between the various identities of characters over a body of different of works in 
which characters appear are taken into consideration in relation to the acceleration of identities of 
a dynamic game character within a single body of work. I try to do this by investigating how dynamic 
game characters are constructed within a character ecology as a phenomenon of contemporary 
transmedia practices, where the idea of an ‘core essence’ of a person-like entity or work in general 
is given an incredible value. Dynamic game characters have become a phenomenon that challenges 
practices of (trans-)media control, such as authorship (Foucault 1969), canonisation (Backe 2012; 
Harvey 2015), and ownership or intellectual property (E. J. Evans 2012; Wasko 2001). A theory of 
dynamic game characters tells us about the migration of entities across different works, and how 
the perceiver comes to understand them within a context saturated with characters, stories and a 
variety of media platforms. Digital games are just one of many that participate in this character 
ecology, and they allow characters to challenge the idea that within a single piece of work the 
character must maintain a linear, continuous and coherent identity. 
 
 
3. A Brief Explanation of Terms Used in this Dissertation 
 
Character, Game Character and Dynamic Game Character 
Here, I provide a brief working definition of the terms character, game character, and dynamic game 
character here as I use it in this dissertation. I will explain the definitions in more detail over the 
course of the next chapters. 
I use the term character to refer to Frow’s concept of the quasi-person. Frow considers 
characters to be pieces of writing or imagining and person-like entities (Frow 2014, 2; 2018, 109). 
He argues that our understanding of characters is based on our prior knowledge of what persons 
are: 
 
Our recognition of the kind of thing fictional characters are depends on our prior knowledge 
of the kind of thing persons are. We understand characters as quasi-person. But the 
modeling goes the other way as well: our understanding of persons is, in part, shaped by our 
experience of dealing with fictional characters. Both fictional characters and kinds of persons 
are models of an aspect of the world, schemata which generalize and simplify human being 
in conventional ways and make it available to understanding and action. (2014, 107) 
 
To his description, I add Gô Itô’s description of the character, who describes characters as 
toujoujinbutsu, ‘dramatis personae’ (2005, 117), with specific personalities that give the impression 
of a continuous existence in which they are born, grow up, develop and die (2005, 120). 
The working premise that I adopt for this dissertation is that a character is a quasi-person. 
That is, a pattern of writing or imagining that readers understand as person-like figures from which 
the interpreter infers a continuous existence: a (daily) life to which they are born and in which they 
will die, and to whom thoughts and intentions are ascribed. However, as I will explain over the 
course of this dissertation, the idea that characters have a continuous existence is rather a 
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theoretical ideal than an actual rationale, as there are plenty of forces that attempt to mould, 
transform and control the existence of the identity and lives of characters. 
A game character is first and foremost a character, a quasi-person, a person-like figure to 
which an interpreter infers a life-like existence. The game allows the player to see in the game 
character a life-like existence in which it is born and can die, and to whom the player ascribes 
thoughts and intentions. A character becomes a game character once it is integrated in the game’s 
mechanical system which requires the player’s non-trivial effort to progress from one state to 
another (see Aarseth and Calleja 2015). This means that a game character has a processual nature, 
so that it has the potential for change when the player progresses the game. That change can be 
rigid, scripted and set in stone so that a game character may only change in one specific direction. 
The dynamic game character is a type of game character with a development structure that 
branches into different outcomes, which are undetermined until the player actualises one or more 
possibilities. A dynamic game character is inherently ergodic (see Aarseth 1997) because the player 
has to put in non-trivial effort to direct the development towards a certain outcome. The 
actualisation of these possibilities in a dynamic game character’s development structure has 
structural consequences for the manner in which the player continues to traverse the game, as the 
game will indicate that the player influences the development of the character to a certain path, 
and thereby the closing of another path. The outcome does not necessarily have to be clear to the 
player until they have actualised it. 
The game characters of which I speak are game characters, not game-player characters or 
gamer-characters. The difference lies in the focus. Although an experiential focus would very well 
describe how players experience game characters and develop a certain affective engagement with 
them, my reader-response method approaches characters as a player-constructed phenomenon, in 
which the game character needs the player to be invoked, but the game encourages the meaning-
making process with different means to different effects. This is in line with Frow’s (2014) 
understanding of the character as simultaneously being a piece of writing and a person-like entity, 
instead of being either only part of the work or only part of the player’s perception of a person. 
 
Other Terms and Definitions 
In addition to the terms character, game character, and dynamic game character, I use several other 
terms over the course of this dissertation that require at least some clarification. 
Let me first concretely specify what I do not mean when I use the term character. In almost 
every language, words, their signifiers and signifieds, can carry different connotations depending on 
the context. The word ‘character’ is no different: it has a variety of connotations that are different 
to how I use it within this work. However, I will avoid any ambiguity that the various connotations 
of the word ‘character’ can bring by simply using different alternative words. ‘Character’ can refer 
to the individual units of the Japanese and Chinese logographic writing system. Since the culture of 
Japan plays a significant role in the theory about characters within this work, I will instead use the 
Japanese word kanji to refer to the units of the logographic alphabet in their writing system. 
‘Character’ can also refer to a person’s personality, the accumulation of their perceived behaviour 
and being. When I refer to this behaviour, I will use the word ‘personality’ instead of ‘character’. 
The West is a term I use for the conceptual distinction between the West and Japan. In 
Edward Said’s influential work Orientalism (1978), the West is juxtaposed against the Orient as the 
Occident, and they relate to each other in a relation of power in which the West dominates the East. 
While the scope of my research does not include the power struggle for dominance of the West 
11 
 
over the East, the conceptual distinction between the West and Japan I use is based on Said’s 
description of the West and the Orient—a position taken up by Japan—as “an idea that has a history 
and a tradition of thought, imagery, and vocabulary that has given it reality and presence in and for 
the West” (1978, 5). 
Japan is not simply a passive agent within the conceptual distinction. Although I do touch 
upon Japan’s creation of its own image juxtaposed against the West in chapter four, ‘The Immaterial 
Character’, an in-depth discussion of the socio-historical development of this is outside the scope of 
this work. However, I will briefly state here that, according to Takami Kuwayama (2009), Japanese 
scholarship has been strongly influenced by Western Europe and the United States of America, 
which are often conflated within a single category called ‘the West’ to both positive and negative 
effect (2009, 44). Misconceptions about the West include ignoring that many Europeans are 
multilingual and most Americans monolingual, as well as the regional variations between Western, 
Northern, Southern and Eastern Europe etc. (45). On an academic level, “the generalised West has 
been held responsible for its alleged failure to clarify the interpersonal quality of the Japanese 
character” (2009, 45), particularly on the dichotomy between Western individualism and Japanese 
collectivism (45). 
The player refers to the model of a player, a tool to describe how the player plays a role in 
the meaning-making process of a game, particularly when it comes to the construction of a dynamic 
game character’s identity. In addition, I use the terms the reader, the user and the interpreter in 
similar ways, as models to describe the meaning-making process of a work, specifically when I refer 
to works in general or when I refer to specific works that are not game works. I will explain the 
model of the player in more detail in chapter three, ‘On Method’. 
Game(s) is a term I use to describe a digital game work which I consider to belong to the 
larger phenomenon of cybermedia which consists of a sign surface, a mechanical system, a material 
medium, and which requires a player (see Aarseth and Calleja 2015). For something to be a game, 
an actual player has to consider it one within their socio-cultural context. I will explain this term in 
more detail in chapter three as well. 
The character ecology is based on Roland Barthes’ description of text (1977). The character 
ecology refers to the ever-shifting sphere in which characters are constantly produced and re-
produced. As I will explain in more detail in chapter three, the character ecology is not limited to a 
single piece of work, but is experienced in a constant flow of reading, constant activity of production, 
which in turn shapes the textual configuration of the character. 
 
Note on names: all Japanese names in this dissertation appear in the order given name first, family 
name second.  
 
 
4. Chapter Overview 
The chapters of this dissertation are spread over three main parts. Part I contains the introduction, 
the theory, and the method of this dissertation. Chapter one, this chapter, is an introduction to the 
rest of the dissertation, stating the topic, the motivation for the study, its aim and the scope of the 
study. Chapter two is the literature review. It provides an overview of the different perspectives, 
paradigms and complications of characters and game characters within contemporary transmedia 
practices. The first part of the chapter presents historically shaped ‘classical’ perspectives about 
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characters in literary, theatre and film studies. The second part discusses the existence of characters 
in games, the connection between avatar and character, the player’s agency over the player-
character, and the (lack of) discussion on other characters in games. Chapter three introduces the 
methodological approach I apply to my research of dynamic game characters. It clarifies my use of 
reader-response theory as the central approach to studying game characters. This chapter explains 
the selection criteria of the corpus, and the challenges of conducting game analyses on dynamic 
game characters. It will additionally discuss the historical development of reader-response theory 
as the necessary context to clarify how the approach can be adapted onto the structures of games, 
onto the interpretation of game works by reader, and onto the function of the work as means to 
analyse dynamic game characters. 
Part II examines the concept of the character in a character ecology. Chapter four introduces 
the multiplicity model. The first part of the chapter examines the appearance of characters in the 
character ecology. It focuses on the theory on contemporary transmedia practices from the West 
and from Japan. The second part specifies the conceptual problems based on the theoretical 
discussions from this chapter and chapter two. Following from that, it provides the definition of 
characters as quasi-persons, and introduces the multiplicity model to address the meaning-making 
process of the cultural of the character to explain its existence of multiplicity in the character 
ecology. Chapter five examines the challenges to the identities of the character in a character 
ecology. The first part of the chapter explains the fallacy of narrative continuity’s importance to 
police the reader in interpreting a certain version of a character as the official truthful version. It 
addresses three venues of control authoritative figures use to gain interpretative authority: the 
author-function, ownership and canonisation. The second part of the chapter shows the textual 
organisation, the configuration of the characters Sherlock Holmes, Pikachu and Link to show how 
authoritative figures control of character’s identities is enacted through the different venues of 
control that vary per character. 
Part III examines the role of games in the character ecology. It introduces the dynamic game 
character. Chapter six focuses on how games constitute game characters. It explains the context 
and the means to how the player infers an entity to be a game character in order for me to discuss 
the particular means via which dynamic game characters are constructed in the next chapter. 
Chapter seven introduces the dynamic game character. It presents the topic and the basic conditions 
for the dynamic game character. This chapter also addresses the game’s possibility space, and 
subsequently explains the development structure of the dynamic game character, which uses the 
possibility space so that the player plays a significant role in the characterisation process of the 
dynamic game character. Chapter eight examines the strategies in which dynamic game characters 
appear. It discusses the player’s creative agency over the characterisation process, the migration of 
the dynamic game character between games to other media platforms, and the consequences this 
migration has on the dynamic game character’s identity. Finally, chapter nine presents the system 
of affection as a process by which game characters become dynamic so that the player obtains 
creative agency to influence these character’s characterisation process into a certain direction until 
the character has reached a specific outcome. 
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Chapter Two 
Theory: Character Paradigms and 
Complications 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the different perspectives, paradigms, and their complications 
about characters within contemporary transmedia practices. The chapter is split into two different 
sections: ‘General Character Theory’, and ‘Characters in Games’. 
The first section, ‘General Character Theory’, starts with ‘classical’ perspectives on 
characters. Here, I discuss the crucial debates that historically shaped the current academic 
understanding of characters. 
The second section, ‘Characters in Games’, discusses the existence of characters in games: 
the connection between avatars and characters, the focus on the player’s control over the player-
character, and the lack of discussion about other types of characters in games.  
 
1. General Character Theory 
The first part of this section discusses characters in the field of theatre and drama studies, in which 
the earliest account of the concept of character can be located in the West. The second part 
discusses characters in the field of literature, perhaps the field where the discussion on characters 
likely has the most prevalence. The third part shifts the discussion of characters to that in film 
studies. And the fourth part, the summary, provides a short overview of the sections discussed prior. 
 
Theatre and Drama Studies 
The etymology of the English word ‘character’ derives originally from the Greek word ‘kharakter’, 
an instrument for stamping a distinctive mark, which in turn derives from the Greek verb ‘kharattein’, 
meaning ‘to engrave’ or ‘to make sharp’ (Cixous 1974, 386; Frow 2014, 7). When it appeared in 
Greek literature, kharakter referred to the impression made by the stamp and not to the instrument 
anymore (Frow 2014; 7). This impression served to differentiate between things of the same kind, 
such as between portraits (Cixous 1974, 386), speech, style of spoken expression, or abstract entities 
like virtue and noble extent (Frow 2014, 7)—even so far as to refer to a certificate of conformity, 
the “detailed report of a person’s quality, good reputation” (Cixous 1974, 386). It is not until the 
word appears on stage that it denotes “the individual nature of a single person” (Frow 2014, 8) or 
“the representation of a ‘real’ that is itself a stage” (Cixous 1974, 386). 
It is in the Greek theatre where the predecessor of the character in contemporary 
transmedia practices makes its first appearance. Perhaps the earliest account of the character is 
Aristotle’s Poetics (around 330 BC) (see Aristotle 1902). In this work, Aristotle differentiates 
between agents (prattor) and character (ethos) in ancient Greek tragedy. Favouring plot, and 
therefore action, Aristotle considers agents—that is, persons who perform the actions—as 
necessary components to drama, which he perceives as an imitation of action and life; action is the 
soul of the tragedy. Character, on the other hand, Aristotle considers less important than the agent, 
as it describes the qualities of the agent which only come through via the agent’s actions (1902). 
‘Character’ here is understood as a set of traits that arise from the actions of an agent, while the 
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agent carries the progression of the drama via its actions. 
Aristotle’s disciple Theophrastus considers the moral character (ethos) as a set of inherent 
qualities, but one that manifests via choices made within the framework of these qualities. 
Following Aristotle, Theophrastus understands character as the habitual actions which give 
characters its consistency. Frow states the following in his historical overview of Theophratus’ 
notion of character: 
 
Each ‘character’ begins with an abstract definition of a moral quality, and then 
describes the type who embodies it; the general formula is: ‘He is the sort of person 
who will’ ” (Frow 2014, 108).  
 
Besides Greek tragedies, other forms of theatre in which characters are of large influence include 
the commedia dell’arte, professional improvisation theatre that originates from the 16th to 18th 
century in Italy. Robert Henke (2002), who analyses commedia dell’arte’s combination of the spoken 
work and written text, explains that commedia dell’arte performances function on a general plot—
mostly romantic plots—with substructures based on character interactions and speech 
performances actualised through verbal actions. He states that commedia dell’arte is one of the best 
examples in theatre history of a character system in which the characters are shaped in relation to 
another (2002, 15). The character system resembles a family with an extended structure of fathers, 
children and servants (15). 
The masks in commedia dell’arte are one of the most—perhaps the most—essential parts of 
the performance. According to John Rudlin (1994, 34) the masks are identical to a persona: the mask 
is “the person part of a character played by an actor”, and “the part of character sustained by 
anyone in the world”. Each mask refers to a character type, the father, children, servants, or two 
lovers, but, as Rudlin states, should never be mistaken for the representation of actual human 
beings (35). However, Henke argues that commedia dell’arte characters are not stock characters—
flat, stereotypical characters iterated in novels, films or plays, based on the premise that each 
character only has a certain set of traits—because the characters are rich and flexible (2002, 30). 
Each character type possesses a set of basic traits, but the actors of the character could also 
significantly diverge from the basis as long as they kept to the plot of the performance (2002, 19). 
Actors were often incredibly attuned to the role they performed, as they were often committed to 
the same role for an extended period of time, giving them plenty of opportunities to adjust the 
characters via the improvised dialogue of the performance that transformed the character type into 
an individual character (19). 
Brenda Laurel (1991) uses theatre as analogy to describe the interaction between human 
user and computer, defining human-computer interaction as “representations of actions with 
agents of both human and computer origin” ( 46). Using the Aristotelian definition of agents as those 
who take action, and characters as those entities with a bundle of traits, she argues that computer 
programs have agency in some form, because they perform actions. However, the “real argument”, 
she states, “is whether the agency is a ‘free-floating’ aspect of what is going on, or whether it is 
captured in ‘entities’—coalesced notions of the source of agency” (60). Her answer is that even if 
these entities do not exist, they are implied since people tend to attribute agency to the computer 
itself (60). Explicit entities, on the other hand, “consist of bundles of traits or predispositions to act 
in certain ways” (61). She states that these entities need to have two kinds of traits: internal traits 
that determine how the agent can act, and external traits that represent the internal disposition of 
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the agent so that users can infer from them how the agent could act (61.). 
According to Laurel, it is action alone that shapes the character—as suggested by Aristotle—
and therefore she argues that the character’s actions are dictated by the plot. To display traits that 
are not put into action would violate the principle that the character is shaped by action. Laurel 
prioritizes action—and therefore agent—over character, which she perceives as just a bundle of 
traits. Her perspective on computer-based agents is, in other words, one in which the computer-
based entity is first and foremost an agent, and only by being coalesced into a single entity with 
traits does it become a character. 
Janet Murray (1997) also discusses computer-based agents in her book Hamlet on the 
Holodeck. She presents the structure of commedia dell’arte as a solution to the problem of 
procedural (computer-based) characters acting inconsistently towards each other when they are 
written according to a set of rules that determines their behaviour, actions, and responses. 
Explaining that commedia dell’arte does not rely on a script, she sees a possibility for procedural 
characters in commedia dell’arte’s dependence on scenarios that allow the actors to create a 
coherent improvisation (236.). Murray considers the patterns found in these scenarios a formula for 
procedural characters to have the possibility to respond appropriately to each other (236). 
 
Literary Studies 
From the twentieth century onwards, characters are primarily discussed as a facet of narrative 
discourse in literary studies. Literary studies’ response to the psychological approach to characters 
as human beings led to a structuralist position that saw characters as signs or structures of the text. 
In turn, the structuralist position was met with a more humanistic position about the nature of the 
characters. In her overview of the debate about characters in literary and media studies in recent 
times, Henriette Heidbrink explains the following: 
 
There is a long ongoing debate between >humanistic< positions on the one hand that deal 
with characters on a mixed basis of phenomenology, hermeneutics, and textual analysis, and 
on the other hand so-called formalists, structuralists and semioticians, that hold the view 
that characters should be addressed as signs, semantic components (>semes<), >bundles of 
differentiations< / paradigms, words, sentences, or more generally, textuality (2010, 73) 
 
The humanistic position can be found in E.M. Forster (1927), who introduces the Homo fictus, an 
ambiguous species similar to the Homo sapiens, that, created in the minds of novelists, cannot exist 
in our world. The Homo fictus is a character in a book. Forster divides the Homo fictus into two 
different categories: flat and round. The former are characters created around a single idea or 
quality, but they are easily recognised and remembered by the readers of the novel, since they are 
not changed by the events of the novel (74). The latter are more complex. Round characters are the 
complete opposite of flat characters, because they change during the events of the novel or play. 
One of Forster’s criteria to recognise round characters is that they must have the ability to surprise 
the readers. 
 Around the same time as Forster, the structuralist position also emerged: structuralist 
and folklorist Vladimir Propp (1928) reduces the basic elements of Russian fairy tales to their 
primary functions. Interested in spheres of action, Propp considers functions as the acts of dramatis 
personae (characters) that are significant to the overall events in the fairy tales (20). The 31 
functions that he identifies are merged into seven spheres of actions and assigned to the roles of 
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the dramatis personae (such as the hero, the witch, the villain, the victim, etc.) (24 – 59). The roles 
themselves, however, are not characters but are only meant to be filled by characters. A single 
character can also take on multiple roles. 
 According to Heidbrink (2010, 73), from the mid-1960s on, semioticians and 
structuralists were against the synthetic idea of a character, in which the character was understood 
as a human being. They instead consider the character to have no autonomy beyond the text; the 
character is wrapped as a semiotic sign in the work (73). French structuralist A.J. Greimas (1966) 
introduces his ‘actantial scheme’, based on Propp’s theories. The actantial model is a typology that 
breaks down an action to six actants in total: sender, object, receiver, helper, subject, and opponent. 
Greimas’ actantial model is rooted in the structure of the narrative: the actions are carried by 
‘acteurs’ who are then ascribed to the actantial classes of sender, helper, object, etc. (Greimas 1966; 
Heidbrink 2010; Hébert 2011). Acteurs are not necessarily human actors, nor characters in the 
strictest sense, because the model looks at thematised actions within any given (story-) text, so 
animals or inanimate objects can also be categorised as an acteur belonging to a certain actant. 
Furthermore, Greimas’ model relies much on perspectives in which one acteur could correspond to 
several actants depending on the perspective of the acteurs. 
From the same structuralist branch, Roland Barthes attempts in Introduction à l’analyse 
structurale des récits [Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives] (1966) to capture the 
character with the categories of persons, though, as Heidbrink puts it, “not in a psychological sense, 
but in a grammatical one” (2010, 81). Barthes states that the distinction between agents and 
characters presents the following problem: 
 
One the one hand, the characters (whatever one calls them—dramatis personae or actants) 
form a necessary plane of description, outside of which the slightest reported “actions” 
cease to be intelligible; so that it can be said that there is not a single narrative in the world 
without “characters”, or at least without agents. Yet on the other hand, these –extremely 
numerous- “agents” can be neither described nor classified in terms of “persons” […], in 
which case it is necessary to leave out of account the very large number of narratives […] 
comprising agents but not persons. (Barthes 1966, 276)  
 
If a character is only considered to be an agent, then there exist, according to Barthes, a large 
amount of narratives that do not have any persons in them, only entities that act. According to 
Heidbrink, in 1970 Barthes attempts to solve the problem of characters as persons by understanding 
characters as a combination of both person and agent, thereby separating ‘personage’ (character) 
from ‘figure’ and the ‘I’: 
The character (figure) is thereby understood as a kind of literary foil that is detached 
from the personage and -particularly in modern literature- exposed to a high degree 
of ambiguity. (Heidbrink 2010, 82)  
Another structuralist-semiotic perspective comes from Hélène Cixous (1974) who states that the 
character can only be made sense of as a figure used in semiotics: as a ‘personage’ that functions as 
a social sign in relation to other signs in the text (384). She presents the character as a set of 
externals, preconceived by an author, that is then offered up to interpretation by a reader who looks 
for identification with the character (385). Thereby, Cixous grounds the existence of the character 
in the work itself. Though the character might allude to a real-life referent, its essential traits are 
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fixed within the work, and on which the work depends (385). 
Seymour Chatman (1978), also a structuralist, considered the idea that a character is nothing 
more than words to be wrong (see Heidbrink 2010, 76). He critiques how structuralist positions use 
the Aristotelian distinction between agent and characters, and instead argues for a theory that 
treats characters as autonomous beings independent from any type of medium (1978). Considering 
them not only as plot functions, Chatman argues that it is the audience that constructs characters 
via explicit and implicit evidence communicated by the text (1978). Characters, from his perspective, 
are a paradigm of traits: they have a relatively stable personality that may unfold through the story 
of the text, but these traits can also disappear, reappear, or new traits may appear (1978, 126). He 
attempts to fit his paradigm of traits into Forster’s notion that deep characters have to surprise its 
readers by arguing that round characters are open-ended, which allows readers to uncover even 
more traits (126). 
 Gérard Genette, concerned with the ambiguity of narrative, distinguishes between 
three uses of narrative: a) as a series of events (story), b) as the signifier of the story (narrative 
discourse), and c) a telling about a series of events (narrating) (1980). When it comes to the topic of 
characters, Genette takes on the structuralist position and seems to be mostly concerned with the 
character’s role in the narrative perspective. He distinguishes between narrator and character 
(though they sometimes overlap) by asking questions such as “who is the character whose point of 
view orients the narrative perspective” and “who is the narrator?” (186). Without giving a concrete 
definition of characters, they seem to matter mostly to Genette in terms of the function they play 
in the construction of the narrative discourse and narration, contrasting Chatman’s proposition to 
perceive characters as independent from the medium. 
In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, Chatman’s trait paradigm triggered a paradigm shift 
towards the humanistic position of textual analysis. Three scholars who were occupied with these 
questions were Mieke Bal, Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, and Uri Margolin. 
A work that is particularly overlooked in the English-speaking academic field of literary 
studies is the book Mensen van Papier [Humans of Paper] (1979) edited by Bal. Bal, known for her 
work Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative2 (Bal 1978; 1999), points out that the lack 
of research about characters in literature was due to the idea that one had to look at the connection 
between character and person (1979, 2 - 3). She states that, although literary studies focuses more 
on the communication between author and reader and the function of literature within general 
society, at that time characters in literature were only discussed in terms of their classification. 
Commenting on the structuralist model, and specifically Greimas’ actant model, Bal argues that the 
disadvantage of classifications is that they do not demonstrate the nature of the character, because 
the different classes and traits of these classes only relate to each other. As a result, the amount of 
classes and characters are asymmetrical: one particular class could have more characters in one text, 
whereas in another text, one character can fit more classes (1979, 4 -5). Nevertheless, she does 
point out that the advantage of a classification is that it allows one to relate the character to the 
whole text so that the character’s development over the text can be shown (7). 
Addressing the question of whether characters are people or words, Rimmon-Kenan (1983) 
writes in her book Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics that characters in stories function as 
constructs modelled after the readers’ perceptions of human beings and are therefore person-like 
(33). Relating to Chatman, she notes that characters can be described in a network of character-
 
2 Bal originally released this work in Dutch in 1978 as De Theorie van Vertellen en Verhalen: Inleiding in de 
Narratologie. 
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traits, and that every element in the text can function as a direct or indirect indicator of character 
(59 -61). 
Margolin (1986) provides a definition of characters in stories as Narrative Agents (NA), 
human-like individuals to whom readers can ascribe mental properties based on the text. The 
ascription of these mental traits—that is, characterisation—is based upon the characters’ individual 
acts. Characters are constructed through the accumulation of these traits but, moreover, Margolin 
believes that readers only have a full portrait of the final character once they have completed the 
text in which it appears (206). It must be noted however that a couple of years later, Margolin 
emphasizes that his NA theory is developed in the domain of possible world semantics in contrast 
to classical narratology, in which characters are only elements part of the narrative (1990). Possible 
world semantics can be traced to the early 1980s with articles from scholars such as Lubomír Doležel 
(1983) and Marie-Laure Ryan (1985). Within this domain, Margolin considers the NAs to be 
individual members of a possible world located in a certain space and time, and they can be 
identified through for example proper names or specific descriptions (1990). The role narrative plays 
here is that as a “verbal representation of hypothetical states of affairs”: it mediates the actions and 
events within this world (844). 
At the end of the 1980s, Frow (1986)—like Margolin—challenges the notion of characters as 
simply elements of a narrative. He acknowledges that characters do not simply belong to the field 
of literary studies, but also highlights that neither should characters be considered persons: 
 
The concept is both ontologically and methodologically ambivalent; any attempt to 
resolve the ambivalence by thinking character either as merely the analogue of a 
person or as merely a textual function avoids coming to terms with the full complexity 
of the problem. (1986, 227) 
 
Frow identifies three stages to the problem of our understanding of the conceptualisation of the 
character: 1) there is a tendency to think of characters as textual effects, 2) literary characters have 
been historically differentiated based upon institutionally sanctioned conventions of the self and 
‘character’, and 3) there is the question of how characters hold the interest of the reader in the 
story (238). As an answer to why characters belong to both (narrative) discourse and representation, 
and why characters tend to move between linguistic and mimetic domains, Frow argues that 
characters are both an object and a subject of speech simultaneously: “in the production of 
character, language produces fictional representations which in turn produce more language” (245 
-246). 
James Phelan (1989) attempts to solve the ambivalence of characters as an analogue of 
persons and as textual functions by distinguishing three different dimensions, which he considers 
the attributes that characters possess in isolation from the work in which the characters appear, 
and from which the text derives its significance (9). The first dimensions he calls “synthetic”: 
characters are constructs from text and are thereby artificial (10). The second dimension he calls 
“mimetic”: characters are analogues of persons and their attributes become traits to create an 
illusion of an actual person (11). And finally, the last dimension he calls the “thematic”: characters 
are the representative entities to express certain ideas larger than the individual character (12 - 13). 
In the early 2000s, Phelan continues his three dimensional model of the character, calling it 
‘character functions’ instead (2005, 12). He presents the idea of ‘character narration’, and art of 
direction through which the author directs a message to the reader by means of the character as 
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the narrator, combining the ‘I’ figure in the narrator and the character (2005, 1). Although the ‘I’ 
figure is both the character and the narrator in a single figure, Phelan distinguishes between the 
‘narrator functions’ and the ‘character functions’. In the former, the narrator either functions as a 
reporter to the audience, or unwittingly tells the audience about certain events without knowing 
the audience exists. The latter refers to the three functions a character can have: synthethic, 
mimemtic, and thematic (12).  
Another work that discusses character narration is Alan Palmer’s Fictional Minds (2004). 
Palmer coins the term ‘fictional minds’ as a “functional and teleological perspective that considers 
the purposive nature of characters’ thoughts in terms of their motives, intentions, and resulting 
behavior from action” (12). Using this concept, he describes how characters are constructed via the 
reception of the readers’ observations in the narrative through not only speech—referring to 
Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of polyphony (having multiple voices in a text) (1986), but also through 
actions and the way the inner minds of the characters experience these actions (Palmer 2004, 211). 
Recent works on characters tend to focus less on constructing a comprehensive theory of 
characters, and instead take a broader look at the debate between the humanistic position and the 
structuralist position in order to construct a theory about characters. In Characters in Fictional 
Worlds (2010), Eder et al. show via articles from multiple writers the various perspectives from 
which one can understand characters. Within this book, Heidbrink provides an exhaustive survey, 
Fictional Characters in Literary and Media Studies: A Survey of the Research, which explains how the 
two different positions constructed characters in the past. She finds that characters have been 
discussed mostly around the three following topics: 
 
1. The notion of a character naturally seems to be connected to concepts of 
humanlikeness, although they seem to be made of rather abstract medial 
material like words, images, and sounds. 
2. Different characters seem to be of different importance to the plot in respect 
to their acts and functions. 
3. Characters seem to be constructed by a link between the observed material 
and the thereby elicited reception process and effects.  
In general all three points refer to a continuum between >abstraction< and 
>concretion<, whereas the first pole stands for the medial material, the text, the signs, 
or the structures of the medial product and the second pole stands for the character 
that is via reception perceived as a humanlike entity with a coherent self including an 
individual personality (Heidbrink 2010, 72). 
 
Besides Heidbrink’s extensive literary overview, the book also offers an ontology of fictional 
characters by Maria E. Reicher, who perceives characters as existing but completely undetermined 
abstract concepts whose existence rely on stories as created by human activities (2010, 116). With 
this explanation, she seems to mean that as an undetermined abstract concept, the core feature of 
the character is its incompleteness, that is, not every aspect of the character is determined nor has 
to be determined in order for the character to exist at all (119).   
In The Living Handbook of Narratology (2012), Fotis Jannidis gives an overview of characters 
in which he defines characters as “a text- or media-based figure in a storyworld, usually human or 
human-like” (2012).  
Other recent works discuss, for example, the question of why readers are interested in 
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literary characters at all. Blakeley Vermeule (2010) argues that the answer lies in our curiosity to 
other humans in general, making us susceptible to gossip and therefore interested in characters as 
well. 
It is Frow’s book Character & Person (2014) that I particularly want to highlight here. Frow 
provides an extensive account of the tension between the thinking of characters as pieces of writing 
or imagining and thinking of them as person-like entities, which refers to the tension between the 
structuralist position and the humanistic position. His aim is to resolve that tension by proposing 
that (fictional) characters must be seen as both at once (2). He states the main argument of his book 
to be the following: 
 
Persons exist across a range of modalities. Some people are real and physically present to 
us; others are real but we know them only by repute- by the stories that are told about them 
or the reports we have of their existence or our assumption they must exist or have once 
existed - or they exist in our memories; others may or may not be real, or imaginary qualities 
may be grafted onto real people; and others may be fictitious, with varying degrees of 
resemblance to real people. The argument itself is neither original nor particularly 
interesting; It becomes interesting, I think, when we begin to examine the way these 
different modes of existence relate to each other. I try to do this here by investigating some 
of the many culturally and historically specific schemata by which real and imaginary persons 
are assigned their particular ways of being, and I take fictional character as the starting point 
from which to examine the spectrum of modalities along which persons exist. I do this 
because fictional characters have a more clearly modal existence than real people do (they 
are more clearly constructs of the imagination), and in that sense they are exemplary of the 
way a mode of reality is ascribed to persons of all sorts. (2014, vi) 
 
Frow argues that the problem to understanding characters as both pieces of writing and person-like 
entities is that “characters and persons are at once ontologically discontinuous (they have different 
manners of being) and logically interdependent” (vii). He proposes that the solution is to view 
persons as somewhat familiar to fictional characters, because it “allows us to understand persons 
not as ontological givens but as constructs, which are in part made out of the same materials as 
fictional characters” (vii). 
Frow’s discussion on the character is not focused on the nature of the character—what they 
are—but rather he focuses on the construction of the concept of character, and he describes the 
dependence of its construction on the historically and culturally changing understanding of persons. 
Frow roots the concept of ‘character’ in the taxonomies of personhood, the character is constructed 
in a specific moment of time “within terms of an ethical or legal or religious or civic mode of action 
and understanding” (2014, ix).  
The definition of the ‘character’ that Frow provides is established on the recipients’ cultural 
understanding of persons, but also acknowledges that characters are constructed within texts. He 
therefore considers characters to be quasi-persons: 
 
Our recognition of the kind of thing fictional characters are depends on our prior knowledge 
of the kind of thing persons are. We understand characters as quasi-persons. But the 
modeling goes the other way as well: our understanding of persons is, in part, shaped by our 
experience of dealing with fictional characters. Both fictional characters and kinds of persons 
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are models of an aspect of the world, schemata which generalize and simplify human being 
in conventional ways and make it available to understanding and action. (2014, 107) 
 
I leave Frow’s work for now, but over the course of this dissertation, I will frequently refer to this 
work as I explore the construction of the character via multiple works, and specifically its role in 
games. 
 
Film Studies 
Film studies derives its understanding of characters primarily from literary studies. The opposition 
between the structuralist position and the humanistic position can also be found within this field. 
In film studies, David Bordwell (1985) discusses the classical narration of Hollywood studio 
filmmaking from 1917 to 1960. Classical narration is the specific normalised composition of how 
classical Hollywood films present their stories (156). Bordwell states that characters were defined 
as individuals struggling to solve a specific problem or a certain goal. They have a clear set of 
qualities, traits and behaviours, with the protagonist characters as the ones who progress the film 
in terms of its causality (157). According to Bordwell, the canonical Hollywood format relies upon 
character-centered causality that provides action so that these characters would achieve their goals 
(157). 
Murray Smith (1995) focuses on films after the 1960s in the book Engaging Characters: 
Fiction, Emotion, and the Cinema. He assumes the humanistic position, perceiving the character in 
terms of its mimetic relation to human beings, as he considers the term ‘character’ to be a “fictional 
analogue of a human agent” ( 17). He argues that the understanding of character does not only 
depend “on a general conception of human agency but also on conceptions of social roles specific 
to cultures” (21). He therefore provides a person schema that lists the features human agents are 
deemed to have, and on which culturally specific developments are based: 
 
1. a discrete human body, individuated and continuous through time and space; 
2. perceptual activity, including self-awareness; 
3. intentional states, such as beliefs and desires; 
4. emotions; 
5. the ability to use and understand a natural language; 
6. the capacity for self-impelled actions and self-interpretation; 
7. potential for traits, or persisting attributes (21) 
 
Smith demonstrates that the notion of character relies on a cultural understanding of persons. He 
considers characters as constructs: “but they are constructs formed on a perceptual and explanatory 
schema (the person schema) which makes them salient and endows them with certain basic 
capacities. Particular characters drawing on culturally specific schemata are built upon this 
foundation” (31). Although characters are structurally embedded in texts, Smith argues that the 
necessary condition for character construction appears primarily on the side of reception. Based on 
the person schema, the reader projects (initially) the person schema onto a figure and turns the 
figure into a character (31). 
At the end of the 1990s, Robert McKee (1998), a screenwriter, argues that characters in a 
story and the structure of the story are the same (100). Characters not only provide structure to the 
story, but also belong to stories. McKee seems to assume the structuralist position. As he contrasts 
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characters as paradigm of traits—as suggested by Chatman—McKee considers the accumulation of 
traits simply to be characterization. A paradigm of traits gives the character a personality, but it is 
not a character on its own (100). According to McKee, there exists a distinction between 
characterization and ‘true character’, the latter of which refers to the personality of the character 
revealed when they are under pressure. McKee is mostly concerned with his idea of true characters 
that he constructs based on Forster’s idea of round and flat characters. He considers the revelation 
of the true character as fundamental to major characters, because the revelation of their true 
personality is provided by the story structure that forces characters into dilemmas (105). 
In the English summary of his German work Die Figur im Film (2008), Eder proposes to 
explore film characters as “identifiable fictional beings with an inner life that exists as 
communicatively constructed artifacts” (2010, 18). Eder approaches film characters through 
audience reception: the audience’s mental model of the character is the core to constructing 
character. However, he considers characters to be not entirely subjective. Rather, reception is of 
importance to the analysis of characters, because the seed of their origin depends on the mental 
model that the audience has of characters (2010, 19). These mental models consist of multiple 
modalities: “they combine different forms of information processing—visual, acoustic, linguistic, 
etc.—into a vividly experienced unity” (19). The mental models of a character, character models, 
“represent the properties of a fictional being in a particular structure, with a particular transparency, 
and a particular perspectival orientation” (19). 
Based on various theories of film analysis, Eder provides for the practice of character analysis 
a ‘clock of character’, that consists “of the most general domains of features that can be ascribed to 
characters, and it closely connects them with the viewers’ reception” (2010, 22). Characters can be 
analysed as: 
  
1. Artifacts; the representation of characters in terms of stylistic devices such as 
the composition, textual features, and aesthetic structures, 
2. Fictional beings; the character as an individual living in a fictional world, 
3. Symbols; a sign with a deeper meaning that answers, e.g., what does the 
character stand for? 
4. Symptoms; “consequences or causal factors of real elements of 
communication; for example, as the outcome of the work of the filmmakers or 
as role models for viewers” (2010, 22).  
 
As fictional beings, Eder refers to characters as “the inhabitant of an imaginary world”: the reader 
has to consider them as entities that think, feel, and are active (23). As artifacts, characters are 
analysed in terms of their structure and how they are constructed “with the help of the devices and 
techniques of filmmaking” (26). They can be analysed in terms of their representation: via images 
and sounds, audiovisual streams provide information about the character. But they can also be 
analysed as artifact properties such as realism and consistency: “the combination of several artifact 
properties may correspond to high-level conceptions of character, which inform the decisions of 
scriptwriters, directors, and actors” (27). 
Eder considers characters as ‘symbols’ and characters as ‘symptoms’ to be umbrella terms 
that cover a wide range of phenomena: 
 
When we examine characters as symbols, the question to be answered is what indirect 
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meanings they convey. When we examine them as symptoms, the question concerns the 
causes in the production process that lead to their specific properties, and the effects of 
them on the viewers during and after reception. (2010, 32) 
 
Finally, Smith (2011) discusses the twofoldness of characters in order to explain the caring attitude 
that readers assume towards characters set in ‘realist fiction’, a narrative in a fictional world 
primarily based on “an existing or historical social reality and relies upon our recognition of  this for 
proper appreciation of the fiction” (278). Twofoldness, a term he borrows from Richard Wollheim 
(1987) describes the phenomenon of seeing two aspects at once as a single experience (279). He 
explains that readers tend to respond to characters as actual persons, while also being aware of the 
designed status of the character. The central argument of his work is that the twofoldness of 
characters allows readers to “talk freely of fictional characters as if they literally inhabited our own 
world, but in so doing we do not lose sight of their invented status. Far from suggesting naïveté, 
such talk betrays the ease, sophistication, and naturalness with which we handle fictional characters” 
(2011, 291). 
 
Section Summary: Pieces of Writing and Imagination, and Person-like Entities 
The debate on the concept of the character does not occur in each field independent from the other 
field. Historically, the debate starts in theatre studies, moves into literary studies and continues in 
film studies. Subsequently, these fields also shape the discussions on computer-based characters. 
Theatre and drama studies initially differentiates between the character and agent as two 
separate aspects of a figure; a Greek tragedy’s soul is action performed by an agent to progress the 
plot. The character are only the qualities of the agent. Commedia dell’arte is a form of improvisation 
theatre that hinges on the relations between character types. Each character type has a certain set 
of traits, although actors can significantly diverge from these traits as long as they keep to the plot 
of the performance. Theatre studies, specifically the Aristotelian perspective, or commedia dell’arte, 
is also used to describe the construction of computer-based agents as characters, as computers 
have a certain form of agency, shaping the scripts to determine the agents’ behaviour, actions and 
responses. 
Literary studies’ reaction to the psychological approach to characters as human beings 
started a long and ongoing debate between a more structuralist position on characters, in which 
characters are only situated within the text’s as structures and signs, and the humanistic position, 
which focuses on the reception of the characters as person-like entities that exist beyond the text. 
Only recently have scholars in this field tended to look at characters from a broader perspective, 
and instead of trying to define the nature of the character, they consider the different perspectives 
by which a character can be analysed. Characters are, from that perspective, simultaneously pieces 
of writing and person-like entities. 
Film studies is informed by the debate between the structuralist position and the humanist 
position from literary studies. The field seems to continue the debate that characters are either 
embedded in the structure of the film story or person-like entities. However, just as in literary 
studies, recent works discuss characters in film also from a broader perspective, perceiving them 
not to be either/or, but rather as constructs that are both embedded in the text and person-like 
entities at the same time. 
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2. Characters in Games 
This section is divided as follows: in the first part, I discuss the historical development of the 
connection between characters and avatars in games. This leads to the second part, in which  discuss 
how the literature of game studies discusses characters in games. In the third part, I provide a 
summary of this section, pointing out that the discussions on avatars and characters in games tend 
to construct their concept of game characters primarily around the player’s direct control over the 
character, so that the player-character becomes the topic of focus, while other types of game 
characters –some of which players can indirectly control—tend to be neglected. 
 
Playing with Puppets: The Confusion between Avatars and Characters 
According to Lars de Wildt et al. (2019), the term ‘avatar’ gained prominence in tech culture—
including digital games—around the early 1980s when Californian tech culture “inherited a 
fascination with Eastern philosophy and religion from their ‘hippie’ forebears” (2019, 1). In Virtual 
Reality software from the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s, the term was used to refer to: 
 
1. A virtual object used to represent a participant or physical object in a virtual worlds; the 
(typically visual) representation may take any form.  
2. The object embodied by a participant.  
3. Adapted from Hindu, meaning the earthly embodiment of a deity. (Sherman and Craig 
2003, 13) 
 
The term ‘avatar’ originally derives from the Sanskrit noun originating from Hindu scripture and 
theological literature. De Wildt et al. (2019) states that in its original context, “the avatar is an object 
of worship and the manifestation of divinity that descends on Earth. Avatar is most commonly 
translated into English as a form of ‘(re-)incarnation, ‘an often cyclical ‘making flesh’ (carn-) of a 
deity” (4). I will discuss the problematic appropriation of the term ‘avatar’ in tech culture—and game 
studies scholarship—in more detail at the end of this section. First, I will describe in what terms 
game studies scholarship has discussed and engaged with the term ‘avatar’ in games. 
Espen Aarseth’s Cybertext (1997) formulates the idea of a cybertext, dynamic texts for which 
readers have to put in non-trivial effort in order to traverse the text. Aarseth calls this effort ergodic, 
and thus considers all texts for which readers rely on ergodicity—including games—cybertexts (1997, 
1). Despite not solely discussing games, Aarseth’s manuscript is one of the earliest contributions to 
the field of game studies, one that presented games as essentially different from other literary texts 
by integrating a model of the player, the intriguee: the real user of adventure games, at the center 
of the text (127). 
In his discussion about the intriguee, Aarseth explains that the user takes on the role of the 
main character by identifying with it as “a remote-controlled extension of herself” (Aarseth 1997, 
113). While he first calls the figure the main character of the game, Aarseth uses term ‘character’ to 
describe an entity through whom readers identify and manipulate the game in terms of its modality, 
rather than a character in the sense that it has an individual identity with some sort of personhood. 
Instead, Aarseth differentiates between the implied user, the intriguee, and the puppet that he 
describes as follows: 
 
The puppet is not a character or a narratee but an empty body, a contested ground zero of 
both the discourse and the intrigue. And the intriguee […] represents an immanent position 
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but one that must be (re)constructed by the implied user and not by the voice of the event 
narrator. The implied user, on the other hand, is both responsible for the action and the 
game’s outcome. (127) 
 
In response to Aarseth’s concept of the puppet, James Newman (2002) disputes the direct one-to-
one player-character relationship, because he argues that what Aarseth describes is a relation of 
vehicular embodiment. Therefore, Newman considers the notion of ‘character’ to be inappropriate 
for the figure that is controlled by the player. Instead, Newman perceives characters through an ‘on-
line’ and ‘off-line’ framework in order to describe when players engage with characters and when 
they engage with vehicular embodiments. In what he calls the ‘off-line mode’, the player does not 
have to devote non-trivial effort or active input (2002). These might be, for example, cut-scenes, in 
which the character takes over so the player does not have to provide any input. The offline mode 
allows for characterisation as if the figure has personhood of its own. However, in contrast, Newman 
considers that the ‘on-line mode’—in which the player has to employ non-trivial effort—presents 
the figure only in terms of its capacities and capabilities (2002). The player’s ability to control their 
figure strips the character from being a character and turns them instead into a vehicle. The duality 
between character and vehicle here is, in other words, clearly separated by the moments of direct 
control that players have over the figure. This proposition assumes that characters in games can 
only prevail without interference of players to manipulate and control them. The figure, then, is in 
that way either an avatar or a character, but cannot be both at the same time. 
Considering the player’s identity in relation to the figure they control a point of friction, 
Richard Bartle (1996) distinguishes between the player, the avatar, the character, and the persona 
based on immersion, that is, the idea of the player inhabiting a figure’s body so that the player is 
absorbed into the game world. He refers to the avatar as a “player’s representative in a world” 
(1996). It functions as a tool for the player and the world to interact (1996). Bartle considers the 
character, on the other hand, to be a player’s representation in a world, a representation of the 
player that they don when entering the world. To Bartle, this is a deeper level of immersion (1996.). 
The main distinction Bartle offers is that avatars “are dolls” whereas “characters are simulacra” 
(1996). The former is a tool, whereas the latter is a copy of the player whom the player role-plays. 
Interestingly however, Bartle considers a persona to be the player: “the player is the 
character” (1996). The player is not role-playing, nor assuming an identity like they do with the 
character, but they are that identity. Their persona is them. However, Bartle omits how and where 
he draws the line in his distinction between the avatar, the character, and the persona. Can they 
exist at the same time in one figure? Does it always have to be three distinct figures? Does this 
distinction apply only to the MUD genre that he analyses, or can it be extended to other kinds of 
games? These are questions his distinction does not answer. 
Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman use a general concept of ‘character’ that refers to “a 
fictional persona contained within a game representation” in their comprehensive book Rules of 
Play (2004). They distinguish between characters who are under the player’s control (the 
protagonist character), and those outside the player’s control. To them, the combination of 
interaction and the rules of the game constructs these characters instead of an on-line or off-line 
mode; they argue against the duality of the figure as a vehicle and as a character that Newman prior 
constructed. Instead, they identify two layers of the so-called protagonist character and relate it to 
the players. First, they consider the figure a persona through which players exert themselves into 
the game world. Second, simultaneously the figure is a tool, a puppet and an object for players to 
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manipulate according to the rules of the game (2004, 453). 
Jonas Linderoth (2005) extends Salen and Zimmerman’s idea about the relation between the 
player and the figure, but considers the playable game character an ‘avatar’ instead, referring to the 
Hindu mythology in which avatars are the incarnations of deities on earth. He identifies three 
functions of the avatar in games: 
 
1. It is a fictive character; a role players can pretend to be; 
2. It is a tool, a piece of equipment for players to manipulate that provides them 
with agency in the game; 
3. A prop through which players identify themselves in the game (2005). 
 
He borrows the first two functions from Salen and Zimmerman, and seems to add in Bartle’s idea of 
the persona and calls it prop. His reason for adding the identity of the players as a third function 
might be because Linderoth looks at player sociability between players in multiplayer games, 
whereas Aarseth, Newman, Bartle and Salen and Zimmerman look at the playable figure as a 
construct within the game without the possible interference of other players. Linderoth’s three-
layered functionality of the avatar is completely dependent on players and how they might construct 
the figure as a character. Yet, while he calls the figure an avatar, a concrete difference between 
avatar and character is lacking in the sense that his model implies that the avatar is always a 
character that depends on players for their individuality and personhood. It relies on the concept of 
character as a role for players to play, but leaves out other ways in which games might construct 
characters. 
 It took until Rune Klevjer’s work What is the Avatar? (2006) for game studies to get a 
grip on the difference between the avatar and character. Previous works used the terms ‘character’ 
and ‘avatar’, ‘puppet’, or even ‘tool’ arbitrarily without a clear distinction for when which term is 
applicable to the figure. Klevjer’s notion of the avatar follows Newman’s differentiation between 
character and vehicle in the sense that Klevjer perceives the avatar as a mediator of agency and 
control (62). He defines the avatar as “an instrument or mechanism that defines for the participant 
a fictional body and mediates fictional agency; it is an embodied incarnation of the acting subject” 
(87). It is the extension of the player: a body in the world of the game through which players are 
able to interact with the game environment. However, Klevjer also emphasises that the avatar is a 
reflexive extension: the avatar’s body inhabits the environment and is part of it. It is therefore not 
only acted upon by players, but is also affected by the environment to which it is exposed (95). The 
avatar differs from a tool, because a tool does not belong to the environment since we are only 
interested in its capacity to alter it (95). 
 According to Klevjer, the difference between character and avatar is that a character 
is an independent subject, a subject that acts and can be related to as a human person with feelings 
(16). This is in alignment with notions of characters from literature and film studies in which 
characters are also perceived in terms of their reception as mimetic analogues to humans. The 
avatar on the other hand, is not an independent agent, since it is a “prosthetic extension of agency 
and perception” (Klever 2006, 94). 
Agency specifically is important to Klevjer in order to differentiate between an avatar and a 
playable character. The embodiment that the avatar provides players relies on what he calls the 
simulation of ‘realistic agency’: 
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Realistic agency is when you do not have to perform the simulation by following a set 
of instructions, and when the behaviours of agents, objects, and processes in the 
environment can be ascribed their own properties and capabilities rather than to 
formal procedures that are external to them. In computer game environments, this 
kind of realistic agency is often combined with and balanced by game rules that are 
not concretised—either because they are transparent and non-reified (as in a role-
playing game), or because they were never integrated with the simulation in the first 
place (as when a timer cuts you off in a racing game). (Klevjer 2006, 110) 
 
To have this type of agency, ‘tangibility’ is a concept that Klevjer uses to describe the simulation of 
a direct physical interaction with the game environment (118). The avatarial relationship between 
players and avatars is then defined by tangibility and real-time control to simulate realistic agency 
(124). What should be kept in mind is that an avatarial relationship with an avatar always implies 
avatarial embodiment that allows players to manifest with a body in the game, but for Klevjer this 
does not necessarily have to be a human-like body as it could also be a vehicle (116). He also 
distinguishes between two-dimensional (2D) and three-dimensional avatars (3D). The latter 
“mediates embodied interaction through continuous space” (167), whereas the former mediates 
embodied interaction as a puppet where players do not perceive the game world from a subject-
position (167). 
Although players could have avatarial relationships with playable characters, Klevjer 
emphasises that, first of all, such a relation does not imply avatarial embodiment as it is not the 
extension of the players’ bodies per se, and playable characters can also be indirectly controlled, 
like in point-and-click games (119). In contrast, the avatarial relationship is always tangible and 
directly controlled (124), which means that the moment the player controls a playable figure 
indirectly, the avatar ceases to exist. 
Ragnhild Tronstad (2008) responds to Newman’s suggestion that identification with the 
playable figure relies on its capabilities and has little connection to the figure’s appearance. Instead, 
Tronstad distinguishes between two different kinds of identities: 1) sameness identity: the player 
enters a state where they experience being the figure, and 2) empathic identity: the player 
experiences what the figure experiences as an entity other than themselves (251). With World of 
Warcraft (2004) as his case study, Tronstad finds that the sameness identity is found in what he 
considers ‘regular gameplay’; the player experiences flow, “a state of trance-like concentration in 
which the body seems to perform and react automatically as well as perfectly, without the conscious 
mind interfering” (253). The player experiences being the figure, because capabilities of figure and 
player are perfectly in balance. Tronstad considers this type of figure an avatar, because it is simply 
a representation of the players without any identity of its own. This resembles Klevjer’s notion of 
the avatar, although Tronstad considers the avatar to be a tool for players to use in the gameworld, 
whereas Klevjer specifically does not. 
According to Tronstad, empathic identity is found in the act of role-playing in World of 
Warcraft, in which players identify with the figure through an imaginative form of empathy in the 
sense that players are aware that the figure is a different entity from them with its own identity, 
history and motivations. For Tronstad, this is a character actualised through the player’s act of role-
playing, whose development as a character is not completely in the hands of the player, although 
the player does play a deliberate part in the construction of the character (257 - 259). 
Tronstad points out that even if the player perceives the figure as an extension of themselves, 
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it is still materialised in the context of a gameworld with its own history, which enables the player 
to distinguish the figure as an entity separate from themselves to a certain extent (259), meaning 
that they are never fully capable of experiencing ‘being’ the figure. 
 Klevjer’s work is the most extensive contribution to this point in debates on the avatar 
and its distinction from a character in games. That is not to say that discussions on the avatar are 
over. After his work, several academics have made contributions about the avatar in terms of role-
playing by players taking up their own identity within the world of the game (Manninen and 
Kujanpaa 2007; Westecott 2009; Carter, Gibbs, and Arnold 2012). Additionally, when the avatar is 
considered to be an extension of the self, it opens up the possibility to look at interaction between 
players through the avatars (van Vugt, Hoorn, and Konijn 2010). Nevertheless, while studies about 
the notion of the avatar-as-tool after Klevjer have been few, there are exceptions, such as Linderoth 
(2013), who looks at the avatar from the perspective of ecological psychology, and Peter Bayliss 
(2007), who proposes a distinction between the player-character as a separate body of the players 
and the avatar as tools to change the game world. 
Finally, de Wildt et al. (2019) explore the cultural appropriation of the term ‘avatar’ within 
Western tech culture, which used “Eastern traditions to re-chant technology with a sense of wonder” 
in the 1980s and 1990s (7). Their argument is that the contemporary use of the term ‘avatar’ in 
gaming cultures: 
 
‘plays’ on and with the original meaning, and that this hybridity is fraught because it is based 
on asymmetrical power dynamics and obscured through secularization, by which we mean 
both the long-theorized and observed general decline, in the Western world, of religious 
practice within and sense of ‘belonging to’ institutionalized—e.g., Christian—church religion. 
(2) 
 
For gaming this meant that the term ‘avatar’ was appropriated as a term to signal that playing digital 
games “was ‘other’ to mundane everyday experience” (7). According to de Wildt et al., the avatar 
gave the impression that digital games have the potential for creating embodied, empathic 
experiences, as the avatar was not merely a tool, but “a potentially incarnation of self” (7). 
They pinpoint three key reinterpretations of the term ‘avatar’ entering in Western tech 
culture that established the current use of the term: the game Ultima IV: Quest of the Avatar (Origin 
Systems 1985), the MUD game Habitat (LucasArts 1986), and the novel Snow Crash (Stephenson 
1992). De Wildt et al. argue that in Ultima IV the avatar is used as an Orientalist story device, framed 
as the ‘Other’, but rendered to correspond to typical Christian values; rather than being an 
embodiment of a god out of many gods, the avatar in this game the only embodiment of virtue. “It 
re-mystifies the secular Western world through this gesture towards otherness, but the sacred 
world it invokes is thoroughly Christian and Western, yet rendered unfamiliar” (8). 
In Habitat, the term ‘avatar’ received a new connotation: the avatar became the 
embodiment of the players in the game world: “Rather, than picking up a tool to execute a function, 
an avatar was possessed, inhabited, and a representation of the self to others in the virtual world” 
(10 -11). 
In Snow Crash, the Western use of the term took on its final form as it is used in 
contemporary media practices. De Wildt et al. state that one of the novel’s core themes was the 
exploration of mind, language, and myth through computation models giving computation a 
transformative power: the “fictional avatars of the Metaverse are technologically advanced, and 
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signal a potential future where a great deal of human activity is augmented and enabled by avatar 
technologies” (11). De Wildt et al. suggest that acknowledging this relationship in game studies has 
three important consequences for game scholarship: 
 
1. Videogames are culturally hybrid. 
2. While videogames are a global phenomenon, they draw from (and are experienced 
in) multiple, uneven local contexts. 
3. Power and privilege shape how we experience and understand games. (20) 
 
The term ‘avatar’ operates on an uneven power relationship between the West and the East. 
The use of the term illustrates that the cultural exchange between East and the West functions on 
a historically-set Orientalist discourse that extends beyond the cultural exchange between the Euro-
American hemisphere and Japan. Instead, the term avatar suggests an uneven power balance by 
which games are experienced (21). 
 
Game Characters: Playable Figures and Miniatures 
The previous section showed the early debates on the distinction between avatar and character. 
These tended to focus on the idea of immersion, in which the avatar becomes a tool or an 
embodiment for the player to act within the world. Klevjer (2006) however, pointed out that he 
considers the character to be a separate entity from the avatar, an entity that acts independently 
from the player. His idea is that the moment the player is in a direct avatarial relation with a 
character, this is an avatar instead of a character, thereby shaping the initial perception of what was 
considered in game studies to be a character and what was an avatar. 
In this section, I will focus on game characters in the works within game studies. The initial 
debate on the distinction between avatar and character continues in the discussion on characters 
in game, resulting in debates about the nature of game characters whose primary focus is the 
identity of the player-character, the character who the player has an avatarial relationship to and 
whose identity they therefore partially take on. However, that is not to say that discussions about 
characters that are not the player-character do not exist, but that they usually are discussed 
together with the player-character in order to set the player-character apart from these kinds of 
characters, with a few exceptions. 
Simon Egenfeldt-Nielsen et al. (2008) present a typology on characters in games in general 
that includes types of characters beyond the player-character or avatar. In contrast to Klevjer, they 
consider the player-character to be a character that the player can directly control and which 
therefore has an avatarial relation to it. They approach characters in a similar fashion as Aristotle, 
perceiving them as agents who make actions happen and are therefore the ones to produce stories 
(2008). Their typology is created from a theatre studies approach as they identify four different 
types of characters: 
 
1. Stage characters: part of a scenario and do not have their own personality nor 
motive. 
2. Functional characters: similar to stage characters, but they have a general 
function. 
3. Cast characters: characters with different degrees of personality that have a 
specific function in the game related to its story. 
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4. Player-characters: characters manipulated by the players, but the characters’ 
motivations are decided by the story of the game. (209) 
 
There are few works that discuss in detail characters diverging from the player-character. One of 
them is Dan Pinchbeck’s analysis (2009) of non-player characters (NPCs) that identifies the 
persistent NPC (PNPC). According to Pinchbeck, an NPC implies an agent that “has some form of 
individuality, that they are recognisable as a separate character from the background population” 
(262), whereas PNPCs “are those individuals presented in the diegesis who appear repeatedly or 
have a definable role in the world and plot. They are, to an extent, defined by diegetic significance 
rather than representation” (262). He argues that the PNPC is a type of character that plays a 
significant role in the plot, moving it forward—often as the ally but also as the enemy (263 -264). 
In Pinchbeck’s analysis, characters other than the player-character do not particularly 
contribute to the game structure, and are only present as characters in ‘off-line’ segments of the 
game. He argues that they are primarily shown via cut-scenes or audiovisual segments (267). If they 
are crucial to the ludic structure, he argues, they are goal-givers, giving the player quests and 
rewarding the player, enabling the player to attach significance to these characters and rewarding 
them for this significance (270). In other words, these characters—although he considers them 
persistent—remain on the periphery of the game, with the player-character as the agent who 
structurally impacts the progress and structure of the game. 
Kristine Jørgensen (2010) does identify characters other than the player-character- 
important to the structure of the game. She discusses supporting characters as narrative devices 
that enable a coherent narrative experience in games such as Dragon Age: Origins (BioWare 2009) 
and Mass Effect 2 (2010). She considers interesting characters and a plot that unfolds in conjunction 
with character development as the basis for a successful implementation of a narrative depending 
on characters (2010). She regards support characters—what Egenfeldt-Nielsen et al. consider ‘cast 
characters’—as having their own individual identities and that they are in charge of advancing the 
narrative of the game (315). A focus on these supporting characters places players in the position 
of that in a traditional narrative (like film or novels) in which they take on the role of a witness (323.). 
She is quick to point out that the difference between these traditional narratives and the games she 
discusses is that the games allow “the player to take some part in its progression by making the 
player responsible for the growth and development of the protagonist” (323). 
Gordon Calleja (2011) identifies two types of characters that the player can control: the 
avatar and miniatures. He considers the former an entity to whom the player’s presence is fixed and 
whom the player directly controls. For the latter, Calleja uses the term ‘miniatures’ to describe 
entities who the player can fully or partially control, but who do not represent the player (60). This 
means that the player could control multiple miniatures simultaneously in games in what Calleja 
calls a ‘miniature environment’, a representation of a landscape in which the player has a bird’s eye 
view and is present in all places at all times with these miniatures under their command, as if the 
player were a god (91). 
The terms ‘game character’ or ‘character’ in games are mostly ascribed to the role of 
characters within a story that a game supposedly tells. Calleja’s notion of miniatures refers to games 
that emphasize the management of resources, but Pinchbeck’s and Jørgensen’s approaches are 
specifically tied to games that emphasise narrative progress. Egenfeldt-Nielsen et al. describe game 
characters mostly in terms of their narrative function or story role as well. Nevertheless, the 
assumption that characters always have to be discussed in terms of their narrative function can 
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cause friction in games in which the characters hop from a storytelling medium to a game genre 
with less storytelling capacities. Celia Pearce (2006) and Jessica Aldred (2012) address the issues of 
adaptation from film to games. Pearce argues that the reason game-to-movie adaptations fail is 
because the functions that characters play are “diametrically opposed” (2004, 152). According to 
her, characters who serve as avatars stimulate player interpretation: “taking a caricature that has 
been created as a vehicle for player-projection and trying to develop it unto a full-blown cinematic 
character is a dangerous game to play, so to speak” (152). 
Aldred (2012) observes that the issue with movie-licensed (video) game characters is the 
balance between those characters as stand-ins for the player (as player-characters) and the 
characters being “visual and narrative associations demanded by their source medium” (92). She 
states the following: 
 
Game characters forced to be “digital doubles” of their filmic incarnations are similarly 
bound to the expectations and constraints of that image. Not only does this force the game 
character in question to function more as object for aesthetic contemplation rather than 
locus of player agency and subjectivity—it also leaves minimal space for users to form a 
successful projective identity (101). 
 
Aldred distinguishes between the roles that game characters represent in two dimensions: a) the 
game character functions as the avatar of the game to embody players in the game world of the 
film, and b) the game character functions as the film character transported to the game (2012, 101). 
Abstracted characters such as Lego figures help players to obtain a sense of projective identity (101). 
Building on Scott McCloud’s (1994) assumption that cartoon characters are empty shells who can 
absorb our identities due to their abstraction, Aldred states that abstraction allows players to 
perceive these characters as extensions of themselves, while simultaneously the abstraction takes 
away the associations demanded by the source medium (101). 
In her later work, Aldred (2014) extends the idea of (video) game characters being the 
extension of players and being fictional entities that serve to advance the story of the game world 
by adding another dimension to game characters: characters have also become symbols for the 
larger game franchise to which they belong as agents that can be easily translated into other types 
of media. I should point out, however, that Aldred uses the term ‘agent’ to describe the characters 
as film characters due to their lack of customisability, contrasting with the term as used by Aristotle 
to describe agents as performers of actions. 
 Like Aldred, Aarseth (2012) also considers characters to be one of the most important 
elements of crossmedia productions. Based on Forster’s (1927) character model, Aarseth 
categorises characters found in games into three different kinds: 
 
1. Bots: without individual identity. 
2. Shallow characters: little personality but with names and individual appearances. 
3. Deep characters: with full personalities, names and individual appearances. (132) 
 
Aarseth’s typology is compact and embodies the same simplicity of Forster’s. However, Aarseth’s 
typology avoids the dependency on narratives and stories, instead taking the depths of the 
characters’ personalities into account, which suits more game genres than just those that rely on 
narrative conventions. The simplicity of the typology shows us a spectrum on which, on one end, 
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characters with depth can become an authorial tool for designers to regulate strictly any game 
progress. On the other end, we find characters that are limited in authorship but are more malleable 
and provide players with more control (2012, 132). 
 Felix Schröter and Jan-Noël Thon (2014) present a method to analyse video game 
characters based on their theoretical understanding of medium-specific representation and the 
additional mental processes involved in the construction of characters via player reception. 
Contrasting Newman’s on-line and off-line framework (2002), they propose three modes of 
representation that each contributes to three dimensions of video game characters as 
intersubjective communicative constructs: 
 
First, the mode of narration is primarily used to represent characters as fictional beings to 
whom the players can ascribe a specific corporeality, mentality, and sociality. Second, the 
mode of simulation – the interactive gameplay as such – primarily focuses on these 
characters’ function as game pieces, which is connected to specific ludic abilities (such as 
‘running’ or ‘shooting’) and characteristics (such as ‘health’ or ‘accuracy’) as well as to the 
game goals and the possibilities of interaction that the game provides. Third, the mode of 
communication allows for forms of self-representation that let characters function as 
representations of the players in the social space of the game. (2014, 48) 
 
Schröter and Thon’s modes of representation echo the three functions of the avatar that Linderoth 
(2005) previously identified in which avatars are simultaneously a fictive character, a tool for players 
to manipulate, and a prop through which players identify themselves in the game. Schröter and 
Thon’s points of departure are similar: Linderoth focuses on player sociability, while Schröter and 
Thon believe that player experience is more closely related to game characters as intersubjective 
communicative constructs than how games represent characters (2014). 
Although Schröter and Thon have given us a model for character representation in games, 
they emphasise player reception and how players construct characters over how games 
communicate characters. They present three frames of player experience of game characters based 
on Erving Goffman’s (1974) concept of frames and Gary Alan Fine’s (1983) frame analysis: 
 
1. Narrative experience: players perceive game characters as fictional beings with 
an inner life. This is the dimension of fictional being that crosses different media. 
2. Ludic experience: players perceive the characters as part of the game mechanics 
– as game pieces. The player-character is a tool that allows players agency in the 
game world. 
3. Social experience: in multiplayer games, players look at the other players behind 
the avatar. (Schröter and Thon 2014, 49 – 50) 
 
What Schröter and Thon seem to present is a method of analysis that indicates that every character 
in a game is to be represented through all different modes and that game characters are to be 
experienced in at least two different ways. 
Daniel Vella (2015) describes how the player makes sense of the game world via playable 
figure: a controllable entity that could become a character. Vella combines a phenomenological 
approach to games with an in-depth textual analysis of the playable figure. He argues that the 
characters who players directly control in games—the player-characters—are ontologically speaking 
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game components: entities that comprise the games in which they appear. As such, he considers 
that calling them ‘characters’ for this reason would be inadequate as the term refers to represented 
individuals within the represented world of the game, while ignoring their status as elements (10). 
Put simply, instead of looking strictly at player-characters in terms of their representation as 
characters, Vella promotes a formal approach to perceive them as elements of the game as well. He 
thus refers to these entities as playable figures, a term that “encapsulates both the fact that the 
entity is taken on and ‘played out’ by the player […], but also the fact that it remains a figure in its 
own right” ( 10). 
From the perspective of phenomenology, Vella explains the dual nature of the playable 
figure that consists of both an ‘I’ as the player herself, and also an external entity belonging to the 
mediated world of the game (20). Of relevance to game characters is Vella’s account of the playable 
figure’s transition into a character. Vella distinguishes between the terms ‘playable figure’ and 
‘character’ in order to clarify the difference between the ludic subjectivity of the player—that is, the 
player’s own performance within the game world and the ludic subject that the player controls. 
Using Margolin’s concept of the ‘possible non-actual individual’ (Margolin 1986), Vella argues that 
the term ‘character’ does not refer to the playable figure, but “to the unity into which the 
representation of the player’s subjectivity is shaped as seen from the objective, external perspective” 
(2015, 366). In other words, the game presents the figure as if it were a character, which does not 
depend on the identification of the players with the character (367). 
Based on his previous model with Thon, Schröter (2016) provides a cognitive approach in 
order to theorise the ontology, reception and emotional engagement with game characters. His 
model presents game characters in three distinct dimensions: as fictional beings, as ludic game 
pieces, and as social representations of other players. As fictional beings, game characters perform 
as inhabitants of a storyworld with certain personality traits, motivations, social roles, etc., which 
the game narrates to the player. As ludic pieces, they function as entities in the game’s mechanical 
system with certain game-related features and abilities. As the representation of other players, they 
allow the player to create a mental model of the other players in the social space of multiplayer 
games3. 
Just like his model with Thon, Schröter’s model focuses solely on the player-character, and 
presents game characters as fictional beings that the player can only experience narratively. The 
cognitive approach that he presents, then, is one that only describes those characters that the player 
can directly control, and with whom the player has an avatarial relationship. Nevertheless, he omits 
the ontology, reception, and emotional engagement the player could have with other kinds of game 
characters. Instead, by using the general word ‘game character’ to refer to the player-character, 
Schröter implies that only the player-character is a game character. 
In this chapter, I focus mostly on monographs that engage with characters in games as a 
theoretical construct directly, but the interdisciplinary field of game studies has been paying 
attention to game characters from different perspectives as well. To give a short summary of a few 
examples: from a gender perspective, Diane Carr (2002) discusses the issues around the 
representation of female characters using Lara Croft from the Tomb Raider series as a case study. 
Carr shows that Lara’s exaggerated proportions as a female avatar is problematic in terms of neutral 
participation by players of all genders as Lara’s duality as the avatar to be manipulated and her 
exaggerated sexual appearance seems to be specifically imagined for a heterosexual male consumer 
 
3 I initially wrote this paragraph for my article ‘The Definition and Construction of Dynamic Game Characters in Digital 
Games’ for the Character and Figurine academic seminar at Ropecon (2019) in Helsinki, Finland. 
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(8). Later, Jeroen Jansz and Raynel G. Martis (2007) dubbed the appearance of a competent female 
character in video games as the ‘Lara phenomenon’ and showed that strong female characters like 
Lara were represented as overly sexual, but they also showed that men in games were represented 
as gender-stereotypical and hyper-muscular, aimed at the heterosexual male audience as well. 
Characters are also discussed from a design oriented approach. In Better Game Characters 
by Design (2006) and How Games Move Us (2016), Katherine Isbister provides a practice-oriented 
approach towards game characters (player-characters mostly) through whom players project 
themselves in games. Furthermore, she identifies common social roles of non-playable characters 
in games, such as minions, rescuees, pets, allies, guides and more, although a methodological 
explanation is absent. Another character design book is Virtual Character Design (2015) by Robin J.S. 
Sloan. Sloan uses the term ‘virtual characters’ to acknowledge the existence of game characters in 
other types of media, stating that virtual characters only come to life within virtual simulations once 
a user runs the software (xii). Yet despite her theoretical approach towards terminology, Sloan’s 
book mostly focuses on how to design characters in terms of their bodily autonomy, visual and audio 
style, personality, story and more. 
 
Section Summary: Avatars and Game Characters 
This section shows that at the beginning of game studies, game characters are primarily discussed 
in terms of the difference between the avatar and the character. The term ‘avatar’ comes from the 
Sanskrit noun originating from Hindu scripture and theological literature, and was culturally 
appropriated in the 1980s and 1990s by a tech culture fascinated by the East as the ‘Other’. 
In game studies, the focus in the debates between the avatar and the character is about 
whether or not the entity the player directly controls is a character, the representation of the player 
in the world, or a tool that the player uses to interact with the world. Since Klevjer’s (2006) 
distinction between the avatar as the extension of the player and the character as an agent 
independent from the player, discussions about the nature of the avatar have calmed down. 
Nevertheless, debates about the nature of the character continue in the player-character, 
where the convergence of the identity of the player-character and the identity of the player is the 
main interest. Whenever game characters other than the player-character are discussed, they are 
discussed within a general character overview that tends to focus on the narrative roles of these 
characters, with the player-character as a separate kind of character since it takes on the main role 
within the games’ narratives. 
The main distinction on which the debates focus is between the character that the player 
avatarially controls—the player-character—and those that the player does not control. Aside from 
Calleja’s ‘miniatures’, Jørgensen’s (2012) discussion about supporting characters, and even 
Pinchbeck’s PNPCs, there is a striking lack of academic works about game characters that the player 
only partially controls or influences. It seems that game studies’ primary interest is the player’s 
relation to the player-character, often the protagonist of the game, but seems to lack interest in 
how the player’s agency can also affect characters beyond the one that the player directly controls. 
A reason for this interest in the player-character might be because the particular discipline in game 
studies that discuss characters in games, with scholars from the field of literary studies, implicitly 
(and sometimes explicitly) compares game characters to characters to other fields of media studies, 
such as literature, comics, film, theatre, etc. The player-character becomes then seemingly distinct 
from other characters, because the player has avatarial control over it, whereas in the other fields 
of media studies such avatarial control over the characters in these media almost always does not 
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exist. 
 
3. Summary 
In this chapter, I provided an overview of the paradigms in which characters within contemporary 
media practices are discussed, and what kind of complications arise when the nature and 
constitution of the character as a concept is up for debate. I showed this overview by first outlining 
how the discussion on the character developed in the more ‘classical’ fields of literary studies, 
theatre studies, and even film studies. 
I then moved towards the discussion of game characters within game studies. In the 
discussion about game characters, I noted that game characters have primarily been discussed in 
terms of control and agency over the avatar/player-character, which could be attributed to the lack 
of a mechanical system in non-cybermedia where the character had been discussed prior. However, 
academic discussion about game characters without the player’s agency to directly control them 
seems to be lacking in game studies. 
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Chapter Three 
On Method: Selection Criteria and 
Reader-Response Theory  
 
This chapter explains the methodological approach to dynamic game characters. It is devoted to the 
explanation and discussion of the use of reader-response theory as a central approach to studying 
game characters. The chapter is split into two main parts. The first part is devoted to the process of 
corpus selection. In this part, I discuss the challenges of conducting game analysis on dynamic game 
characters. More specifically, I discuss the challenge posed by the creation of a corpus consisting 
primarily of cybermedia artefacts whose processual nature changes the state of the medium. In this 
part, I therefore also discuss the problems in the conceptualisation of games in order to support the 
choices of games in the corpus. The chapter ends with an explanation of the role of games within a 
character ecology. 
The second part explains how to adapt reader-response theory for an analysis of the 
cybermedia in which dynamic game characters appear. I highlight the historical development of 
reader-response theory to provide the necessary context in order to show how the theory’s main 
characteristics—the structure of the work, and the reader interpreting the work and the text—
function particularly well to explain the construction of dynamic game characters within a character 
ecology. 
 
1. Approach: How to Reach an Analysis of Dynamic Game 
Characters? 
This section starts with a discussion of the challenges concerning the game analysis of dynamic game 
characters. The next section defines the corpus consisting primarily of games and related media, 
and clarifies the role of games within a character ecology. 
 
Game Analysis 
This section describes the challenges of performing game analysis, especially on game characters. I 
will outline my motivation behind the choices of the means by which I conduct the analysis. 
Early on the field of game studies, Espen Aarseth (2003, 2) already points out that the 
question of game analysis is not necessarily about how to do it, but why, since the motives of the 
research provides an answer as to how to conduct that research. He presents three main methods 
for researching games. First, one can analyse the design, rules, and mechanics of the game so far as 
they are available. Second, one can observe others playing and make conclusions based on their 
knowledge. And third, one can play the game themselves (2003, 3). His argument is that the latter 
one is best, because it allows researchers to put themselves in the role of the player and experience 
the “mental interpretation and exploration of the rules, which of course is invisible to the non-
informed non-player” (2003, 3). 
The necessity to play the game one analyses lies in the game’s dependence on the non-trivial 
effort (see Aarseth 1997) the player has to exert so that the game progresses. As Aarseth explains, 
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while literary or filmic works need an analytical approach, games, on top of that analytical approach, 
also require “analysis practiced as performance with direct feedback from the system” (2003, 5). He 
proposes a set of different strata of engagement to conduct game analysis: 
 
• Superficial play, the researcher only plays for a couple of minutes to get a feel of the game, 
but does not learn any structural features; 
• Light play, the researcher learns a bit to make meaningful progress, but stops once that 
progress occurs; 
• Partial completion, the researcher stops when a specific goal or series of goals has been 
reached; 
• Total completion, only possible in games with defined endings; 
• Repeated play (and expert play), which only happens after total completion unless the 
researcher is so completely used to the genre that learning more about the game has 
become unnecessary; 
• Expert play, where the player is typically also a winner of multi-player games; 
• Innovative play, where the researcher invents new strategies and does not play to win but 
to reach goals not generally acknowledged by other players. (2003, 6) 
 
These strata show the amount of engagement required when analysing games empirically. When 
the motives are clear, the researcher can create an empirical basis from which they can attempt to 
answer the research question. However, as Aarseth also warns, one “must be careful to choose 
games that not only will confirm our hypotheses, but also potentially refute them. Our choice should 
be well argued and thoroughly defensible” (2003, 6). 
There exist a few other works on approaches for game analysis in the field of game studies 
that describe how one reaches interpretation and attaches meaning to games. Like Aarseth’s 
description of game analysis, these approaches focus on hermeneutics and textual analysis. For 
example, Clara Fernández-Vara’s Introduction to Game Analysis (2015) presents strategies 
borrowed from textual analysis, but is written as a step-by-step guide primarily for audiences who 
are new to the field. Another example would be David Jara and Evan Torner (2018, 271) who suggest 
to ‘close-play’, a reader/player-based methodology centered around the subjective experience of 
gameplay, typical for the analysis of table top role-playing games. This type of methodology has 
been around in game studies for quite a while, and also been applied to digital games, from scholars 
such as Aarseth (1997), Torill Elvira Mortensen (2003), Astrid Ensslin (2014), and Kim Johansen Østby 
(2016), among others. Works on the study of game characters are primarily situated in the area of 
game design. Both Katherine Isbister (2006) and Robin J. S. Sloan (2015) offer guides that explain 
how to design a character’s appearance, how a character’s (visual) design affects certain types of 
players’ experiences, or the role the characters have to play in certain types of games. Petri 
Lankoski’s (2010) work describes characters as facilitators for gameplay-related emotions that focus 
on social conflict. He uses what he calls ‘gameplay design patterns’, the “semiformal interdependent 
descriptions of commonly reoccurring parts of a game that concern gameplay” (2010, 164). These 
patterns can be used as analytical tools to chart possible design spaces and expand them. However, 
as Lankoski points out, no specific method or choice of aesthetic is required to use these patterns, 
and so even when using these gameplay design patterns for game analysis, the researcher is still 
required to explain and specify their choice for using and describing certain patterns on a specific 
game character. 
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This means that when it comes to the analysis of game characters, it becomes imperative to 
borrow approaches from other disciplines and adapt them to fit the analysis of game characters, 
and specifically dynamic game characters. As I will explain, the approach I assume for my research 
is based on reader-response theory, a school of literary theory that focuses on the reader. Reader-
response fits the interpretative and meaning-making process assigned to game characters that this 
work intends to explain. However, my approach is not only reader-response theory. It goes beyond 
it, because this research’s main corpus is not simply literature but cybermedia with mechanical 
systems that require the player’s non-trivial effort to traverse (see Aarseth 1997; Aarseth and Calleja 
2015). Reader-response theory allows me to show the means by which games communicate 
dynamic game characters, and how the role of the player influences not only the player’s particular 
interpretation of the character but also how the player affects the game character’s development 
and identity on the structural level of the game. 
Before I delve into an explanation of reader-response theory and how I connect that to play 
research, I believe it is necessary that I first describe in more detail what I mean when I use the word 
‘game’, as it is a term that since the start of game studies as a field has led to many a dispute. After 
a brief overview about what games are, I will combine play research with reader-response theory 
to further construe the means by which I arrived at the definition and description of the dynamic 
game character. 
 
Corpus: Which Games to Select? 
To create a corpus, I had two choices. One choice would have been a close study of one or two 
games or game series. This would allow me to show the multiple possibilities and means by which 
dynamic game characters could potentially develop in intense detail in these one or two games. 
Østby’s (2016) work does just that. His close study of the Mass Effect series (2007–2012) allows him 
to explain the multiple ways the game series portrays heteronormative standards within seemingly 
homosexual relationships between characters. 
The other choice is to take a large corpus of a variety of games in different genres that 
present game characters, and more importantly, dynamic game characters. This approach allows 
me to demonstrate how a variety of games present different species of dynamic game character. 
I am by far not the first person who has attempted to describe a theory of a certain 
phenomenon that allows us to understand, evaluate, and analyse that phenomenon. A theory of 
characters presents similar challenges as theories of narrative. Characters, albeit not bound by 
stories, are definitely dominated by stories and, just like stories, they appear over many a different 
medium. Even within games, characters appear in different shapes and roles and so, as a result, one 
of the main challenges that one encounters when trying to create a theory about game character is 
the corpus. How does one reach a certain corpus? Which games does one study to come to a 
definition of game characters? 
Roland Barthes (1966) and Mieke Bal (1978; 1999) describe similar ways to delimit a corpus. 
Facing the problem of millions of narratives, Barthes (1966, 253–254) proposes a deductive method 
that starts with a theory, and then works down gradually from the proposed theory to different 
narrative species that conform to and depart from the model. This way, the researcher is able to 
perform an analysis that allows them to describe the differences and similarities within these 
different narrative species. Bal (1978, 12; 1999, 3) proposes a similar approach. Facing the 
impossibility of analysing millions of narratives, she considers the corpus an issue of relevance. To 
consider a specific work relevant, the researcher first needs to propose a theory so that that 
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formulation of characteristics allows one to delimit the corpus. Then they can start to describe each 
individual work and how it departs from and conforms to the proposed definition. The chosen works 
have to conform to the definition in a broad perspective, but should also allow the researcher to 
research the differences and similarities between each work. 
 
The Conceptualisation of Games: The Problem of Game Definitions 
Before I explain the approach of my game analysis in detail, it is necessary to clarify the selection 
process of the games that I analysed, because ‘games’ and ‘digital games’ are not clear distinct 
objects where it is specifically clear what is or is not a game. Many pragmatic decisions of corpus 
building stem from foundational ideas about the nature of games. I consider it therefore necessary 
to explain the foundational ideas about the nature of games on which this research has been built. 
The aim of this part of is not to describe what a game is, but rather to provide the reader of this 
work with “the ‘dictionary’ so that one understands what another means” (Bal 1999, 5). 
This dissertation is by no means a work about the definition of games. The ideal situation 
would be that I have a valid definition of the term, but I unfortunately do not. And neither do the 
scholars whose topic of research is the conceptualisation of games. Elliot M. Avedon & Brian Sutton-
Smith (1971), Bernard Suits (1978), Espen Aarseth (1997; 2014, 201), Jesper Juul (2005), Christian 
Elverdam & Espen Aarseth (2007); Aki Järvinen (2008), Jaakko Stenros (2017), Espen Aarseth & 
Pawel Grabarczyk (2018) are just a few of many works that have been discussing the definition of 
games until now. 
The discussion on games is usually considered to start with Johan Huizinga’s Homo Ludens: 
A Study of the Play-Element in Culture (1949), originally published in Dutch as Homo Ludens: Proeve 
Ener Bepaling van het Spelelement der Cultuur ([1938] 2008). The title originally means something 
akin: “A test of the definition of the element of ‘spel’ in culture”, which implies rather a study on 
the definition of the element than about the element itself. Furthermore, the English version 
translates Huizinga’s use of ‘spel’ as ‘play’, although the words do not have the same connotation. 
Huizinga writes in the Dutch version: 
  
Wij moeten uitgaan van het begrip spel, zooals het ons gemeenzaam is, d.w.z. zooals het 
wordt gedekt door de woorden, die er, met eenige variatie, in de meeste Europeesche talen 
aan volgt: spel is een vrijwillige handeling of bezigheid, die binnen zekere vastgestelden 
grenzen van tijd en plaats wordt verricht naar vrijwillig aanvaarden doch volstrekt bindenden 
regel, met haar doel in zich zelf, begeleid door een gevoel van spanning en vreugde, en door 
een besef van ‘anders zijn’ dan het ‘gewone leven’. Aldus bepaald schijnt het begrip geschikt, 
alles wat wij spel noemen, van dieren, kinderen en volwassen menschen te omvatten, 
behendigheids-, kracht-, vernuft-, en kansspelen, op- en uitvoeringen. Deze categorie spel 
scheen als een der meest fundamenteele geestelijke elementen van het leven te mogen 
worden aangemerkt ([1938] 2008, 56).  
 
The English translation of this paragraph states the following4: 
 
We can only start from the play-concept that is common to us, I.e. the one covered, with 
slight variations, by the words corresponding to the English word “play” in most modern 
 
4 Unfortunately, the translator of the English version remains anonymous. 
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European Languages. Such a concept, we felt, seemed to be tolerably well defined in the 
following terms: play is a voluntary activity or occupation executed within certain fixed limits 
of time and place, according to rules freely accepted but absolutely binding, having its aim 
in itself and accompanied by a feeling of tension, joy, and the consciousness that it is 
“different” from “ordinary life”. Thus defined, the concept seemed capable of embracing 
everything we call “play” in animals, children and grown-ups: games of strength and skill, 
inventing games, guessing games, games of chance, exhibitions and performances of all 
kinds. We ventured to call the category of play: one of the most fundamental in life. (1949, 
28) 
 
One of the main challenges to translation is that it is difficult to directly translate the meaning of a 
spoken and/or written statement, especially when the languages diverge to a great extent. Certain 
things that someone says in one language might not have an equivalent in another language, so as 
a result, the translator often ends up translating the attitude of a given statement in one language 
to a similar attitude in the other language instead of providing a one-to-one translation. For example, 
the Japanese term ‘yoroshiku onegaishimasu’ does not necessarily mean anything until it is spoken 
within a given context; it can mean ‘thank you’, or ‘please’, but can also be used as a way of saying 
‘sorry’ or formally saying ‘it is up to you’. However, for translations of academic works, translating 
the attitude of an academic statement that discusses the meaning of a given phenomenon or term 
is beyond tricky. It is non-trivial that the translator chooses the terms carefully, as the translation of 
a word also changes the meaning of that word. To use Ferdinand de Saussure’s sign model (1916), 
when one changes the signifier, the signified will also (slightly) change. 
The English version of Huizinga suffers from the problem that by changing the Dutch word 
spel to the English word ‘play’, Huizinga would appear to discuss a different phenomenon in the 
English version than in the Dutch version of his work. He states in the original version that the use 
of the concept of spel varies slightly per European language, however the English version concretely 
states that it covers words from most modern European languages that correspond to the English 
word ‘play’. The Dutch version does not make the claim that it only examines the Dutch 
phenomenon of spel. 
To a native speaker of the Dutch language like myself, the word spel remains ambiguous at 
best. Spel could mean games as an artefact, but Huizinga discusses spel primarily as a process or 
activity (‘handeling of bezigheid’). If I want to refer to spel as an artefact in the modern Dutch 
language, I would need more context. I could do this by adding a verb (‘spel spelen’) or use the 
diminutive version of the word (‘spelletje’). The former allows me to say that I am playing a game, 
and the latter can be used in contexts that suggest that the artefact is something less serious: “Het 
is maar een spelletje” (“it is only a game”). However, even when these derivative forms of the word 
spel are used, the distinction between spel as an artefact, an activity, or a process is still not entirely 
clear. A board game might be a spelletje as an artefact, but I could use the same word for the 
performance of someone dressing up and pretending to be Sinterklaas (Saint Nicholas), a historical 
figure and the patron saint for children who, every year in November and December, comes to visit 
Dutch children to give them sweets and toys. During the time of this ritualistic Sinterklaas festival, 
adults might perceive the performance of Sinterklaas as nothing more than a spel or a spelletje, 
which refers to the performance as an activity or process (although not a very serious one). But, for 
children—especially those who still believe this figure is real—this festival is more than just a 
spelletje. That said, the profoundly debated (and highly problematic) blackface performances of the 
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servants of Sinterklaas, the Zwarte Pieten (Black Petes) suggest that, even for adults, the Sinterklaas 
festival is a serious spel. As Huizinga already said, the opposite of ‘spel’ is not ‘earnest’ (seriousness) 
(1938, 33). Spel can be very serious. 
For spel, Huizinga also uses the variant of spelen, which indicates either a verb or a noun. As 
a verb, the term is an activity that can be used in similar means as the English verb ‘to play’. One 
can play a game (‘een spel/spelletje spelen’), or play an instrument (‘een instrument spelen’), or just 
play (‘spelen’), although the latter invites the question of what one plays. As a noun, spelen refers 
to an event of (competitive) activities and sports, such as the Olympische Spelen (the Olympic 
Games). It is important to point out that the plural of spel as an artefact would be ‘spellen’ and not 
‘spelen’. Spelen as a noun can include games as an artefact, but is not necessarily an artefact itself 
nor does it have to consist of games. The English version translates the activities that Huizinga in 
Dutch considered to be spelen as ‘games’: “behendigheids-, kracht-, vernuft-, en kansspelen, op- en 
uitvoeringen” become “games of strength and skill, inventing games, guessing games, games of 
chance, exhibitions and performances of all kinds” (1949, 28). The translation of ‘spelen’ as ‘games’ 
makes sense when one talks about the Olympic Games, but unfortunately the emphasis on the 
activity rather than the artefact in the Dutch version is lost in translation in the English revision of 
the work. 
In short, what Huizinga’s use of spel emphasizes, more so than the use of ‘play’ and ‘games’ 
in the English version, is the infinite and varied ways humankind engages with the spectrum of spel. 
The central problem in Huizinga’s discussion of spel for this dissertation, however, is that for the use 
of game characters, or perhaps spelpersonages in Dutch, Huizinga’s concept of spel is too broad as 
it covers anything that might possibly be playful. And if anything could possibly be a game character, 
then nothing is. 
That games are infinite and varied is precisely the point that other early works emphasise as 
well. Roger Caillois’ (1958) work, as a critical response to Huizinga, discusses Huizinga’s English 
definition of ‘play’ as something that is voluntary, separate from ordinary life, uncertain, 
unproductive, governed by rules, and a form of make-believe (1958, 9–10). It is important to note 
here too that Caillois’ work was originally in French, and his classification is a classification of the 
French word ‘jeu’. Caillois’ classification shows the categories of agôn, alea, mimicry, and ilinx 
spread between paida (free play) and ludus (structured play). It is an attempt to cover all the 
different characteristics of games, but just like Huizinga’s definition of spel, Caillois’ definition of jeu 
is too broad to use for an analysis of game characters. 
In English, the words ‘play’ and ‘games’ seem to have two distinct but related meanings. 
Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman (2004, 72) explain the complex relationship between these terms, 
stating that the relation can bear connotations of games as a subset of play, and can bear 
connotations where play is a component of games. In the former, they point out that games belong 
to the broader form of play, where games portray a form of organised play with formalised rules, 
whereas other forms of play can be looser and less formal. The latter describes games as containing 
play as one of the many elements of which games consist. 
 
Games as Cybermedia and Corpus Selection 
Although these researchers change or adjust the definition of a game, they share the disposition 
that the term ‘game’ has many different uses. My own use of the term ‘game’ is not one that 
attempts to contribute to this discussion, but one that demonstrates what kind of corpus I use to 
come to my theory about dynamic game characters. 
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First, I consider the games that I use for dynamic game characters as artefacts in accordance 
with Espen Aarseth and Gordon Calleja’s article: The Word Game: The Ontology of an Indefinable 
Object (2015). Aarseth and Calleja accept Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ([1953] 2009) idea that games 
cannot be formally defined and are instead a historically constructed notion (Aarseth and Calleja 
2015, 2). They propose instead an analytical framework that acknowledges the wide variety of 
cultural artefacts that are referred to as games. To solve the distinction between games as an ‘object’ 
and games as a ‘process’, they propose to look at games from a processual perspective. This refers 
to: 
 
The potential for change in every engagement with the game and favours a dynamic and 
recursive view of games. A processual perspective thus presents games as ever evolving and 
socially contingent in a manner consistent with other domains of social experience. The 
processual nature of games also presupposes a ludic perspective from the part of the player 
towards the game object. (2015) 
 
Aarseth and Calleja place games under a more general class of phenomena that they call 
‘cybermedia’. Building on Aarseth’s proposition for cybertexts (1997), each cybermedium, they 
argue, requires non-trivial effort from its user that puts into motion the mechanical system 
underneath the surface (Aarseth and Calleja 2015). Cybermedia, to which games belong, consist of 
four different elements. The first three elements are: a sign surface that follows Umberto Eco’s 
semiotic theory (1976), the mechanical system that structures the process so that the cybermedium 
switches from one state to another, and the material medium like the material incarnation of which 
the cybermedium consists. These three elements describe the cybermedium as an object, so that it 
can be studied in isolation from the user (Aarseth and Calleja 2015). The fourth element is the player, 
the human agent(s) that engages with the cybermedium object. What Aarseth and Calleja stress is 
that in order for the cybermedium to be considered a game, the player has to consider it to be one, 
which means that the set of practices that the player deploys is always inherently related to the 
“social and cultural contexts of the player” (2015). 
Following Aarseth and Calleja’s suggestion, I consider games belonging to the larger 
phenomenon of cybermedia, which consists of a sign surface, a mechanical system, a material 
medium, and which requires a player. For it to be a game, a player has to consider it one within their 
socio-cultural context. Yet, this broad definition of games still requires another set of criteria for 
corpus selection. 
Second, the games I speak about communicate characters. Inside contemporary transmedia 
practices they present characters in similar and distinct ways to novels, television series, films, or 
theatre plays. The characters presented within these objects form a character ecology, an 
environment in which characters are always related to each other and to different versions of each 
other, where with every new addition of a character the composition of those characters within that 
ecology shifts. 
Third, the games are digital, or digital games. Players play them on consoles such as the 
PlayStation 4 or the Nintendo Switch, but also on the computer via, for example, the distribution 
service Steam. I exclude games such as board games or spel-activities like hide-and-seek. They may 
have a mechanical system, they may be capable of communicating characters in a specific way, but 
board games and spel-activities have less of a contribution in the development of characters within 
the discourse of contemporary media practices that tends to expand the characters’ appearances 
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and development over multiple media and stories. 
Nevertheless, when I speak of digital ‘games’, what counts as a digital game to me, might be 
considered an ‘interactive movie’ to others. Erica (Flavourworks 2019) for example could be 
considered an ‘interactive movie’. At the same time, it is only playable on the PlayStation 4. This 
game blurs the line between games and film since it belongs to the broader class of cybermedia. I 
do not see this as an issue, rather it shows that ‘dynamic game characters’ are not a type of character 
distinct to games, but appear and influence users in other media as well, and are therefore relevant 
to speak about. I will discuss the appearance of dynamic game characters in other media in more 
detail in chapter 6. 
Fourth, since I speak of characters within a discourse of contemporary transmedia practices, 
let me provide the time period of the body of works that I have chosen: 2000–2019. This time period 
corresponds to the beginnings of the discussions around the Western-centric contemporary 
transmedia practices, which started around Lisbeth Klastrup and Susana Tosca’s (2004) article on 
transmedial worlds, Jay Lemke’s (2004) critical analysis of media franchises, and Henry Jenkins’ 
introduction of transmedia storytelling (2006). The current meaning of the Japanese media mix has 
been around since the 1980s (see Steinberg 2012, 1), but the concept gained its current popularity 
in Japanese academia with Eiji Ôtsuka’s narrative consumption (2010) and Gô Itô’s ground-breaking 
work Tezuka is Dead (2005). Albeit not necessarily using that term, the concept’s popularity has 
been on the rise in the Euro-American hemisphere since the translation of Hiroki Azuma’s Otaku: 
Japan’s Database Animals (Azuma [2001] 2009), with Marc Steinberg’s Anime’s Media Mix (2012) 
giving it a permanent spot on the map. The phenomenon of the media mix however has been 
discussed years prior by Susan J. Napier in Anime from Akira to Princess Mononoke (2001), and by 
Anne Allison in her book Millennial Monsters (2006). Using games that were created and played 
around this time period makes sense because their instantiation aligns with the rise of discussions 
surrounding contemporary transmedia practices to which digital games belong. 
And fifth, an important condition for my corpus of digital games was variation. I attempted 
to have as diverse a corpus as possible to obtain an idea about the different means by which games 
communicate characters. The most important aspect of a dynamic game character is the dynamicity 
in its development over the course of playing the game. This means that the games I analyse in order 
to discuss this type of character are games that focus on the development of characters. In certain 
kinds of game genres, game characters and especially dynamic game characters dominate the genre 
more so than in other game genres. In role-playing games, visual novels, dating simulators, 
simulation games like The Sims (Maxis 2000) or otome and bishoujo games, characters have a much 
more prominent presence as these games tend to emphasise character development, which could 
be via stories or some kinds of mechanics like simulating bonding, or taking care of characters’ needs 
to name just two. These kinds of games are also primarily designed to be single-player games 
(although single-player games can still be enjoyed by multiple persons at the same time). That does 
not mean that games from (multi-player) genres such as race- or fighting games do not contain 
characters, but their focus is—as the names of the genres suggest—more on racing or fighting 
competitions between players, or between the player and the computer. As a result, my corpus 
consists much more of games like visual novels or role-playing games than racing or fighting games. 
I make, however, no statements about the role of genres in presenting characters. The focus 
of my dissertation is on game characters, not on game genres. Moreover, even within game genres 
that are very similar, constructing characters can differ to a great extent. José P. Zagal and Sebastian 
Deterding describe the role-playing game (RPG) as a “word used by multiple social groups to refer 
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to multiple forms and styles of play activities and objects revolving around the rule-structured 
creation and enactment of characters in a fictional world” (2018, 46). They distinguish between four 
different forms of role-playing games, to specify the different characteristics a role-playing game 
can have: the tabletop role-playing game (TRPG), computer role-playing game (CRPG), (massively) 
multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG), and the live-action role-playing game (LARP) they 
act and respond to situations within the game world. In LARPs, players enact their characters, using 
their own bodies, with costumes within a ‘real-world’ physical setting with props to act with (34). In 
MMORPGs, ‘characters’ primarily serve as a persona or an extension of the player to engage with 
other players, which I have discussed in the previous chapter. Unlike the other forms, CRPGS are 
usually offered to solitary players, as ‘single-player games’. They provide characters whose actions 
are limited to options made available by the game; their abilities and the outcomes of their actions 
tend to be determined by quantified rule systems, but player-characters also tend to improve over 
the course of the game (2018, 39). No character is constructed by exactly the same means in each 
RPG form. There is definitely some overlap, as well as some distinctions, but in the end there is no 
common core to constitute a character between these four forms. 
The corpus does not exclusively consist of cybermedia. Games make up the mass of the 
corpus, but since this dissertation discusses game characters within contemporary transmedia 
practices, other non-cybermedia are also part of the overall corpus. I explain the use of each non-
cybermedium in detail in the chapters where I discuss these media. 
I selected these non-cybermedia to discover how a medium that does not have a mechanical 
system—which allows the processual change on which a dynamic game character relies—would 
resolve the challenge of presenting a character that is a dynamic game character in the game(s) in 
which it appears. To give an example, my choice to discuss the Mass Effect Omnibus Volume 1 (2016) 
and Mass Effect Omnibus Volume 2 (2017) comics is to put under scrutiny the strategies of 
transmedial appearances of the dynamic game characters. There is one exception to the rule: in the 
next chapter, I discuss Sherlock Holmes, the famous detective whose original manifestation 
manifested in Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s novels (1887–1915). I chose this character precisely because 
the character is an exception to the rule of corpus selection within this dissertation, and also 
because Sherlock Holmes is a character created at the start of capitalistic consumer culture that 
eventually gave birth to contemporary transmedia practices as we know it now. He is also a 
character that has evolved over the past 100 years through multiple identities, including identities 
appearing in digital games such as the dating game Guard me, Sherlock! (NTT Solmare Corporation 
2016) and the mystery game Sherlock Holmes: The Devil’s Daughter (Frogwares 2016). That is to say 
that he is a character with a large variety of appearances over multiple media and media franchises 
in a relatively short amount of time, and for whom it is clear in which work he first appeared. 
It can therefore be said that I study characters in game works. When these works belong to 
the more general class of cybermedia I will refer to them as ‘games’. When they do not belong to 
the general class of cybermedia, I will specify the medium (comics, film, novels etc.). 
 
Which Game Version? 
The final note that I will make about the corpus selection is that in our current media landscape it 
has become increasingly difficult to make a clear separation between ‘complete’ and ‘incomplete’ 
games. Digital games are no longer only sold in a physical format of a package that buyers can hold 
in their hands, or as a CD-ROM to put in a computer. Just a connection to the Internet can be more 
than enough to buy a digital game. Virtual online stores (e-stores) such as the Nintendo eShop, 
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Sony’s PlayStation Network store (the PSN store), Steam, or smartphone stores such as Apple’s App 
Store or Google’s Play Store, allow users to download games to a platform of their choice. The games 
do not necessarily have to be the ‘complete’ game. Downloadable content (DLC), ‘add-ons’, 
expansion packs, and more are common phenomena that players can buy to expand their 
experience in these games. 
An additional challenge is that games, especially via e-stores, are often released in different 
editions where one version might contain more content than another version. For example, the 
European PSN store provides players the choice between three versions of Shadow of the Tomb 
Raider (Eidos Montréal 2018): Shadow of the Tomb Raider, Shadow of the Tomb Raider – Digital 
Deluxe Edition, and Shadow of the Tomb Raider – Croft Edition. The difference? The first is the 
original game, playable and (seemingly) finished for players to experience as a ‘complete game’. The 
second edition includes the ‘original game’, an ‘extra weapon/outfit’, the original game soundtrack, 
and an extra ‘skills booster pack’. And the third edition contains the ‘original game’, a ‘Season Pass’ 
(a ticket for DLC that will be released in the near future), three extra weapons and outfits, the 
original game soundtrack, and an extra skills booster pack. 
No Man’s Sky (Hello Games 2016) is a game that the developers have continuously been 
patching and upgrading since its release in August 2016, because players found that it did not live 
up to the expectations. Two years later, the developers released their latest update called No Man’s 
Sky NEXT, which introduces a “full multiplayer experience, near-unlimited base building, command 
of freighter armadas, a graphical overhaul and more” (Hello Games 2018). It completely changed 
the original game and turned it into another game. This makes it difficult to address games as 
finished, singular products that are continuously the same. Some players might opt to download 
some extra content, while others will not. And if games can change completely after their initial 
release, this raises the question of how we should address the characters within those games. 
Should one only discuss the game character’s initial release and not discuss DLC that could possibly 
change the character, or should all the DLC of the game in particular be discussed? The character 
Javik in Mass Effect 3 (2012) only appears in the game if the player buys and downloads the Mass 
Effect 3: From Ashes DLC pack. Javik’s entire existence depends on the player’s choice to add this 
DLC pack to their game. It also grants the player more knowledge about several diegetic events set 
prior to the events of the game. Not only does this DLC pack shape the player’s experience of the 
game world, Javik’s dependence on the DLC also challenges whether he should be considered to be 
officially part of ME3, as part of its canon. 
I have no perfect answer to that question, but I do have a practical one in relation to my own 
corpus selection. And that is that I specify when I discuss DLC. The availability of DLC can make an 
impact on the identity of the character to one person in comparison to another person. The question 
is therefore not so much whether or not I should discuss DLC, but rather, it shows that characters—
even within a single work—belong to an ever-changing landscape, a character ecology. 
 
Games in a Character Ecology 
In Image Music Text (1977), Barthes describes how a photographic image becomes a text—that is, 
an object that can deciphered and interpreted. I find it relevant to use Barthes’ distinction between 
the text and the work. He considers the work as something that can be held in the hand, something 
that can be seen in bookshops, catalogues, or exam syllabuses (1977, 157). The text on the other 
hand is not a single product, but an ongoing process in language: 
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[The text] only exists in the movement of a discourse […]; the Text is not the decomposition 
of the work, it is the work that is the imaginary Tail of the Text; or again; the Text is 
experienced only in an activity of production. It follows that the Text cannot stop (for 
example on a library shelf); its consecutive movement is that of cutting across (in particular, 
it can cut across the work, several works) (157). 
 
Torill Elvira Mortensen explains Barthes’ distinction between the work and the text in the following 
way: 
 
The work in Barthes’ definition is the unrealised text, the writing before the reader has 
accessed it and begun the act of reading: the book on the shelf, the piece of music on the 
sheet, the game in the CDrom. The text is the realised work. When the reader reads the book 
he creates the text. When the music is heard or played, it is created through the performance 
and by the listener. This opens for an understanding of the text as a much broader concept 
than the written word. The concept links the text to the user, the reader, or the performer. 
Unused and unperformed, the work is not a text at all; it simply has the potential for 
becoming a text. This approach empowers the user, the reader, to a thought-provoking 
extent. (2003, 38) 
 
The text revolves around the act of reading. The work on its own has not been accessed yet, and 
can be shelved away until someone decides to grab it and read it. That is when the text comes into 
existence. The text can cut across several works. It is not limited to a single work, but is experienced 
as a constant flow of reading, that is, the activity of production. 
However, the work does not go away. The work is non-trivial in producing the text, and its 
affordances and limitations affect how the reader will create the text. Without a work, the reader 
cannot produce the text. Although the text is important in the understanding of the overall ongoing 
process, it is also vital to understand what and how a work contributes to the activity of production 
of the text. 
In this dissertation, I find it important to emphasise the text in which characters move, and 
simultaneously acknowledges the contribution of the work that allows for the activity of production 
of the text. I therefore approach the text and the work in the following way: Barthes’ text is the 
character ecology I speak about, to which games as works contribute. In contemporary transmedia 
practices where characters hop from one work to the next, it is necessary to study the sphere in 
which they appear. If we were to approach characters solely within a single medium, we miss a vital 
perception to our understanding of characters in contemporary culture, namely that readers make 
sense of them in the multiplicity of their existence. Studying what games contribute to this character 
ecology stresses that games do not operate in a vacuum, but that they communicate in a network 
consisting of a variety of media that users of those media constantly interpret. Characters are 
independent from any given medium, but are simultaneously dependent on media to be invoked at 
all. This means that we should not discard medium specificity in its totality. As Marc Steinberg 
argues: “each manifestation of the character foregrounds the distinct properties of the medium in 
question […], the character in its media crossing generates a degree of convergence between media 
forms around its image, but it also abstracts some of the specificity each medium and transposes 
this specificity to other material incarnations” (2012, 85). Even if characters transfer from one 
medium to the next, the properties used to invoke the character in a game can vary from those in, 
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for example, a novel or a film. At the same time, some properties of the media are similar so that 
those media generate a degree of convergence around the character. 
When one studies a work as part of a text, the object is part of an activity of production that 
adds and shifts the multiple meanings this text can bear constantly. The character ecology in our 
contemporary transmedia practices is subject to change with every single contribution in the 
possible shape of a (re-)new(ed) novel, a film adaptation, or a new game instalment in a game series. 
In order to see the contribution of games to this ecology, the analysis is situated within the practice 
of interpretation. Rather than a method that suggests that there is a rigid, constant, single meaning 
attached to this character ecology, my approach assumes a position that players gain knowledge via 
their interpretation of game characters within this character ecology. This requires the position that 
games communicate characters from which players can derive a variety of meanings and 
interpretation; that games have a specific structure that manifests characters which the player 
interprets in specific ways. Reader-response theory is therefore particularly useful, as it allows me 
to address the contribution of games to the ever-changing character ecology. That is, it allows me 
to discuss characters within the structure of the cybermedia, and discuss how players derive 
meaning from these structures and add these meanings to the overall character ecology. 
 
2. Adapting Reader-Response Theory to Game Analysis 
This final section discusses how I adapt reader-response theory for an analysis of cybermedia. 
 
A Brief Historical Overview 
Before I propose how reader-response theory can be adapted as an approach to cybermedia, it is 
important to highlight the historical development of reader-response theory, since that provides 
the necessary context surrounding how the main characteristics from reader-response theory 
function particularly well in the construction of dynamic game characters. 
Reader-response theory is closely associated with structuralism. Structuralism, or 
structuralist narrative theory, downplays the work as a product and favours the process of meaning-
making, as it focuses on reading and untangling the work in the larger context of the text (see Freed-
Thall 2018, 63). Major thinkers who contributed to structuralism are, for example, Lévi-Strauss, 
Barthes, and Gérard Genette. With its roots in de Saussure’s discourse about structuralist linguistics 
in Cours de linguistique générale (1916)—which I will discuss in the chapter called Immaterial 
Character—structuralism pays attention to the semiotic gaps and ambiguities within a work (Freed-
Thall 2018, 61). This way, it invalidated traditional ideas about canonisation, the author’s authority, 
and masterpieces (2018, 61). 
Although structuralism declined in the 1960s, it paved the way for reader-response theory 
in its foundation that there exist various ways in which readers derive meaning from a text (see 
Davis and Womack 2002, 58). Reader-response theory gained prominence in the 1960s and 1970s 
with authors such as Wayne C. Booth, Roland Barthes, Umberto Eco, and Wolfgang Iser. Some of 
these writers were also influential in structuralism. The main difference between structuralism and 
reader-response theory primarily lies in the emphasis of both approaches: structuralism describes 
how literature functions as a series of signs (Davis and Womack 2002, 58), and roots interpretation 
and meaning-making within the structures of the text. Structuralists “listen to the text’s interplay of 
voices; to linger in the interstices between narrative levels; to explore the experimental realms of 
tone, mood, and atmosphere; and to examine how meaning is produced by the friction among these 
and other elements” (Freed-Thall 2018, 63). 
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Reader-response theory, on the other hand, considers the text inherently meaningless 
without a reader to create meaning from the text. It takes the structure of works into consideration, 
but emphasises the reader’s role in constructing meaning from the text. In this sense, it provides a 
model that analyses the reading process as well as the mechanisms that works and texts share in 
the production of meaning (Davis and Womack 2002, 51). According to Todd F. Davis and Kenneth 
Womack, the three principal questions reader-response theory explore are: “do our various 
responses to literary works produce the same (or similar) readings?; can literary texts genuinely 
enjoy as many meanings as readers are able to create?; are some readings essentially more valid 
and justifiable than others?” (2002, 51). 
One work in particular that preceded modern reader-response theory is Literature as 
Exploration ([1938] 1995) by Louise M. Rosenblatt. According to Booth, who wrote the foreword to 
the 1995 edition of Rosenblatt’s book, Rosenblatt was hardly acknowledged as a predecessor of 
reader-response theory due to her resistance considering every reading of a text as good as others 
(Booth, [1938] 1995, x). According to Rosenblatt herself, there exists no such thing as a generic 
reader nor a generic literary work; rather only an unlimited amount of potential works. A work such 
as a novel or play means nothing until the reader reads it and transforms the work into a set of 
meaningful symbols ([1938] 1995, 24). Her resistance against every reading being as good as any 
other reading derives from her argument that in order to come to a sound interpretation of the 
literature, readers must critically assess themselves via the text in order to understand how they 
came to a certain interpretation. She does not asks for a single correct interpretation, since that 
would require the author’s intention, but rather, as readers draw on their past experiences to 
interpret a text, she demands active awareness from the readers to come to an critical—and 
therefore correct—interpretation of the text ([1938] 1995, 24). 
Reader-response theory identifies the reader as a significant agent to derive meaning from 
works and text. The model of the reader derives from pre-reader-response theory in the form of 
Booth (1961), who also wrote the introduction to the 1995 version of Rosenblatt’s book. In order to 
understand the reading process, Booth (1961) formulated the concept of the implied reader and 
the implied author. The implied author is the image the actual author constructs of themselves and 
is responsible for dictating the meaning of the work to a model of a reader they constructed as well, 
the implied reader. “The author creates, in short, an image of himself and another image of his 
reader; he makes his reader, as he makes his second self, and the most successful reading is one in 
which the created selves, author and reader, can find complete agreement” (1961, 138). A 
successful and enjoyable reading occurs when the implied reader’s belief system coincides with the 
implied author’s beliefs. 
Iser (1978) deepened Booth’s concept of the implied reader in his phenomenological 
approach to the reading process. His implied reader (in German: “impliziter Leser”), is not exactly 
the same as Booth’s implied reader, and does not exist as an empirical reader. Instead, Iser considers 
it a structure in the text (Iser 1978, 60; Schmid 2013). The implied reader is a model that “embodies 
all those predispositions necessary for a literary work to exercise its effect—predispositions laid 
down, not by an empirical outside reality, but by the text itself” (Iser 1978, 34). The structure of the 
work itself anticipates a specific reader, although never defines it (1978, 34). 
As a response to Iser, Eco (1979) constructed the concept of the model reader, which 
resembles Iser’s implied reader. To Eco, a text (a message consisting of different codes) has two 
components: the author who generates the text, and the model reader who decodes the text that 
the author theoretically foresees (Eco 1979, 7–8; Prince 2011). However, Eco emphasizes that, 
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despite an author’s intentions, no text can be read independently from the reader’s experiences of 
other texts (1979, 21). This experience is what Eco considers intertextual knowledge, which refers 
to the process by which readers overcode the text and rely on their previous experiences of other 
texts that gives them a certain intertextual frame to interpret the text (1979, 20–21). Eco uses the 
idea of frames as the “(cognitive) knowledge representations about the ‘world’ which enable us to 
perform such basic cognitive acts as perception, language comprehension and actions” (1979, 20–
21). The author of the work that the reader reads plays a minimal role within this process; they do 
not determine the interpretation of the work to which the reader arrives. 
Preceded by structuralism and New Criticism, the author loses their control over the 
meaning-making process of reading in reader-response theory. In 1967, Barthes announces the 
death of the author, thereby shifting the emphasis from the author of a work to the reader of the 
work (1967). Ten years later, in Image Sound Text (1977), he argues that there is no single ultimate 
meaning in a text, because the text is made up from a tissue of citations resulting from a thousand 
of years of culture (1977, 3). The text—or character ecology as I call it in this dissertation—does not 
consist exclusively of a single author, the works belonging to this text derive from multiple cultures 
and continuously enter “into dialogue with each other, into parody, into contestation” (Barthes 
1967, 6). According to Barthes, the place where the multiplicity of these works are gathered and 
made sense of is therefore not in the author, but in the reader: 
 
The reader is the very space in which are inscribed, without being lost, all the citations a 
writing consists of; the unity of a text is not in its origin, it is in its destination; but this 
destination can no longer be personal: the reader is a man without history, without 
biography, without psychology; he is only that someone who holds gathered into a single 
field all the paths of which the text is constituted. (1977, 6) 
 
Like Iser’s implied reader, and Eco’s model reader, Barthes’ reader is not an empirical reader, but a 
model in which all the works of a text are gathered independently from any specific cultural, socio-
economic environment that comes with empirical readers. The readers proposed by Iser, Eco, and 
Barthes contradict Rosenblatt’s empirical reader. Rosenblatt does not consider her concept of the 
(student) reader without any cultural background. Rather, she is in favour of having any reader use 
their own previous experiences, shaped by their cultural and socio-economic background, to derive 
meaning from a work. It is on this point where she—unlike Iser, Eco, and Barthes— argues against 
the relevance of any reading of a work as being as relevant as any other work. The ignorance of 
one’s background not only negates any critical opinion, but also ignores the context of connotations 
and relations that someone might only understand when they come from a specific cultural 
environment (1938, 106–108). This does not mean that there exists only one ‘correct’ interpretation, 
but rather she urges readers to heed the variety of possible contexts in which a work can exist (1938, 
106–108). 
  Although reader-response theory emphasizes the role of the reader and does not 
favour one reading over the other, it is important not to forget that any model reader or any work 
is rooted within a set of socio-historical conventions whose patterns have developed over long 
periods of time within a given culture, of which the researcher is also part. That is to say that the 
model reader is not simply a blank slate without any preconceived bias who reads and interprets a 
work in a neutral way, nor is a work on its own neutral, because it is rooted within a specific culture. 
A researcher should therefore be aware that any interpretation is not an unbiased interpretation, 
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but that their model reader and the analysed works are inclined to be read in a certain way. 
Early on, Rosenblatt ([1938] 1995) already argued that readers have to critically assess 
themselves via the text in order to understand how they came to a certain interpretation. A similar 
approach to the awareness of how works shape the interpretation of their readers is given by 
cultural theorist Stuart Hall (1973). Although Hall is not directly a reader-response theorist himself, 
his work about the encoding/decoding of messages is relevant to reader-response theory, because 
it points out that not every work is open to simply any kind of reading. Similar to the previous reader-
response theorists, Hall’s account rejects the simple passage of the message of an author to a 
receiver. According to Hall, every message—or work—yields a certain code that is encoded when it 
is placed in a certain shape to be communicated. In order to be understood by a receiver, it needs 
to be decoded. As Hall points out, both moments—encoding and decoding—are determinate 
moments that affect the ‘message’. The encoded moment is the moment a message enters a 
communication system, i.e., when it becomes a work. The message is then shaped according to the 
particularities of the medium (1973, 92). The other determinate moment is when the receiver 
decodes it according to determined social practices (1973, 93). That is, the conventions on which 
the coding relies which shape a certain discourse and ideology in which readers interpret the work 
(1973, 96). 
Hall distinguishes between three different kinds of readings. The first is the dominant 
meaning in which readers read according to “a pattern of ‘preferred readings’; and these both have 
the institutional/political/ideological order imprinted in them and have themselves become 
institutionalized” (1973, 98). The second is the negotiated position, a position, against the dominant 
mode of reading, that adapts the hegemonic code of the dominant reading, but with certain 
exceptions (1973, 102). And the third reading is the oppositional code in which readers dismantle 
the preferred reading and construct it within an “alternative framework of reference” (1973, 103). 
In summary, reader-response theory presents the model reader as a tool that provides the 
possibility to describe how the reader plays a role in the meaning-making process of a work. 
However, as academics or interpreters, it is important to be critically aware of a model reader that 
theoretically gives any interpretation of a work as one needs it. The cultural and socio-economic 
situation determines not only a reader’s interpretation, but also shapes the conventions on which 
the reader determines their interpretation. No reader, and no interpretation, is without these 
factors, or can even exist without these factors. 
 
Reader-Response Theory for Cybermedia 
The remaining part of this chapter discusses how reader-response theory can be applied to 
cybermedia, and games in particular. Reader-response theory emphasises the role of the reader in 
the reading-process. As I have discussed, the processual nature of games requires the player to 
initiate the changes between states within the game (see Aarseth and Calleja 2015). Although 
Aarseth and Calleja argue that they do not look at empirical players, the model reader from reader-
response theory has been applied to digital games before. Aarseth (1997, 110) shows that Iser’s idea 
of leerstellen -gaps which the reader fill in themselves, has been used by scholars in the 1980s and 
early 1990s to argue that adventure games have a second type of gap: the narrative vacancy that 
must be filled in by the reader (see Niesz and Holland 1984; Buckles 1985; 1987; Randall 1988; 
Ziegfeld 1989; Lanestedt 1989; Sloane 1991). He points out however that the narrative vacancy is 
not a gap that the reader fills in with their imagination, “rather”, he explains, “they are used as a 
filter, in which only the “correct” response lets the user proceed through the text. To use another 
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metaphor, they are keyholes, fitted by the text for very specific keys” (1997, 111). That is, the player 
has to find the solution to a puzzle rather than imagining the narrative vacancy.  
Aarseth proposes several alternative concepts to the idea of narrative vacancy. He 
introduces for example the idea of the intriguee who “is a parallel to the narratee, to the implied 
reader of the narratologists, as well as to the main character” (1997, 113) to whom the undecided 
outcome of the secret plot of the adventure game is targeted. In a later work (2007), Aarseth uses 
Iser’s (1978) concept of the implied reader to describe the implied player, the kind of player “as a 
role made for the player by the game, a set of expectations that the player must fulfil for the game 
to ‘exercise its effect’” (2007). He also links the model of the implied player to Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s ([1960] 1989) notion of the unfree player subject, adding to the model that the implied 
player is a boundary imposed on the player-subject (the empirical player) as a limitation to the 
player’s freedom and choice within the game.  
Another adaptation of reader-response theory to digital games is Mortensen’s (2003) 
concept of the player-reader. She points out that the composite nature and flexibilities of games 
makes it difficult to study games just by observing them -which was simultaneously pointed out by 
Aarseth’s (2003) approach to game analysis. Mortensen’s model of the player is based on Barthes’ 
reader model, but is more active than his reader and has more control over the text. She suggests 
that the player-reader is aware about their power to shape the text of the game, that they can 
influence it and the thereby the options of other players (she speaks about MMORPGs), but does so 
without becoming an author (2003, 71). Mortensen posits the player-reader as a model that does 
not just consume, but that shares an authorial position with the producers and other players of the 
game, because of their partial control over the text (2003, 89). The player-reader not only arrives at 
a particular interpretation through their cultural and socio-economic status, but also takes an active 
part in constructing the structure of the game that they play, which shapes the meaning-making 
process. 
The player-reader's position in relation to the text is a position with influence. Depending on 
what kind of game it is, the player can choose, with the choices ranging from the ability to choose 
the sequence of events, to the wide range of choices available in a Multi-User Dungeon (MUD). This 
freedom of choice appears to be an astounding freedom from the popular media's space of 
entertainment formulas, where the consumer's only space for feedback is a greatly delayed yes or 
no via consuming or not consuming. Computer games do not presuppose a consuming user, and not 
even an actively understanding reader, but a manipulating reader who is a part of the player (2003, 
92). 
Mortensen seems to come from the point of view that players read a text that they write, 
and argues that players do not merely absorb what the game gives them, but that they play an active 
part in the construction of the game and create their own unique text in the process. I should 
mention that Mortensen’s research is specifically focused on the MUD, a multi-user role-playing 
computer game genre of the 1990s, while the games that I discuss were released between 2000 and 
2019. While I agree that, in some games, the player definitely takes an active part in participating 
and shaping their own text, this does not exclude that some games may presuppose a more or less 
consuming user. That would, however, mean discussing the way games allow players to handle 
them. A game in which the player, for most of the time, has to push a single button—as is often the 
case with visual novel games like Danganronpa: Trigger Happy Havoc (Spike 2010)—is perhaps more 
structured for a consuming user than games in which the player has to use skill in pressing 
combinations of buttons to get through the game, such as Nier: Automata (PlatinumGames 2016). 
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Yet, this difference in the activity of consuming games does not determine how the player shapes 
their own interpretation of the text within those games. 
Before Mortensen, Janet Murray (1997) also discussed the authorial position of the player 
in digital environments like those of cybermedia. She explains that we should make a distinction 
between playing a creative role within the authored environment and having authorship over that 
environment. She argues that in digital environments the interactor (or player of the game) “can 
only act within the possibilities that have been established by the writing and programming” (1997, 
152). For Murray, the player does not share an authorial position with the authors due to the 
player’s influence over the text, but rather has creative control within the affordances and 
constraints that have been placed there by the authors over the work. This kind of derivative 
authorship is what Murray considers to be agency (1997, 153). 
A recent study using reader-response theorist Iser’s work for game analysis has been 
conducted by Gerald Farca (2018), who utilises Iser’s implied reader and adjusts Aarseth’s implied 
player (which was based on Iser) as a framework to understand empirical players. Farca proposes 
the implied player as an affordance and structure of the game that allows us to outline an empirical 
player’s participation in the game (2018, 194). He explains the use of the implied player as follows: 
 
The implied player offers an intersubjective and (potentially) multi-layered framework of 
play that enables the empirical player to subversively engage in its structure and in a fruitful 
dialectic- delighting in the elegance of the form, but, at the same time, negotiating its 
contents and exposing it to meticulous scrutiny through play. It can thus be seen as the 
affordance and appeal structure of the game that offers the player various roles to perform 
and functions as a road map to catharsis and the aesthetic effect (harbouring all necessary 
predispositions) (2018, 209) 
 
Farca states that “the empirical player assumes a particular role that is both informed by who she is 
yet, at the same time, is guided by the structural finesse of the implied player and its system of 
perspectives” (2018, 213). In an attempt to fuse the implied player with the empirical player, Farca 
creates another player-type, one that according to him is a type of player who is neither an “ideal 
nor a model player” but a “real-world player who engages in a creative dialectic with the 
intersubjective structure of the implied player” (2018, 198). He calls this type of player the 
‘emancipated player’ (198). However, despite these attempts at a fusion between these two kinds 
of players, Farca unfortunately provides no data on actual empirical players. In one of his five 
hypotheses that he ascribes to the emancipated player, he claims that the emancipated player 
slumbers in every empirical player (198), yet provides no proof or support to back up this claim. This 
means that his claims on the emancipated player do not leave the realm of the ideal player, and are 
therefore unfounded. 
The most important factor that should be taken into consideration for the analysis of 
dynamic game characters is that they are dynamic. The different outcomes of their development 
structure means that just playing a single game once does not show the player all the possibilities 
of how the dynamic game character could potentially develop. Astrid Ensslin describes the result of 
replaying a game in the following way: “Different playings of a game, conversely, tend to result in 
entirely different games, with outcomes as varied as winning or losing, gaining and/or losing lives, 
credits, and other countable units, radically different navigation options, and as a result, a large 
diversity of the gameworld per se” (2014, 28). A single game with a dynamic game character is not 
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just simply a single game in the same sense as that Jane Austen’s novel Pride and Prejudice (1813) 
is a single novel in which Elizabeth Bennet will marry Fitzwilliam Darcy regardless of how many times 
the reader reads it. Quite the opposite: the mechanical system in which a dynamic game character 
is integrated as well as the need for the player to engage with that system so that the character’s 
identity develops, adds the challenge that no matter how much a player plays a game, they might 
not ever discover all the possible outcomes and nuances of the dynamic game character’s potential 
developments. 
This control over the text is, for example, explained via Aarseth’s description of scriptons 
and textons. The former refer to strings of signs “as they appear to readers” and strings of signs “as 
they exist in the text” (1997, 62). Aarseth points out that in a static text the scriptons are constant, 
but in a dynamic one the scriptons change while the number of textons remain the same (1997, 62). 
Due to the game’s traversal nature, “the mechanism by which scriptons are revealed or generated 
from textons and presented to the user of the text” (1997, 62), the player is capable of changing the 
text as they manipulate how the scriptons of the text are revealed to them. Meanwhile the structure 
of the work, the textons themselves, do not change. This mechanical system is what should be taken 
into account in reader-response theory that engages with cybermedia: the layer where the player-
reader manipulates the scriptons of the work is where they construct the identity of the dynamic 
game character. 
In order to research dynamic game characters from the perspective of reader-response 
theory, there are two approaches I can take. Either multiple players play the same games over and 
over and I analyse their process in creating the identity of a particular dynamic game character. Or, 
I play multiple games myself and critically assess my own choices while shaping the identity of the 
character. Since my approach is based on Barthes’ (1966) and Bal’s (1978; 1999) approach to the 
creation of a theory about narrative, I choose to do the latter. I want to establish a theory based on 
a variety of structures and strategies through which games communicate and constitute dynamic 
game characters within a broader character ecology, instead of limiting myself to how one or two 
games communicate dynamic game characters. The former does not provide a general model of a 
dynamic game character flexible enough to suit the variety in which dynamic game characters 
appear, but an applied model that covers only those two works. My approach is not without limits, 
of course, but its strength is that it covers a variety of means used to communicate characters, which 
defines the dynamic game character based on those empirical examples, and can describe the 
differences and varieties of the dynamic game character. 
Using reader-response theory while not discussing the empirical players in digital games 
might appear obstinate, since the mechanical component of a cybermedium requires a player to 
stimulate the processual nature within a digital game. Kristine Jørgensen (2012) for example argues 
that the mechanical system specifically requires empirical players to understand how games react 
differently to different playstyles. She is critical of the use of Iser’s (1978) implied reader as a model 
because that model does not take into consideration the different strategies and interactions 
empirical players use to engage with the game system (Jørgensen 2012, 379). 
My work is, however, not about empirical players’ understanding of characters, and how 
their playstyles affect an empirical player’s experiential understanding of characters. Instead, this 
research focuses on the available structures that enable dynamic game characters; it focuses on the 
mechanical system that allows the player to take an active part in shaping the identity of the 
character. The player is part of the reading process, but the cultural and socio-economic background 
of empirical players is not the main aspect that informs the readings that they can make. If I were 
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to have multiple players play this game and analyse their responses and experiences, that would 
instead entail a focus on their affective engagement rather than on the structure of the game 
(although I will not claim that affective engagement with a character does not inform a player’s 
playstyle). 
Using reader-response theory applied to games involves the mechanical system that 
provides each player with different scriptons while the textons stay the same depending on their 
choices in the game. That structure is relevant as a topic of study on its own, because it actively 
shapes the character ecology in ways that non-cybermedia do not. The structure of the game reveals 
the different strategies games use to constitute the dynamic game character. Adding more empirical 
reader-players to play these games would not lead to anything new in what I already present. That 
is, that dynamic game characters’ development structure contains multiple outcomes that the 
player affects in a certain direction, which the structure of the game enables. However, as I explain 
in section in the next section, I do use the experience of a collective of empirical players as a 
secondary source to enhance my game analysis. 
As I play these games, I position myself as the player who has a certain amount of agency 
over the construction of the dynamic game character. The player also has a certain amount of 
influence over the character ecology within which that character is located, but that influence is far 
from being unlimited, and is not met without opposition from other sources that claim to have a 
specific authority over the identity of that character. Reader-response theory, as I adapt it in this 
dissertation to cybermedia, provides the opportunity to discuss the constant dialogue in which 
multiple forces try to shape the identity of a dynamic game character inside the character ecology, 
as the player plays an active—and constrained—part in its construction inside the game and within 
this ecology. 
My own play experience of the games in which I construct a dynamic game character allows 
me to discuss the various forces that attempt to control the characters’ identities, as my own 
experience might, for example, compete with the character as it is presented in other (non-
cyber)media or even in paratexts (see Genette 1997; Consalvo 2007; Gray 2010). One of the main 
premises that I carry with me throughout this dissertation is that there exist no single ‘correct’ 
construction of a dynamic game character’s identity when the textons of the work provide a plurality 
of possible identities. 
 
Recognising Dynamic Game Characters 
The final question that requires an answer before delving into the construction of game characters 
and, subsequently, dynamic game characters is: how can a player know when a game character is 
dynamic? Or to be more specific, how do I as a player know that my choices affect the outcome of 
the construction of the character and, as a result, how my choices affect the identity of the 
character? The answer is that games tend to be quite clear about the dynamicity of their characters 
due to their processual nature. Some games, like Erica (Flavourworks 2019) or Life is Strange 
(Dontnod Entertainment 2015) state from the beginning that the player’s choices affect the 
development of the character. Before the player starts playing Erica for example, they are told: “This 
is an interactive story. Your choices form one of many perspectives. No single path holds all the 
answers”. ‘Interactivity’ refers here to the player’s agency to make certain choices to affect the 
outcome of the story in a particular direction. The player is presented throughout the game with 
multiple options from which they have to choose, for instance, to have lunch with one character, 
help another character, or make perfume with a third character. These choices then determine the 
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following set of choices the player can make, and subsequently make the player shape Erica’s 
construction and identity over the process of the game. 
In other games, feedback shows where the character is within their development process. 
In this case, the game helps them to decide how to proceed next. For example, Persona 5 (P-Studio 
2016) shows the player how far the player-character, Joker, is within the development of his 
relationship with other characters. This is done with a progress bar that shows on exactly what level 
the player is (with a maximum of ten levels, ten being the highest attainable point in the 
relationship). With each level the player is rewarded with new skills, items, and scripted segments 
between Joker and the character with whom Joker has attained a certain level of relationship. 
The player might not always know exactly which choice changes the development of the 
character, and often it is not a single choice that shapes the character’s final outcome. Games 
consist of different segments that each can contribute to the overall development of the character 
so that no one decision by the player necessarily determines the character’s development. Fire 
Emblem: Three Houses (Intelligent Systems and Koei Tecmo 2019), for example, has the player 
choose at the beginning of the game which house (or faction) they wish to be part of, which 
determines on which side the player will be during the big war later in the game (but not always). It 
also contains a progress bar for each individual character that shows not only the kind of relationship 
the player-character has with other characters, but also what kind of relationship these other 
characters have with each other, all of which the player can influence. Furthermore, if the player 
recruits a character from another house, that character’s development will also be different to how 
it would be if the player had not recruited them. (The player only learns this later in the game, during 
the events of a war in which they are be forced to kill the characters they did not recruit.) 
Since so many segments can potentially influence characters’ development, the player will 
always miss a possible construction of the dynamic game character. And, even if the player plays 
the same game a second or third time (or more), they may be unable to reproduce the character 
exactly as they were in other playthroughs. As a result of my choice to play a variety of games, it is 
impossible to play all the games multiple times in order to perceive which specific choice results in 
a different development outcome of the character. Nevertheless, this is not an impossibility that 
cannot be overcome: Aarseth (2003) mentions that a game analysis consists of two main types of 
analysis: playing and non-playing. The former I have already explained above. Aarseth (2003, 6) 
explains that, in combination with hands-on playing experience, non-playing analysis can serve as 
secondary sources to enhance the game analysis in order to reach the best potential for success. 
Since cybermedia consist of paths and variations that a single player will never be able to experience, 
“a collective pool of experience will always bring new aspects forward” (2003, 6). He argues that 
this collective pool of experience is therefore not merely useful, but even crucial. 
Aarseth identifies several general types of sources for non-playing analysis: 
 
• Previous knowledge of genre 
• Previous knowledge of game-system 
• Other players’ reports 
• Reviews 
• Walkthroughs 
• Discussions 
• Observing others play 
• Interviewing players 
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• Game documentation 
• Playtesting reports 
• Interviews with game developers (2003, 6) 
 
In regards to my motivations to identify the dynamic game character, and the available structures 
and strategies in which dynamic game characters appear, observing other players is not necessary; 
just as scholars rely on other scholars to perform their research, I rely on other players’ observations 
as critics to obtain a collective pool of experience advantageous as support for game analysis. The 
pool of experience useful for my research is a combination of other players’ reports, walkthroughs, 
and their game documentation. This particular combination can be found in many sources on the 
Internet. For example, when Eve died in Mass Effect 3 (2012), I searched on the Mass Effect (“Eve” 
2019) wiki page if there had been any way to avoid her death. It turned out that her death was the 
result of a choice I made in the previous game, Mass Effect 2 (2010), and there was little I could 
have done within Mass Effect 3 to have prevented her death. 
That said, the games which I analyse in this dissertation, I make sure to have played myself. 
The use of secondary sources do not dominate the game analysis; they only function as supplements 
to enhance the analysis. 
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Part II 
Characters in a Character Ecology 
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Chapter Four 
The Multiplicity Model: Transmedial 
Characters from the West and Japan 
 
This chapter is split into two parts. The first brings attention to the appearance of characters in a 
broader character ecology within contemporary media practices and the effect their migration has 
on their nature and identity. By focusing on theory on contemporary transmedia practices from the 
West and from Japan, this part focuses on the migration of characters from one medium to another. 
It explains how academic works about this migration from the West, specifically transmedia 
storytelling, tend to discuss the nature and identity of the character in terms of coherence and 
continuity. It also discusses the Japanese media mix, a media strategy from Japan that focuses on 
the proliferation of characters to stimulate the consumption of this media. The character in this 
media mix does not have to make sense with its other appearances in a coherent and continuous 
way. 
The second part specifies the following conceptual problems, based on the theoretical 
debate from the first part and from chapter two: a tension between transmedial and medium-
specific perspectives on characters, an assumption of characters as inherent elements of stories, 
and a friction between the different identities that a character holds over the course of multiple 
works. Following from that, the second part provides a definition of characters as quasi-persons, 
and introduces the multiplicity model to address the meaning-making process of the cultural 
understanding of the character to explain characters in their existence of multiplicity in a character 
ecology. This model provides the opportunity to discuss the character’s lack of sequential continuity 
within the character ecology and within the representational materials in which the character 
manifests at the same time. Both of these topics I will discuss in the following chapters. 
 
 
1. Transmedial Characters 
Let me briefly explain why it is necessary to discuss game characters in relation to transmedial 
characters. A character such as Pikachu from the Pokémon franchise is not just a character who 
exists within the Pokémon games, but is also a character who plays a major role in the Pokémon 
Adventures anime (Yuyama 1997 - present), appears in the Pokémon manga, and can be regularly 
spotted decorating an iPhone case or a notebook, and also exists as a stuffed toy and figurine. A 
character who migrates from one medium to the next medium is often referred to as a ‘transmedial 
character’. 
In our contemporary transmedial practices, a transmedial character like Pikachu cannot be 
discussed as a game character without attesting to its counterparts, since those counterparts inform 
the identity of the game character as well, and vice versa. Although not necessarily every character 
is transmedial, every character has the potential to become transmedial. The character ecology, the 
sphere in which characters are constantly produced and reproduced, not only shapes the nature of 
the character, but also shapes their identity. It is therefore imperative to take into consideration the 
59 
 
game character’s movement within the broader character ecology as the character moves through 
and manifests in a diversity of media. 
 
Transmedia Storytelling and World-Building 
This part is divided as follows: the first section is dedicated to the Western notion of transmedia 
storytelling, a phenomenon that belongs to the convergence between different media. The second 
section discusses the position of characters within this discourse. The third section leaves the West 
and focuses instead on the role of characters in the media mix, the Japanese version of convergence 
culture. 
The notion of transmedia storytelling appears early on in game studies, when Lisbeth 
Klastrup and Susana Tosca define transmedial worlds (TMW) as: 
 
Transmedial worlds are abstract content systems from which a repertoire of fictional stories 
and characters can be actualized or derived across a variety of media forms. What 
characterises a transmedial world is that audience and designers share a mental image of 
the “worldness” (a number of distinguishing features of its universe). The idea of a specific 
world’s worldness mostly originates from the first version of the world presented, but can 
be elaborated and changed over time. Quite often the world has a cult (fan) following across 
media as well. (2004) 
 
They link storytelling to the idea of creating a single world that users receive and interpret through 
a variety of media platforms. It is, however, Henry Jenkins who came to be known for coining the 
term ‘transmedia storytelling’ in his book Convergence Culture (2006). Inspired by Marsha Kinder’s 
(1991) concept of ‘transmedia intertextuality’, Jenkins mentions transmedia storytelling as a 
phenomenon belonging to our media convergence culture, one that allows characters to become 
more compelling as they move from one medium to the next (Jenkins 2003). 
In his book, Jenkins states that storytelling has become the basis to create a world, which 
cannot be contained in a single story or medium. Each medium would add a new story to an already 
existing world to expand the world of that specific story (2006). Later, on his website, Jenkins would 
add additional information about his view of transmedia storytelling. For example, he considers 
transmedia storytelling as a process whereby stories are distributed through various media channels 
in order to create “a unified and coordinated entertainment experience”, preferably with each 
media channel making a unique contribution to the whole of the story (2007). Media conglomerates 
stand at the centre of this type of storytelling as it allows them to distribute and expand their 
franchise across a diversity of media channels (2007). 
Carlos Alberto Scolari (2009) argues that the idea of transmedia storytelling does not exist 
on its own, but exists alongside a variety of concepts that roughly describe the same experience. 
According to him, there are multiple terms used to describe a narrative that expands through 
different languages and media and that contributes to the construction of a narrative world. 
Previously, Klastrup and Tosca use transmedial worlds to describe this phenomenon, but the term 
‘cross media’ also belongs to this spectrum. Jay Lemke (2004) discusses meaning-making across the 
cross-media franchises and the involvement of media conglomerates behind them through which 
ideological systems are distributed. He argues that in a global marketing culture, media 
conglomerates are caught in a contradiction: 
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On the one hand, it maximizes profits to the extent that there is a homogeneous cultural 
order […], but on the other hand, the conditions of reproduction of capital concentration […] 
demand a differentiated and hierarchical culture (2004, 12). 
 
Continuing Lemke’s (2004) proposition, Aarseth (2006) points out that media conglomerates try to 
make the marketing of franchises less costly and more effective. He argues that the content flow 
relies mostly on medium conventions and affordances, where the flow between media that are alike 
is smooth (e.g., books and films) but less between media forms that have structural differences (e.g., 
games and stories) (2006, 210). 
The business sentiment towards transmedia storytelling is also shared in a relatively recent 
work by Colin B. Harvey (2015). He takes a broad approach to the concept of transmedia storytelling, 
and focuses on the methods of media conglomerates to govern the franchises that make use of 
contemporary transmedial practices. 
 Besides the business culture behind transmedia and its adjacent concepts, transmedia 
storytelling has also been thoroughly discussed alongside a variety of different concepts, mostly 
relating to the idea of world-building. Mark J. P. Wolf (2012), for example, considers stories as not 
the only method through which imaginary worlds are created. Using fantasy writer J. R. R. Tolkien’s 
concept of subcreation (1997), Wolf introduces the idea of world infrastructures. These are a set of 
existing concepts such as nature, maps and genealogies through which readers locate information 
that allows them to create a consistent model of the world in their minds (Wolf 2012, 154). 
Marie-Laure Ryan (2013), known for her work on possible world semantics, discusses the 
concept of transfictionality and its three relations to texts—expansion, modification, and 
transposition—within the potential of transmedia storytelling. She describes how each world, 
created by multiple stories, expands or diverges from its relation to other story worlds. 
In my own recent article (Blom 2018), I explain that transmedia storytelling implies that 
every medium has the same kind of capacity for telling stories to equally contribute to a single 
coherent world. Against that assumption, I therefore discuss how games disrupt the sense of 
coherence within transmedial worlds. Using Overwatch (Blizzard Entertainment 2016) as a case 
study, I propose to consider the Overwatch franchise a shared universe that consists of multiple 
types of worlds, such as the virtual world of the Overwatch game and the storyworld that emerges 
from the Overwatch comics and short films on the developer’s website. Players connect the events 
inside the game to the events happening in the comics and films on a representational level even if 
any continuity between the worlds is incoherent and contradictory. I argue that the connection 
between the different worlds are therefore imagined, since consumers (players, readers and so 
forth) rely on their imagination to connect these media (2018, 9). 
However, instead of considering Overwatch an imagined universe, I consider it a shared 
universe, because the players share the imagination of the connection between the worlds 
supported by Blizzard Entertainment who places the Overwatch comics and short films on their 
website that users can read and watch for free to spread the Overwatch franchise. For example, 
Overwatch is always played with multiple players online (except in a tutorial), and Blizzard 
Entertainment has the comics and short films freely available on their website. In other words, the 
franchise constantly confirms the imagined connection between the media platforms to its 
consumers, therefore turning the Overwatch universe in a shared universe rather than an imagined 
one (2018, 10). 
However, Gregory Blomquist (2019) justifies the Overwatch franchise as transmedia 
61 
 
storytelling because “it does not offer its video game as the ‘mothership’ for its narrative and instead 
relies on all its media to convey a full story”. Applying Rüdiger Heinze’s (2015) concept of heterarchy, 
Blomquist states that the Overwatch characters develop through a “systematic, non-hierarchical 
distribution of content, offering exemplars of transmedia characters and transmedia storytelling” 
(2019). However, despite his claim that the franchise offers a full story through a “non-hierarchical 
distribution of content” (2019), he omits any explanation of narratives and stories, conflating the 
two concepts in the process, and instead seems to romanticise the distribution of content with 
clouded aspirations for coherence in a story. However, the ideal that he seems to describe—a 
systematic non-hierarchical distribution of content—contains similarities to the Japanese media 
mix—which I discuss later in this chapter—although the media mix has little focus on the coherence 
of stories and rather focuses on the distribution of content via characters that do not necessarily 
have to make sense in a continuous and coherent ‘full story’. 
 
Transmedia Characters 
In Western contemporary transmedia practices, concepts such as transmedia storytelling and 
imaginary worlds engage with characters as important aspects. Important, but not vital. Whenever 
characters are discussed within contemporary transmedia practices, the theory, as I will discuss here, 
focuses on the constitution of transmedia characters over a variety of works. Similar to discussions 
about the coherence of stories and worlds, the discussions about transmedia characters 
concentrate on the continuity between the appearances of the character over multiple works. A 
topic of importance is the constitution and the identity of the character. For example, in 1972, 
Umberto Eco (1972) discusses the many iterations of Superman as a mythical character of comic 
strips. Eco argues that the iterations of telling and re-telling Superman stories result in different 
stories in which Superman’s appearances and actions contradict each other. Eco believes that these 
contradictions are a necessary component for Superman as a mythic hero in order to not be 
completely consumed by its readers, since it would ultimately lead to his death (16). 
Discussions about the identity of the character in the West tend to contain hidden 
assumptions about the ‘essence’ of the character’s identity in which scholars try to determine what 
essential components make up the character, or try to explain the continuity between character 
appearances. In the following section, I provide an overview of the debates about transmedial 
characters in the West. 
There are few sources with a specific focus on characters within transmedial storytelling. 
There is, for example, Elizabeth Evans (2008) who discusses transmedia drama series. She points 
out that characters become a point of contact for the audience, because they are recognisable 
across the different media in which they appear and reappear, and “therefore help orient the 
audience within the narrative”(2008). Lincoln Geraghty (2017) seems to come to the same 
conclusion as Evans when he concludes that transmedial characters are not only a profitable 
opportunity for a franchise to create new stories, but that they are also familiar signposts that direct 
audiences to important moments in the franchises’ stories. There is also Shira Chess (2011) who 
writes about the supernatural horror character Slenderman and its development in an online space. 
She mentions that many different versions exist as a result of open-sourcing, where multiple users 
of the Something Awful forums would contribute to the creation of Slenderman and its mythology. 
Before Jenkins coined the term transmedia storytelling, William Uricchio and Roberta 
Pearson (1991) discuss the construction of Batman. In their exploration of who Batman is, they 
argue that no primary work, text, or time period defines the character. Instead, they argue, “a set 
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of key components, becomes the primary marker of Batman texts: the key components of the 
Batman character have constituted the sine qua non for any Batman narrative in any medium” (185). 
According to Uricchio and Pearson, it is these key components that set Batman apart from other 
serial fictional characters (185). In other words, they distinguish Batman from other characters, 
because they consider his appearances not based on continuity but based on a set of components 
that emerge as a pattern in all works describing Batman. 
The five key components constitute the Batman character that Uricchio and Pearson 
propose are as follows: 
 
• Traits/attributes. They consider Batman to have four main traits: wealth, 
physical prowess, deductive abilities and obsession. 
• Events. They distinguish between fixed and accruing events such as the 
character’s origin story, and iterative events, primarily fighting events. 
• Recurring characters. The good and bad characters with whom Batman 
interacts who maintain a constant presence over the Batman stories. 
• Setting. Batman lives in Gotham City where (most) Batman stories take place. 
• Iconography. The basic elements that remain identifiable, such as Batman’s 
cape, costume, gauntlets and logo, even when the iconography changes over 
time. (1991, 186 - 187) 
 
Just like Uricchio and Pearson, Will Brooker (2012) focuses on Batman and his appearances in the 
character ecology. Instead of key components however, Brooker proposes three distinct models of 
continuity in which Batman appears. First is that of a myth—as a popular icon that appears in all 
existing Batman texts. Second, Batman continues to exist as a brand, a product that is carefully 
controlled by the intellectual property owner, Warner Bros. (153). And third, as canon that, 
according to Brooker, is: ”the strict sense of what counts and what happened, what is ‘true’ and 
what isn’t, in the mainstream comic book universe” (154). 
Paolo Bertetti (2014) presents a transmedia character typology, defining the transmedia 
character as a “fictional hero whose adventures are told in different media platforms, each giving 
more detail on the life of that character”. However, Bertetti does not consider transmedia 
characters and transmedia worlds to have a direct correspondence. He gives two main reasons: the 
first is that a transmedia world sustains multiple stories that can each focus on a different character. 
The second reason is that he argues that the presence of the same character in a text does not 
necessarily imply the same world (2346). Indirectly, this means that a character can have a different 
identity even when it seems to be the ‘same’ character. Their backgrounds, physical appearances, 
or relationships with other characters might vary per text, turning these characters into completely 
different entities. Bertetti therefore makes a difference between a character’s existential identity 
and fictional identity based on Aristotle’s differentiation between agent and character (2348). The 
existential identity consists of a proper identity—“the set of elements that relates to a character’s 
being” (2349)—and a relational identity—“based on the relationship of the character with the world 
around him” (2349). The fictional identity consists of an actantial identity that covers the different 
roles played by the actor/character, the modal identity—how the character is communicated—and, 
lastly, the axiological identity that reflects the deep values which lead the character to certain 
actions (2349). Bertetti’s differentiation provides a detailed overview of the similarities and 
differences between the transmedial appearances of a character, but his typology is primarily based 
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semiotician Greimas’ actant model (Greimas 1966) which we see mostly reflected in the fictional 
identity category of his typology. The fictional identity of characters is based on how they act within 
specific stories, thereby assuming that any medium in which a character appears tells a sequential 
story. 
Pearson (2019) tries to avoid the implications that a focus on narrative continuity between 
character appearances brings. She uses Shane Denson’s (2011, 536) idea about the existence of 
iconic characters as ‘traces between of previous incarnations’ for her thinking on the cohesion 
between character appearances. This kind of cohesion does not have to be narrative continuity. 
Instead, she argues that cohesion between appearances is invoked via ‘points of contact’: “the 
overlaps with previous texts that identify an addition as part of an established transfiction. 
Maximum points of contact lead to strong cohesion, while minimal points of contact lead to weak 
cohesion; the degree of overlap establishes a spectrum between strongly and weakly cohesive 
transfictions” (2019, 149). Characters then who appear over two or more media have, according to 
Pearson, a stronger cohesion with the other works in which they appear when there is more overlap 
between the works, and less cohesion when the works have less overlap. 
She argues that there exist three structuring factors for this overlap: two narrative factors 
and one industrial factor. The first narrative factor involves the time and setting of the world in 
which the character appears. Her hypothesis is that cohesion between character appearances arises 
primarily from points of contact between the character appearances over the works, and the 
character’s name, function and template (such as appearances that strongly resemble previous 
appearances of the character in terms of visual and acting style) (152). 
The second narrative factor is the difference between realist and fantastic transmedia 
characters. According to Pearson, realist characters (such as Sherlock Holmes) and fantastic 
characters (such as Batman) differ in the amount of points of contact they have with their 
appearances in other works. Her hypotheses are: 
 
• Specific environments are more of a requirement for the template of fantastic 
characters than for the template of realist characters. 
• Realist characters can function in fantastic world, but fantastic characters 
cannot function in realist world settings. 
• As a result, realist characters have more strategies available to them to 
proliferate and maintain cohesion across different works than fantastic 
characters. (152) 
 
Pearson’s third factor is an industrial one. Her hypotheses are first that proprietary works in which 
characters appear can use more paratextual strategies to create cohesion between appearances 
than public domain works. And second, that public domain works of characters show that they are 
much more dependent on textual strategies of established templates than proprietary works over 
which intellectual property owners own the rights to weave the works together, such as with cross-
over works. 
 
The Japanese Media Mix 
In this section, I discuss characters in the Japanese media mix. In the first section, I introduce the 
media mix, the role of games, and explain why the media mix should be taken into consideration 
for this study on dynamic game characters. In the second section, I introduce the origin of the media 
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mix, having its roots in the Japanese propaganda strategies of the Second World War (WWII). In the 
third section, I discuss the role of characters in the media mix, which as a device stimulate their 
proliferation and connect media. In the following sub-sections, I first discuss moe and kawaiisa—
‘desire’ and ‘cuteness’—as aspects that underline the proliferation of characters in media mix 
strategies, before I subsequently delve into the kyara and kayarakutaa distinction, a discourse that 
takes a prominent spot in discussions about the character within Japanese theory on contemporary 
media practices. 
 
The Media Mix and the Role of Games 
In Japan, the phenomenon of media convergence is known under the name of the ‘media mix’. 
There are two ways the term ‘media mix’ can be used in contemporary media practices: 1) as theory, 
the media mix is the “cross-media serialization and circulation of entertainment franchises” which 
has its own history and development alongside the term media convergence from the West 
(Steinberg 2012, viii), and 2) as an artefact, a media mix refers to the commercial strategies used to 
spread content across a variety of media to stimulate the consumption of these media (viii). 
Although the two meanings often overlap in use, I will call the latter a media mix strategy when I 
point specifically towards a certain media mix project, but otherwise the reader can assume I mean 
the media mix as a theory. 
The media mix accentuates the use of the character as the “device that simultaneously 
allows audiovisual media and objects to connect and forces their proliferation” (Steinberg 2012, 83). 
Unlike transmedia storytelling or transmedia world-building, characters are the entities via which 
transmedia franchises connect their entertainment media and objects. These media do not 
necessarily tell stories with characters that have the same continuous identity as if they are the 
same character. Rather, the character functions as a kyara or ‘recognizable archetype’ (Nakamura 
and Tosca 2019) that can be placed within different series and media entertainment without the 
necessity of these series having to connect from a continuous linear sense.  
The connection of the media mix to digital games is tight; the Japanese video game industry 
is characterised specifically by the media mix (Picard and Pelletier-Gagnon 2015, 3). It is shaped 
simultaneously on a local scale by marketing strategies, on a national scale by industrial 
transformations, and by creative and technological developments which were established on a 
global scale (3). As Martin Picard (2013) puts it: 
 
The Japanese video game industry is at the intersection of local innovations in marketing 
strategies — in part in a context commonly called the media mix, which is itself linked to a 
broader context of a consumption culture that has risen from contemporary, and some 
would say postmodern (Azuma, 2007, 2009), Japan — national industrial transformations — 
whereas the Japanese video game industry is at the crossing of electronics, computer, 
amusement and content industries in Japan — and technological and artistic developments 
— from the hardware to the software — in which some aspects were, subsequently or 
synchronously, established globally and under an increasingly transnational mode, all 
forming a particular media ecology or system, that I name “geemu”. (ibid.) 
 
Rachael Hutchinson’s book Japanese Culture Through Video Games (2019, 15) calls attention to the 
Japanese game industry as a source of Orientalist rhetoric. In each chapter, she explains how the 
Japanese game industry makes itself marketable on both local, national, and global scale, using the 
65 
 
idea of ‘Japanese essentialism’. She explains that the Japanese game industry in, for example, 
fighting games, tends to take ‘essential’ elements of its culture and uses those elements to represent 
the whole culture. This, as Hutchinson puts it, “lies at the heart of Orientalism, a rhetorical structure 
prominent in the eighteenth and nineteenth-century art and literature from Britain and France, 
which represents the lands of Asia as exciting, different, sensual and sexualized in an intoxicating 
alternative to life at home” (2019, 81). 
The search for nihonjinron5, which refers to theories of Japanese uniqueness, was at its 
height during the development of games such as Street Fighter II (Capcom 1991), a fighting game 
that, together with Karate Champ (Technôs Japan 1984), Virtua Fighter (Sega 1993) and Tekken 
(Namco 1994), served as the main template for the representation of Japan and its others outside 
of Japan, primarily by creating a Japan/USA binary (Hutchinson 2019, 70). According to Hutchinson, 
while being criticised for racism, xenophobia and cultural essentialism, nihonjinron was a reaction 
to the rapidly shifting social environment during the 1990s in Japan, when people wanted certainty 
and reassurance that Japan was still a significant country (82 - 83). It is likely the combination of the 
Orientalist rhetoric from the West and the pursuit of nihonjinron coming from Japan that provided 
an excellent basis for Orientalist rhetoric, which the Japanese game industry could dip into and use 
to sell its games on local, national and global scales. 
Orientalist rhetoric is not just confined to the fighting game genre, nor even to Japanese 
games. Rather, entire fields of cultural production are divided between ‘Japanese’ and ‘Western’ 
versions of products (see Napier 2007). According to Mattias van Ommen,6 “these categories do not 
exist to maintain separate forms of products, but labels such as these help maintain conceptual 
categories of distinctiveness” (2018, 30). The juxtaposition turns Japanese games into the exotic 
‘Other’, and thus speaks to the Western-centric perspective of game studies. 
The relevance of the Japanese industry is precisely because it works on a local, national and 
global scale, and so that the use of the media mix is not only relevant to its own restricted 
community, but also influences the larger—Western-centric—global transmedia practices to which 
games contribute as one of the various media that communicate characters. The Computer 
Entertainment Supplier’s Association (CESA) (2017), a Japanese game industry association, has been 
publishing the growth of the Japanese game industry each year since 1996. Their 2016 statistics for 
the Japanese video game market show that the domestic market’s size counts “126.7 billion Yen for 
hardware, 188 billion Yen for software, and 314.7 billion Yen in total” (based on the retail numbers). 
Additionally, the “game software download is 7.9 billion Yen” (2017, II). The overseas market counts 
“1.0854 trillion Yen for hardware, 1.494 trillion Yen for software and 2.5794 trillion Yen in total” 
(2017, II)7. Just based on its size in the domestic and overseas market, the Japanese game industry’s 
influence takes a prominent place in their local game culture, as well as in international game culture. 
As Martin Picard and Jérémie Pelletier-Gagnon (2015) point out, game studies has a 
Western-centric understanding of games (1 – 2). Reasons they attribute to this gap are, among 
others, the language barrier and a lack of knowledge of Japanese studies (1). Most discussions about 
 
5 Harumi Befu (2009)describes nihonjinron as discourses on Japaneseness:” Nihonjinron basically asserts the 
uniqueness of Japanese culture and people, and spells out the ways in which they are unique. The discourse 
exceptionally covers the whole gamut: from the biological make-up of the Japanese, prehistorical cultural 
development, language, literary and aesthethic qualilties, human relations, and social organisation to philosophy and 
personal character” (25). 
6 The current paragraph was first written in the abstract for the panel ‘Japanese Role-Playing Games in the Ludo Mix: 
Paradigms, Practices, and Challenges’ at the DiGRA 2019 conference, in collaboration with Mattias van Ommen. 
7 314.7 billion Yen would be roughly 2.6 billion Euro. And, 2.5794 trillion Yen would be roughly 21.4 billion Euro. 
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Japanese contemporary media practices—including games—are not translated to other languages, 
and the language barriers for Japanese game scholars also make it hard for them to break through 
in game studies. As a result, the tendency of the Western-centric field of game studies continues a 
tunnel-vision: it places itself as the centre of academic research, focusing on phenomena they 
identified using theoretical knowledge that they themselves created without the awareness of 
knowledge produced in non-Western areas of the field—even when that field has been contributing 
to contemporary transmedia practices in the West since its instantiation. 
Yet, I do not wish to paint such a doomed scenario. Looking at the academic works I discussed 
in the last few pages, I can say that, gradually, more work about Japanese contemporary transmedia 
practices has become available in English by scholars who locate their work at the junction of game 
studies and East Asian studies. Furthermore, the Digital Games Research Association’s (DiGRA) 2019 
conference in Kyoto with the ludo/media mix as its theme shows that the relevance of Japanese 
media, as well as the contribution of Japanese scholars (even only in translation), is acknowledged 
by the field of game studies. Respectively, this means that the knowledge that Japan brings on 
games becomes more available to those scholars without (high) proficiency in the Japanese 
language, as exemplified by Carl Therrien’s (2019) recent work on video game platforms from the 
late 1980s, and Tosca and Klastrup’s (2020) book on transmedial worlds and social media. 
It is particularly important to use Japanese theories of characters because it allows us to 
describe the use of characters without this singular Western-centric perspective of characters 
having to be inherently part of a narrative or story. The Western-centric approach, as proposed by 
Eder (2015), is so fixated on the idea that characters have to belong to stories that must make sense 
in a continuous, linear and coherent fashion that it ignores that Western mainstream transmedia 
practices also use characters as devices to connect media with each other when the stories are not 
continuous, linear or coherent. To give a recent example, the animated movie Spider-Man: Into the 
Spider-Verse (Persichetti et al. 2018) functions on the assumption that Spider-Man has multiple 
identities, yet the movie does not try to conflate its world or stories with the various identities of 
Spider-Man in other stories in which these versions of Spider-Man appear. Its connection to the 
other stories is not the linearity nor the continuity between these different stories. Rather, its 
connection is the character that connects and conflates these different stories. 
It is therefore high time to take into consideration knowledge of games and their production 
from outside of the West. My dissertation’s scope is limited to the West and Japan, but I highly 
encourage future work to look at other non-Western countries and cultures beyond Japan. 
 
The Origins of the Media Mix 
Before I delve fully into the current trend of characters in the media mix, it is important to pay 
attention to Eiji Ôtsuka’s (2018; 2019) observation that the origin of the media mix lies in the 
audience-participatory propaganda techniques during WWII by the Taisei Yokusankai (Imperial Rule 
Assistance Association), a special governmental organisation established in 1940 to promote 
Japanese nationalism in order to create a monolithic nation. These propaganda techniques 
functioned as a media mix strategy that was created by state power (2019). 
The propaganda technique that the Taisei Yokusankai used was known as the Yokusan Ikka 
media mix production (Ôtsuka 2018, 6; 2019). The start of this strategy was announced via multiple 
large newspapers, including the Asahi Shinbun, the Yomiuri Shinbun and the Osaka Mainichi Shinbun, 
and depicted cartoon characters of the fictional Yamato Family and members of the tonarigumi, the 
Neighbourhood Association (the smallest unit of the Japanese mobilization program during WWII), 
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consisting of fire fighters and civil defence. These characters were placed within a specific 
neighbourhood map that functioned as the world in which they lived (Ôtsuka 2018, 20; 2019). 
The Yokusan Ikka media mix strategy reflects similar practices to Anderson’s (1983) 
description of the newspaper: it is consumed en masse by hundreds and thousands of persons, but 
diverges in two aspects from Anderson’s proposed method for how the newspaper creates an 
imagined community. First, the media mix strategy simulates the cartoon characters in real-life 
situations to restructure everyday life by educating its readers about the tonarigumi system (Ôtsuka 
2018, 58 - 104; 2019). It set itself apart from ‘real news’ explicitly by placing fictional characters in 
fictional situations, but these situations are inspired by daily life during that time. In this sense, it 
combines Anderson’s idea of the novel and the newspaper: the Yokusan Ikka media mix strategy 
gives its readers ‘homogenous, empty time’ (Anderson 1983, 25), produced en masse, which tells of 
events inspired by daily life so that its readers imagine that they all belong to the same nation. 
Second, the Taisei Yokusankai stimulated the creation of derivative works (nijisousaku) by 
amateurs which featured the Yokusan Ikka characters. This stimulation had been part of the strategy 
since the beginning: at the same time as the announcement of the strategy, readers of the Asahi 
Shinbun, for example, were invited to draw scenes from their everyday life and send these scenes 
to the newspaper (Ôtsuka 2018, 10; 2019). The characters were deliberately drawn using only 
simple contours so that everyone would be able to draw the characters. The Asahi Shinbun also 
released in their newspaper a short guide on how to draw the Yokusan Ikka characters in order to 
stimulate the production of derivative works by its readers (Ôtsuka 2018, 107; 2019). 
Nijisousaku was an important component in the media mix strategy to restructure the daily 
lives of Japanese citizens during WWII as it stimulated the circulation of the tonarigumi system via 
the use of the fictional Yokusan Ikka family, while simultaneously being under strict control of the 
Taisei Yokusankai who held copyright over these characters. Ôtsuka deliberately calls this form of 
propaganda participatory fascism (sankousuru fashizumu) as amateurs were used to create and 
proliferate the characters of Yokusan Ikka under the control of state power (2018; 2019). 
In contemporary media practices, audience participation within a media mix strategy or 
franchise is still widespread. Fan culture is a common form of audience participation in which fans 
of certain brands or franchises stimulate the proliferation of characters in derivative works known 
as ‘fan fiction’. Fans create their own articulations of the characters, placing them in situations and 
in relationships that the intellectual property owners do not wish to see them in since these works 
diverge from the owner’s official identity of the characters—that is, their ‘canon’. Unlike the 
Yokusan Ikka media mix strategy, fandom and derivative works operate on a site of contest between 
fans and authority forces where different sides try to gain control over the interpretation of a 
character’s identity (see Harvey 2015, 97). 
Let me emphasise that Japan was far from the only country under the control of state power 
that used the circulation of media and characters to propagate their ideologies. Rikke Platz Cortsen 
et al. (2014) demonstrate how comics shaped the societal, political and cultural development in the 
Nordic countries (with case studies from Denmark, Sweden, and Finland) between the 1930s and 
1950s. Their examples point to how comics are effectively used as an illustration of the fight 
between artists, newspaper and government officials over censorship (117), how comics were used 
as means to create social cohesion (119), how publishers influenced other markets to influence 
nationally-produced comics (126), and how comics reflect the sentiments of the times during which 
they were produced (130). These comics all used characters to express the different mentalities in 
order to influence the readers of these comics. 
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Despite the character’s relative free movement through media without the necessity for 
coherence and continuity, it should be clear that the media mix is an explicit strategy to stimulate 
the consumption of mass media, with roots in fascism that, besides Ôtsuka’s description of the 
media mix’s WWII history, can also be found in the media mix’s founder Haruki Kadokawa’s original 
ideas for the media mix. Steinberg (2017) suggests that the goal of the Yôkai Watch media mix 
strategy, his case study, is the total mobilisation towards collection-based consumption by young 
audiences. One of the most appalling details that Steinberg points out are the troublesome 
comments of Kadokawa. On several occasions Kadokawa commented that: 
 
Hitler and his Mein Kampf were his inspiration in formulating his media mix strategy. He, 
quite provocatively, ‘reads’ Hitler’s use of uniforms, music, Rilke’s poetry and Nietzsche’s 
thoughts as elements of a wider media strategy key to total mobilization […]. He claims that 
Mein Kampf is his ‘greatest textbook’, in an article and later an autobiography titled ‘Wa ga 
tôsô’ or ‘My Struggle’, the Japanese translated title of the Hitler book he references. (2017, 
247) 
 
According to Steinberg, a successful media mix moves towards a form of total social mobilisation in 
which consumption has become the focus as the driver of the economy instead of production (248). 
The goal of total social mobilisation of consumption replaces the social production towards war-
making from the Junger model (248). The Yôkai Watch media mix strategy strives towards total 
social mobilisation via forms of ‘affective condition’ combining “supply chain conditions, limited 
merchandise, an animation expository sequences that are at once parodic and priming, and a media 
mix system in which collection of both in-game and physical objects is central to the expanded game 
experience, within which animation—both in-game animation and anime show—was a mission 
critical element” (255). 
 
Characters in the Media Mix 
Characters played a prominent role early on in discussions about the media mix. In 1989, Ôtsuka 
formulates the concept ‘narrative consumption’ (Ôtsuka 1989; [1989] 2010), a theory that explains 
how the individual narratives of characters allow users to gradually learn about the world in which 
a character lives. Ôtsuka uses the Bikkuriman Chocolates, a chocolate wafer product with stickers 
inside that became a hit among Japanese children in 1988 and 1989. Ôtsuka ascribes the children’s 
motivations behind the craze to certain devices implemented within the stickers as follows: 
 
 
• Every sticker contained the drawing of one character. On the reverse side of 
the sticker was a short bit of information called “Rumors of the Devil World,” 
describing the character drawn on the front of the sticker. 
• With one sticker alone this information amounted to little more than noise. But 
once the child had collected a number of them and put them together, the 
child began to vaguely see a “small narrative” emerging […]. 
• This unexpected appearance of narrative functioned as a trigger to accelerate 
children’s collection. 
• Moreover, with the accumulation of these small narratives, a “grand narrative”, 
reminiscent of a mythological epic appeared. 
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• Child consumers were attracted by this grand narrative, and tried to gain 
further access to it through the continued purchase of chocolates (106). 
 
Ôtsuka links the ‘grand narrative’ to the term ‘world view’ commonly used in the field of anime 
(106). Every anime episode, animators show a ‘small narrative’ focusing on the central character of 
the series, but it is only the accumulation of the series’ episodes that allows for a complete 
‘worldview’ so that the audience understands what happens in the world. 
Within this relationship, characters become the central element around which the narrative 
revolves, but a narrative continuity is not a given even within a serialisation. As Hirohito (2011, 86) 
points out, one of the elements for characters to stand out is for them to have a certain autonomy 
or para-existence. Their individual appearances should evoke something like a background narrative 
world behind it, but it is the character that creates the continuity, as there is no coherent sequence 
of events between the narratives in which they appear (86). This is not unlike Ôtsuka’s narrative 
consumption. As readers consume the small narratives in which the character appears—despite the 
narrative incoherence—a certain background narrative (grand narrative) arises that makes sense so 
long as the characters are the central point. 
Albeit not necessarily explicitly, the phenomenon of the media mix has been discussed years 
prior in the West by Susan J. Napier in Anime from Akira to Princess Mononoke (2001), by Anne 
Allison in her book Millennial Monsters (2006) and Thomas Lamarre in The Anime Machine (2009). 
It is however not until Marc Steinberg’s Anime’s Media Mix (2012) that the media mix became 
widely known in academic circles in the West, primarily in the fields of media studies and Japanese 
studies. 
In a media mix, Steinberg (2012, 85) considers characters as devices whose nature is to travel 
across different media, and who are materialised in each medium in a distinct way. While he 
considers characters to be abstract entities that cannot be caught in their entirety within any one 
medium, Steinberg stresses that each medium is able to foreground each manifestation of the 
character according to the capabilities of that medium (85). The convergence—or rather synergy—
between these media is within the media mix actualised through the number of manifestations of 
the character within various media, the character’s undertaking in connecting these media, and the 
character’s distinct properties within each medium (85). 
Steinberg ascribes to the character a double nature, perceiving it to be an “im/material entity, 
a composite of the actual and the virtual” (Steinberg 2012, 194). He takes this idea of the double 
nature from Deleuze’s notion of the virtual that “is fully real in so far as it is virtual” (Deleuze and 
Patton 1994) in the sense that something can be real and not actual simultaneously. It is due to the 
character’s virtual nature that it is capable of moving through different media, and can therefore 
never be confined to a single manifestation: 
 
The virtual quality of the character enables its multiple material and transmedial 
embodiments. It prevents the character from ever being confined to a single one of its 
manifestations, and it keeps the character ever open to new and subsequent 
transformations, leading to the formation of character-based media environments. 
(Steinberg 2012, 195) 
 
Both Ian Condry (2013) and Douglas Schules (2015) point towards the lack of necessity in storytelling 
in the media mix when the character is its focus. Condry notes, for example, that the character’s 
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openness allows for a transmedial and unified experience that only depends on storytelling to a 
degree (Condry 2013). Schules (2015) summarises concretely the relationship between characters, 
stories, and worlds within narrative consumption: “narrative consumption […] focuses on the role 
stories play in driving the consumption of discrete media. Motivating this consumption is the 
character-world relationship, where a grand narrative (or worldview) structures how smaller ones 
known as narrative fragments fit together” (57). 
The constitution of the concept of character in English articles has also been applied to field 
beyond the media mix in contemporary media practices. Toshiyuki Sadanobu (2015) applies the 
concept of character to discuss style and personality in communication research. He argues that 
‘character’ can be a useful applied tool to explain why learners of the Japanese language sound 
strange when they speak textbook Japanese, because the Japanese language incorporates the 
speaker’s personality into the style of the speech (2015, 23). 
In his article 8-Bit Manga: Kadokawa’s Madara, or, the Gameic Media Mix (2015), Steinberg 
discusses the role of games in the mix. Steinberg provides Madara as a case study, a manga created 
by Ôtsuka, and which was the basis for Ôtsuka’s narrative consumption theory. The Madara manga 
and world was designed in accordance to the rules of role-playing games similar to that of Dungeons 
and Dragons (1974). Steinberg points out that information such as hit points, karma, health etc. 
were maybe not necessary for the narrative in the manga, but it gave the manga an intermedial 
quality “as if it were a RPG video game” (2015, 48). While this gives an impression of characters, it 
only shows how game-like elements could be used outside of games. 
Shige C.J. Suzuki (2019) critiques the argument that the Japanese public embraces yôkai 
(preternatural monsters in Japanese folklore) characters due to Japan’s Shinto-inspired animistic 
beliefs, because such a perspective invites “an Orientalist frame from outside and cultural 
nationalism from within” (2200). He argues instead that the proliferation of yôkai characters is due 
to the ongoing practices of the media mix (2200). However, instead of praising the media mix for its 
focus on characters instead of storytelling, he argues that the lack of storytelling diminishes the 
folkloric, collective, and critical nature of the yôkai in narrative formats, because media mix products 
exist only to be “owned, consumed, and forgotten without any narrative or critical traces in a 
neoliberal society” (2211). 
 
Desire Towards Characters: Moe and Kawaiisa 
Early Japanese scholarly work on characters focuses on the desire for virtual characters. As a 
response to Ôtsuka’s narrative consumption, Japanese cultural critic Hiroki Azuma released in 2001 
Otaku: Japan’s Database Animals ([2001] 2009). Azuma argues that before postmodernity, Ôtsuka’s 
narrative consumption was the entrance for consumers into a world, but that this kind of 
consumption collapsed during the rise of postmodernity, meaning that for otaku culture the 
character has become the most important object in a work (31). An otaku can generally be described 
as a man between 18 and 40 years old who obsessively consumes media such as anime, manga, 
games and other related Japanese products. In contrast to Ôtsuka’s narrative consumption, Azuma 
names the consuming behaviour of the otaku ‘database consumption’, whereby otaku consume the 
aggregated elements of characters and settings, but not the grand narrative in which they appear 
(54). This is supposed to contrast with Ôtsuka’s narrative consumption in which audiences consume 
the grand narrative via small narratives. 
An important element to the database consumption is moe, which Azuma describes as the 
“fictional desire for characters of comics, anime, and games, or for pop idols” (47 – 48). He states 
71 
 
that moe stimulates the popularity of a product by the ability to invoke desire through the 
character’s design and/or illustrations (48). Azuma repeatedly points out that characters are not 
created based on their stories, but are created first thing based on the feelings of moe they might 
invoke, which is then followed by world and stories. The database itself consists of these moe-
elements, fragments of characters which might be cat ears, sailor uniforms or a specific type of hair 
(48). In other words, a character is taken apart based on its moe-elements, and the elements are 
then categorised and put into a database. As a result, with the elements from that database, one 
can put together a character that visually evokes a feeling of desire towards that character.  
Based on this premise, Azuma argues that a distinction between an original character and 
its copy does not seem to exist for the otaku. In such a situation, it is quite ambiguous what the 
original is or who the original author is, and the consumers rarely become aware of the author or 
the original. For otaku, the distinction between the original and the spin-off products (copies) does 
not exist; the only valid distinction for them is between the settings created anonymously (a 
database at a deep inner layer), and the individual works that each artist concretised from the 
information (a simulacrum on the surface outer layer). Here, even the idea that the original 
functions as an entry point into the settings or the worldview is becoming inappropriate (39). 
Azuma builds his theory based on French sociologist Jean Baudrillard’s (1994) notion of 
simulacra, in which there is no distinction in a postmodern society anymore between an original 
product and its copies. The original product and its copies become replaced by a dominant interim, 
a simulacrum that is neither original nor copy (Baudrillard 1994; Azuma [2001] 2009). The character 
in the database consumption replaces the original character. It is neither original nor a copy: it is a 
simulacrum put together from a set of fragments of desire in a database. If the character is placed 
into a setting, a world or a story at all, this only happens after the creation of the character—that is, 
the character is not created with the purpose of being an inhabitant of that world. It is visually 
created to invoke moe and can therefore easily be taken apart into moe-invoking elements, put in 
the database, and put together again to appear in a new, unrelated setting ready for the otaku to 
consume. 
Another work that describes the desire for virtual female characters is Tamaki Saitô’s 
Beautiful Fighting Girl ([2000] 2006). Saitô argues that the beautiful fighting girl, a specific type of 
character, is not a unique phenomenon to Japan, but can be woven well into a media mix strategy. 
Saitô attempts to normalise the otaku’s desire for virtual female characters. However, Lamarre 
points out that Saitô’s psychoanalytic approach to these characters reinforces the normative ideas 
about sexuality. Lamarre states: 
 
Saitô's psychoanalytic approach falters in the sense that it's a defense towards simple 
normalcy. He wishes to highlight the creativity of the otaku, but that is always in keeping 
with normal sexuality, which means to him heterosexuality. In Saitô's opinion, otaku 
sexuality differs from ordinary daily sexuality in its self-consciousness delight in 
fictionalization. (2009, 255)  
 
Moe’s sexual connotations are also a topic of debate in games when it comes to games with explicit 
sexual content. Galbraith (2017), relying on Azuma’s notion of moe, discusses sexual violence 
against cartoon characters in digital games such as RapeLay (Illusion Soft 2006). In adult games with 
sexual content, moe characters are the kind of characters that trigger affective response through 
interaction with them that could range from suggestions of sex to explicit interactive rape (Galbraith 
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2017, 15). Galbraith states that the term ‘moe image literacy’ exists to describe the culture of 
reading and responding affectively towards these moe characters. The premise of moe image 
literacy is approaching characters as fiction, a fantasy distinct from reality and real images (16). This 
then becomes especially the case for characters in adult pornographic games like RapeLay, in which 
these violent “sex acts are imagined and produced by creators and players, but no one, and no body, 
is engaged in sex acts that are recorded as part of the pornographic work. The sex, however violent, 
is not a record of violent sex acts. Adult computer games are completely constructed 
representations of sex acts” (16). Moe, on the premise that the characters are fiction, is used as a 
form of desire to inspire violent sexual acts to the characters. 
The role of attraction to and desire for characters are aspects of importance within the 
character ecology of Japanese culture.8 Another much discussed aspect of characters in Japanese 
culture is their kawaiisa—that is, their cuteness. Kawaiisa and moe often use similar elements to 
invoke these feelings of desire or attraction towards characters. A character that is moe-invoking 
often also has cute elements that reinforce this desire. 
Kawaiisa in characters is often treated as a product specific to Japan. Allison (2004) explains 
that kawaiisa has become the cultural product that Japan sells to the global marketplace of children 
as a form of ‘cultural power’ that Japan is cultivating overseas. The qualities with which kawaiisa is 
associated are along the lines of sweetness, dependency and gentleness, which are in turn linked to 
comfort and warmth (40). Kawaiisa is mostly shown through a character’s visual appearance—
something it has in common with moe—but Alison stresses that kawaiisa also refers to the 
relationship people form with cute characters (43). An example of a game character she provides in 
Millenial Monsters (2006) is the Tamagotchi (Bandai 1996), a portable game that was hugely popular 
during the late 1990s in Japan but which also became a huge hit in Europe and America. It was quite 
simple in its idea that it allowed players to take care of a virtual pet. The cute appearance was not 
that important, rather it was the affordance of taking care of these creatures and bonding with them 
that mimicked raising a flesh-and-blood animal (2006, 166). In other words, kawaiisa not only 
describes the character’s virtual qualities, but also highlights the bonding process between person 
and character. 
Schules, like Allison, argues that kawaiisa is a cultural product used by the Japanese 
government as part of the Cool Japan campaign to promote Japanese soft power overseas as a form 
of cultural uniqueness (2015, 58). He considers kawaiisa a persistent motif in Japanese role-playing 
games (JRPGs) and argues that, specifically for Western players, kawaiisa shapes the game 
experience in such a way that it gives these players the chance to experience Japanese ‘uniqueness’: 
“To originate in Japan implies that a product is somehow invested with a fragment of the country’s 
culture, a characteristic so intrinsic that it even applies to products imported into the country” (62). 
However, the idea of Japanese uniqueness is a concept to be wary of. As stated previously, 
Hutchinson (2019, 15) points out that the Japanese game industry is a source of Orientalist rhetoric. 
By attributing ‘Japaneseness’ or Japanese ‘uniqueness’ to a product, such as games originating from 
Japan, Japan turns itself into a “marketable commodity” (2019, 75). Kawaiisa and moe are not 
aspects unique to Japanese culture, but are used as stereotypical tropes to make Japan more 
marketable and to establish cultural power particular in the West. 
 
8 But definitely not exclusive to Japanese culture. The popularity of fan culture and (slash) fan fiction shows that the 
desire for and attraction to characters also plays an extensive role for fan consumers in the West. See, for example, 
Jenkins’ Textual Poachers: Television Fans and Participatory Culture (1992), or Sherlock and Transmedia Fandom 
(2012) edited by Louisa Ellen Stein and Kristina Busse. 
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Kyara and Kyarakutaa 
The debate about desire towards characters takes a turn with the publication of Gô Itô’s book 
Tetsuka izu Deddo [Tezuka is Dead] (Itô 2005; 2011). Unfortunately, the book is mostly untranslated; 
there is only an abridged translation of the book’s foreword and its opening chapter ‘Manga in 
Transformation and Its Dysfunctional Discourse’ by the translator Miri Nakamura (2011). In the 
introduction of the translation, Nakamura reveals that Itô’s goal is to come up with a theoretical 
tool to analyse manga as a distinctive representational form, contrasting those that conflate manga 
with anime and film. She states that Itô argues over the course of the book that “realism of modern 
manga originated from the suppression and effacement of its postmodern elements - epitomised 
by what he defines as kyara, a “proto-character” entity that turns into a complete kyarakutaa once 
the reader identifies it as human-like” (2011, 69). The distinction between the kyara and the 
kyarakutaa (character) defines the rest of the debates in Japanese scholarly works about the 
constitution of characters. 
Itô bases his distinction between the kyara and the kyarakutaa on famous mangaka, manga 
artist, Osamu Tezuka, who is also known as the ‘father of the (modern) manga’. The distinction 
between the kyara and the kyarakutaa is primarily visual. Tezuka considers a body made out of 
simple lines a kigou shintai, a ‘symbolic body’, only the visual representation of a body, but not yet 
a character (Itô 2005, 116). Using Ôtsuka’s idea of the character as human-like (and who can 
therefore die) (see Itô 2006), a kyarakutaa is what Itô considers to be a toujou jinbutsu, a dramatis 
persona, who convinces it readers that it is an “appealing dramatis persona” (Itô 2005, 120). The 
character appeals as a dramatis persona by showing the following aspects: the character has to give 
a sense of a seikatsukan, the feeling of having a daily life of a person, ikigata, a way of life, 
hanashikata, a speaking style, and jinseikan, a certain stance in life. These aspects combined should 
give the character a sonzaikan, a feeling of existence—that the character is born, grows up, gets old 
and dies (2005, 120). Itô considers the character to be the representation of a body with a 
personality (121). In contrast, the kyara is an easy icon that only looks like a character. It is a ‘proto-
character’, it precedes the kyarakutaa before readers consider it a character, and can therefore 
even be considered to be a visual cliché. 
Itô follows Ôtsuka’s idea that the toujou jinbutsu (the dramatis persona) has to be akin to a 
‘real’ person. That is, it needs to have a corporeal element (2005, 131). In contrast, Zoltan Kascuk 
points out that the kyara is purely the semiotic aspect in Ôtsuka’s duality of the character’s nature 
(Kascuk 2016, 279). In other words, the kyara’s body functions as a sign, but is not the kyarakutaa, 
while the kyarakutaa also uses the body as a sign, but has the medium to evoke ‘human-like’ 
behaviour in the sign, turning it into a character. 
Another work that remains untranslated is Azuma’s Geemuteki Riarizumu no Tanjô [The Birth 
of Game-like Realism] (2007) in which Azuma continues his discussion on database consumption 
that the established in Otaku: Japan’s Database Animals (2009 [2001]). Azuma continues to build 
his argument on Ôtsuka’s narrative consumption (2010 [1989]) and Itô’s distinction of the kyara and 
the kyarakutaa (2005). Azuma points out that Ôtsuka distinguishes between three different forms 
of light novels (young adult novels usually aimed at middle and high school students): jyubunairu 
shôsetsu (juvenile novels) from before the seventies, joshi shôsetsu (girl novels) appearing in the 
seventies, and teeburutaaku rôrupureingugeemu shôsetsu (table-talk role-playing game novels or 
TRPG novels) (2007, 111). According to Kascuk, Azuma’s argues that Ôtsuka considers the table-talk 
role-playing game novels9 inferior to the other novels about which Ôtsuka speaks, because the 
 
9 In Japan, ‘tabletop role-playing games’ are known as ‘teeburutooku RPGs’, that is, ‘table-talk role-playing games’. 
74 
 
former do “not contain the inevitability of death—due to the possibility of resets, replays, and 
alternative endings” (Kascuk 2016, 278; Azuma 2007, 118 - 120). Ôtsuka’s conceptualisation of the 
character relies on the character’s mortality (Kascuk 2016, 278). A character from Ôtsuka’s 
perspective cannot maintain multiple lives, because it needs to die in order to give the presence of 
a person who similarly is born and dies. However, according to Azuma, characters function like 
nodes and enable the possibility of a meta monogatariteki na souzouryoku no kakusan, the 
proliferation of the power of meta-story-like imagination.10 When otaku read characters in one story, 
they can easily imagine the character appearing in another separate story, not only in works from 
the same author but also in derivative works or products (2007, 125). These characters have a meta-
story-like quality in the sense that they can be “freely extracted from stories and relocated, and new 
story endings can be created, […] irrespective of whether the original work from which the character 
comes is a game or not” (Kascuk 2016, 279). The characters move from story to story, with the 
author unable to stop this movement (Azuma 2007, 125). In short, Azuma’s argument is that 
characters that are used in anime or manga novels and characters that appear in game novels (such 
as the TRPG novels) have a geemuteki na (game-like) existence (125). This is because their meta-
story quality enables them to migrate from story to story without the necessity that these stories 
have to make continuous sense nor that the character has to be the same character throughout all 
the stories. In other words, what Azuma describes is a type of transmedial character. 
Azuma uses Itô’s distinction between the kyara and the kyarakutaa to demonstrate that the 
movement of the character is not against the nature of the character as proposed by Ôtsuka. While 
Itô considers the kyara to be primarily visual, Azuma’s focus on the character’s meta-story quality 
leads him to conclude that the possibility to repeat the character in various works has always been 
an essential element to modern manga as drawn by Osamu Tezuka (2005, 138). 
The idea of the kyara seems very different to how Western theory discusses the transmedial 
character, but is in fact not an entirely new concept. Uricchio and Pearson distinguish characters 
such as Bugs Bunny and Mickey Mouse as distinct from Batman despite the characters’ similarities 
in “being multiply authored and not bound to a particular medium, urtext or period” because they 
“function as actors/celebrities rather than characters” (1991, 185). However, they seem to root the 
kyara and kyarakutaa phenomenon as two entirely different concepts where a character that 
sometimes function as a kyara cannot be a character, and a character that is a kyarakutaa is not a 
kyara, because it maintains a human-like life. Yet, the kyara/kyarakutaa phenomenon is more of a 
spectrum on which a character functions in some works or products more akin to a kyara and 
sometimes more as a kyarakutaa without there necessarily being a clear-cut distinction as to when 
it does function like one or the other. Brooker’s (2012) framework, however, does acknowledge that 
one existence for Batman is that of the brand, whose iconic appearance decorates many a product, 
and functions thus as a kyara. 
Building on Itô’s kyara/kyarakutaa distinction, Hiroshi Odagiri (2010) contributes to the 
discussion on characters by arguing that the concept of character has a combination of three 
elements: zuzou (icon), naimen (interior) and imi (meaning) (119). Characters defined by the image 
function as the kyara and are a fetish character (2010, 120), not unlike the description of the 
 
10  Kaskuck translates meta monogatariteki na souzouryoku as ‘metafictional imagination’. I use meta-story-like 
imagination instead, in order to avoid the ambiguous meaning of ‘fiction’ and ‘fictional’. Monogatari refers to a general 
form of ‘story’ in Japanese literature, particularly from the Heian period (794 AD) until the Muromachi period (1573 AD). 
These stories are often considered ‘fictional’ in the sense that these stories are ‘not real’, but can contain actual 
historical events. 
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characters in Azuma’s database who consist of elements that invoke moe. Characters defined by the 
interior refer to round characters who have a certain personality obtained in media such as anime 
or manga (119). And characters that primarily consist of meaning are flat characters and symbolic 
characters that represent a certain theme such as Uncle Sam, the personification of the USA as a 
country (120). According to Odagiri, the combination of these three elements constitute the 
character as a concept. 
Saitô’s Kyarakutaa Seishin Bunseki: Manga, Bungaku, Nihonjin [An Analysis of the Soul of 
Characters: Manga, Literature, and Japanese Persons] (2014) discusses the appearance of the 
character—and the distinction between kyara and kyarakutaa—as a concept over multiple 
disciplines. His book covers the definition of the character over the course of ten chapters, in which 
he discusses youth, psychiatry, semiotics, manga, novels, the difference between art and kyara, the 
kyara’s creation power, the kyara and moe, the kyarakutaa as fiction, before he discusses the 
question ‘what is a character?’ in the book’s final chapter. 
Using Itô’s distinction between the kyara and the kyarakutaa, Saitô points out that, for Itô, 
one of the most important aspects of the kyara is its traversing nature. Saitô argues that the kyara 
has the power of toujiseisonzaikan, the ‘same presence’ that does not come from individual works, 
but comes from its appearances in multiple works, different derivative works, and withstands a 
variety of codes. It is why the kyara’s traversing nature is its most essential elements (2014, 108). 
Saitô also uses Azuma’s idea of the character’s geemuteki rirarizumu to explain that 
characters are the persona who lives many different lives and die many different deaths, as an 
essential element to the kyarakutaa that contrasts them to human persons (2014, 108 - 109). He 
therefore concludes that the essential element of the kyarakutaa is its tensou 
kanou/fukuseifukanou, its possibility of transferring and the impossibility of reproducing (109). This 
refers to characters being able to move from one work to another but never being entirely the same 
character—something which Bertetti (2014) also argues. In contrast, the kyara’s essential element 
is the exact opposite: fukusei kanou/tensou fukanou, the possibility of reproducing, but the 
impossibility of transferring (Saitô 2014, 109). This statement refers to the idea that the kyara live a 
non-world existence and cannot develop as characters. As a result, the kyara dwells in a network 
where it is constantly repeated (reproduced) as it moves from work to work like a phantom with the 
constant same existence, but due to its lack of development with a personality set in a world, the 
kyara cannot be transferred (110). 
Discussions on the kyara and the kyarakutaa are slowly appearing in English articles. Sandra 
Annett (2015, 165) for example, describes the appeal of the characters in the Vocaloid media mix 
strategy, and describes how these characters work as kyara in the current media system. Her work 
seems to be geared towards Western academics unfamiliar with the concept of the kyara, and who 
are likely unable to read or speak Japanese. She describes the distinction between the kyara and 
the kyarakutaa as follows: 
 
Kyara can be distinguished from both fully rounded literary or cinematic characters 
(kyarakutaa) and the simple, one-dimensional brand mascots copyrighted and disseminated 
by major corporations. As evolving image-constructs that thrive on fan adoption, kyara cross 
the planes between psychologically rounded subjects and flattened symbols, between 
official and unofficial realms of product circulation, between licensed merchandise and free-
for-all repurposing on the Internet (2015, 164 - 165) 
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Annett points out that kyara are “more akin to surfaces that facilitate the play of desire” (169) in 
the sense that they do not necessarily have an established personality and that their visual 
appearances is largely exaggerated. However, as she points out, their lack of uniqueness make them 
also very mobile across media, appearing in manga, anime, light novels, games and more (170). 
In his book on the role of anime and television within the Japanese media mix, Anime Ecology 
(2018), Lamarre describes the function of characters in anime, describing how the character 
switches semiotic codes within the different segments of an anime episode. He explains that the 
back-and-forth traveling of the character between media causes it to become the embodiment of 
‘code switching’ (214). The character has to adhere to the distinct properties of the medium in which 
it materialises. Additionally, within a single medium, the character also has to conform to formal 
codes and conventions of the different segments in which it appears. For example, when a character 
appears in a television series, and then later in an advertisement on television, the character has to 
adhere to the codes of the advertisement to sell something, whereas in the television series it has 
to adhere to different codes to tell a story. The constant switching between media and coded 
segments causes the character to attain a dual nature; it is autonomous from any given medium, as 
it does not rely on any medium in particular to come into being, while it also always needs a medium 
in which to materialise (217). 
Recently, Wilde (2019) has summarised the discussion on the different character 
phenomena in Japan in an extensive literary overview, similarly to this chapter. It would be excessive 
to repeat the same works upon which he draws, and so I will only highlight the information in which 
Wilde clarifies the kyara and the kyarakutaa distinction, providing additional information on the 
character discussion to help the article’s Western readers understand the omission of story in the 
kyara. 
Wilde points out, for example, that the ‘pre-narrative’ state of the kyara is not rooted in the 
lack of any narrative information, but is based instead on the overabundance of competing and 
incoherent information between the appearances of the character (5 -6). Kyara function as nodal 
points where multiple appearances of the character intersect: 
 
They essentially function as hubs, interfaces, or intersections for diverging ›games of make-
be-lieve‹. These games, in turn, are often forms of aesthetic, medial, social, and especially 
diegetic recontextualizations. Consequently, every kyara could also be addressed as a 
»meta-narrative nodal point« (meta-monogatari-teki na kes-setsuten メタ物語的な結節点, 
AZUMA 2007: 125). Kyara can easily be placed back into heterogeneous narrative contexts 
(as contingent kyarakutā) (2019, 7).  
 
The distinction between kyara and kyarakutaa is in other words not necessarily clear-cut, but moves 
over a spectrum on which sometimes the character functions more akin to a kyara and sometimes 
more akin a fully-fledged kyarakutaa. The main difference, however, between the two concepts still 
seems to be the mortality of the character—that is, the character only has a single life in which it 
will be born and in which it will die. As a result, the character has many iterations that eventually 
move towards their own death. That does not mean that the character itself dies, rather, it means 
that that particular iteration of the character has died. The character can always iterate anew in 
another work, in another medium, in another life. 
The kyara is not a concept unique to Japanese culture, on the contrary, characters such as 
Mickey Mouse and Bugs Bunny (see Urrichio and Pearson 1991) show that the kyara exists in 
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Western culture as well. Tosca (2003) and Aldred (2014) also ascribe game characters’ capability to 
hop from one game to the next game (or from one medium to the next) to the characters’ iconicity. 
The kyara is just less acknowledged, and perhaps even wilfully ignored, because the West seems to 
be more focused on the coherence of characters. The kyara belongs to a discourse of contemporary 
media practices that focuses primarily on the proliferation of characters—without the necessity of 
story coherence—whereas the other discourse of contemporary media practices, from the West, is 
more concerned with the idea of continuity and coherence of characters within stories. That is, there 
is a romantic strive for fidelity, with transmedial storytelling as a phenomenon of that ideal. 
 
 
2. The Multiplicity of Characters 
In chapter two and in this chapter, I have extensively discussed the literature engaged with 
characters from different points of view: a ‘general’ point of view, a point of view from the field of 
game studies, and a point of view from (trans-)media studies. These discussions bring a few 
conceptual problems to the fore, some of which I will point out here. Of course, there are more 
conceptual problems than the ones I discuss here, but the problems that I focus on have a direct 
relation to the challenges that the dynamic game character brings to the table, which I will discuss 
in chapters seven and eight. 
The conceptual problems with the phenomenon of characters can be listed as follows, in no 
particular order: 
 
• As pointed out by Thon (2019), there is a tension between transmedial and 
medium-specific perspectives on what characters are. ‘Character’ in game studies, 
for example, tends to overlap with the term ‘avatar’. In literary studies, the 
character is divided between a structuralist perspective that considers the 
character to be solely a textual construct, and the humanistic perspective that 
treats the character as persons. In Japanese studies, there is a concrete distinction 
between the character as a human-like figure and the floating icon, the kyara. 
 
• The underlying assumption that characters are inherently part of a story. This 
assumption might derive from literary studies, which initially dominated the 
discussion on characters, but, as recent transmedial perspectives on characters—
both from Japan and from the West—show, characters are not necessarily defined 
by any story specifically. They hop from one story to the next, and can even exist 
without stories (but perhaps not necessarily develop as persons). 
 
• In transmedial perspectives, there is friction about the identity of the character as 
it exists in multiplicity in the character ecology: the character appears as if it is the 
same character, but does not necessarily have the same identity as another of its 
appearances. It exists as many. This focus on identity is especially visible when 
comparing Western theories on characters to Japanese theories on characters. 
Both derive from the inconsistency between character appearances, but whereas 
Japanese theory primarily pays attention to the proliferation of the character to 
explain the different identities of a character, Western theories focus on a strive 
for narrative continuity between character appearances in order to form a single 
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coherent identity. 
 
In the rest of this chapter, I therefore propose a model to address the conceptual problems 
explained above. This model aims to represent the meaning-making process of the cultural 
understanding of the multiplicity of characters, their coherence and (lack of) continuity, as well as 
the medium-specific representational material in which they manifest. I will explain this model in 
the following ways: first, I will provide a general definition of character. This definition is not mine, 
I borrow it from Frow (2014). His definition addresses the ontological discontinuity between 
character and person, as discussed in chapter two, which allows the definition to remain open to 
the peculiarities of the conceptual problems that come with the concept of character. Next, I will 
propose the model, which I call the multiplicity model. The model consists of three different 
elements: the archetype, the immaterial character and the indicator, and the manifestations of the 
character in the local works embodied by representational material. 
 
The Character as Quasi-Person 
Over the course of his book, Frow (2014) provides several descriptions of the phenomenon of 
character but does not provide a concrete definition. Instead, the descriptions that he gives pertain 
to the ambiguity of the character that can mean different things depending on the perspective one 
uses to look at the phenomenon. Frow’s discussion about the character is not focused on the nature 
of the character—what they are—but rather he focuses on the construction of the concept of 
character, and he describes the dependence of its construction on the historically and culturally 
changing understanding of persons.  
When Frow approaches a concrete definition, he considers characters to be quasi-persons: 
 
Our recognition of the kind of thing fictional characters are depends on our prior knowledge 
of the kind of thing persons are. We understand characters as quasi-persons. But the 
modeling goes the other way as well: our understanding of persons is, in part, shaped by our 
experience of dealing with fictional characters. Both fictional characters and kinds of persons 
are models of an aspect of the world, schemata which generalize and simplify human being 
in conventional ways and make it available to understanding and action. (2014, 107) 
 
Another description that he gives is of the character as a figure: at once a “figure of speech and of 
figural representation, the figure that stands out from a narrative background and, more generally 
the human shape or form” (8). Here he illustrates the character as belonging to language, as a 
representation, as part of a story—but not only in stories—and a general human-like form. 
Frow establishes concept of the character on the recipients’ cultural understanding of 
persons, but also acknowledges that characters are constructed within texts (2014, vi). He argues: 
 
Character is not a substance but the literary or dramatic or filmic instance of an operation 
within a social assemblage, by means of which the reader is inscribed into the terms of a 
particular formation of personhood. It is a moment of an apparatus for the mobilization of 
subjectivity within the terms of an ethical or legal or religious or civic mode of action and 
understanding. (2014, ix) 
 
According to Frow, the character depends on a prior category of human being, the person. The 
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concept of the person is formed by, as Frow states: “a rich set of changing socio-technical practices 
which distinguish human from non-human being and bring together religious, legal, medial, ethical, 
civic, and socioeconomic taxonomies in a single point” (2014, 71). How a someone becomes a 
person depends on the socioeconomic practices dependent on the culture and the position of that 
culture. For example, in the Roman Empire, Roman law allowed an individual to have multiple 
personae, multiple persons depending on that individual’s legal role in society (Frow 2014, 76). In 
Christianity, every human being was considered a person so that everyone became qualified to 
receive divine judgment (2014, 77).  
The reason why I prefer Frow’s descriptions over any concrete definition is because it points 
out the different persuasions that come with the phenomenon. It is an understanding of character 
as depending on the prior concept of a person that is itself constructed via socio-technical practices 
which grant certain human beings a particular formulation of personhood. Furthermore, as Frow 
also points out, any theory about characters is to some degree typological, “invoking a limited range 
of kinds of person subsuming actual named characters” (2014, 107). Such a problem is, however, 
unavoidable, and defining the phenomenon of character provides at least a working premise on 
which further uses of the character in specific media can be analysed. As stated in chapter one, to 
Frow’s description, I add Itô’s description of the character, who describes characters as 
toujoujinbutsu, ‘dramatis personae’ (2005, 117), with specific personalities that give the impression 
of a continuous existence in which they are born, grow up, develop and die (2005, 120). Therefore, 
based on Frow’s Itô’s and  descriptions, I use the following working premise for the phenomenon of 
character: 
 
A character is a quasi-person: a pattern of writing or imagining that readers understand as a 
person-like figure who, in the work in which they appear, gives the impression of a 
continuous existence in which they have a (daily) life in which they were born and in which 
they will die. 
 
Now that I have a working premise of the phenomenon of the character, I will explain the multiplicity 
model. 
 
The Multiplicity Model 
The impression that characters have a continuous existence is, as I have shown, a theoretical ideal 
for which Western theories of character in particular strive, rather than an actual rationale since 
characters in the contemporary media landscape appear in multiplicity. Their identities are 
incoherent, narratively discontinuous and sometimes even conflicting. This means that in the 
character ecology, the existence of a character is ultimately a paradox. Because characters are 
thought of as somewhat person-like, they give the impression that they have a coherent existence. 
However, they simultaneously appear in works that do not necessarily make continuous sense in 
relation to each other, even without taking derivative works into consideration. Furthermore, many 
scholars have argued that even characters within a single work are necessarily incomplete (Eder 
2010, 11; Reicher 2010, 119; Vella 2014, 15; Wilde 2019, 5). Therefore, I argue that a character exists 
in the character ecology as a multiplicity spread over multiple works. 
The multiplicity model represents the meaning-making process of the cultural understanding 
of this multiplicity, as characters proliferate over a variety of works which do not characterise them 
as a coherent entity. The advantage of the model lies in its adaptability to each individual character: 
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it takes into consideration the medium-specific representational material, and simultaneously 
displays a set of consistent elements that constitute the meaning-making process by which the 
interpreter considers a figure a character. 
The multiplicity model consists of three interdependent elements: the archetype, the 
immaterial character and the indicator, and the manifestation(s). Figure 1 shows a visual 
representation of the multiplicity model. I use three different characters to illustrate how the 
archetype, the immaterial character and its indicator, and the manifestation (M) constitute the 
meaning-making process in each individual case. Additionally, the introduction of the model in this 
chapter allows me to discuss the challenges each character brings in the textual configuration of its 
identity in chapter five, Manifestations and The Problem of Identity. The characters are: Sherlock 
Holmes, who first appeared in Arthur Conan Doyle’s A Study in Scarlet (1887), Link from Nintendo’s 
The Legend of Zelda series (1989–present), and the Chocobo, a recurring character species in the 
games of Square Enix (1987–present). 
 
 
Figure 1: The multiplicity model 
 
The Archetype 
Characters are often seen as fitting into recurring patterns that seem to go back into human history, 
and the existence, nature and longevity of these patterns have been the subject of much study, as 
for example Frow’s (2014) work on characters demonstrates. These patterns can be called a, 
formula, a model, recipe, style or rule according to which characters are expected to behave. In the 
case of characters, the term ‘archetype’ is suitable to describe the person-like figures that iterate in 
these archaic formulas. 
The archetype tends to be associated with the field of analytical psychology, also known as 
Jungian psychology. Carl G. Jung (1959), known for his work on the collective unconsciousness and 
the concept of the archetypes, describes archetypes as pre-existent motifs dwelling within the 
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collective unconsciousness. The collective unconsciousness is a realm, “a psychic system of a 
collective, universal, and impersonal nature” (1959, 43) that all individuals from a particular culture 
inherit and access. The collective unconsciousness consists of unspecified and unrealised elements. 
According to Jung, archetypes are unspecified elements that change once they take on a specified 
shape and are perceived in that shape (5). Essentially, the collective unconsciousness is made up 
only of archetypes which are then encountered everywhere, but only in their manifested shape (42). 
The archetype also appears in other fields. According to Jung, the concept of the archetype 
appears in psychology, comparative religion and in the field of mythological research, where they 
are known as ‘motifs’ (1959, 42). In the field of literary studies, Régis Boyer (1992) critiques Jung’s 
description of the archetypes, arguing that it runs the risk that all behaviour is reduced “to a 
reflection of a known and recognizable (archetypical) element in the collective psyche” (116). 
Reducing every element encountered in literary works to a familiar pattern gives the impression 
that every manifestation of the archetypical element develops in the exact same manner as defined 
by the archaic formula. This is exactly what Propp (1928) does when he identifies the seven broad 
character functions according to which every character from a fairy tale can be categorized. He 
reduces them to their actions, and a set of behavioural patterns is then assigned a specific category, 
e.g., the helper, the villain, the hero, etc. 
Instead, manifestations can relate to the archetype in several ways. Boyer states that “any 
tale worthy of literary expression can be linked to one or more archetypes” (1992, 110). Although 
Boyer does not directly speak of characters but of stories, he connects the meaning of the concept 
of the archetype to three connotations: the prototype, the ideal model and the supreme type. The 
prototype is an element that brings about the explanation of its successors that appear in other 
works. Boyer states: “it is a fundamental symbol that acts as a kind of matrix for repeated 
representations of itself” (1992, 112). For characters, Sherlock Holmes can be considered the 
archetypical prototype of many characters that came after him. Not only in terms of being a great 
detective, but also in terms of being an extremely intelligent and hyper-observant, eccentric 
(typically male) protagonist using his ability of deductive reasoning to uncover mysteries. This 
archetype appears in characters such as Gregory House from the medical drama series House (2004- 
2012), or Gill Grissom from CSI: Crime Scene Investigation (Zuiker 2000 - 2015) to name only two. 
The ideal model is similar to the prototype but with a status of value (Boyer 1992, 112). It is 
the model image with admirable qualities and virtues to which we refer even when it is not the first 
depiction of this archetype. A character considered to be an ideal model functions as the 
personification of the archetype. For example, the fictional character Arsène Lupin, created by 
Maurice Leblanc and who first appeared in 1905, is perhaps the personification of the archetype of 
the gentleman thief. According to Boyer, history plays the primary role in the establishment of this 
archetype (114). 
Lastly, Boyer proposes the supreme type, the archetype to have an almost divine, god-like 
status, and the most difficult archetype to define. He describes it as follows: 
 
The absolute, the perfect image, that transcends particular circumstances because it goes 
straight to the essential point wherever once chooses to tap it whether the context is 
fictional, religious, or mythical. […] An ideal world where only archetypes can develop; the 
divine Creator makes them move from that universe to the physical universe, where they 
are incarnated in people and concrete objects. Thus all creatures have a spiritual double that 
connects them to God the creator and gives them an underlying nobility and dignity. (1992, 
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114) 
 
As seen from Boyer, the archetype in literature studies seems to be particularly associated with 
narrative structures. John Cawelti (1976) also discusses the archetype as narrative structure. He 
proposes archetypes as literary formulas, considering them structures “of narrative or dramatic 
conventions employed in a great number of individual works” (5). He distinguishes between two 
usages of literary formulas: the first refers to patterns of cultural convention, specific to culture and 
period (5). The second refers to plot types. Plot types function as recipes for narratives that are not 
limited to a culture or period. They consists of general structures in narratives with series of events 
that follow each other in a specific way, like the plot of ‘boy-meets-girl’ (5). Umberto Eco (1979, 19) 
calls the recurring stock situations that inform stories topoi, considering them to be intertextual 
support for the reader (or interpreter) to make sense of narrative situations (31). The reader goes 
outside of the main work—goes on inferential walks (31)—in order to obtain this kind of intertextual 
support by building up a repertoire of topoi that they then can recognise (119). 
As shown, the archetype in literary studies tends to be connected to archaic formulas in 
stories, whereas Jungian archetypes favour personality and behaviour via human-like figures. This 
juxtaposition bears similarities to the juxtaposition between the humanistic position and 
structuralist position in literary studies as discussed in chapter two. 
For the multiplicity model, the archetype functions as reoccurring structural patterns in the 
shape of person-like figures. Iterative patterns evolve with every appearance and manifest 
differently in each character. For pragmatic reasons, I add labels to archetypes—such as ‘hero’, 
‘princess’ or ‘silent protagonist’—in order to be able to discuss the pattern, but I strongly emphasise 
that these should not be understood as fixed archetypical categories, because that weakens the 
patterns’ progression as textual elements. And, just as Boyer argues, it simplifies these characters 
to these categories, while ignoring the variety in which characters come. This would essentially 
reduce the characters to stock characters, clichés with a fixed set of traits and behaviours. 
The archetype in the multiplicity model can be used to describe the different motifs that 
appear and reappear in characters over multiple courses of works. These archetypes are not fixed, 
but are iterative and evolve as the character proliferates. Some of these archetypes are specific to 
a particular type of genre, others are particular to the medium, some are particular to both. For 
example, let me describe how the archetype appears in Link from The Legend of Zelda (LoZ) series: 
besides representing the archetype of the hero as identified by Propp (1928) and Joseph Campbell 
(1949), Link is also the archetype of the silent protagonist particularly present in digital games. Link 
does not speak in the LoZ games. He tends to grunt or nod instead. In The Legend of Zelda: Breath 
of the Wild (BotW) (Nintendo 2017), the player sometimes gives the opportunity to have Link 
respond via a fixed set of dialogue options, but Link never actually delivers the speech: he nods or 
grunts, and the other character responds with their own speech as if Link actually responded with 
the dialogue the player chose, but this delivery remains in the player’s imagination. 
While Link tends to be silent in almost every work in which he appears, sometimes a 
character belongs to different archetypes depending on the work in which they appear. The 
Chocobo is, for example, a character so dispersed across a variety of works that certain works 
represent the Chocobo more akin to a kyara in which it mainly functions according to its ludic role. 
For example, in the Final Fantasy (FF) series, the Chocobo sometimes function as hostile enemy 
species, such as in FF VII (1997) or FF X-2 (2003). In the works such as Hataraku Chocobo [Working 
Chocobo] (Square 2000), or FF XIV: A Realm Reborn (Square Enix 2013 - present), the Chocobo 
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functions as a mount or a pet. In these games, the Chocobo is a cliché, having a fixed set of traits 
and behaviours reduced to its ludic role of enemy, mount or pet. 
In other works, the Chocobo is more on the spectrum of a quasi-person than just a function 
of the game. Works such as Chocobo no Fushigi na Dungeon [Chocobo’s Mysterious Dungeon] 
(Square Enix 1997) and Final Fantasy Fables: Chocobo Tales (H.a.n.d. 2006) depict the Chocobo as 
an individual, as the player-character with its own personality and motivation for experiencing the 
events in the narration of the game. Within these games, the Chocobo belongs to the archetype 
curated over the variety of works of the FF series and the Chocobo series. For example, Final Fantasy 
Fables: Chocobo Tales presents Chocobo as an orphan who lost his parents in a war, and after an 
event where he releases an evil demon, he goes on a journey during which he is revealed to be the 
descendant of a Warrior of Light. A Warrior of Light is a recurring motif within the Final Fantasy 
series in which heroes, chosen by the crystals, legendary objects, to embark on a journey to save 
the world from its doom. The character then represents both the archetypical hero, but also 
represents the archetype of Final Fantasy’s Warrior of Light. 
As an iterative motif, the archetype is inherently abstract and inherently intertextual, which 
informs the interpreter to make sense of characters over the course of a great number of works, 
while these formulas also remain autonomous from a specific work. It is up to the interpreter to 
recognise these formulas. Therefore, an interpreter with less cultural knowledge or experience of a 
certain formula will less likely recognise the formula in a character, but they will start recognising 
these motifs as they build up their repertoire of motifs by consuming, reading and interpreting 
gradually more works. 
 
The Immaterial Character and the Indicator 
The second element in the model consists of the immaterial character and its indicator. The 
transition from the archetype to the immaterial character is a two-step process: the reader first 
needs the indicator to understand its reference to the immaterial character before they can 
recognise the archetype in that character. Even more so than the connection between the archetype 
and the immaterial character, the immaterial character and the indicator cannot be separated, 
whereas the reader can theoretically interpret a character without an archetype if their repertoire 
is not large enough yet to recognise the archetype. This means that the connection between the 
immaterial character and the indicator is bilateral—that is, it is impossible to discuss one without 
the other. For pragmatic reasons however, I will discuss the immaterial character and indicator 
individually, but will not be able to mention one without mentioning the other. 
The immaterial character is not yet embodied in any particular medium. Similarly to the 
archetype, the immaterial character resides in an unspecified, abstract realm as a yet-to-be-
embodied existence. But, in contrast to the archetype, the immaterial character points to a specific 
quasi-person. That is, the immaterial character is the figure that has yet to be packed in 
representational material. 
I base the idea of the immaterial character on Steinberg’s account of the character in the 
media mix. Within the media mix, Steinberg identifies two attributes to the concept of the character. 
The first attribute is the character’s mobility, that is, its movement between media, its appearance 
and re-appearance over a variety of works (2012, 83). The second is its communicative aspect. 
Characters are not limited only to their material instances (the manifestations), but they are also 
abstract (84). Steinberg assigns the character a double nature as a material and an immaterial entity 
at once (2012, 194). As discussed previously in this chapter, being an immaterial entity, or an 
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‘abstract’ or ‘virtual’ entity (see Deleuze and Patton 1994; Steinberg 2012, 194) keeps the character 
open to new and subsequent transformations that can become realised in various representational 
material to different effects. 
Let me explain the immaterial character as follows: someone can refer to a specific character 
without concretely describing it. The proper noun ‘Sherlock Holmes’ can at once refer to all of its 
manifestations, to none, or to a specific number of them. The proper name does not even have to 
refer to the first manifestation of Arthur Conan Doyle’s character. Rather, the name ‘Sherlock 
Holmes’ can perfectly well be stated by someone without the necessity to identify which Sherlock 
Holmes that person speaks about. The conceptual existence to which someone can refer, lacking 
any concrete components, is the immaterial character. Nevertheless, in order to refer to the 
immaterial character, one needs an indicator, a signifier to refer to something abstract (figure 2). 
The immaterial character and the indicator are therefore bilateral: without an indicator to refer to 
the existence of an immaterial character, the immaterial character will not exist. Vice versa, without 
an immaterial character to accompany the indicator, the indicator will carry no meaning. 
  
 
Figure 2: An image of the linguistic sign model by de Saussure. 
The immaterial character and its indicator brings to mind de Saussure’s sign model, designed 
to analyse the nature of the linguistic sign (de Saussure 1916; Nöth 1995, 59). Saussure’s bilateral 
sign model consists of three terms. In English, these are the sign, the signifier and the signified. 
According to Saussure, a sign consists of a concept and a sound-image. De Saussure later introduced 
the terms signified (the concept) and the signifier (the sound-image) (Nöth 1995, 59). The image 
which de Saussure uses to describe the sign represents an ellipse, which stands for the sign as a 
whole with two sides, the concept and the sound-image (image 2). The signifier is the sound and/or 
image that is used to refer to a concept. The arrows stand for the ‘psychological association’ 
between the signifier and the signified (Nöth 1995, 59). The sign model describes the meaning when 
a specific sound or image is used to invoke a concept in someone’s mind. A common example for 
this model is the Latin sound sequence ‘arbor’ to refer to the concept of ‘tree’ (Nöth 1995, 59). 
Intrinsically, ‘arbor’ as the sound-image means nothing, neither as a piece of writing nor as sound, 
but by allocating a specific concept to the sound-image, the idea of a tree, obtains the sign as a 
whole a specific meaning. 
Applying de Saussure’s linguistic sign model to the bilateral relation between the immaterial 
character and the indicator, the immaterial character comes to function as the signified, and the 
85 
 
indicator as the signifier (figure 3). Together, they make up the sign in order to refer to the 
conceptual existence of the character—but are not the character itself per se. The sound-image 
‘Sherlock Holmes’ does not need a specific manifestation of Sherlock Holmes in order for the 
interpreter to understand that it refers to the immaterial aspect of the character. That said, if, for 
example, someone unfamiliar with Latin hears or reads the word ‘arbor’, they are likely not able to 
recognise that it points to the signified of ‘tree’. The sign is culturally learned. For specific 
interpreters unfamiliar with the character Sherlock Holmes, the indicator might not refer to 
anything at all, they might not even recognise it as a name used to indicate a person (or person-like 
entity). Or, the person might only be familiar with a certain manifestation of the character, and not 
with others. Thus, the immaterial character is not only an abstract, to-be-realized entity of a specific 
character, it also functions as the repertoire individual to each interpreter. 
 
 
Figure 3: The immaterial character and the Indicator. 
The immaterial character, in order to be invoked in the interpreter’s mind needs at least one sound-
image to function as an indicator, however both indicator and immaterial character are inconsistent. 
Sherlock Holmes is, for example, referred to in the 1980s animation series as Sherlock Hound 
(Miyazaki and Mikuriya 1984), a pun on the appearance of the character as an anthropomorphic 
dog. In Miss Sherlock (J. Mori, Yusuke, and Matsuo 2018), Sara Shelly ‘Sherlock’ Futaba, having the 
appearance of a modern Japanese woman, only uses the name ‘Sherlock’ as a nickname, but this is 
enough to invoke the immaterial character of Sherlock Holmes. Philippe Hamon (1972) 
demonstrates the inconsistency of the character’s indicator and immaterial character, using de 
Saussure’s sign model, as follows: the character can be defined as a double articulated morpheme, 
the smallest meaningful unit in language, manifested via a discontinuous signifier (signifié 
discontinu) to refer to a discontinuous meaning (signifiant discontinu) (1972, 96). The discontinuous 
signifier refers here to the indicator, and the discontinuous meaning refers to the immaterial 
character. 
According to Hamon (1972), the discontinuous meaning refers to the process of 
characterisation of the character constructed over the course of the work (98). During the 
characterisation process, the reader acquires gradually more information about the character 
through scenes in the work using the character’s name and substitutes (98). What he refers to is 
that the character is not a constant rigid concept, but a changing individual over the course of the 
work. Applying this idea of the discontinuous meaning over multiple works, the immaterial 
character is not continuous either, but by nature discontinuous. The Chocobo, for example, can be 
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the protagonist from Final Fantasy Fables: Chocobo Tales (2006), but can also refer to the enemy 
species of FFVII (1997). 
The indicator to the immaterial character is also discontinuous. Hamon explains that in a 
single work a character is presented through a variety of discontinuous signifiers, such as 
“je/me/moi” [I/me/my] for an anonymous narrator, or “il/Julien Sorel/le jeune homme/notre 
héros/etc.” [he/Julien Sorel/the young boy/our hero/etc.] for a normal character in a roman novel 
(1972, 96). Over the course of a variety of works, the indicator changes. Sherlock Holmes can 
become ‘Sherlock Hound’ or ‘Sara Shelly ‘Sherlock’ Futaba’. Even within these individual works, the 
character Sherlock can refer to themselves as “I/my/mine”, or be referred to as “he/she/‘high-
functioning sociopath’ 11 ”. This is particularly important to point out when discussing game 
characters, as games sometimes offer the player the ability to change the name of the character 
before the start of the game. For example, although the games suggest the name ‘Link’, the player 
can this to another name in games like LoZ: Oracle of Seasons (Capcom 2001) and LoZ: Oracle of 
Time (Capcom 2001). This has no actual consequence for the rest of the player’s game play, and the 
character themselves also does not change, except for the player’s experience, in which the player 
has obtained a (limited) amount of agency over the indicator towards the immaterial character. 
It should be pointed out, however, that the indicator does not have to be a proper noun, 
since the sign model by de Saussure specifies the sound-image. Theories from Japan particularly 
have demonstrated the importance of the visual icon. It is specifically in the discussion about kyara, 
the floating icon that functions as some sort of ‘proto-narrative’ kind of character (see Itô 2005; 
Wilde 2019), where the importance of the image lies in referring to the immaterial character. As 
discussed in the first part of this chapter, even the kyara is a discontinuous signifier as it does not 
always have the same shape, but rather operates as network containing family resemblances (see 
Wittgenstein 1953) which share traits without a specific trait that defines the icon. For example, the 
indicator of the Chocobo takes on many shapes and appearances, most often that of a bird, but not 
necessarily: in Final Fantasy XIV it has a more ‘realistic’ bird-like appearance, whereas in the Final 
Fantasy Fables series, it has a cute, cartoon shape with big eyes. Most of the time, the Chocobo is 
yellow, but black Chocobos also exist. These are all birds, but the character Chocolina from Final 
Fantasy XIII-2 (Square-Enix 2011) has the ability to take on a human form, which resembles a 
(sexualised) female human-like figure with feathers. 
The immaterial character and its indicator do not constitute the character on its own; the 
bilateral element indicate in the meaning-making process of a character how interpreters make 
sense of a specific conceptual character. The immaterial character is at once all the manifestations 
in which a character can appear and none of them. This abstract quality of the character, and the 
discontinuity of the indicator and immaterial character, makes the meaning-making process of the 
character inherently individual: not every empirical interpreter will have seen all the works in which 
Sherlock Holmes appears, and neither will every interpreter recognise the indicator referring to the 
immaterial character. 
 
Manifestation of the Character 
A common critique of de Saussure’s sign model is that he excludes the referential object, because 
he does not take into consideration the objects in the world to which the sign he describes refers 
(see Nöth 1990, 61). In contrast, Steinberg’s distinction between the immaterial and material aspect 
 
11 This is how Sherlock Holmes in the BBC series Sherlock, played by actor Benedict Cumberbatch, refers to himself. 
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of the character does include the referential object: the material aspect of the character is the 
realised incarnation of the character constituted by the local representational material of a specific 
work. This realised incarnation is “embodied by each medium in a distinct way” (Steinberg 2012, 
84), and is specified and can be distinctively identified. This referential object I call the character 
manifestation. 
In the local works, where the character becomes embodied by representational material, it 
becomes possible for interpreters to describe the particular manifestations of the characters. It is 
also on this local, tangible level that interpreters perceive the multiplicity of the character’s 
existence within the character ecology. Link from LoZ: BotW is a different Link than the Link from 
LoZ: Twilight Princess (Nintendo 2006), they are the same character but do not have the same 
identity. In the model I have ascribed these manifestations the variable ‘M’ followed by a number 
(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc.) (image 1) to indicate that these manifestations are two different entities. 
There are several means to distinguish between the different identities of Link in LoZ: BotW 
and Link from LoZ: Twilight Princess. For example, the first indication is that the character appears 
in two different game works, although that does not necessarily exclude that it could be the same 
identity. Another indication is in the games’ stories. The stories do not seem to acknowledge the 
existence of both manifestations as the same identity. And, another indication is Nintendo’s official 
book on the series, Hyrule Historia (Miyamoto, et al. 2013), which states that the heroes in their 
games all share the same name, some are even the same person, or belong to the same line of 
familial descendants (68). The problem here is that although multiple manifestations point to the 
same immaterial character, the manifestations themselves do not necessarily relate in a 
sequentially continuous sense to each other. Some of these heroes are ‘the same Link’ or ‘the same 
person’, yet in other cases they are not. 
Character manifestations tend to iterate, building on previous manifestations, while 
simultaneously reconstructing the character anew. As a result, there is little coherence between 
manifestations and they do not make sense in a sequentially continuous way. The lack of coherence 
is challenging to interpreters because, as Frow also stated, the character operates in a social 
assemblage embedded in a particular formation of personhood so that the interpreter will consider 
it a character (2014, ix). Yet, as I have demonstrated throughout this chapter with both theoretical 
and empirical means, characters are not the same persons in all the works in which they appear.  
The challenges that this brings relate to the control of the character’s identity: when not 
every character manifestation is the same person as another manifestation, yet the interpreter 
recognises this as the same character because it points to the same immaterial character, then who 
or what controls the identity of the character? This question relates to one of the main questions of 
this dissertation: how is the identity of a dynamic game character constructed? In order to answer 
this question, I first need to explain the mechanisms of control that attempt to construct the identity 
of characters in general within the character ecology. Hence, in the next chapter, ‘Manifestations 
and the Problem of Identity’, I will explain the manifestation and the challenges that come along 
with them in more detail. 
 
3. Summary 
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first discusses the appearance of the transmedial 
character in contemporary transmedia practices in the West and in Japan. The main distinction 
between the character discussed in the West and discussed in Japan is that the former focuses on 
coherence and some sort of core essence to conceptualise the nature of the character. The latter 
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seems to find the solution to the incoherence of character appearances in a description of character 
proliferation and how the character moves from one medium or story to the next medium or story, 
which leads to a conceptual distinction between the kyara, a semiotic icon, and the kyarakutaa, a 
dramatis persona. 
 I have been arguing that there exists a tension between transmedial and medium-
specific perspective on what characters are, there exists an assumption that characters belong 
inherently to stories, and there exists a friction about the identity of the character that exists in 
multiplicity. Based on these conceptual problems I provided a definition of characters as quasi-
persons and introduced the multiplicity model, a model that represents the meaning-making 
process of the cultural understanding of characters in their multiple existence, which allows for the 
explanation of the characters’ coherence and (lack of) sequential continuity, and the 
representational materials in which they manifest. I discussed the three different elements of which 
the model consists: the archetype, the immaterial character and its indicator, and the 
manifestations of the character. 
In chapter five, ‘Manifestations and the Problem of Identity’, I explain the challenges that 
occur in the inconsistency between character manifestations as the identity of the character is 
policed by top-down mechanisms of control, such as the author-function, ownership, and 
canonisation. In chapter six, ‘The Construction of Game Characters’, I explain character 
manifestations in games, and how the player comes to understand the entity in the game as a 
character.  
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Chapter Five 
The Challenges of Manifestations and 
their Identities 
 
In the previous chapter The Immaterial Character, I identified three conceptual problems with the 
concept of the character. First, there exists a tension between transmedial and medium-specific 
perspectives on character. Second, the character is assumed to be always part of a story. Third, and 
most relevant to this chapter, the identity of the character is based on the premise—primarily in the 
West—that it has to be a coherent entity via narrative continuity between works. These conceptual 
problems affect how the reader—or interpreter—understands and interprets the identity of the 
character over a course of works. Additionally, authoritative figures attempt to police the reader’s 
interpretation of the character’s identities through a variety of top-down venues of control. The 
process of how character identities are controlled top-down is important in understanding how the 
identity of a dynamic game character is constructed because, as I will explain in more detail in 
chapter eight, the dynamic game character causes tension in a character’s identity within the 
character ecology, since the player obtains agency within a work created by these authorities to 
affect the dynamic game character’s identity. This is in contrast to non-cybermedia works in which 
the reader cannot influence identity of the character within the work itself. 
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part explains why the fallacy of narrative 
continuity is of importance as an attempt to police the reader into interpreting a certain version of 
a character as normative, while other versions with different identities of the same character are 
cast aside as heresy. This part then addresses three venues of control instituted top-down by 
different forms of authority to police the character’s identity: the author-function, ownership and 
canonisation. I describe these venues separately from each other, but they are far from distinct, and 
influence each other greatly. The goal of this part is to point out not only how these venues of 
control work, but also to show how the premise of narrative continuity on which these venues 
operate fails to deliver their promise of the character as having a singular, coherent identity. 
As explained in chapter three, ‘On Method’, I do not include empirical players or readers in 
the equation. While I agree that empirical readers and players provide valuable insight in how they 
engage with top-down control over character manifestations, my focus on the top-down approach 
itself shows that the concept of reader-response theory—including Roland Barthes’ notion of the 
death of the author (1967)—should be revisited in the age of contemporary transmedia practices. 
In these practices, the line between the reader and the author is not only blurred more than before, 
but authorities are also in constant negotiation with the users of their works as these authorities 
give the user the impression that they have agency over the authorities’ works, while simultaneously 
struggling to keep control over their works based on archaic venues of control. It is therefore 
important to understand what these authorities do in their attempt to control the characters’ 
identities and police the reader’s interpretation of these character manifestations, and how they 
fail to uphold this control. 
In the second part of this chapter, I map the textual organisation, a constellation between 
the manifestations of three different characters: Sherlock Holmes, Link and Pikachu. This 
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constellation includes the semiotic references to different character manifestations, and aims to 
show how individual character’s identities are controlled by the different venues in the wider 
character ecology consisting of multiple manifestations of that character. I have chosen the 
characters based on the differences of control over these characters. Sherlock Holmes belongs to 
the public domain and is therefore not any authority’s property, whereas Link and Pikachu are both 
entirely owned by The Nintendo Company. Although I used Sherlock Holmes and Link in the previous 
chapter, I deliberately switched from the Chocobo to Pikachu for two reasons. First, switching to 
Pikachu allows me to show how a single company can use different venues of control over different 
characters. Second, although Nintendo has a variety of iconic characters they use to represent the 
company (such as Link or Mario depending on the discourse), the company seems to have a 
particular preference for Pikachu. While I omit the reasons why Nintendo might have this preference 
to Pikachu, Pikachu appears even in ‘real life’ situations such as being the host in a Pokémon cafe, 
or appearing in a ‘Pikachu Parade’12 organised by Nintendo in which a horde of Pikachu dance 
together at different settings in the city of Yokohama in Japan. 
 
 
1. The Challenge to Character Identities 
In chapter four, ‘The Immaterial Character’, I pointed out that Western theories about characters 
focus on a strive for narrative continuity between character manifestations to form a single 
coherent identity, whereas, in contrast, Japanese theories explain the incoherence between 
character appearances through the dichotomy between kyara and characters. In particular, the 
theories that strive for narrative continuity—the kind of coherence where the identity of a character 
between stories is the same—attempt to ‘repair’ the inconsistencies between the different 
manifestations by reinforcing the idea that the ‘same character’ must have the ‘same identity’. 
However, this kind of perspective falls into the fallacy of considering characters to ontologically 
adhere to the idea of personhood, while in practice, characters’ existences are ontologically 
different from persons. As proposed by Frow (2014), characters are, as quasi-persons, “at once 
ontologically discontinuous […], and logically interdependent” (vii), and depend “on our prior 
knowledge of the kind of thing persons are” (107). The ontological discontinuity and logical 
interdependence is cause for friction, because although a character manifestation might be ‘the 
same character’ as another character manifestation, they do not have to share the identity; they 
can be completely different persons. 
The reader can discern between different identities of a character and perceive the 
manifestations as different persons whether the reader likes it or not. As explained in the previous 
chapter, the indicator is discontinuous and relies on the reader to recognise the manifestation and 
link it to the immaterial character. However, even when a reader recognises a manifestation and 
links it to the immaterial character, they might not be willing to accept that manifestation being the 
same character as another manifestation of that character. Recognising and accepting character 
manifestations are two different actions. Let me share an anecdote of a friend of mine who is a huge 
fan of the superhero character The Flash. At the time, she was furious about the manifestation of 
The Flash, in the movie Justice League (Snyder 2017) played by actor Ezra Miller. According to my 
friend, this character “was not The Flash”. Justice League’s manifestation of The Flash did not adhere 
 
12 If people want to attend the Pikachu Parade in August 2020, they have to sign up in advance: 
https://www.pokemon.co.jp/ex/pika_event/?event_main002=msign. 
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to her idea of how the character was supposed to be. She believed that the movie did not show 
what the character was supposed to look like, how he should act, and moreover, the choice of actor 
was wrong. She compared this manifestation of The Flash to the manifestation that she did like, 
played by actor Grant Gustin in the Netflix television series The Flash (Berlanti, et al. 2014), who she 
considered to be the “real Flash”. 
What was interesting to me was not her argument for which Flash was more truthful. Clearly, 
she was a fan of the Flash played by Grant Gustin, while Ezra Miller’s performance was not up to 
par in her eyes. Of interest to me was her distinction between the manifestations of the character 
where she perceived one as the ‘actual’ character, and the other as an untruthful version. Grant 
Gustin’s version adhered to her perception of the ‘real’ Flash, because her imagination of the Flash 
was constructed by the Flash manifestation of Grant Gustin. Ezra Miller’s version was rejected. She 
seemed to look for a truthful identity, a ‘real’ The Flash character. Yet, here there were two 
manifestations of the same character, but without sharing the same identity. She did not accept the 
manifestation of the character played by Ezra Miller, but she did recognise him as The Flash. Even 
when character manifestations are adjusted, twisted and changed in the process of their 
reconstruction in another work, the readers’ ability to interpret a manifestation to be a specific 
character overrides their conviction to accept it as a character. That is to say that in order for a 
discussion about whether or not a manifestation belongs to a specific immaterial character, the 
reader first has to infer from the work signals to connect it to the immaterial character. 
The identity of a character is complex and not fixed to a core trait or set of core traits, 
because every manifestation can have or lack a trait that other manifestations do or do not have in 
a configuration specific to that manifestation. Bertetti (2014) explains the complexity of a 
character’s identity in an extensive typology in which he uses the Aristotelian dichotomy between 
actant and character to distinguish between a character’s existential identity and its fictional 
identity. Bertetti differentiates on a semiotic level between different kinds of existential and 
fictional identities, but in general it can be said that the former refers to a discursive identity in 
which the identities of character manifestations depend on the discourse—a set of works—in which 
they appear (2014, 2351). Within a specific discourse the identity of the character manifestations 
are perceived to be (usually) one and the same, so that the character is treated as the same person. 
I discuss later in this chapter who decides the identity in the discourse and why. The fictional identity 
refers to the character as an agent who acts within a diegetic world, either as an actor playing in 
different works or as a set of features to which motivations and skills are attributed, and a level that 
concerns the values leading up to the character (2349). 
It is in a character’s existential identity where Bertetti shows the friction between character 
manifestations in terms of their narrative continuity. To explain a character’s different identities 
over different works, Bertetti proposes a preliminary distinction between characters over a single 
course of events and multiple courses of events. According to him, characters over a single course 
of events do not change their fictional identity. After all, they are supposed to be the same being. 
But he does state that their existential identity changes over time, whereas over the course of 
multiple events, characters do not have any temporal connection and vary greatly between 
appearances. Variations in a fictional identity can occur as long as it occurs inside a single universe 
(a continuous time and space) with no contrasting events between the character manifestations. 
Bertetti’s typology demonstrates most of all the need for narrative continuity to determine 
a character’s identity over a set of works in which it manifests. This emphasis on narrative continuity 
is nothing new. It is entirely in alignment with the need for continuous space and time in stories set 
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in contemporary transmedia practices that focus on relations between different works, and 
specifically different (story) worlds. In her work on transfictionality, Marie-Laure Ryan (2013) 
distinguishes between three different relations of story worlds across different works based on 
Lubomír Doležel’s Heterocosmica (1998), on expanding possible worlds in literary fiction. The links 
between story worlds in different works are expansion, modification, transposition, and Ryan adds 
quotation as a fourth link. Although she does not explain the latter in much detail, expansion and 
transposition are based on narrative continuity in which a change in events, or a change of time and 
spatial setting determine how the story world in one work relates to another. An expansion of a 
work to another suggests the same time and setting and therefore the same world. A modification 
refers to a counterfactual sequence of events such that one sequence of events cannot have 
occurred in the same world as the counterfactual sequence of events. And transposition refers to a 
different spatial or temporal setting in another work. All of these different relations between worlds 
inherently also imply that the character manifestations that inhabit these worlds have a different 
identity in one work depending on its relation to another work. For example, the BBC’s Sherlock 
television series (Moffat and Gatiss 2010), having a different temporal setting than the original 
Sherlock Holmes novels, necessarily implies that the manifestation in the television series is its own 
separate discourse and therefore maintains a different identity than the Sherlock manifestation in 
the discourse of the original novels. 
However, while textual relations between works definitely determine the reader’s 
understanding of the identity of a character, what remains omitted in the scholarly works from 
Bertetti, Ryan and other scholarly works such as those from Uricchio and Pearson (1991), Denson 
(2011), and Pearson (2019) is a critical investigation of who determines the identity of a character. 
Bertetti does note that time and space are important factors for how readers obtain a sense of 
continuity between character manifestations, but even within a specific discourse in which 
coherence between these manifestations is assumed, a character does not always have to have the 
same existential identity that conforms to time and space. The BBC Sherlock series only suggests 
that Sherlock Holmes within that series maintains the same identity, but the special episode ‘The 
Abominable Bride’ (2016) implies that this is not always the case. 
To explain the multiple identities of Batman, Brooker (2012) has three distinct but coexisting 
models of continuity. The first model, the myth, is a summation of all Batman manifestations. The 
second model, brand, shows that the identity of Batman is determined by a contained and 
controlled network of works “defined by their current status as Warner Bros. Batman products” 
(153). On top of that, the third model, canon, address that the identity of Batman is controlled by a 
system of canon that specifies what events of Batman do and do not count (154). These different 
types of continuity demonstrate that the different identities between manifestations is not only a 
matter of textual relations between one work and the other work, but also that the configuration 
of these identities is a question of control. Who creates the discourse in which these manifestations 
appear? And, who determines the configuration of these identities? 
The configuration of character manifestations over different works and in different 
discourses through which the reader interprets a character’s different identities is inherently a 
question of control over the character ecology. Therefore, in order to understand how 
manifestations relate to each other, and how the reader comes to interpret manifestations as 
specific identities, it is crucial to not only investigate how works in which the character appears 
relate to each other from a narrative continuity perspective (prioritising story coherence), but the 
process of how character identities are controlled and policed should also be put under scrutiny. 
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This process is important in this dissertation, because in order to understand how the identity of a 
dynamic game character is constructed, and how the dynamic game character influences the 
character ecology, it is necessary to explore how the identities of characters in a character ecology 
tend to be policed before explaining how a dynamic game character’s identity influences the friction. 
How the reader makes sense of the configuration of character manifestations and their 
identities occurs from a top-down approach via three different venues of control: authorship, 
ownership and canonisation. All three of these venues are in constant negotiation to determine the 
identity of the character, wrapped up in a continuous process to police the construction of the 
constellation of different identities of manifestations in the character ecology. As discussed in 
chapter three, ‘On Method’, I purposefully omit discussing audiences and their activities in 
contemporary transmedia practices except for those moments in which scholars point out where 
fan culture specifically interferes with the creation of the character. This is not to say they fans do 
not participate in the policing of a character’s identity. The backlash on Sonic’s design in the 
upcoming Sonic the Hedgehog movie (Fowler 2020) is an example of the influence fans can have 
over character manifestations (see Jackson 2019). Rather, my approach focuses on how authorities, 
controlling the manifestations of ‘official’ works, attempt to influence the reader’s interpretation of 
a character’s identity through a variety of venues in which the authorities attempt to control the 
relations between works, and therefore between character manifestations and their identities. 
These venues are not without their own challenges. As I will point out, the constant 
negotiation within and between the different venues might attempt to police the constellation of 
character identities, but upon a closer critical view, these venues hold up little to scrutiny. In the 
following segment, I first discuss the role of the author, and then role of the owner. These are two 
seemingly similar roles that can converge but, as I discuss, we should perceive them as two different 
entities with entirely different functions. In the later part of the segment I will discuss their role in 
canonisation. 
 
The Author-Function 
In chapter three, ‘On Method’, I discuss Barthes’ argument of the death of the author for the 
construction of the reader-response approach I maintain within this dissertation. In reader-response 
theory, the discussion of the author seems to have become an irrelevant matter, because the reader 
can come to an interpretation of a work regardless of the author determining or legitimising that 
interpretation. However, as Ebony Elizabeth Thomas (2019) points out: 
 
The question of the reader-author struggle must be revisited, given that in this digital age, 
more people than ever before are writing for work and during leisure, readers connect with 
one another in powerful networks, lines between readers and writers blur, definitions of 
what counts as text are negotiated and reconfigured in hybrid multimodal and multilingual 
constellations, and texts and people circulate across asymmetrical trajectories (154). 
 
Ebony refers specifically to writer J. K. Rowling’s tweet that commented on the backlash after the 
announcement that the character Hermione in the theatre play Harry Potter and the Cursed Child 
(Thorne 2016) of the Harry Potter franchise would be played by a black actress: “Canon: brown eyes, 
frizzy hair and very clever. White skin was never specified. Rowling loves black Hermione” (Rowling 
2015). 
Rowling has a history of revealing details about the identity of her characters outside of the 
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original Harry Potter book series in paratexts, such as stating that Dumbledore is gay, and expressing 
doubt about having Ron and Hermione marry instead of Hermione and Harry. According to Thomas 
(2019, 155), Rowling’s statements and the backlash from fans shows the extent of the ownership 
fans felt they had over the Harry Potter narrative landscape. However, I would add that Rowling’s 
statement also reveals the ownership Rowling seems to grant herself over the reader’s 
interpretative agency. While the tweet above shows that Rowling is happy with any kind of racial 
interpretation about Hermione from the reader, she assumes the position that what is the core of 
the Hermione (“Canon: brown eyes, frizzy hair, and very clever”). For Rowling, the reader 
themselves then only has the agency to interpret what the author does not claim to be the core of 
the canon. 
Among the reader-response theorists from the 1960s and 1970s, Michel Foucault (1969) 
describes the relevance of the author to identify a work as a work. Like Barthes (1977), Foucault 
assumes the position that the author is dead, but instead of arguing for the many different meanings 
a work can have, Foucault instead points to the function the author has in ascribing a discourse. In 
his 1969 article ‘What Is an Author?’, Foucault clarifies that the author of the work is not the same 
as the individual, instead he argues that the function of the author (the ‘author-function’) is to serve 
as a group of classification bringing together a set of works, a discourse that can be identified as 
such: 
 
The name of the author remains at the contours of texts -separating one from the other, 
defining their form, and characterizing their mode of existence. It points to the existence of 
certain groups of discourse and refers to the status of this discourse within a society and 
culture. The author’s name is not a function of a man’s civil status, nor is it fictional; it is 
situated in the breach, among other discontinuities, which gives rise to new groups of 
discourse and their singular mode of existence. (1969, 19) 
 
The author shapes a specific discourse in which a set of works are grouped together implying 
“homogeneity, filiation, reciprocal explanation, authentication, or of common utilization” (1969, 19). 
Foucault (1969) identifies four characteristics of the author-function that support a discourse in 
order to separate it from other discourses: 
 
• The author-function is an object of appropriation. When ownership and 
copyright were established (end of 18th, beginning of 19th century) the author 
gained the right of ownership over the work in that it is lawfully recognized 
that they possess it as a product. (1969, 20) 
• The author-function is not universal and constant. An example that Foucault 
gives is that there was a time that scientific works were only considered 
truthful and valuable if they contained a name, whereas now the value of 
scientific work is ideally determined by the quality of the work (shown, for 
example, by the prevalence of double-blind peer review). (1969, 20) 
• The author-function does not come to be via the attribution of a work to a 
single individual, but “results from a complex operation whose purpose is to 
construct the rational entity we call an author” (1969, 22). Foucault argues that 
the norms that are used to attribute a work to an individual author has, in 
literary criticism, almost a holy dimension derived from Christian traditions. 
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These norms of authenticity concern a process in which a specific quality of 
their works, a certain conceptual or theoretical coherence, a stylistic uniformity, 
and the author as a historical figure are attributed to the author as a single 
entity. 
• Lastly, the author-function contains a plurality of egos inside the work divided 
between “a unique individual who, at given time and place, succeeded in 
completing a project, […] an instance and plan of demonstration that anyone 
could perform provided the same set of axioms, preliminary operations, and 
an identical set of symbols were used”. (1969, 23) 
 
It is in the author-function that an explanation for Rowling’s sense of ownership over the reader’s 
agency over character interpretation can be found. Ascribing to the author a holy status, the author 
becomes the figure that can determine the existence and, therefore, the identity of the character. 
The reader themselves then judges their understanding based on the fallacy of authorial intention. 
That is, if the author assigns the character to be a certain way, in the original work or in paratext, 
the reader puts the author’s claim above their own interpretation and assumes that the author is 
right, because the author is the creator of the character, its “author-god” (Barthes 1967). 
The idea that the existence of the character is causally related to the author is known as 
‘creationism’. Stuart Brock (2010) describes creationism about character as “the view that fictionalia 
are created not by God but by the authors of the novels in which they first appear” (338). Theological 
creationism is the counterpart of creationism about characters, and has been used for centuries as 
a psychologically satisfying explanation to clarify the existence of the earth with the view that the 
Christian God created Earth and humanity (2010, 337). The author of the character and God share 
in the view of creationism a similar position. But while the author-function might seem satisfying to 
some to explain the identity of the character, Brock counters the idea that the existence of a 
character is causally related to the author because it suffers from the same problem as theological 
creationism: “the purported explanation is more mysterious than the data it seeks to explain” (2010, 
338). 
Brock’s argument against creationism is only an argument against the idea that characters 
are causally related to their author, not that they are not created by their author at all (343). The 
view is the difference between the idea that the author can describe a character in a certain context 
and the author causing the character to exist at all. David Friedell (2016) counters Brock’s view 
against the fallacy of the causal relation between author and character, because Brock’s view is “not 
a knockdown argument” (Brock 2010, 362). According to Friedell, the existence of characters 
depend “in some way on authorial intention” (2016, 132). In Friedell’s view, if the author of a 
character says something about that character, then that is true: “[i]f Doyle intended for Watson 
and Holmes to be one character, then they are” (2016, 132). Friedell justifies his claims stating that 
if the author intends to decide how characters are, the corresponding interpretation of the reader 
has to be legitimate, to which he seems to mean “consistent with literary and linguistic constraints” 
(133). 
The problem with Friedell’s claims in a character ecology are twofold: first, he does not take 
into consideration multiple authors (see Friedell 2016, 137), and, second, he grants the author-
function value with, as described by Foucault, an almost holy dimension derived from Christian 
traditions. His view on the causal relationship between the author and the character does not 
explain how both a black and white Hermione can exist in the same work, nor how Rowling can 
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assert that Dumbledore is gay in a paratext, while none of the ‘official’ works in which she was 
involved explicitly make his sexuality clear—it is entirely ignored. Even without taking empirical fans 
into consideration, Friedell’s claims do not hold up to scrutiny, because he does not take into 
consideration the constant negotiation between multiple forms of control. 
In contemporary transmedia practices, the idea that a single author creates a work in order 
to give an impression of authority and authenticity to the discourse carries less weight when entire 
teams and companies are behind the production of a work, like in game development. Games are 
usually created by a team rather than a single author. Big companies like Nintendo, Rockstar Games, 
Atlus, Square Enix and Electronic Arts tend to have multiple teams that are all involved in different 
games. Even so-called indie games—games created by independent developers—are much more 
likely to be produced by a group than by a single person. Take Hollow Knight (Team Cherry 2017) 
for example: despite that there are ‘only’ three creators involved,13 the authors go by the singular 
name of Team Cherry, indicating the same process as Foucault’s author-function: the attribution of 
the game is not to a single individual, but to an entity called an author. In this case, Team Cherry 
maintains the author-function rather than any of the individuals involved in the actual creating 
process. The contention does not go away, but rather the problem is redirected to attributing the 
appropriation of the work to a single institution—even though institutions consist of multiple 
persons. 
The idea that an author can determine a character’s identity creates an even bigger friction 
once the author of a work becomes involved in multiple ‘official’ discourses, creating different 
manifestations of the same character in the process. Writer Margaret Atwood, for example, is 
involved as a consulting producer in the writing of the television series The Handmaid’s Tale (Miller 
2017), based on her novel of the same name (Atwood 1985). The character Aunt Lydia from the 
television series bears a slightly different identity than Aunt Lydia from the novels. In the sequel to 
the 1985 novel, The Testaments (Atwood 2019), Aunt Lydia is revealed to have been a family court 
judge prior to the establishment of the country Gilead (former USA), whereas in the series, Aunt 
Lydia is known to have been a lawyer. Both manifestations are Aunt Lydia, but which manifestation 
is considered to have a more official, or ‘truer’ value than the other? The friction is that Atwood’s 
presence as the author grants both manifestations a sense of authenticity, but when the 
authenticity of a character identity depends on the author-function, and two or more 
manifestations bear that status, the author-function fails to deliver both discourses in which the 
character appears a sense of truth and value. 
In this venue, the author-function acts as an authority to create specific discourses in which 
manifestations of the character over a series of works is to be interpreted by the reader to be a 
single coherent identity. This allows particular manifestations to be differentiated from character 
manifestations in other discourses to which different authors are assigned. However, issues arise 
once the authorial intent is considered to be causally related to the identity of the character 
(Hermione can be both black or white because Rowling says so), when multiple authors are involved 
in the creation of a single manifestation, or when the author-function grants multiple different 
identities the same status. 
 
Ownership: Character Merchandising 
Ownership is another venue through which authorities differentiate between discourses with 
 
13 See http://teamcherry.com.au/about/.  
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different character identities. Foucault assigns ownership originally to the author-function, but this 
particular feature is outdated in contemporary transmedia practices. The author of the character 
and the owner of the character are more likely to be two separate entities than the same entity. 
Evans (2012, 111) for example points out that, aside from the agency of individual production, forces 
at an institutional level also contribute to the creation of multiple Sherlock Holmes manifestations. 
The BBC Sherlock television series was created by screenwriters Mark Gatiss and Steven Moffat who, 
despite their author-function, do not have the intellectual property (IP) rights over the character 
manifestations, as these rights belong to the BBC. As the property owner, the BBC funds and 
broadcasts the series, and simultaneously keeps a specific in-house style to which the character 
manifestations are subjected; the Sherlock Holmes manifestation within this discourse has to 
adhere to the BBC’s agenda that attempts to maintain its public service purposes whilst competing 
in a global television market (Evans 2012, 111). 
Ownership is important to contemporary transmedia practices, because it provides 
opportunity to produce and control a character’s identity via character merchandising. Explaining 
the term, Steinberg (2012) states: “[n]arrowly defined, character merchandising is the copyright 
business; it is the business of creating contracts and gaining income through selling or leasing the 
rights to use a character image” (41). That said, character merchandising is far from a new practice. 
He traces the business back to the 1950s with Disney’s presence being responsible for the legal 
framework in Japan (41). According to Janet Wasko (2001), Disney considers itself the largest 
worldwide licenser of character merchandise, but is essentially no different from “other copyright 
holders of film and television properties”. Via veto power, the company tries to control the 
characterisation process of the character manifestations in multiple discourses, which shapes the 
multiple identities of characters in the process. When the IP holder allows the characterisation 
process to circulate through the hands of other institutions, the different manifestations emanating 
from these institutions obtain both distinct features and traits, so that they essentially become 
different identities, while they simultaneously have to adhere to the ideal of a coherent identity 
between manifestations.  
Character merchandising practices form a site of tension and negotiation where the 
character’s identity is coordinated by multiple parties. According to Derek Johnson (2013), 
franchises mutated their license-practices “from an intra-industrial franchise with limited cross-
platform appeal in the 1980s, to an inter-industrial behemoth that drove excessive conglomerate 
expansion and corporate reorganization in the 1990s, and finally to a license-supporting partnership 
between economically and culturally distinct corporate entities” (104). License-supporting 
partnerships remain a site of continuous negotiation that struggles over territories and unequal 
power relations (Johnson 2013, 94) which results in the identity of the character between its 
manifestations in different works being continuously affected by these negotiations. 
There are several challenges that arise when the characterisation process is negotiated via 
the practice of character merchandising. One of them is that character merchandising does not 
combine well with the strive for narrative continuity in the West. Eco (1979) explains that Superman 
needs to be easily recognised by an emblematic and fixed nature in order to move between media, 
but the character is simultaneously subjected to character development typical of the kind of 
production in which it appears. A character such as Superman finds themselves in a situation in 
which they are not supposed to consume themselves, since that means they will come closer to 
their own death and cannot appear in other productions anymore. But, at the same time, the 
character has to give the impression that it develops as a person (1979, 19). This observation is in 
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accordance with Brooker’s models of continuity. One of the models, the brand, describes that IP 
holders dispose of previous versions of Batman and replace them with newer versions (2012, 154). 
Each new version provides a new discourse, implying another fixed and stable identity of Batman 
that develops in a different way than previous versions. Once a particular discourse of the character 
has been exhausted, developed to the point of no return, IP holders will create a new discourse in 
which the character operates as a new version. 
In the Japanese media mix, IP holders embrace the different images and identities. According 
to Akinori Nakamura and Susanna Tosca (2019), IP-related products surround the fans so that they 
can choose whatever product they can or want to consume, while at the same time, the IP holder 
creates “more touchpoints to newcomers to a ground of products” (4). Having IP rights over specific 
kyara, then, not only allows the IP holder to decide in which discourse the character appears and 
what kind of identity it holds, but, more importantly, the focus on business and not on narrative 
continuity provides the IP holder with the ability to expand their products without the problem of 
the character meeting their own narrative death. 
A subsequent challenge is that it becomes hard for consumers to keep track of all the 
different manifestations and their identities. Johnson (2013, 79) explains that already in the 1970s 
media entertainment franchises such as Marvel Entertainment and DC Comics noticed with their 
comic distribution that although continuity between comic issues created a group of potential loyal 
customers, potential losses on unsold issues revealed that the mass market audience could not keep 
up with the effort it takes to keep track of what was happening in the comics. According to Johnson 
(2013, 79), to appeal to the loyal customers who valued continuity, a niche market was created. But 
what we can tell from critics on continuity between character manifestations is that IP owners 
constantly negotiate the character’s identity between multiple parties, although they also 
continuously reiterate the character to control continuity. 
The third challenge is that IP holders tend to make use of non-memory methods to assign 
more value to a newer identity of a character than an older identity, so that the older identity will 
be forgotten in cultural memory. According to Colin B. Harvey (2015): “legal frameworks play a 
crucial role in determining what can and cannot be remembered, and therefore in circumscribing 
canon, the collectively agreed mythology to which storyworld must ideally adhere” (93). He uses 
Anna Reading’s concept of non-memory methods (Reading 2014, 168; Harvey 2015, 97) to explain 
non-memory methods in contemporary transmedia practices: “what the IP holder is engaged in, 
often through licensing agreements with third parties, is an attempt to circumscribe what is and is 
not canon by excluding certain pre-existing elements but including others” (Harvey 2015, 97). A 
current example is for instance the newest Spider-Man played by actor Tom Holland. Holland’s 
Spider-Man is part of the so-called Marvel Cinematic Universe (MCU), a franchise that to date 
consists of 23 different movies that are all set in the same universe, relying on narrative continuity. 
Holland is far from the first Spider-Man owned by Marvel Entertainment (now part of The Walt 
Disney Company). However, previous Spider-Men, such as those played by actors Toby Maguire and 
Andrew Garfield, are not included in this universe. They are through the technique of exclusion 
gradually forgotten as the Spider-Man. Through techniques such as these, IP holders erase previous 
character identities so that the newest version, and the character’s newest identity, gains the status 
of the ‘true’ character—until another one pops up, that is. 
Character merchandising essentially creates a paradox on an institutional level: the 
character becomes dispersed over a variety of media works in the hands of multiple parties involved 
in the character’s characterisation process such that the character ends up in different discourses 
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owned by different institutions. Even when the character has a specific entity within a specific 
discourse, the character can only develop so much before they meet their own end, and the IP 
owner must—if they want to continue using the character for profits—ultimately renew the 
character in another discourse. To keep the newest version of the identity of a character alive, the 
IP owner tends to turn to non-memory practices to have the previous character be forgotten in 
cultural memory. When the IP holder tries to keep the identities of characters that they find most 
relevant alive for as long as possible, this inevitably results in multiple manifestations in which a 
character has different identities depending on the discourse, and in which the identities of the 
characters are nothing more than commodities to pass around in order to obtain profit. 
 
The Concept of Canon: Canonisation 
The third venue is canonisation: the process of creating a canon. The strive for narrative continuity 
between character manifestations leads almost inevitably to a discussion of canon that, as Brooker 
(2012) discusses, determines which events ‘actually’ happened, and therefore what a character’s 
identity ‘actually’ is within the complexity of discourses in which the character appears. Canon 
formation about a character’s identity is ultimately a struggle of control over the character’s 
characterisation process between two or more parties. Both Brooker (2012) and Harvey (2015) 
describe canon as a set of works carefully constructed by means of including and excluding specific 
works so that a character appears with a stable identity. However, the formation of who determines 
the official identity of an ‘official’ or ‘actual’ identity of a character in the character ecology of 
contemporary transmedia practices and how that is determined is vague, and should therefore be 
held up to scrutiny. 
In order to understand how a character’s identity is formed through canonisation, it is 
important to understand what a canon is, and what the mechanisms behind canon formation are in 
contemporary transmedia practices. Addressing the debate of canon in the age of digital media, 
Hans-Joachim Backe (2015) presents three major topics relevant to the issue that the concept of 
canon poses to characters in a transmedia ecology: the historical development of the concept of 
(literary) canon within Anglophone and Germanophone contexts, the mechanisms of canon 
formation, and the challenge digital media pose to the concept of canon. 
Backe (2015 4) explains that it would be misleading to discuss the concept of canon as a 
monolithic phenomenon—as in Harvey and Brooker’s discussion—because the term has a plethora 
of meanings ascribed to it that stretch over many branches of knowledge. According to Backe, canon 
has had historically a shift in usages, the most influential of which being when it became used to 
refer a set of sacred texts for particular religious groups where the “additional meaning of the term 
reflected back on its general usage, which came to be associated with unquestionable authority and 
the totality of knowledge on a subject, outside which only heresy remains” (2015, 6). From this point 
on, canon emerges as a monolithic and static phenomenon that authoritatively determines the 
interpretation of a selected set of works as ‘official’. 
Instead of scrutinising the problematic authoritative aspect of a canon, the German 
approach in academia to canon focuses on understanding the mechanisms of canon formation as a 
“complex, interdependent system of the production, distribution, reception, and evaluation of 
literary texts” (2015, 10). Backe utilises the invisible hand concept applied by Simone Winko (2002) 
to describe the uncoordinated actions within intentional collaborations that construct a canon 
(Backe 2015, 11). The process of the construction can be distinguished between two kinds of actions, 
micro-actions and macro-actions, which cooperatively form a canon. The former are actions by 
100 
 
individuals and the value judgments they place on a text, ranging from “an author’s choice of literary 
allusions” to “a professor’s selection of works for a course syllabus” (Backe 2015, 11.). The latter 
refer to so-called groups of ‘agents’ of the canon: institutions that carefully curate and preserve the 
canon so that the works within this canon obtain value as masterpieces (11). 
The existence of groups all trying to create a monolithic canon causes multiple canons to 
appear at the same time (Winko 2002; Backe 2015). Despite the fact that Sherlock is a character 
who belongs to the public domain, when the character is used by groups creating their own 
manifestation of the character, the characterisation process of that character becomes intellectual 
property carefully curated and maintained by these groups. Yet, despite the fact that the character 
is the focus of the canon, what in turn also happens is that these groups create their own group-
identity: 
 
As canon always reflects the choices by its group and so reinforces the group identity, each 
group tries to establish its canon as a normative, singular canon for the whole system to 
assert its own role in the system. (Backe 2015, 12) 
 
These groups establish their own identity along with that of the character; the character becomes a 
distinctive label to represent these groups, allowing them to become significant within the character 
ecology. The character that represents them also has to conform to the brand these groups wish to 
express. An example would be Disney. Given Disney’s appeal to young audiences, the company will 
likely not produce any overly violent or pornographic character, since that does not conform to the 
identity the company wants to present, which, in turn, shapes certain expectations about character 
manifestations produced by this company. For example, only recently (at the time of writing), 
Disney’s Donald Duck magazine in The Netherlands drew an LGBTQ+14 couple in one of its comics 
after a request by a ten-year old girl in the national news program for children, Het Jeugdjournaal. 
The couple only functioned as background characters, but it was nonetheless surprising enough that 
it became a topic of news in the national newspapers (Benjamin 2019).  
The concept of the invisible hand is present in all layers of an institution, in which multiple 
groups attempt to pluck away at a canon that the institution proclaims as a normative one, so that 
multiple discourses, each with their own canon and own ‘official’ version of a character, can exist. 
BBC’s Sherlock was not the first Sherlock BBC created. The BBC had already released the television 
series The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes (Cox 1984) that ran from 1984 until 1994 with actor 
Jeremy Brett, portraying a Sherlock Holmes in his mid-fifties set in Victorian Britain like Doyle’s 
Sherlock Holmes. Neither one of these discourses is more official than the other, rather they exist 
separately with each being a canonical discourse on its own next to the other. 
The final point Backe (2015) makes is the problem of electronic media challenging 
canonisation. As Backe notes, the invisible hand is applicable to digital texts too, and he identifies 
three key aspects in which digital media challenge the process of canonisation: 
 
First, dynamic networks texts can produce countless paratexts and text versions, which 
makes it difficult to select a single, authoritative instance of a text for canonization. Second, 
digital art is, to an even greater degree than twentieth century mass media, open to the 
influence of and reconfiguration of recipients. Third, many digital artifacts have to be 
completed through interaction. (2015, 20) 
 
14 LGBTQ+ stands for: lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and more. 
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Backe (2015) explains in detail that the concept of canon suffers from many flaws. Canon is far from 
being a static phenomenon, but rather is constantly in flux, and has always been in flux even ‘only’ 
inside forms of traditional literature. As both Backe (2015) and Ebony Elizabeth Thomas (2019) also 
suggest, digital media, such as games, pose another challenge to canonisation: they produce 
countless works, are constantly being re-written by recipients so that the distinction between 
author and reader becomes even thinner, and are ‘read’ by non-trivially traversing through it. In 
other words, ‘canonisation’ is much more suitable to the concept of canon than the term ‘canon’. 
That does not mean that owners, authors or producers of these digital works do not attempt 
to create a canon. A concept popular within the building of (transmedial) worlds is the idea of a 
‘Bible’ used to preserve narrative consistency (Wolf 2012, 201). Nieves Rosendo (2015, 60) notes 
that in the case of major franchises such as Star Wars and Halo, producers endorse a set of works 
to represent the official world of those franchises, and everything outside of their authority is 
dismissed as unofficial. The concept of the Bible retrieves the exact meaning as canon had 
previously: a set of sacred texts “associated with unquestionable authority and the totality of 
knowledge on a subject, outside which only heresy remains” (Backe 2015, 6). Yet, Harvey (2015, 
114) also shows the irony of the Bible, using the Halo franchise as an example: the producers 
constantly attempt to fix the mythology and its canon, even when the story world has already been 
established, thereby including and excluding different works. Their attempt to create a fixed canon 
reflects what a canon actually is: canonisation, a process constantly in flux. 
The identity of the character is subject to canonisation. A character’s identity is in a constant 
flux, never really determined, never finished as multiple groups and individuals negotiate, debate 
and enforce a character’s identity repeatedly. Eco (1979, 116) argues that a canon implies that the 
character belongs to the continuous present. A canon promises the development of characters in a 
linear way over the course of a series of works, but, at the same time, any development leads to the 
end of the character. That creates the paradox that if the character ends, it should not be able to 
continue existing in other works, and, if it does, it dissolves any sense of narrative continuity. The 
character can therefore never fully develop, because it cannot reach its death. It will just iterate 
anew in a new identity brought forward as the new normative, ready to develop again. The 
character’s characterisation process is therefore not a process that will likely reach an end, but exists 
constantly on a site of negotiation. 
Just like the other two venues, the concept of the canon is flawed. A canon allows invisible 
hands to operate in a field of hierarchy in which they place value judgment on certain manifestations 
of a character. They attempt to police the reader to interpret certain manifestations as the only 
truthful manifestations of that character while other manifestations are set aside as a heresy. Canon 
provides a promise to reduce the complexity of a character’s identity to a single coherent existence, 
but as it is influenced by many invisible hands containing their own agenda, providing their own 
version of the character’s identity, the canon creates what it promises to avoid: an identity that 
cannot be brought to a core. 
 
 
2. A Textual Organisation 
Up until now, I have shown three venues through which a character’s identity is policed, controlled 
and negotiated in a constant process. In order to understand the characterisation process of a 
character over multiple works, I propose in this part of the chapter a constellation that maps the 
textual organisation of the discourses controlled by the invisible hands trying to create and maintain 
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the identity of the character as a static singular being. To do so, I propose three schematics: Sherlock, 
Link, and Pikachu. Each character shows a different constellation, allowing to me to demonstrate 
how the three different venues of control operate per character. 
I am far from the first one who has attempted to show a map of the textual organisation of 
related works. For example, as discussed in this chapter, Ryan’s (2013) model of transfictionality 
shows four different forms in which story worlds tend to grow. Another work that concentrates on 
the distribution of intellectual property and canonisation inside the ecology of contemporary 
transmedia practices is by Eder (2015). For his textual organizations, he proposes four strategies in 
which transmedial multitexts (constellations of works) are produced and distributed: multiple 
exploitation, supplementation, integration and participation (2015, 75). 
The model that I propose is meant to incorporate both the semiotic references between 
works as well as the control that invisible hands employ to determine the character’s identity in the 
character ecology. The advantage of this model lies in its adaptability to each character’s individual 
situation that allows for a deeper understanding of the control over the relation between the 
distribution of works in which the character appears and the identity of the character. In other 
words, the model that I propose places the struggle for control over the characterisation process at 
its centre. 
With three different character examples, known from the previous chapter (Sherlock Holmes, 
Pikachu and Link) I will show the textual organisation of how the identity of these characters are 
controlled. Each character’s constellation has a different structure, but every constellation consists 
of three layers organised according to the value placed on the works to determine the 
characterisation process. These elements are: an urtext, discourses and the character ecology. 
My reason for choosing one character from the West (Sherlock Holmes), and two from Japan, 
both from the same company (Link and Pikachu) is as follows: although Japanese media mix 
strategies do not usually strive for narrative continuity, that does not mean that such an occurrence 
does not happen. Nintendo’s attempt to give the manifestations of Link narrative continuity via their 
official book on The Legend of Zelda series, Hyrule Historia (Miyamoto, et al. 2013), demonstrates 
that although the character is originally from Japan, it does not only have to operate according to a 
Japanese strategy for proliferation. As I make clear in the rest of the chapter, while Sherlock Holmes’ 
constellation operates on the strive for continuity and Pikachu’s constellation focuses on 
proliferation, Link’s constellation posits itself somewhere in-between the two other constellations. 
This provides an opportunity to demonstrate in which different shapes a character constellation can 
potentially appear. 
 
The Urtext and the Prototype 
The reason to identify an urtext in a character’s constellation is two-fold. First, an urtext is constantly 
negotiated anyway in the search for the character’s ‘actual’ identity. Via the author-function, the 
character’s ‘origin’ or its prototype are determined. Second, identifying an urtext highlights the 
struggles of the constant negotiation over the character’s identity, as it points out the fallacies of 
fidelity to the prototype, and which forces support this fallacy. An urtext allows for scrutiny of which 
works that derive from the urtext use what patterns from the urtext in an attempt to adhere to and 
diverge from it. 
In general, the German prefix ‘ur-’ refers to what is original or primordial, or in some extreme 
cases it even stands for purity (see Boyer 1992a; 1992b). In contemporary transmedia practices, the 
urtext is used to create coherence between works. Harvey (2014; 2015) uses the concept in the 
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specific case of transmedia storytelling to address its basic assumption of consistency of the story 
world across all platforms. The urtext in his use then is associated with an authenticity that has an 
implicit value judgment that places a work that is considered the urtext above all other works. I use 
the term urtext to address the work in which the first manifestation of the character, the prototype, 
appears. 
The idea that a character has to adhere to its prototype is an invalid way of reasoning, a 
fallacy, because it places high value on fidelity to an ‘original’ along with narrative continuity in the 
situation of contemporary transmedia practices that cannot maintain neither promise. As discussed, 
who and what determines the traits of the characters that follow from the prototype is difficult to 
determine due to the constant negotiation between many invisible hands (Backe 2015). The author-
function cannot be used to determine a character’s origin, and character ownership creates a 
paradox as well. Furthermore, the reader themselves can also interpret the character as a different 
entity than any of these venues ever intended. 
The urtext is not a necessary work for the reader to make sense of a character. Uricchio and 
Pearson (1991, 185) argue that “Batman has no primary urtext set in a specific period, but has rather 
existed in a plethora of equally valid texts”. Brooker (2012, 152) too argues that Batman will survive 
as a cultural icon even if publisher DC Comics closes down and Warner Bros. stops making superhero 
films, because Batman is sufficiently embedded in popular culture that the character does not need 
the comics and films to exist as a cultural reference (2012, 152). Batman can survive because his 
embedding in popular cultural memory is sufficient enough for him to reconstructed in new versions. 
Sherlock Holmes has the same status. Eco (1995) points out that Sherlock Holmes’ constant iteration 
grants him a form of citizenship. In the character ecology, the character becomes emancipated from 
its original work so that the work is not a prerequisite to be able to connect a particular 
manifestation to the immaterial character, specifically to the character prototype manifestation. 
One can read a work in which Sherlock appears just fine without ever having read the works of Doyle, 
but what the urtext shows is that the value as the genesis is attributed to Doyle’s work in which the 
prototype of Sherlock Holmes first manifests. 
 
Sherlock Holmes 
The author-function is the primary venue in determining the urtext of Sherlock Holmes. Sherlock 
Holmes appeared for the first time in a short work titled A Study in Scarlet (Doyle [1887] 1888) 
published in the magazine Beeton’s Christmas Annual. That work then becomes the urtext in which 
the prototype of Sherlock Holmes first appears. Doyle expanded the urtext with more works that 
became part of the urtext, because the author-function assigned the status of ‘truthful’ to these 
expanding works. By extending his own oeuvre with expanding works that follow narrative 
continuity, Doyle acts as the preserver of the identity between the individual character 
manifestations of Sherlock Holmes in those works. The relation between the works within the urtext 
are shaped according to Ryan’s model of expansion by the same author (figure 4). 
Although the urtext does not determine the identity of the character, assigning all these 
works to a single author gives the works a sense of filiation and homogeneity to an almost romantic 
ideal. Here hides the fallacy of fidelity to the prototype, because the impression of filiation and 
homogeneity demands that other manifestations of the character remain loyal to the prototype in 
the urtext. For example, since the prototype of Sherlock is originally a Caucasian man in 19th century 
England, many manifestations follow those traits, but the Japanese Miss Sherlock (2018) series 
shows that the character can also be depicted as a Japanese woman living in contemporary Japan. 
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The latter can then easily be dismissed as not a truthful or ‘real’ Sherlock, because she does not 
adhere to the prototype. 
 
 
Figure 4: A schematic overview of Sherlock Holmes’ urtext written by Doyle, according to Ryan’s (2013) model of 
expansion. 
 
Link 
Link’s prototype can be traced to a single work: The Legend of Zelda released by Nintendo in 1986 
in which players controlled a pixelated figure called Link whose goal was to save Princess Zelda from 
the evil Ganon (figure 8). Shigeru Miyamoto is credited as the author (producer) of the game, and 
has been involved in almost all of the Legend of Zelda games released after the first game instalment 
(see Miyamoto, et al. 2013). Players navigated an overworld that contained eight dungeons, with 
Link as their player-character. Once they had completed these dungeons, they were allowed access 
to the final dungeon where Link had to face the evil villain Ganon to rescue Princess Zelda. 
The author-function is less relevant to Link than the company of which the character is 
intellectual property. Nintendo seems to be more concerned with the idea to disperse its characters 
as much as possible over as many works as possible—as media mix strategies do— rather than being 
engaged with an urtext to which the characters have to remain loyal. Link’s status as intellectual 
property gives the company the complete control over textual organisation of their characters so 
that the company, with every manifestation of Link, creates, as Nakamura and Tosca state: 
“touchground for newcomers to a ground of products” (4). The prototype of Link in The Legend of 
Zelda is not so much the manifestation to which other manifestations have to adhere as the 
prototype and does not have the romantic ideal of being the authentic character ascribed to it. 
Rather, it is the first manifestation from which a set of topoi derive and appear in the other game 
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works of the LoZ series, although not necessarily so. I will explain this in more detail in the section 
about discourses. 
 
Pikachu 
Pikachu does not have a clear urtext. Game designer Satoshi Tajiri is credited with the first game 
releases in which Pikachu appears (Kohler 2016), but there exist at least two games in which Pikachu 
makes its first appearance: Pokémon Red and Pokémon Green (GameFreak 1996). These games are 
just two versions of the same game, with only minor differences in which creatures are available in 
which game. Pikachu’s urtext becomes even more complicated when taking into consideration a 
third version of the same game, Pokémon Blue (GameFreak 1996), an improved version of Red and 
Green. This game was not only released later in Japan, it was also the version that was introduced 
in the West together with Red. These games only made their appearance in the West after the anime 
in which another version of Pikachu was introduced, whereas in Japan the games were first released 
and then later the animation (Kohler 2016). Among the same generation of games, a fourth version 
was introduced: Pokémon Yellow (GameFreak 1998). Created after the anime was first broadcasted, 
it allowed players to have a Pikachu as their starting Pokémon whose happiness players could track 
and influence. 
This cluster of works can be considered Pikachu’s urtext and involve the previously 
mentioned four games—also known as ‘Generation I’ in the Pokémon franchise (figure 5). Each new 
generation of games introduces a new layer to the urtext (as of November 2019, there are eight 
generations). These games do not expand the game’s diegesis via narrative continuity, but use the 
formula set in the first generation, re-use familiar game mechanics –such as catching Pokémon with 
a Pokeball-, and use old and introduce new Pokémon creatures with every new generation. This 
turns the urtext in a growing and expanding triangle in which each generation is separate, but also 
grows the game series. 
 
Figure 5: A schematic overview of Pikachu’s urtext controlled by Nintendo. 
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Within this cluster, Pikachu is part of a Pokémon species called ‘Pikachu’, instead of an individual 
character. The player can become emotionally attached to the Pikachu entity they caught in the 
diegesis of the game, and perceive the Pikachu they own in the game as an individual being, but the 
game initially does not specifically set one Pikachu apart from the other. The games Pokémon Red, 
Pokémon Green and Pokémon Blue require the player to turn a Pikachu entity from a species into 
an individual. They can, for example, change the name of the creatures that they own. The default 
name for a caught Pikachu is just ‘Pikachu’, but if players change it to, let’s say, ‘Jerry’, the indicator 
refers to that Pikachu specifically—as an individual—instead of it referring to the whole species. 
Training the Pikachu also sets it apart from other Pikachu entities, so that its power level is higher 
than other Pikachu entities. It is only in Pokémon Yellow, based on the anime in which Ash’s Pikachu 
is presented as an individual character, that the game refers to a Pikachu individual specifically 
instead of a species. 
 
Discourses 
As explained in this chapter, the three venues of control create different discourses that present 
their manifestation of the character as the normative character. As I will demonstrate in this section, 
the relation between these discourses vary per character, since the venues of control are in a 
constant negotiation and flux. 
A short note on the constellation of discourses: it is not my intention to create the illusion of 
an exhaustive list for each character manifestation or work in which the character appears. I have 
selected certain examples, based on the pragmatic reason that an exhaustive list will only clutter 
the constellation and diminish the clarification it means to provide. 
 
Sherlock 
Sherlock has spawned a wide variety of manifestations inspired by the prototype created by Doyle. 
Sherlock’s manifestations appear outside of Doyle’s novels and short stories as early as 1908 with 
the Danish film Sherlock Holmes i Livsfare [Sherlock Holmes in Danger] (1908) by director Viggo 
Larsen. These works appear as a different set of discourses where the manifestations of Sherlock 
Holmes are sequentially connected to each other within that discourse. Each of these series is the 
property of one or multiple different IP holders. The film Sherlock Holmes (Ritchi 2009) is owned by 
Warner Bros. Studios, the CBS Television Distribution has the right to broadcast the television series 
Elementary (Doherty 2012), the television series Miss Sherlock (2018) is owned by the Japanese 
Nippon Television Network Corporation, and BBC’s Sherlock is owned by the British network BBC. 
For this segment about the canons in which Sherlock manifests, I pay special attention to the latter, 
the BBC’s Sherlock, a widely popular British television series produced by the BBC, as an example to 
show that manifestations of Sherlock Holmes, despite being manifestations diverging from the 
prototype, tend to create their own canon to which they adhere. 
Sherlock Holmes’ textual organisation of discourses can be shaped in a flower pattern—but 
one with loose pedals placed over the urtext (figure 6). New manifestations always use topoi that 
move from one discourse to another, some of which they share with other discourses, some of 
which they do not. Most topoi derive from the urtext. 
Adaptations especially share familiar elements with the urtext, but also change the character 
in a certain way, because adaptations work on the premise that they are “creative and recognizable 
transpositions of other work, or works, adaptation is a kind of palimpsest, and, at the same time, 
often a transcoding into a different set of conventions” (Hutcheon 2006, 33). 
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Figure 6: A schematic overview of Sherlock Holmes’ discourses controlled by various different IP owners. 
 
Another discourse is the BBC Sherlock series, an adaptation that only partially assumes the formula 
defined by the prototype in the urtext (figure 7). The BBC’s Sherlock Holmes is introduced for the 
first time in the episode called A Study in Pink, a play on the name of the novel A Study in Scarlet in 
which Doyle introduced the character for the very first time. In BBC’s Sherlock, Sherlock Holmes, 
played by actor Benedict Cumberbatch, is shown to be, as an analogue to the prototype, an eccentric 
consulting detective often used by New Scotland Yard when they are unable to solve a (murder) 
mystery. Actor Martin Freeman assumes the role of John Watson, a doctor recently returned from 
military service in Afghanistan—an intertextual reference to Dr. Watson’s prototype who served in 
the Anglo-Afghan war. Watson becomes Sherlock’s flatmate on 221B Baker Street after the first 
episode, and dedicates a blog to Sherlock’s adventures, which we can interpret as an homage to the 
urtext in which Watson assumes the role of the first-person narrator and is suggested to be the 
writer of the novels about Sherlock Holmes. 
Until now, the series spawned four seasons, each consisting of three episodes of about an 
hour and a half long. While some episodes are loose adaptations of parts from the urtext such as 
the episode The Hounds of Baskerville of season 2 (2012) based on the third novel The Hound of 
Baskervilles (Doyle 1902), other episodes only refer to the urtext in their titles (e.g., season 3, 
episode 2 The Sign of Three (2014) refers to the novel The Sign of Four (Doyle 1890)). The series 
creates its own thread of events that follow each other’s sequences, while referencing the urtext 
via topoi such as the apartment in which Sherlock lives, the characters and the similar roles they 
play. 
Topoi and other intertextual references provide pleasure to the reader with sufficient 
knowledge of the urtext or other texts in which different manifestations of the characters appear, 
but the series also follows its own logics within the carefully created course of events even when 
these diverge from the urtext. For example, as a Christmas special, the BBC released the mini-
episode, Many Happy Returns (2013), in between season 2 and season 3. The episode tells about 
the character Philip Anderson, a forensic scientist from New Scotland Yard already introduced in the 
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first episode of the first season, who does not believe Sherlock Holmes is actually dead, and goes 
through great lengths in the seven-minute episode to explain his theories as to why Sherlock is not 
dead. The character does not exist in the urtext, but it does fit logically inside the discourse that the 
series established. 
Even within the single discourse of BBC’s Sherlock, narrative continuity is precarious. As a 
New Year’s special, the BBC released the episode The Abominable Bride on January 2016 in between 
the end of season 3 and before the start of season 4. The episode is set in the Victorian era, the 
same setting as the urtext in which the prototypes appear. Initially, this episode appears to be an 
episode separate from the rest of the series’ episodes with the actors Benedict Cumberbatch and 
Martin Freeman portraying a different identity of Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson than the rest of 
the series. Besides a few intertextual references to the urtext, the episode does not seem to be 
based on any work within the urtext. However, the BBC attempted to ‘fix’ the double identity of the 
characters within the discourse by revealing at the end of the episode that Sherlock Holmes had 
been under influence of drugs to discover how Moriarty could have been capable of faking his own 
death. This method of fidelity allows the episode to give the impression that it remains faithful to 
the discourse’s narrative continuity, while also allowing the producers to break away from the 
promise of narrative continuity (figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7: A schematic overview of the Sherlock Holmes’ television series (2010 - 2017) discourse controlled by BBC 
in relation to the urtext. 
This kind of constellation with loose petals (figure 6) is most likely due to Sherlock’s status as 
belonging to the public domain, because the multiple discourses are created by multiple authors 
and owned by a variety of institutions. Since it is the manifestations within a particular discourse 
that these institutions own, I argue that narrative continuity provides an important impression of 
coherence so that the character can function as intellectual property to be sold or to be leased to 
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other parties for gaining income. 
 
Link 
Nintendo attempts to control the Link’s identity via a constellation in the shape of a chronology 
(figure 8). The chronology includes only those work that Nintendo considers to belong to the Legend 
of Zelda series that at the moment of writing consists of nineteen games, with a twentieth 
instalment planned for 2020 (The Legend of Zelda: Breath of the Wild 2 (Nintendo 2020)). 
 
 
 
Figure 8: A schematic overview of Link’s discourse in the Legend of Zelda series as controlled by Nintendo based on 
the chronology from Hyrule Historia (2013 [2011]). 
Before the 25th anniversary of the Legend of Zelda series in 2011, most games within this series 
lacked any sequential connection to each other. Nintendo relied on a formula and topoi that they 
established over the course of the series before they imposed the chronology on the series to create 
a sense of narrative continuity between each game work. The formula of the series goes as follows: 
Link functions as the player-character who has to save the world, usually by rescuing the games’ 
other main character Princess Zelda from the games’ antagonist Ganon (also known as Ganondorf). 
Topoi in most of the games within the series is that the characters are associated with the Triforce, 
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an artefact consisting of three distinct entities of power. This is considered the most important 
divine artefact of the game that, and has become the emblem to represent not only the LoZ series, 
but any game in which Link manifests. 
At some point, Nintendo created a paradox between the series’ game works, and with that 
the coherence of the Link manifestations. Usually, Link in each instalment was not portrayed to be 
a character with the same identity between each game work, but the game instalments became 
inconsistent with Link manifestations. As Hyrule Historia (Miyamoto, et al. 2013, 41) suggests, in 
some games the relation between Link manifestations is that of being the ‘incarnation’ of the hero, 
in other games, Nintendo implies a constant singular identity between the Link manifestations. The 
latter can be found in, for example, LoZ: Oracle of Ages (Capcom 2001), and Oracle of Seasons 
(Capcom 2001), which use passwords given once players have finished each game. The password 
allows players to connect the games that turns the narrative into a linear story so that Link’s identity 
becomes singular. 
Nintendo provided some clarity surrounding the confusion of continuity between the works 
when they released Hyrule Historia, a compendium that introduces a chronology between the 
games released up to 2011. In this chronology, Nintendo implicitly states the amount of control they 
have over the Link’s constellation and identity: 
 
This chronology merely collects information that is believed to be true at this time, and there 
are many obscured and unanswered secrets that still lie within the tale. As the stories and 
storytellers of Hyrule change, so, too, does its history. Hyrule’s history is a continuously 
woven tapestry of events. Changes that seem inconsequential, disregarded without even a 
shrug could evolve at some point to hatch new legends and, perhaps, change this tapestry 
of history itself. (Miyamoto, et al. 2013, 68) 
 
The chronology introduced by Nintendo splits into three different timelines after the events of The 
Legend of Zelda: Ocarina of Time (Nintendo 1998), based on whether or not Link would have 
defeated the evil Ganon. The chronology allows Nintendo to avoid having to adhere to a single linear 
form of narrative continuity, but can instead choose from branches, three different lines of linear 
continuity, but linear nonetheless.  
This form of narrative continuity is however incredibly unstable. The newest 
instalment, The Legend of Zelda: Breath of the Wild (BotW) (2017), was introduced after the 
chronology. In the Japanese video game magazine Famitsu (2018), 15  the series’ producer Eiji 
Aonuma and the game’s director Hidemaro Fujibayashi responded that BotW takes place at the end 
of the chronology created by Hyrule Historia. The catch however was that they did not specify which 
of the three timelines. Instead, they mentioned that it is up to the player’s imagination to decide 
where the game takes place. It seems that only when the authorities are stuck, because of the 
paradoxes they inflicted on themselves, do these authorities release the reins and ‘grant’ the player 
the agency to interpret Link’s manifestations however the player wants. 
 
Pikachu 
The urtext in which the prototype of a character appears gives the impression that the character’s 
prototype is established without the interference of any other work(s) that do not belong to the 
urtext, as if the urtext were an entirely separate work with an almost holy dimension to it, like the 
 
15 The translation can be found at the website Siliconera (see Wong 2018). 
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Bible. In practice, especially in transmedia strategies where character proliferation is the norm, the 
idea that there is a character prototype without the influence of other works outside of the urtext 
becomes problematic. Take the anime-inspired Pokémon Yellow (1998), for example. Although it 
can be argued that season 1 of the anime is part of Pikachu’s urtext, I have three reasons why I do 
not include the anime in the character’s urtext. First, the anime was created after the first two 
games. Second, the anime is a different media platform and does not merge well with the games (I 
explain the challenges of games in contemporary transmedia practices in more detail in chapters six 
and eight). Third, the diegesis of the games is not presented as the same diegesis as the anime. 
The Pokémon anime series is perhaps, after the core game series, the most important 
discourse in which a manifestation of Pikachu appears—the series is still running at the moment of 
writing, and consists of over 1,000 individual episodes. The animation series has two primary 
protagonists: Ash Ketchum,16 and his Pokémon, Pikachu. The series follows the adventures of both 
Ash and Pikachu in which the identities of Ash and Pikachu are continuous between the episodes 
and seasons. The indicator ‘Pikachu’ in this particular case of this manifestation refers to both 
Pikachu as a Pokémon species, but also refers to this individual. In order to distinguish the character 
however from the rest of its species, the series tend to identify the character by relating it to Ash, 
usually in the form of ‘Ash’s Pikachu’. 
The animation series follows the core games series closely, but it should not be considered 
an adaptation. Rather, each new game generation functions as the inspiration for a new season of 
the anime. The anime series uses topoi introduced in a new generation of game series—such as new 
Pokémon creatures or new characters—but does not expand the game series at all. The anime series 
expands as a discourse on its own with narrative continuity to create coherence between the 
different seasons, whereas, whenever a new generation of game works is release, they tend not to 
expand on the previous game generation via narrative continuity, but use the same formula, similar 
game mechanics, and Pokémon creatures from previous games to give the impression of a growing 
series. Pikachu is always present as a creature to catch in all these game instalments, but circulates 
rather as a kyara than as an individual (with few exceptions). Pikachu’s constellation can therefore 
be easiest pictured with the anime series in the form of Ryan’s (2013) expansion by a single author 
model placed over the urtext triangle (figure 9). 
The anime and game series are far from the only discourses that Nintendo maintains. 
Pikachu appears in a variety of discourses, sometimes as a manifestation in a single work without 
sequential relation to other works, and sometimes as a manifestation in a series of works that are 
only related because they use the same formula over and over again, like the Super Smash Bros. 
game series. All these works add another layer to the constellation of Pikachu to the extent that it 
becomes difficult to discern how exactly these different works are related. It is at that moment that 
it becomes important to speak of the character ecology, the network in which all manifestations of 
the character are gathered. 
 
 
16 Ash is also known as Satoshi in Japan as a reference to the game series’ author Satoshi Tajiri. 
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Figure 9: A schematic overview of the relation between Pikachu from the animation discourse and the urtext. 
 
The Character Ecology 
In chapter three, ‘On Method’, I introduced the character ecology as an environment in which 
characters are always in relation to each other and to different versions of each other. This ecology 
is in constant flux as every new manifestation shifts the constellation of character manifestations. I 
base the character ecology on Barthes’ (1977) understanding of the text, in which works derive from 
multiple cultures and are constantly in dialogue with each other, and are constantly negotiating. 
Despite the fact that I base my understanding of the character ecology on Barthes’ idea of 
the text, the character ecology is tangible whereas Barthes’ text is not. His concept of the text 
resembles my concept of the immaterial character. The difference between the character ecology 
and the immaterial character is that the former refers to the accumulation of the local 
representational material through which the character manifests, the works in which it appears, and 
its manifestations. Technically, all manifestations can be found and mapped in specific 
constellations, in similar figures as I did in the previous sections. The reader can encounter the 
character manifestation in the work, see it, read it and/or even hear it. Together they make up the 
character ecology. Contrasting the character ecology, the immaterial character is abstract. As 
Steinberg (2012) describes the character as an abstract device capable of communicating between 
different media, he states that “the character cannot be reduced to any one of its incarnations but 
must be thought of both in its material forms and in the way it exceeds them. It is this surplus that 
permits different media and material instances to communicate” (84). The immaterial character 
refers to that surplus, and can vary per reader on how they perceive the immaterial character 
depending on their repertoire of knowledge about the character. Both the immaterial character and 
the character ecology inform each other, and the distinction that I make between them only exists 
on a theoretical level. 
The character ecology resembles the idea of the ‘myth’ that scholars tend to use. For 
example, Brooker, using Reynold’s concept of the meta-text, considers the myth the summation of 
all the manifestations of the character, including the gaps left unspecified (2012, 152). He uses the 
myth as one of his three frameworks to describe Batman’s continuity, and considers the myth to 
belong to everyone, “to the public, to popular cultural memory, to a modern folk culture” (152). For 
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Eco (1979, 117), the myth is where readers lose their need to reason for the basis of a stable identity 
and instead give themselves over to the “uncontrollable flux of the stories” that are accessible to 
the reader who at the same time attempts to hold on “the illusion of a continuous present”. Eco’s 
myth frees the character of its constraints to be a fixed identity, yet giving the impression it has a 
fixed identity in the tangible works that wrap the character in representational material. Eco’s myth 
explains the paradox of the character ecology, in which so many different identities of the character 
exist that, despite the impression the character ecology attempts to provide, the character is 
actually in a constant flux of manifestations where there exists no stable identity of that character. 
To explain the flux of the character ecology, I will refrain from showing an exhaustive list of 
works in which the three examples—Pikachu, Link and Sherlock—appear, and rather focus on a few 
outstanding aspects for each character that demonstrate the struggle of control authorities perform 
in their attempt to show a certain identity of the character as normative. I discuss Sherlock Holmes’ 
text relatively briefly, reflecting on the character’s historical development and status within the 
public domain. In the case of Link, I will provide a bit more information about Nintendo’s attempt 
to control the discourses inside the character ecology by focusing on a few works that they like to 
exclude. And finally, for Pikachu’s case I will focus a bit more on Pikachu as a kyara. 
 
Sherlock 
Sherlock’s position in the public domain transforms the character ecology in which the character 
exists as one dominated by a variety of discourses. As I explain in the previous section about Sherlock, 
the IP holders who own the discourse also own the characters within that discourse, as if the 
character were a singular static entity. They can sell or lease the rights of the character within this 
discourse to other parties and, by doing so, hold the capacity to change that character’s 
characterisation process according to their own wants and needs. However, at the same time, there 
exists no specific control over Sherlock’s identity by a single institution within the character ecology, 
which means that the discourses within Sherlock’s character ecology gather mostly around the 
urtext. The manifestations that appear in these discourses are then judged according to their 
similarities and differences with the prototype. 
Sherlock’s identity seemed originally relatively simple, fixed by the author-function as it was, 
but became transmedial only when invisible hands started adapting the character to other media, 
or into different stories. Sherlock Holmes has been around for over 100 years—long enough for him 
to become an archetype, but not long enough for the author-function to have been forgotten— as 
is the case with old fairy tales and/or myths for which the authors are mostly unknown, or reclaimed 
as a transposition by specific authors such as the Brothers Grimm or Hans Christian Andersen. The 
author of Sherlock Holmes’ prototype is still widely known in cultural memory, but rather than to 
claim that the character only has one author, the character of Sherlock Holmes as it resides in the 
character ecology contains many different authors each shaping and influencing past and future 
manifestations of the character. 
 
Link 
Nintendo seems to have a preference for controlling exactly how different manifestations of Link 
are related, and has made several attempts at restructuring the textual organisation when it suited 
the company better, to the extent that the company has made several attempts to exclude certain 
manifestations in the character ecology via non-memory methods (see Reading 2014, 168; Harvey 
2015, 97). 
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Outside of the core game series, Link appears in games such as the Super Smash Bros. 
series—Super Smash Bros. (HAL Laboratory 1999), Super Smash Bros. Melee (HAL Laboratory 2001), 
Super Smash Bros. Brawl (Sora Ltd. and Game Arts 2007), Super Smash Bros. 3DS/WiiU (Bandai 
Namco Studios and Sora Ltd. 2014), Super Smash Bros. Ultimate (Bandai Namco Studios and Sora 
Ltd. 2018)—and Mario Kart 8 (Nintendo 2014). These games were all published by Nintendo. 
Occasionally, Nintendo allows Link to appear in games by third-party developers with whom they 
had a license agreement, such as Bandai Namco’s SoulCalibur II (Project Soul 2003) (but only on the 
version for the Nintendo GameCube), and Omega Force and Team Ninja’s Hyrule Warriors (Omega 
Force and Team Ninja 2014). 
Nintendo is quite clear on when it officially approves of a Link manifestation. Official works 
show Nintendo’s copyright marks and/or Nintendo allows games they approve of to be played on 
their own console, as is the case with the GameCube version of SoulCalibur II, and Hyrule Warriors, 
which is only available for the Nintendo Wii U and Nintendo 3DS consoles. Nintendo likely wants 
the manifestations of Link in these works to be in the character ecology. 
However, despite the license agreements of that time, Nintendo seems to be keen to ignore 
the following works: Link: The Faces of Evil (Animation Magic 1993), Zelda: The Wand of Gamelon 
(Animation Magic 1993) and Zelda’s Adventure (Viridis Corporation 1994). These three Legend of 
Zelda games developed for the company Koninklijke Philips N.V. (Philips)’s console, Compact Disk 
Interactive (CD-i), came to be via an exclusive deal between Philips and Nintendo. Chris Kohler 
(2018) explains that Nintendo struck a partnership with the Sony Corporation in 1988. The engineer 
Ken Kutaragi would create a Super Nintendo with a CD-ROM drive built in instead of the cartridges 
that Nintendo previously used. Sony called it the ‘Play Station’. Nintendo agreed, but announced in 
1991 to partner with Philips instead—much to Sony’s surprise. Ken Kutaragi was allowed by Sony to 
pursue the PlayStation project, and released its standalone console in 1994. Nintendo never 
released the Super NES CD-ROM System that they collaborated on with Philips. Moreover, giving 
Sony the initiative to release the PlayStation on its own, Nintendo has inadvertently created its own 
rival.17 
As part of the partnership with Nintendo, Philips obtained the rights to create games for 
their CD-i platform using Nintendo’s characters. This provided them with the opportunity to create 
Link: The Faces of Evil (1993), Zelda: The Wand of Gamelon (1993), and Zelda’s Adventure (1994), as 
well as Hotel Mario (1994). These games do not bear any of the Nintendo copyright logos, and they 
are not available for any Nintendo consoles, not even as ports to newer consoles which regularly 
happens with older games. For example, the Legend of Zelda (1986) can be played on the company’s 
newest console the Nintendo Switch, but Philips’ three Legend of Zelda games seem to be consigned 
to oblivion. 
Despite that Philips’ Legend of Zelda games are part of the character ecology, being the IP of 
a company does not mean that that company necessarily wants the manifestations, resulting from 
a partnership with a third company, to be remembered as part of the character ecology. That means 
that although a character ecology technically consists of all manifestations of a character, if no one 
remembers particular works in which they exist, the ecology shifts again to form another 
constellation with different relations between works. 
Nevertheless, invisible forces can also bring character manifestations back to the forefront 
again, and canonisation can give new value to otherwise forgotten works and character 
 
17 A translation of the interview with Kutaragi from which Kohler received this information can be found at Nintendo 
Everything (Brian 2016)   
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manifestations. In October 2018, Beeld and Geluid, the governmental institution for Dutch media 
culture, announced the officially recognized Dutch Game Canon, an archived set of games 
developed in the Netherlands as a record of the Dutch game history (Beeld en Geluid n.d.).  Zelda: 
the Wand of Gamelon is the game recognised by the experts to belong to this game canon (Glas and 
van Vught 2019). The context in which the work and Link’s particular manifestation is acknowledged 
differs from the usual control by Nintendo. However, that is the whole irony of the character ecology. 
Its constellation is in constant flux, thereby constantly restructured by different forces such that the 
character ecology will always be “off-centred, without closure” (Barthes 1977, 159). 
 
Pikachu 
Pikachu is a character utilized by Nintendo in many works, and for many purposes. Besides the core 
series and the animation series, Nintendo has several other discourses in which a manifestation of 
Pikachu appears. Examples would include games such as Hey You, Pikachu! (GameFreak 1998), the 
Pokémon Mystery Dungeon series (Chunsoft 2005 – 2016), or the board game Pokémon Master 
Trainer (Hasbro and Milton Bradley 1999). Perhaps more than anything, Pikachu is used as a kyara 
outside any game or narrative contexts. 
As previously discussed, Wilde (2019, 13) argues that since the default mode of a character 
is not bound to any specific incarnation—a premise on which I write this dissertation—the 
manifestations of the character are more like a role they can don and take off than anything else. 
Kyara from this perspective is what Wilde (2019, 13) calls ‘mediated performers’ or ‘virtual 
celebrities’ that can take on any role—even ones that exist outside a narrative context. 
Characters in contemporary transmedia culture can function as labels for companies. One of 
Brooker’s (2012) models of continuity proposes the character to be a brand. What I speak of is not 
a form of narrative continuity in which the character is a specific product or service—although they 
definitely are—but, rather, the character can be used to represent the company, because its 
proliferation across media as an IP owned entity gives the company the opportunity to have the 
character constantly associated with them. In the shape of a kyara, the character not only 
represents itself, or a literary theme. Rather it becomes a stand-in for the company that owns them, 
like a mascot. 
More than anything, Pikachu is so closely associated with Nintendo that in its form as a kyara 
it has become Nintendo’s mascot to represent the company through its image. As a kyara/mascot, 
Pikachu’s image is enough to invoke Nintendo, to represent Nintendo without the company having 
to provide any narrative context in which the character has to appear. I am not saying here that any 
other iconic Nintendo characters—such as Link or Mario—are not used in this way, but rather 
Nintendo seems to use Pikachu in particular cases for which it does not use other IP owned 
characters. For example, the Pokémon Café (J.R. for Japan Experience 2019)  in Tokyo is a café 
created by Nintendo where consumers can eat and buy food in the style of Pokémon, dominated by 
images of Pikachu. I am not aware of any cafés officially recognized by Nintendo that do this for 
Nintendo’s other characters. The logo is a Pikachu kyara dressed up as a chef. The café itself is filled 
with merchandise of primarily Pikachu toys. Once consumers are ready to eat, they can order food 
in the shape of—mostly—Pikachu and, as was the case during my visit, the guests of the café are 
entertained by the host Pikachu the chef (image 1). 
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Image 1: The Pikachu host entertains the guests of the Pokémon Café (July 2018) (photo taken by the author). 
Since the ecology consists of every work in which the character manifests, then non-narrative 
manifestations like the Pikachu host of the Pokémon Café are included in the character ecology as 
well. While it initially appears that a kyara is not a quasi-person at all, the kyara’s intertextual 
relations to works in which the character gives the impression that it is a quasi-person should not 
be excluded. A kyara is not not a character, as it operates on a spectrum of moments in which it 
sometimes is more akin to an image and sometimes more akin to a quasi-person. I will discuss in 
more detail how the intertextual relations between kyara and quasi-persons in a work can influence 
how a character is perceived in more detail in the next chapter when I discuss the game Overwatch 
(Blizzard Entertainment 2016). 
In the case of Pikachu, it can be said that while a hamburger with a Pikachu image might only 
last for a few minutes and therefore functions more akin to an image, the Pikachu host that 
appeared in the Pokémon Café functions more akin to a quasi-person with whom one can interact, 
because an actual (very small) person is inside the costume. Pikachu is then not simply ‘just’ a 
mascot, representing Nintendo, but has become a character who can fulfil multiple functions, like 
that of an image, a quasi-person in a diegetic world, host of an actual café, and more. All of these 
manifestations belong to the character ecology. 
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3. Summary 
This chapter is split into two parts. In the first part I explained three venues of control that form a 
top-down approach attempting to police the identity of the character in order to bring a certain 
identity of the character forward as the normative version. These venues were the author-function, 
ownership and canonisation. I argue that each of these three venues are unable uphold their version 
of the character’s identity as a rigid and narrative continuous entity for the following reasons. 
First, the author-function functions as a form of authority to create a specific discourse in 
which a character manifests distinct from another manifestation in another discourse. However, 
there are several means by which the author-functions fails to ascribe to a character manifestation 
the value to be the ‘authentic’ manifestation. Once authorial intention is ascribed to be causally 
related to the identity of the character, or when multiple authors are involved in the creation of a 
character—as is commonly the case in contemporary transmedial practices—or even when the 
author grants multiple identities of the character the same status value, the almost holy dimension 
of the author-function fails to maintain the promise of showing the reader the ‘authentic’ identity 
of the character. 
Second, ownership creates a paradox on an institutional level. Ownership promises 
character development over the course of multiple works, but cannot uphold that promise because 
the character will develop at some point towards its own death so that the developer has to 
reiterate the character anew to maintain the illusion that the character still develops. Furthermore, 
because ownership is essentially about proliferating the character via selling or leasing characters 
to third parties, multiple institutions will be involved in the characterisation process, and so the 
character will end up in different discourses owned by different institutions who all declare their 
version of the character’s identity to be the normative one—until that character too meets its end.  
Third, canonisation is a constant process in which multiple invisible hands operate on a strive 
for narrative continuity in order to depict their version of the character as normative and coherent. 
Canonisation attempts to police readers into interpreting certain manifestations as the truthful 
identity of a character while other manifestations are cast aside as heresy. While canonisation 
promises to reduce the complexity of a character into a single coherent identity, many invisible 
hands have many different agendas. As a result, what a canon promises to do, it fails to fulfil. 
In the second part of this chapter, I used the examples of Sherlock Holmes, Link, and Pikachu 
to demonstrate how the three venues influence the characterisation process of a character’s 
identity. I demonstrated the influence of these venues by mapping the constellations of these three 
characters, each consisting of three layers: an urtext, discourses and the character ecology. The 
mapping of these constellations are not supposed to indicate any final or rigid model, rather these 
constellations are meant to incorporate the semiotic references of manifestations between works 
as well as the venues that attempt to determine the character’s identity within the overall character 
ecology. As I showed through the character examples, each character has a different constellation 
that allows for a deeper understanding about the relation between the distribution of works in 
which the character manifest and the control that the venues of control employ. 
  
 
 
118 
 
Part III 
On Characters in Games 
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Chapter Six 
The Construction of Game Characters 
 
This chapter presents how games constitute game characters. It provides an answer to the question 
of how games communicate characters. Since this dissertation provides a theoretical framework for 
the dynamic game character, I deem it necessary to first address the construction of game 
characters in general before delving into the construction of dynamic game characters. This chapter 
therefore explains the context and the means of how game characters are broadly constructed so 
that in the next chapters I can focus on the particular means by which a dynamic game character is 
constructed. 
This chapter is split into six parts. The first two parts are dedicated to the challenges of how 
games constitute game characters. These parts explain how there is not a single common means by 
which games communicate characters. It addresses topics such as how games have similarities and 
differences with other media, and how games can vary greatly from each other, so that even within 
the phenomena called ‘games’, the communication of characters can vary greatly as well. I provide 
a definition of game characters that I subsequently apply to the four case studies I discuss in the 
rest of this chapter. The next four parts are dedicated to four case studies of game works in which I 
will provide an interpretation of the means by which these game works stimulate the player to 
consider an entity a game character. The games are: Thomas Was Alone (Bithell 2012), Overwatch 
(Blizzard Entertainment 2016), Hollow Knight (Team Cherry 2017), and Animal Crossing: New Leaf 
(Nintendo 2013). 
In chapter two, I explained that academic work on game characters discusses characters 
along three general discourses: the difference between the avatar and the character, the difference 
between the player-character and the player, and a general description of a game character that 
argues that games present characters in three different modes: as ludic pieces, as fictional beings, 
and as the representation of the player. As seen from the previous chapters, academic work on 
characters in general attempts to explain how the reader comes to interpret characters as 
characters, but there exists a tension between transmedial and medium-specific perspectives on 
what characters are. Despite that tension, academic works on game characters lack an explanation 
for how the player comes to perceive game entities as characters, and specifically those entities 
over which the player has no direct control (or any control at all). The main question of this chapter 
is therefore: what are the different means by which digital games construct the game character so 
that the player perceives that entity to be a character? The premise of this chapter is therefore as 
follows: characters, being a player-constructed phenomenon, need the player in order to be realised, 
but the games motivate the process with different means to different effects. 
 
On the Approach of this Chapter 
This chapter takes two important aspects of characters in general into consideration. First, 
characters are independent from any medium. Characters are dependent on representational 
material to manifest, but they do not need any specific medium. Just like films, novels, theatre and 
television series, games are capable of communicating characters, wrapping the character in specific 
representational material and using culturally-learned conventions so that the player will consider 
the figure a character. The difficulty, however, is, as I explain in more detail in this chapter, that how 
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games wrap the character in representational material, and the means and conventions they use, 
can differ greatly per game. I will therefore do a close reading on four different game works based 
on the reader-response theory approach explained in chapter three, ‘On Method’. 
As explained in chapter three, it is difficult to select a corpus when there are so many game 
works available to choose from. I therefore decided that it is the main question of this chapter that 
guided the selection of games that I discuss in this chapter. The main criterion for this chapter was 
variation: each game should have at least one different means by which they stand out from the 
rest of the corpus in this dissertation in terms of how they communicate characters. Thomas Was 
Alone is the first game I chose based on this criterion, because it lacks the common means of using 
human-like figures and instead uses quadrilateral shapes. I choose the other games based on my 
first choice. I explained in chapter three that research on dynamic game characters means that my 
corpus consists primarily of games that focus on character development, so that other games like 
racing or fighting games make up less of my corpus than other kinds of games. Since I wanted to 
show, however, that these kinds of competitive multiplayer games can and do employ means by 
which the player can infer a sense of characterhood from the figures they perceive, I chose 
Overwatch as a work for this chapter. From there I chose Animal Crossing: New Leaf. The game’s 
characters operate as artificial intelligent agents who, combined with the game’s real-time 
mechanic, give the player a sense of autonomy, unlike the characters from Overwatch and Thomas 
Was Alone. Finally, I chose Hollow Knight to join the four case studies, because the game contains 
characters who, despite their initial appearance that they are in service to the player to reach the 
game’s end-state, are scripted in such a way that they serve their own goals rather than the player’s 
goal. 
I do not claim that my interpretations provide a complete picture of how empirical players 
could interpret the entities as characters. Rather, I posit the particular elements that I discuss as 
relevant means by which games signal to the player the entities they perceive to be characters, but 
not the only means. Nevertheless, there are two dominant means that I leave out of my 
interpretation: the visual design of the character, the kyara, and the stories that some games tell. I 
made this choice in order to prevent these means to dictate my interpretation and downsize the 
other means games can use to incite characters into the player. My reasoning for this choice is as 
follows. 
Sometimes the answer to why the player thinks of something as a character is just because 
it looks like a character, which is common for media and platforms in contemporary media culture 
where visual components dominate. The kyara, discussed in the theory chapter, is a relevant 
example of this way of thinking. In general, the answer ‘it looks like a character’ is a good enough 
reason to think of something as a character, but it is also an unsatisfying answer that obviously 
favours visual displays of characters, and does not cover the different possible ways in which games 
can invoke characters. In my description how the game invokes game characters within this chapter, 
the underlying assumption is that in digital games, the kyara is already constructed to give the player 
the impression of a character before the game uses its means to turn the kyara into a character—
unless I specifically state otherwise, as is the case with Thomas Was Alone. 
Some of the games, such as Thomas Was Alone and Hollow Knight, present a story over the 
course of the game. I deliberately leave the story out of the interpretation of the case studies 
presented in this chapter. I realise that this is a precarious position, and I have no intention to say 
that story is not important—it often is. However, in this dissertation, I have been calling attention 
to the tendency that story and narrative continuity are such dominant forms by which interpreters 
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make sense of characters that the focus on story and narrative continuity takes over our complete 
understanding of how the reader comes to infer the existence of a character. As a result, other 
techniques by which media can communicate characters become subsumed in the focus on story. 
Although story is perhaps the most important element for a character to develop as a person, story 
is not the sole element by which the interpreter infers the existence of a character or interpret a 
figure as a character. 
Nevertheless, I also do not ignore the existence of story. In Thomas Was Alone, for example, 
I discuss the narrator, the function that tells the story of the game. This might initially seem to cause 
friction because, in literary studies, the narrator is known as a function to communicate the 
narrative discourse—the story—to the reader (Margolin 2012). While story and the narrator are 
interdependent, they are different concepts; the narrator is not the story itself. As Mieke Bal 
explains: 
 
A narrative text is a story that is ‘told’ in a medium, that is, it is converted into signs. […] 
these signs are produced by an agent who relates, who ‘utters’ the signs. This agent cannot 
be identified with the writer, painter, or filmmaker. Rather, the writer withdraws and calls 
upon a fictitious spokesman, an agent technically known as a narrator. (1999, 8) 
 
The narrator is the one who narrates, the one who engages in the act of storytelling, not the story. 
And therefore narration, along with the narrator, refers to the act of character-construction, the 
techniques and methods that a work employs so that an interpreter may infer from it the existence 
of a character. By focusing on the narrator, I can focus on the different techniques and elements 
that are used in the act of storytelling through which a reader can interpret a character in such a 
manner that I will not have the ever-present focus on the story of the game but also without ignoring 
the presence of the story. 
 
 
1. Media Presenting Characters 
The reader, player, or interpreter can turn almost anything into a character. There is a plethora of 
possible means that could make up a character, and not one that is necessarily the primary means. 
I base this premise on Frow (2014), whose description of the quasi-person treats the character as a 
schemata of human beings onto which certain conditions apply in order to invoke a (fictional) 
character. He states: 
 
The conditions are minimal because we have the capacity to turn just about anything into a 
quasi-person. Usually a character is a human person; it has a name; it speaks; it is embodied, 
unitary, and persistent over time; and it performs an action or series of actions on the basis 
of which we impute intentionality to it. But even those minimal conditions need not all be 
met. (2014, 36) 
 
This means that it would be futile to list everything that could potentially turn something into a 
character. Such a description would not only go against the reader-response method I employ, but 
would also fail to address that games reside, influence, and are affected by a larger character 
ecology in which different media communicate characters in different but also in similar means, 
shaped by and shaping the cultural conventions with which readers, audiences, users, players and 
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more make sense of characters. Frow’s description instead suggests that it is more fruitful to 
describe how games use certain cultural conventions, mechanics and means that allow the player 
to infer a sense of personhood from the figure (or shape) to interpret it in a character. That is 
because such a thing stems from the idea that the player has a repertoire accumulated over the 
years of their existence which the player employs based on the signals that the game communicates 
in order to interpret a figure into a quasi-person. 
Frow shows that the schemata resembles the reader in order for the reader to construct the 
figure as a character. The reader has culturally learned to interpret these conventions to invoke a 
character rather than that the conventions make a character exist. There are no conditions to the 
existence of a character in the sense that certain rules have to be there for the character exist, but 
rather conventions have taught the reader certain means to construct a character. Characters are 
therefore constructs invoked not only by works or readers, but also by a culture that allows its 
members to interpret a figure as something like a person with thoughts, feelings, intentions and 
more, even when it cannot have such states. 
Game characters, as I engage with them in this dissertation, are computer-based agents and, 
like characters in novels, comics or film, have no inherent thought or intention. That is no problem 
in itself, as Brenda Laurel (1991) puts it: “Computer-based agents, like dramatic character, do not 
have to think (in fact, there are many ways in which they cannot); they simply have to provide a 
representation from which thought may be inferred” (57). This means that when I talk about the 
feelings, intentions or thoughts of characters, I refer to the representation from which I, as a reader, 
interpret the existence of a thought, feeling, or intention of the character. 
 
Media Modality 
Here I explain the different and similar means by which media communicate characters. Although 
characters are independent from any given medium, the character is dependent on 
representational material to manifest. The medium in which characters are presented therefore 
determines which means and conventions are used and how to turn something into a quasi-person. 
In media studies, the question of how media represent is a broad one. For the sake of my argument, 
I will only outline here the problematic notions that follow from how media communicate. Coining 
the phrase ‘the medium is the message’, Marshall McLuhan (1964) wrote his argument on media 
communication well before the rise of the internet of our current twenty-first century digital world. 
He shifts the focus from the ‘content’ of the medium to the technology of the medium because, as 
he argues, the “content of any medium is always another medium” (8). He argues that the message 
of any existing medium is the change of patterns that it introduces into human affairs, since the 
nature of the medium determines how humans act and associate with each other (9). Any medium, 
when first introduced, has certain psychic and social consequences in society, regardless of the 
content that the medium or the technology produced. 
McLuhan’s notion is followed by Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin (1999) who discuss 
remediation, the convergence of media within other media. They specifically point towards the 
convergence of three technologies—computer, telephone and television—which each appropriate 
each other and will continue to exist alongside each other to produce different devices and practices 
within our culture. 
Lars Elleström (2010) provides an elaborate theoretical discussion about how media are 
related to each other by asking the question of what a medium is, which is necessary to understand 
the interrelations between media. His underlying reason is that that any materiality of art—or, as I 
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like to put it, any form of expression—depends on the thing that mediates it. He provides a 
theoretical framework of what different media platforms have in common, and how they differ. 
Since he considers the concept of ‘medium’ too broad to define—any definition will never cover all 
the various notions that lurk behind the word—he divides the notion of medium into subcategories 
to cover the interrelated aspects of media and mediality. These aspects cannot exist without the 
other aspects. 
Elleström divides the basic aspects of each medium into four different modalities which are 
the “essential cornerstones of all media without which mediality cannot be comprehended” (15): 
the material modality, the sensorial modality, the spatiotemporal modality, and the semiotic 
modality. The material modality refers to the corporeal interface of the medium. The sensorial 
modality refers to the reception of the interface via sensory faculties. The spatiotemporal modality 
concerns the experience of space and time via perception and interpretation. And finally, the 
semiotic modality refers to the interpretation of signs for which Elleström uses Charles Sanders 
Peirce’s theory of signs (see Nöth 1995, 39 - 47), dividing the semiotic modality into three sign 
functions: the symbolic, the indexical and the iconic.  
What is relevant from Elleström’s description for characters is the explicit argument that 
each medium possesses these modalities in some mixture and combination in order to mediate any 
form of expression. His description of media shows that the brackets between media and their 
modalities is so ambiguous that no medium is entirely distinct from another medium as to how it 
can communicate characters. Each medium, such as film, television, literature and even digital 
games, shares a mix of modes and modalities with another medium, so that some media materialise 
characters in a similarly to other media, but also have their own distinct properties and specific 
conventions for how they express these characters. 
An awareness of the similarities and differences of media, as well as their specific 
conventions is important to take into consideration when explaining how a player considers a figure 
a character, because characters not only have to adhere to the distinct properties of the medium in 
which they materialise, but, within the boundaries of a single medium, the character also conforms 
to the formal codes and conventions of the segments in which it appears. Thomas Lamarre (2018) 
argues that within a single episode of an anime television series, a character has to adhere to 
segments with different codes, such as the opening song to the episode, the ending song, the story 
of that episode as well as the commercials in between the segments. The character’s capability of 
switching between media and codes of segments prompts Lamarre to consider the character as a 
platform of hardware (media switching) that is capable of running software (code switching). 
Although, I would argue that it is not software that the character is capable of running, but rather 
that it is capable of switching between platforms of media, and within the specific medium also 
capable of changing between semiotic codes depending on the conventions of the function to which 
it has to adhere: in the episodes it adheres to the narration of that story, in the commercial it also 
functions as a construct to sell a product, and in the opening and ending song it announces the start 
and the end of the episode segment. 
In short, although Elleström and Lamarre indicate that ‘medium’ is too broad a category to 
lock down, what can be said is that each work, as proposed by Barthes (1977), has its own specific 
set of constraints, affordances and conventions by which it communicates and represents 
characters. No description of how each work can stimulate the player to invoke a character will 
cover all the possible means via which the player infers a sense of characterhood from an inanimate 
object —and that is even without taking into consideration conventions autonomous from any given 
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work. Additionally, an attempt to identify and describe all distinct properties with which a character 
could possibly manifest would be far from fruitful, because it emphasises medium specificity, and 
focuses on the work instead of what the work does, what conventions and means they use, to have 
the player interpret an entity to be a quasi-person. 
 
 
2. Game Characters 
Games, whether they can be considered a medium or not, are not an exception to the challenge a 
medium brings to have the player read a character. Depending on the notion of ‘game’, they too 
have certain constraints and affordances that allow them to communicate characters in particular 
ways. The challenge to how games present game characters is twofold. 
Let me clarify first what I mean with the term game character: a game character is a first and 
foremost a character, as I proposed in the introduction chapter. It is a quasi-person, an individual to 
which the game allows the player to infer a life-like existence in which it is born and can die, and to 
whom the player ascribes thoughts and intentions. A character becomes a game character once it 
is integrated in the game’s mechanical system that requires the player’s non-trivial effort to progress 
from one state to another (see Aarseth and Calleja 2015). This means that a game character has a 
processual nature, so that it has the potential for change when the player progresses the game. That 
change can be rigid, scripted and set in stone so that a game character may only change in one 
specific direction. 
Zelda from The Legend of Zelda: Breath of the Wild (BotW) (2017) provides an interesting 
borderline case, because the game gives the player the impression that the character has potential 
for change. The game gives the player the goal to rescue Zelda from the evil Ganon and save the 
world—the usual formula for The Legend of Zelda games. When the player finally saves Zelda from 
Ganon’s clutches and meets her, the game’s macrostructure ends, however, and this supposed end 
causes friction with the open-world genre of the game. The designer’s solution to the friction 
between the ending of the game’s macrostructure and the supposed open-endedness is to 
transport Link to the moment right before he went into Ganon’s castle to slay Ganon. Every time 
the player defeats Ganon, Link is transported back to this exact spot. The game never allows the 
player to actually end the game and have Zelda in a state where she is saved. From this perspective, 
Zelda is presented as a game character, integrated in the mechanical system, however the game 
cannot function with her being a game character, and thus she stays at the sign level, forever 
promising the potential for change but always out of reach. 
The second challenge to how games present game characters is that games can vary to a 
great degree in how they present characters in general, so that also game characters are subject to 
games’ variety in structure and modalities and can therefore not be reduced to a single core. In 
chapter three, ‘On Method’, I explained that my definition of characters demands a very specific set 
of games, such as role-playing games and games that rely on narrative expression, because they 
tend to focus on character development to a greater extent than game genres which emphasise 
other activities, such as competition in racing and/or fighting games. Like characters in general, 
game characters are subjected to the codes of the genre to which the game belongs, but that does 
not mean that a character in a fighting game cannot give the impression of having a life-like 
existence. For example, a character such as Link appearing in the racing game Mario Kart 8 
(Nintendo 2014), in which the player uses the character as an avatar to compete against other 
players, presents the character as a quasi-person via different means than BotW, in which the player 
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uses Link as their player-character to save the game world of Hyrule. 
An extensive account that discusses how games turn entities into characters comes from 
Daniel Vella (2015), who constructs a semiotic-structural model of the player-character, the figure 
“that emerges through the accretion of a set of textual signifiers” in digital games (371). Vella uses 
Uri Margolin’s (1986) Characterization Statements (CS) to explain signifiers as textual cues with 
which the reader deduces attributes and traits belonging to a character giving the impression that 
the character has mental properties and capabilities (Vella 2015, 373). Margolin distinguishes 
between three different categories of characterisation statements, namely static mimetic elements, 
dynamic mimetic elements, and formal textual patterns, which Vella applies to the player-character. 
Static mimetic elements refer to fixed facts about characters, such as their “name, appearance, 
customs, habits, man-made and natural setting or environment” (Margolin 1986, 206; Vella 2015). 
Vella proposes three subdivisions of Margolin’s static mimetic elements applied to the player-
character, namely the represented elements, the contextual elements, which Margolin had already 
proposed himself. On top of those two elements, Vella adds the ludic elements. According to Vella 
(2015, 384), the ludic elements are the vehicles for characterisation unique to games. He identifies: 
 
• Capabilities and Limitations. That is, what the players can and cannot do through the 
character in the game world. (387) 
• Passion, which he considers “the vulnerability and openness to be acted upon as much as by 
its capacity to act” (387) so that player-characters can be influenced by other entities. 
• Goals. These might be self-imposed or set by the player, but there are the ludic goals of the 
game. (388) 
• Attributes: statistical values attached to the character, but which need to be able to be 
compared to other characters. (389) 
• Development: the capacity for the character’s ludic elements to change over time. (391) 
 
Within the category of Margolin’s dynamic mimetic elements, which are the mental and verbal acts 
of the characters, Vella distinguishes between character-actions and player-actions. The former 
refer to the actions the player-character performs without the need for a player, while the latter 
points to the actions players perform as themselves within the game world (2015, 394 - 397). Vella 
points out that for the character to be coherent, both player-actions and character-actions have to 
match (398). 
Lastly, Vella presents Margolin’s final and vaguest category: the formal patterns, which 
focuses on how characters are presented, referring to the “grouping of [narrative agents]; the 
analogies, parallels, or contrasts between them created by such groupings; repetitions or gradations, 
and various stylistic features associated with their introduction or occurrence” (quoted from Vella 
2015, 399; Margolin 1986, 206). Vella’s description demonstrates in extensive detail how games 
construct and characterise a playable figure from a literary point of view, but I would like to point 
to a few limitations in his analysis. First, while this is not a problematic issue on its own, his 
understanding of characters is rooted within the field of literary studies, the dominant discourse on 
characters and games. This brings the assumption that characters are constructed exclusively via 
stories, also in games. Although narration and stories might be the most dominant means by which 
to convey character—perhaps even the most thorough means to characterize characters within a 
range of media—it is important to realise that such an approach shapes for what kinds of games 
Margolin’s characterisation statements can be used. Vella uses for his analysis the games The Last 
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of Us (Naughty Dog 2010) and Gone Home (The Fullbright Company 2013), which are two games 
with strong linear narratives, but does not apply the characterisation statements to games that 
diverge from this kind of game. 
Second, the development element seems to be a meta-element, since it requires the other 
ludic elements to change and evolve over time, and cannot stand on its own without those elements. 
Third, Vella’s model only fits the player-character, which means that it does not explain how 
any other types of figures turn into game characters—which reflects game studies’ tendency to 
discuss primarily those characters over which the player has direct control—and can therefore only 
be used to explain how the ludic elements attached to the playable figure can potentially turn that 
figure into a character. 
  Lastly, Vella’s approach to the character as a semiotic construct has the advantage that 
it approaches characters as constructs created by the player and the game, but has the disadvantage 
that it does not take into consideration the affordances, limitations and conventions of the games 
and other media in which they appear. This is noticeable in his application of Margolin’s formal 
patterns for literary works onto digital games. The adaptation of a framework for literary characters 
onto game characters seems to be inadequate, because the framework lacks any consideration for 
the variety of structure and modalities via which games can communicate characters. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein ([1953] 2009, 36e) explains that language can point to different 
phenomena using the same word. Using games as an example, he argues that games have nothing 
in common at all, but are related to each other by family resemblances: a complicated network 
consisting of similarities and differences but without a core trait (36e). Considering games from this 
perspective, how can game characters, which rely on games for their materialisation, be expected 
to have one thing in common in all games? The answer is simply that they cannot. There is not a 
single common element that games have in order to create a character. As Frow (2014, 36) also 
states, just about anything can turn into a character. There is not one single convention to which 
games have to adhere. The question ‘what are the different ways a character turns into a character?’ 
is not a question that requires a formal description of which elements constitute a game character, 
as if there were one particular way that an entity turns into a character, since characters are a 
construct of both the work and the reader. Rather, with a reader-response theory approach in mind 
the question is: what is it that different games do so that the player perceives an entity as a 
character? The premise is therefore that characters, being a player-constructed phenomenon, need 
the player in order to be invoked, but the games motivate the process with different means to 
different effects. 
Let me provide an example of how a reader-response theory approach explains how the 
player interprets an entity as a character with a game that is commonly known: chess. Does the 
game of chess contain characters? Perhaps not, but the distinction between the chess pieces, such 
as the queen, the bishop, the king, certainly provides a good basis to turn them into characters. 
There is little that one needs to do in order to assign thought and intention to an inanimate object 
to give it a sense of life-likeness. For example: the queen refuses to give up, and destroys all 
attackers who threaten to kill her king. This description is enough to anthropomorphise the pieces 
and turn them into characters. Indeed, it can be said that the characters of Through the Looking 
Glass and What Alice Found There (Caroll 1871) are based on an anthropomorphisation of chess. 
The anthropomorphisation is, however, not done by the game, but is a form of role-playing done by 
the player. The game of chess itself does not recognise these as characters. In fact, even when I treat 
them as characters, the game of chess itself will not structurally change. My experience perhaps will, 
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but not the game itself. 
The same interpretive approach can be applied to digital games and stimulated by digital 
games even when the characters in question are inanimate objects. Interpreting inanimate objects 
as characters is also something films, novels and comics can stimulate their readers to do, such as 
Linus’ security blanket in the Peanuts comics (Schulz 1950- 2000). For games, the companion cube 
from Portal (Valve 2007) provides an example of how games can stimulate the player to infer a sense 
of characterhood from an inanimate object. The companion cube is an object used in the game to 
solve the puzzles in the game’s test chambers. There are several moments when the game provides 
the cube a sense of being a character, such as when GLaDOS asks the player to ‘take care of it’, has 
to remind the player that the cube is inanimate and cannot speak, or instructs the player that if it 
speaks the player should ignore it. More importantly however, the player is dependent on the cube. 
The cube is the player’s only ally in solving the puzzles, as each puzzle in the sequences where the 
cube is present require the cube to be solved so that the player can proceed and escape from 
GLaDOS. 
At the end of the puzzle sequence, GLaDOS tells the player that the cube cannot ‘accompany’ 
the player anymore and the player therefore has to ‘euthanise’ it. This choice of words gives the 
cube a sense of being alive. For example, in order to euthanise something, it first and foremost has 
to be alive, as euthanasia is usually considered to be ending someone’s life to stop them from 
suffering. That is exactly what the word ascribes to the cube: it is alive, and the player has to kill it 
humanely so that it does not suffer. GLaDOS’ use of words gives the player at the very least the 
impression that the cube could be a character. 
In the next four case studies, I will provide an interpretation, based on the reader-response 
theory approach, of how the player infers from the game an entity—be it a figure or a shape—as a 
character. 
 
 
3. Thomas Was Alone (2012) 
Thomas Was Alone is a puzzle platformer game. Each level contains a different puzzle where the 
player must navigate one or more blocks into a target the same size as the block the player controls. 
Solving one level brings the player to another, more difficult level until the player manages to reach 
the game’s end-state. 
In contemporary transmedia practices, the image of the character is one of the most 
important components of the existence of a character. The kyara demonstrates that the image itself 
is enough for the interpreter to infer that the image is a character before any story even happens. 
Gô Itô (2005, 150) calls the character-image before it enters a narrative the “proto-character-state” 
that can be consumed outside of its original narrative context (see Galbraith 2009, 125; Wilde 2019, 
5). This means that although characters tend to be associated with a story or some sort of narrative 
situation as the dominant form in which the manifest, a story is not a crucial element for the reader 
to infer a figure to be a character, especially not when there exists a character-image to support the 
interpreter to think there is a character. A game such as Thomas Was Alone is therefore an 
interesting case to study how the player comes to interpret the quadrilateral shapes the player 
directly controls as characters, because the game lacks the visual components of showing the 
entities as human-like figures. 
The game portrays the quadrilateral shapes as characters using three inter-dependent 
elements: individualised personal names, the extra-diegetic narrator, and the kinaesthetic motion. 
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These provide a combination of elements from which the player infers the existence characters onto 
the quadrilateral shapes. In the following paragraphs, I first discuss the character’s personal names, 
then the extra-diegetic narrator, and finish with the kinaesthetic motion. 
 
Individualisation via Personal Name 
When the player starts playing the first scenario of puzzles, they only control Thomas, a little red 
block who can jump. After the player has solved the puzzles of this first scenario, they enter the 
second scenario during which they are introduced to a second block, this time a tiny orange square 
who, compared with the red block, does not jump that high. At this point, the narrator states: 
“Christopher took an immediate dislike to the skinny red triangle. Who the hell did this ‘Thomas’ 
think he was?” (image 2). In this one sentence, the narrator introduces the existence of two 
characters: Christopher and Thomas. 
 
 
Image 2: Chris meets Thomas for the first time. 
While the introduction of a proper name to indicate the existence of a character might be very 
common in novels in which the presence of a visual figure is usually omitted, Thomas Was Alone is 
not without a continuous visual shapes. They come in different sizes and have different colours so 
that the player can immediately perceive their difference. However, the different colours and sizes 
do not make these shapes into different characters, because these shapes do not correspond to the 
convention in which the character comes in the shape of a human-like figure. As a convention, 
characters tend to come in an anthropomorphic shape that communicates to readers that they are 
persons. The kyara, for example, operates on this convention, as it invokes the idea of a character 
while not being a dramatis persona itself. 
Especially the presence of eyes tends to be important to anthropomorphise figures to give 
the impression of a human-like presence. Eyes allow characters to express emotion, feelings and 
even intentions. In discussion about anime, the size of the eyes tend to be the main topic to animate 
an entity (Condry 2013; Lamarre 2009; 2018), while for Western comics Scott McCloud (1994, 94) 
considers the abstraction of eyes to allow for greater levels of perception, arguing that abstracted 
eyes require reader interpretation to construe a sense of life-likeness. Specifically, in media 
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platforms that are unable to communicate characters via sound or animated motions, such as 
comics and manga, eyes play a prominent role in anthropomorphising a designed entity. An early 
example is also the silent movie: actors would wear heavy make-up around their eyes, and would 
act with the emphasis on their eyes to show certain emotions and feelings, because they could not 
say them.  
The lack of visual elements that signal the presence of a kyara makes the proper name the 
primary means via which the shapes are assigned the status of a character. Frow demonstrates the 
necessity of a proper name over the course of his book Character & Person (2014), but summarises 
the argument as follows: 
 
Two of the crucial mechanisms by which the form of the person is constructed are the 
pronoun system and the system of social nomenclature; these figure crucially in the way 
person effects are shaped in fictional texts, and in the way the reader or viewer is induced 
to identify and to relate to the text’s quasi-persons. (2014, ix) 
 
Indicators such as proper nouns are therefore crucial to Thomas Was Alone in order to give the 
shapes the impression that they are characters. The game in particular does not only use proper 
nouns to indicate the blocks, but uses personal, human names, like Christopher and Thomas—and 
variations on those personal names such as ‘Chris’—so that the player is led to identify the blocks 
as individual characters. 
Returning to the scenario in which Chris is introduced: from the previous level, the player 
knows that the name ‘Thomas’ corresponds to the red triangle, so when the second proper name 
‘Chris’ is voiced by the narrator, the player will be able to infer that  this ‘skinny red triangle’ (see 
image 2) implies that the other entity in the game corresponds to the name of Chris. And, as a result, 
a connection between the game entity and the character described by the narrator is born. 
Each time a new character is introduced, the game follows the same patterns: the player 
suddenly controls a new quadrilateral shape, which could be a small green rectangle or a large blue 
square, and the narrator immediately introduces a new personal name: John or Claire, for example. 
More often than not, the player first only controls the new shape and none of the previous shapes 
are present, so that the player can connect the new shape to the new personal name. And thus, the 
first indication of individualisation comes to be by the different proper names. 
 
The Extra-Diegetic Narrator 
The narrator appears in two modes: in written text and spoken words by voice actor Danny Wallace . 
Both modes work at the same time; when the player hears the spoken words, they also see it written 
on the screen. From this point on, I will treat both modes as one, which I refer to as the narrator. 
The narrator is a function of a work to communicate events to an audience or readers of a 
story. According to Margolin (2012) a narrator is a function of the text that is not necessarily 
occupied by any specific real or fictional entity, but acts to guide the reader in a certain direction: 
 
A narrator is a linguistically indicated, textually projected and readerly constructed function, 
slot or category whose occupant need not be thought of in any terms but those of a 
communicative role. Terms designating this role include discursive function or role, voice, 
source of narrative transmission, producer of current discourse, teller, reporter, narrating 
agent or instance. (2012) 
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The narrator functions to communicate characters, their personalities and the events in which they 
appear. James Phelan (2005) calls the act of communicating characters character narration, in which 
“an author communicates to her audience by means of the character narrator’s communication to 
a narratee” (1). The author and the audience are positions to be filled in by actual persons. When I 
read Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone (Rowling 1997), I do so as an empirical reader, while 
knowing that the author is J. K. Rowling. On the other hand, Rowling is not the narrator of the book, 
and nor am I the narratee. These are two functions of the work that allow Rowling as the author to 
present the text to a recipient. 
According to Phelan (2005, 12), character narration occurs along two tracks of “telling 
functions”: the narrator-narratee track, and the narrator-authorial track. The former is where the 
narrator functions as an interpreter, teller or evaluator to the narratee. Phelan calls these actions 
the “narrator functions” (12). The narrator only tells of what is happening, but does not enter the 
consciousness of another character. The latter is where the narrator unintentionally reports all kinds 
of information to the audience (while not showing signs knowing that the audience exists). Phelan 
calls this kind of reporting the “disclosure functions” (12). 
In literary studies, scholars also use the terms ‘focalization’, ‘filter’ and ‘centre’ to distinguish 
between the narrator focusing on a specific character during the events of a story, and the narrator 
describing the thoughts and feelings of these characters. Gérard Genette ([1979] 1980) coined the 
term focalisation to reformulate the terms ‘perspective’ and ‘point of view’ (see Niederhoff 2011). 
He distinguishes between three types of focalization: zero, internal and external. Zero focalization 
corresponds to the omniscient narrator, where the narrator knows more than the characters. The 
internal focalization has the narrator only stating what a specific character knows and nothing more. 
The external focalisation has the narrator saying less than the character knows ([1979] 1980). 
In addition to Genette’s ‘focalization’ are the terms ‘filter’ and ‘centre’. Seymour Chatman 
(1986) explains that focalization describes “the narrator’s use of the character’s consciousness as 
the screen or filter through which the events of the story are perceived, and conceived” (191). While 
the character is not necessarily the narrator of the story, a character does correspond to the 
narrator-function of the events depending on whether the focalization is zero, internal, or external. 
Within a single work, the narrator can switch between characters, or not correspond to any of the 
characters at all. When a character is simply followed in a story—regardless of whether the narrator 
provides the reader access to its consciousness—it is a function of the text that Chatman calls the 
‘centre’. When the events are perceived through a character’s consciousness, Chatman calls that 
function a ‘filter’. 
Although these terms come from literary studies, they are applicable to Thomas Was Alone’s 
communication of its characters. The game’s narrator adds two dimensions to the idiosyncrasy of 
the quadrilateral shapes: it provides them with thoughts and feelings, and it works in alignment with 
the player’s control over the shapes so that what the narrator narrates becomes connected with 
what the player does as the character. 
The narrator in Thomas Was Alone appears to function along the narrator-authorial track: it 
reports the thoughts and feelings of the entities. In Thomas Was Alone, however, these filter and 
centre functions are dispersed over the game and its narration, because the centre function is 
subject to the player’s avatarial control over the entities. When the player only controls Thomas in 
the beginning of the game, the player does not immediately perceive the centre-function’s 
dependence on their control. The second scenario introduces the player to other characters, starting 
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with Chris, a little orange block, who takes “an immediate and deep dislike to the skinny red 
rectangle” (image 2). This is the point where the game shows the player that they can switch 
between characters. While the player avatarially controls Chris, the game centres on Chris and 
follows his acts. Thomas is completely outside the border of what the player can visually perceive. 
When the player switches their control to Thomas, the game brings the player over to Thomas so 
that they can see Thomas, but not necessarily Chris. In other words, the player’s direct control over 
the character replaces the centre function. 
The filter-function only occurs when the player visually perceives the entity whose thoughts 
the narrator describes. There is a shifting centre in the characters’ internal focalization. With a few 
exceptions, this usually means that the player avatarially controls the entity about whom the 
narrator speaks. The correspondence between the control and the filter function creates the 
impression that what is happening in the game is in accordance with the events that the narrator 
describes. When the character Claire is introduced, the ground beneath her collapses and she falls 
in the toxic water. Via the filter-function, the narrator describes her inner thoughts as Claire knowing 
that she would die, but the moment the block drops in the water, the narrator reveals that she 
realises she has superpowers (image 3). Unlike the other characters, Claire does not disperse so that 
the player has to start anew, but instead she floats. The narrator’s revelation is in accordance with 
the player’s discovery of Claire’s ability, and at the same time confirms to the player that, indeed, 
Claire can float. 
 
 
Image 3: Claire discovers she has superpowers. 
Kinaesthetic Motion 
The narration ties directly into the kinaesthetic motion of the different characters. What the 
narrator describes, is also what the player notices and even feels. Gordon Calleja (2011, 55) relates 
the term kinesthetic involvement directly to agency as the ability where “players perform actions 
that affect the game world and its inhabitants”. I do not necessarily talk about agency here, although 
agency gives players the opportunity to discover how a character feels when they directly control 
that character. 
Motion in general is an important design aspect to turn game entities into characters. Robin 
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Sloan (2015, 153) utilises the Disney company’s animation principles to explain how to create lifelike 
motion in characters. She explains that the company’s twelve principles for character animation 
movement are supposedly grounded in reality and imitate real movements in order to “produce a 
creative and expressive imitation of reality that would suspend audience disbelief” (154). According 
to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word ‘animation’ refers to both the state of being alive, and to 
“the technique of photographing successive drawings or positions of puppets or models to create 
an illusion of movement” (Oxford n.d.). Sloan’s use of the word seems to conflate both meanings, 
where she emphasises the illusion of movement to animate entities in games without the 
involvement of the player, over kinesthetic control where the player is involved in the acts and 
movement of the entities. 
Katherine Isbister (2006, 203), on the other hand, perceives the player-character to be the 
core of the player’s ‘interactive experience’, which contains four layers of psychological experience: 
visceral, cognitive, social and fantasy. The visceral feedback refers to the sensory experience the 
player has, especially when the entity performs an action. According to Isbister, “[f]acets of this kind 
of feedback include sorts of physical powers, how it feels to control them and move them, and the 
general effects that the actions have on the senses” (205). In other words, the feedback of how a 
character feels also provides a description of the character, and in turn invokes the character. 
For Thomas Was Alone, kinaesthetic motion is one of the primary means to invoke the 
characters, because the characters lack the visual anthropomorphisation that characters tend to 
have within contemporary media ecology. The feeling the player receives from the characters is 
produced by their individual abilities, but also by their differences in speed, sound and how high 
they jump. Claire, for example, is described as rubbish at jumping, and moves slowly. The player 
feels this when they control the block. Through this difference in feeling, the game juxtaposes the 
different shapes so that their own idiosyncrasies become emphasised in relation to each other. 
Claire might be rubbish at jumping, and the player can feel that, but this is only in comparison with 
the other blocks, such as Thomas who is described to be good at jumping and falling, and 
Christopher who might “not be the highest jumper but held his own”. 
The game furthermore emphasises the shapes’ differences through their abilities. Not every 
shape has a special ability. Thomas, Chris and John, for example, just have different sizes—which 
for some puzzles are very useful—but characters such as Claire and James have each a special ability 
that the other shapes do not. Claire’s ability to float on toxic water helps the player to get the other 
shapes across the water if the player places the other character on top of Claire and then moves her 
to the other side. James’ ability to, as the narrator states, “disregard Newtonian Law”, has him falling 
upwards instead of downwards like all the other characters, which again proves to be useful in 
solving each puzzle in which he appears. None of the shapes move exactly according to any of the 
other shapes so that once the player has the possibility to control all shapes can feel the unique 
quirks and abilities each shape has, and from that infer a sense of characterness. 
 
In Short 
Thomas Was Alone is an interesting game for the fact that it does not portray its characters as visual 
figures that look human-like. Instead, the game uses three interdependent elements that allows the 
player to assign a sense of personhood to the quadrilateral shapes the player controls to solve the 
levels of puzzles: their personal names, the extra-diegetic narrator, and kinaesthetic motion. 
Personal names are one of the most important mechanisms for a reader to identify a figure as a 
quasi-person. The narrator is connected to what the player does in the game, so that what happens 
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in the game is in alignment with what the narrator says. This allows the player to not only make 
sense as to how to solve the puzzles and control the shapes, but also enables the player to assign 
thoughts and feelings to the shapes. Finally, the game’s kinaesthetic motion allows the player to 
feel the difference between each shape. Not only does every shape move, jump and sound different 
in comparison to each other, some shapes also have abilities that others do not have. These three 
structural elements combined allow the player to infer personhood from the shapes beyond the 
game’s story and in spite of the game’s lack of visual human-like figures. 
 
 
4. Overwatch (2016) 
In this section, I discuss how the team-based online multiplayer shooter game Overwatch allows the 
player to interpret avatars into characters through the developer Blizzard Entertainment’s 
transmedia practices within the Overwatch franchise. 
Overwatch contains, at the time of writing, 31 different heroes for the player to control. The 
characters function as avatars in the sense that they represent the player, and function as the 
player’s locus of agency to act in the game world. When the player chooses one of the characters, 
the characters’ names are replaced by the player’s name so that the individual player is recognisable 
to another, even when two players use the same avatar. The avatars provide the player the 
possibility to play the match that suits their style of play (Bartle 1996; Aarseth 2003). Each hero is 
categorised into one of three different categories—healer, tank or damage—but also maintains 
their own unique abilities within their category.  Although their unique abilities give them an 
individual flavour, these abilities do not characterise them as individual quasi-persons, because 
these abilities are nothing more than abilities; they do not provide the character an existence to 
whom the player can ascribe thoughts and intentions. Theoretically, the avatars can be completely 
stripped from their personal names, their visual design as kyara, and more, and the player could still 
play the game so long as they have their abilities. 
The question then is: how do these avatars turn into characters? I argue that Overwatch uses 
paratext (see Genette 1987) to facilitate the characterisation of these heroes through the 
transmedia practices Blizzard Entertainment executes in and outside of the game’s matches. 
Genette (1987) introduces the notion of paratext as a textual element that supports the reader in 
their interpretation of a certain work, “whose existence alone […] provides some commentary on 
the text and influences how the text is received” (7). Genette places the responsibility of the 
paratext onto the author (or its associates) who then in a variety of degrees provides certain types 
of official and unofficial support for the reader’s interpretation of the author’s work. As explained 
in chapter five, the example of J. K. Rowling’s tweet on Hermione’s ethnicity shows that this kind of 
responsibility provides the author with an almost holy dimension, and can lead to the reader 
becoming more confused as to how to interpret certain works instead of clarifying that work. 
Johnathan Gray (2010) expands on Genette’s notion into contemporary media practices, 
considering paratext those additional works that shape the reader, watcher, or audience’s 
expectations of the work to the extent that paratexts such as movie trailers, advertisements for 
games and such, “shape the reading strategies that we will take with us ‘into’ the text, […] they 
provide the all-important early frames through which we will examine, react to, and evaluate textual 
consumption” (26). Although Gray’s additional interpretation of the paratext provides a frame for 
how to interpret trailers, posters etc., for convergence culture, prior to his work, Mia Consalvo 
(2007) adapted Genette’s concept of the paratext to be specifically applied to games. She argues 
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that peripheral industries surrounding games function as paratext, which includes game magazines, 
mods, strategy guides and more to shape the player’s experience of the game work. 
 
Hanzo and Genji 
Blizzard’s method to turn the avatars from the game into characters via their transmedia practices 
can be considered a paratextual strategy that shapes the player’s experience of the game work. 
Blizzard Entertainment characterises its characters through the comics and movies on their website 
as paratextual elements that connect to the game work. The comics and movies that I discuss here 
include the comics18 Blizzard Entertainment makes available on their website, and the videos that 
Blizzard Entertainment calls animated shorts, cinematic trailers and origin stories. This excludes 
gameplay review videos and character introduction videos, because these portray the characters in 
terms of their usage as avatars in the game’s matches. 
The videos and comics can easily be read and understood apart from the game, and could 
therefore not be considered paratext. However, since Blizzard Entertainment is a game company, 
and tends to release new comics and videos at the same time as they introduce new characters, 
events, or other mechanics to their game, it is questionable to consider the video and comics to be 
standalone works. More importantly, the game makes intertextual references to the comics and 
videos often that are more easily interpretable when the player has read or watched these comics 
and videos. For example, a conversation between two characters randomly occurs at the start of 
each match, and seems only to be available to the players who use these characters as their avatar 
within the same team. When two players on the same team choose Genji and Hanzo before the 
start of a match, the following conversation may occur: 
 
Genji: It is not too late to change your course, brother. 
Hanzo: You may call yourself my brother, but you are not the Genji I knew. (Blizzard 
Entertainment 2016) 
 
On its own, the conversation provides little information. The player might initially not even realise 
that this is a conversation between Genji and Hanzo, because the only indication that this 
conversation occurs are the characters’ voice-overs. When the player realizes that this is a 
conversation between Hanzo and Genji, they could infer that these two are siblings—which is 
further supported by the Japanese-sounding names and their broadly ‘Asian’ appearance— and that 
they share a troubled past. As to what this past is, what happened between them and why, that 
remains unclear, and is not resolved during a match. 
The player can find the answer to what this conversation refers to in the comics and videos. 
In this case, one video in particular, Dragons (2016) which, in eight minutes, tells of the tragic history 
between Hanzo and Genji. The video shows Hanzo returning to his home to honour his dead brother. 
But, while he performs the ritual, an assassin sneaks up to him and questions why Hanzo honours 
someone he murdered. While they fight, the assassin continues to torment Hanzo, telling him that 
it was Hanzo’s duty to kill his brother who had presumably betrayed his clan. Hanzo performs his 
ultimate attack, calling forth a dragon with the words “Ryuu ga waga teki wo kurau”.19 The assassin 
 
18 The comics are also available in print, but Blizzard Entertainment usually makes their comics first available for free 
on their website. 
19 Hanzo’s summoning words translate to something like “Dragon, devour my enemies”. 
The English voice-over of these words says “Let the dragon consume you!”. 
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responds to the attack, summoning another dragon with the words “Ryuujin no ken wo kurau”.20 
Hanzo remarks that only someone of his Shimada family “can control the dragons”, upon which 
assassin reveals himself to be Genji, Hanzo’s brother whom Hanzo thought to be dead. Genji tells 
Hanzo he has forgiven him for what he has done, and that Hanzo should forgive himself, but also 
that it is time to pick a side in a changing world. Hanzo responds with anger and attempts to shoot 
Genji. Genji, however, avoids the attack and leaves Hanzo with the message that he still has hope 
for his brother. 
There are quite a few intertextual elements in the video that the Overwatch game uses in 
order to build the characters of Hanzo and Genji. The video Dragon reveals the brothers to have a 
difficult background, one that might be even more tragic than the player can realise from the game. 
Other elements include the dragon attacks. Each hero has an ‘ultimate attack’ in the game that they 
can use once the player has charged them. Hanzo’s and Genji’s ultimate attack in the game is—with 
a few slight changes—almost identical to how their ultimate attack is depicted in the video. Both 
characters use the same summoning words to call forth the dragons, the dragons look the same, 
the sound of the summoning is similar, and the types of attack that the summoned dragons perform 
in the short film coincides with what the player notices in the game. Although the game does not 
facilitate any character-development, by connecting the game to the comics and short films, the 
player can perceive Hanzo’s and Genji’s characterisation process from which they infer a life-like 
existence and read Hanzo and Genji as quasi-persons. 
 
Blizzard Entertainment’s Paratextual Strategy 
Blizzard Entertainment’s strategy to have the player read the game’s avatars as characters recalls 
Martin Roth’s (2013) description of the Naruto fighting game adaptations within the Naruto media 
mix strategy. Roth explains that the Naruto fighting games facilitate “distinct experiences of the 
‘Naruto’ world” (244), and therefore distinct experiences of the characters. He argues that the 
characters in the Naruto games can be regarded as kyara, seeing as they share the visual appearance 
with the characters in the anime, and therefore encourage emotional attachment. However, 
although the anime stimulates this emotional attachment via story and narration, in the fighting 
games “the degree of abstract rather requires the player to link the kyara to the experience of other 
parts of the franchise in order to retain or regain this emotional engagement” (250). 
Blizzard Entertainment uses the Overwatch characters as kyara whose appearance in the 
comics and videos functions as paratextual support to facilitate distinct player experiences which 
the game itself cannot facilitate. In December 2016, a little over six months after Blizzard released 
Overwatch, the company published the comic Reflections (Chu and Montlló 2016). The comic shows 
Tracer, a character that Blizzard tends to use as their mascot character, running around to obtain a 
green scarf. When she arrives home, the reader is introduced to a new character that the player of 
the game had not encountered before: Emily. Emily unwraps the gift Tracer brought and kisses 
Tracer intimately. From that cosy scene, and particularly the affectionate kiss that comes after the 
gift, the reader can infer certain information that was previously unknown about Tracer, specifically 
regarding her sexuality: having a girlfriend can make the reader assume Tracer’s sexual orientation. 
A genre such as a shooter or fighting game provides little space for character development. 
I have not found a single indication in the Overwatch game that Tracer has a girlfriend, or anything 
about her sexual orientation. Yet, my perception of her as a character is one who is at the very least 
 
20 Genji’s summoning words translate to something like ”Devour my dragon sword”.  
The English voice-line of these words is ”The dragon becomes me”. 
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bisexual. This perception I then take with me as a player to the game, constantly interpreting what 
the Tracer avatar—whether controlled by me or any other player—does to re-affirm this perception. 
The development of Tracer, Genji, Hanzo and the other characters occurs outside of the game in 
the paratext. Their person-like qualities, their development as characters that are born into a life 
and might possibly die, rely on the stories narrated in the comics and videos. The player then has to 
link the Overwatch avatars to the characters in the comic and short films to experience the avatars 
as characters. 
 
In Short 
A prevalent way Overwatch turns its avatars into characters in the game is by their relation to the 
comics and videos. In these comics and videos, the characters are portrayed as quasi-persons. The 
player links the character’s portrayal to the game, which shows several intertextual references so 
that the game characters carry the impression that they develop, even when the genre of the game 
does not fully support such a development. 
 
 
5. Hollow Knight (2017) 
Hollow Knight, like many games, gives its characters specific functions that they have to fulfil. 
However, the game manages to go beyond the player’s expectations that these characters will fulfil 
these ludic functions according to the player’s repertoire of game character role functions by 
subverting these roles, to the extent that they might even work against the player. In this section, I 
will explain how Hollow Knight stimulates in the player certain expectations of the characters and 
the functions they perform, and then subverts these roles. This way, the game gives the player the 
impression that these figures exist beyond serving the player within a specific role, but have—as 
quasi-persons—their own will and agenda according to which they act. 
Additionally, this section will also discuss how the player can interpret certain figures as 
characters that initially only seem to operate according to their ludic function and nothing else. The 
pieces of information that the game gives the player allows them to attain additive comprehension 
(see Jenkins 2006, 127) to connect the figure that they see to the signs that the game gives them in 
order to infer that the figure is a quasi-person. 
 
Millibelle’s Betrayal 
Because game characters are integrated within the game’s mechanical system, they function 
according to the role they were given to lead the player towards a specific goal or the game’s end-
state. Isbister’s (2006, 240) categorisation of social role templates suggests that character 
conventions dictate how the game characters are supposed to behave according to their function 
within a given game. Hollow Knight has many characters that use a certain convention of a 
character’s social role. It contains characters with supporting roles, such as Cornifer who provides 
the player with maps of the area, or merchants such as Millibelle. It also contains obstacle characters 
such as Hornet who the player has to defeat in order to reach their goals, and enemies such as the 
Traitor Lord. The game also contains allies such as Cloth, who will help the player defeat the Traitor 
Lord on the condition that the player saves her before battling the Traitor Lord. 
Initially, Hollow Knight’s characters act according to the function that they have been given, 
such as an obstacle, enemy, or support. At the same time, the game also manages to provide these 
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characters their own psyche and agenda that allows them to act outside of their given function 
when the player performs the right combination of actions, which gives the impression that these 
entities are characters because they come off as unpredictable beings with thoughts and an agenda 
of their own that is prioritised over the function the game at first impression gives them. 
One of Isbister’s social role templates for non-playable characters is the informant/trader, 
who provides the player with services that they need which ranges from information to trading 
goods (2006, 248). According to Isbister the player has little investment in these characters besides 
the basic trading and bargaining. The role seems to be incredibly fixed in the average game 
experience, and Isbister warns in her game design book that game designers have to keep these 
characters ‘plausible’ in the game world and not have them interfere too much with the ‘core 
gameplay’. That means that a kind of character such as a trader serves a very specific function to 
the player, and is basically not allowed to act outside the template of this function. 
In Hollow Knight, every time the player-character loses its life, the player has to retrieve the 
player-character’s soul and Geo (the in-game currency). If the player manages to reach the soul and 
defeat it, the Geo returns to the player, but if the player-character dies again before reaching its 
soul, the player loses all the Geo they had accumulated until that point. Luckily, the game provides 
a solution to this problem: the player can save up their Geo at the bank of Millibelle the Banker. The 
player will not have to worry about losing their Geo at the bank when the player-character dies, but 
what they do have to worry about is Millibelle. 
During my own gameplay, I would regularly deposit some of my hard-earned Geo into 
Millibelle’s bank so that when I had saved up enough I could buy items that I needed to progress 
through the game without having to worry about losing all the Geo that I had worked so hard to 
obtain. My money was safe in her care. Or so I thought. The next time I visited Millibelle after I had 
deposited over 2,500 Geo, she was gone. And so was my Geo. I had no idea where she was, but I 
found myself quite frustrated with the character. Like the other games I discuss in this chapter, 
Millibelle contains some signifiers that communicate that she is a character: she is an individual with 
a name, she is visually an anthropomorphic insect, and she spoke to me with a speech distinct to 
elderly ladies (“Hello there dearie”, and so on). She was already a character before she ran off, but 
before that action, her primary existence operated on her function as a banker to prioritise me, the 
player, and support me as I try to solve the mystery of the game. I did not perceive her necessarily 
as an individual with her own thoughts and intentions. But, by running away, she had intervened on 
my gameplay. 
Eventually, I found Millibelle in a spa bath in an area called ‘The Pleasure House’. She started 
shaking from fear the moment she noticed the player-character, and lied that the Geo was gone 
because the costs it took her to maintain the bank were supposedly higher than she had expected. 
When I tried to press her again, she would not say anything else than: “No h-hard feelings, okay?”. 
Clearly, the script had run out. I would not gain any new information about retrieving my Geo. 
Frustrated, I hit her. All these Geo coins suddenly dropped out of her: there was my money! 
What is special about Millibelle is that she fulfils a ludic function that is standardised, but 
then deviates from the role. Her betrayal characterises her as a character with an agenda of her own 
instead as a mere function that exists to serve the player. Her betrayal has real consequences for 
the player’s experience in the game. Not only does she take away the Geo the player had to work 
for, her disappearance also removes the saving mechanism that the game initially promised the 
player would have. Even after I had retrieved my Geo, I did not get the saving mechanism back, and 
so every time my player-character lost its life, I would run the risk of losing all my Geo again. I had 
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to be even more careful, as I could not run the risk of losing the Geo that I needed for the upgrades 
to my player-character’s abilities, since the game had become more difficult as well. Millebelle’s 
betrayal thus allows her to become more idiosyncratic, and hence more of an individual, a quasi-
person, than her function as a banker could have given her. 
Not all of the game’s characters subvert the player’s expectations. But, nonetheless, Hollow 
Knight has several characters that defy the initial ludic function the player gives them. The Dung 
Defender, a character in the shape of a beetle, has the ludic function as one of the game’s main 
bosses. Hollow Knight does not contain many boss characters that the player has to beat but, 
unfortunately for me, the Dung Defender is one of them. If the player wants to pass the Royal 
Waterways in order to progress the game to its end-state, the player has to defeat the Dung 
Defender. They can hear the Dung Defender already at the entrance of the beetle’s domain as he 
shouts non-sensible utterances that to my own ears sounded much like a Spanish bullfighter (or 
however I imagine a Spanish bullfighter to sound like). The Dung Defender attacks immediately on 
sight, throwing mud balls while simultaneously attacking the player underground and in the air, so 
that the player has to avoid multiple projectiles at once and only has a small window to attack the 
Dung Defender. This boss fight took me more attempts than I would like to admit. After the player 
has defeated the Dung Defender, he collapses and crawls back into the ground. 
The game gives the impression that the Dung Defender’s function in the game as a boss is 
over, and he therefore will not appear again. But after the player visits the Royal Waterways again, 
the Dung Defender will approach them—this time not to fight, but to apologize. He admits that he 
mistook the player-character for a mindless husk, and realised only after the player defeated him 
that this was not the case. And therefore, the player will infer that although the Dung Defender’s 
original function is that of a boss to defeat, the Dung Defender’s mistake gives the character a 
person-like existence. 
 
Additive Comprehension 
Besides the game characters who show a distinct will beyond their ludic function, Hollow Knight also 
contains characters who initially only seem to operate according to their ludic function as, for 
example, a merchant, boss, or quest provider. Nevertheless, even in the case of these types of 
characters, the player can infer from them a life-like existence as quasi-persons when they acquire 
additive comprehension of the game’s world to piece together background information over the 
characters they encounter. 
Additive comprehension is a term Henry Jenkins borrows from game designer Neil Young 
(Jenkins 2006, 127). It refers to a piece of information given to the player that changes the player’s 
perception of the situation. This concept is useful to apply to Hollow Knight in order to describe how 
the player can infer a sense of characterhood from figures that only seem to fulfil a certain ludic 
function (and do not act beyond that like Millebelle and the Dung Defender do). 
Deep within the game world’s Fungal Wastes lies the Mantis Village that contains a chamber 
in which the Mantis Lords reside. These three lords are optional bosses who the player can challenge 
to fight. Beating them grants the player safe passage through the Mantis Village, and a gateway to 
another location in the game’s world, Deepnest. Although there are only three mantis lords present, 
the observant player will notice four thrones, one of which is broken (image 4). This fourth throne 
suggests a fourth lord, and the fact that the throne is broken suggests a dark past. 
When the player gets closer to the Queen’s Garden, a location in the game’s world that the 
player has to visit to meet the world’s queen, a giant mantis shows up, announced as the Traitor 
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Lord. He provides no other function at all other than being a main boss, an enemy obstacle that the 
player has to overcome if they wish to progress the game towards its end-state. However, his name, 
his vile appearance, and the fact that he attacks the player suggests a connection to the fourth 
throne of the Mantis Lords. 
As soon as the player defeats the Traitor Lord, he bursts open and the orange infection—
something that the player encounters throughout the whole game, driving characters mad—
spreads out of his skull. At this moment, the Traitor Lord appears as an entry in the game’s Hunter’s 
Journal, the compendium that provides information about each enemy the player has defeated. This 
journal states the following about the Traitor Lord: “Once a member of the Mantis tribe, now cast 
out and driven mad by infection”. This revelation provides the player with additive comprehension, 
connecting the Traitor Lord conclusively to the fourth throne and understanding that this is the 
Mantis Lord that betrayed the three other Mantis Lords, thereby giving the figure a sense of a life-
like existence than it initially seemed to provide as a boss that the player simply had to defeat. 
 
 
 
Image 4: The fourth throne of the Mantis Lords’ lair is broken. 
 
In Short 
Hollow Knight shows its figures as quasi-persons by giving the player the expectation that the 
characters will act according to the ludic function these characters were initially given, such as being 
a merchant or a boss, who exist to serve the player in their progress towards the game’s end-state. 
Yet, Hollow Knight subverts these ludic functions and defies the player’s expectations by having the 
characters act out of the function: the characters might betray the player or apologise for their 
previous behaviour. Since it seems that all these characters have their own agenda, beyond serving 
as a ludic function for the player, the player receives the impression that these characters are quasi-
persons. 
Not every character in Hollow Knight subverts their ludic function, and some act only within 
the constraints of the function they were given. Nevertheless, the game allows the player to obtain 
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pieces of information about these characters that the player puzzles together, thereby allowing the 
player to attain additive comprehension, by which the player can infer a life-life existence from 
these figures that go beyond their ludic function. 
  
 
6. Animal Crossing: New Leaf (2012) 
Animal Crossing: New Leaf (AC:NL) gives the player the impression that the figures in the game’s 
world are quasi-persons through the game’s real-time mechanics, and through the transfer of data 
between two or more players that connect their game worlds. This provides a form of continuity 
between the character manifestation that appears in one player’s game and then reappears in the 
other player’s game, suggesting that it is the same character. 
 
Villager Autonomy 
Having abandoned the game for over a year, my town in AC:NL was almost exactly the same as I had 
left it, but run over with weeds and with fewer flowers. The five or six villagers that were living in 
my little town before were still there, walking around as if no time had passed. But although they 
gave the impression little had changed, the villagers were not shy in telling me that I had not been 
around. My first conversation was with Pompom, a little duck character with an energetic 
personality. Her immediate dialogue when my avatar initiated a conversation with her was, “Eek! 
It’s the ghost of Joleen! Run away! Run away!”. She did not seem to believe that the figure in front 
of her was my avatar, but as her dialogue went on (my avatar does not actually have any dialogue 
lines at all) she came to realise that it was really ‘me’ who had returned to the village. Other villagers 
responded in similar ways. All of them showed surprise that I had returned. Some would 
immediately welcome me back, while others would point out exactly how long I had been gone 
(over twelve months). 
AC:NL can be considered a simulation game. Although all games are in some sense 
simulations (Aarseth 2004; Frasca 2006), Apperley (2006) points out that the genre of simulation 
games “clearly remediate a ‘real’ world activity. Within this is often the assumption—or the 
promise—that the game is ‘authentic’ to the ‘real’ activity” (12). AC:NL seems to promise some of 
those ‘real world’ activities. The player’s primary actions involve mostly mundane activities: 
watering the flowers, designing and decorating their house, catching insects, and talking to the 
villagers of their town. However, Aarseth (2007) points out that entities not belonging to the real 
world can also be simulated, such as dragons. He argues that although the dragon Smaug in Tolkien’s 
world is fictional, the dragon in EverQuest (Verant Interactive and 989 Studios 1999) is a simulation. 
The former consists only of signs, while the latter consists of signs and a dynamic model that 
responds to the player’s input (37). AC:NL’s characters are far from mimicking any real world entities 
too. As anthropomorphic animals they might resemble certain entities, such as ducks, rabbits, or 
lions, but I have yet to see a real lion watering a rose and asking how my day has been. 
AC:NL contains about 333 villagers (Animal Crossing Wiki n.d.), characters who can live in a 
player’s village, although only about ten of them can live in the village at the same time. The game 
also contains ten characters with specific social roles, such as the merchant and real estate agent 
Tom Nook, providing the player with upgrades to their house, or the assistant Isabelle, helping the 
player to improve the town. Any character with a special role usually only responds when the player 
requires something from them, or when a special event occurs in the game such as during New 
Year’s Eve, but villager characters live autonomously and do not require the engagement of the 
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player to perform actions. They do not have a specific function to fulfil other than populating the 
player’s village, occupying themselves with the mundane activities of fishing, shopping, catching 
bugs and listening to music. 
The game follows the player’s time in the ‘real’ world. When it is for example, Wednesday 
the 24th of April 2019 at 10 AM for the player, it will be that exact time in the game as well. The 
time can be manipulated, because the game does not follow any satellite time based on the location 
of the player. Instead, the game follows the time as set in the 3DS console, which can be changed 
manually by the user of the console. This means that if the player were to change the time from the 
24th of April 2019, 10AM to the 25th of April 2019, 3PM, AC:NL’s time will change to that time as 
well. 
Their capacity to instil guilt in me from not having visited for so long can be partially 
attributed to my own personality as a player, but it also partially lies in the representation of how 
the game expresses the characters so that the player assigns certain sets of thoughts, intentions and 
behaviours to these characters. AC:NL shows that the characters have a certain autonomy from the 
player. The characters instilled in me the message that while I was out of the game, they continued 
to live inside the game world and the same amount of time passed as in the real world. This 
particular example can be attributed to the time mechanic of the game, but the characters also 
maintain other sorts of behaviour that gives the impression that they have their own autonomous 
life. 
As I was strolling through town, cleaning up the weeds that had grown all over the game 
world, villagers Mott and Pompom entered a conversation. I could not tell the topic of their 
conversation, but they seemed rather animated. I never managed to be in time to overhear any 
conversation characters have with each other, although the game does afford the player the ability 
to listen in.21 The question here is not so much whether or not they actually had a conversation, the 
relevance lies in the signals that made me think it was a conversation: the animation between 
Pompom and Mott, as they were conversing, resembled the conversations between my avatar and 
other characters: when a villager wishes to speak to the player, either an exclamation mark or three 
red stripes appear above their head, followed with a high-pitched sound. 
 
Continuity 
Another means by which the villager characters show autonomy is their habit of moving in and out 
of the village. Depending on how well the player treats the town and the villagers by keeping the 
village clean, sending the villagers letters, or constructing public work projects, the number of 
villagers increases up to a maximum of ten villagers. The simulation is based on the specific 
paradigm of Japanese society, the furusato, the concept of old villages where one lives a rustic 
lifestyle, completely the opposite of any busy cosmopolitan cities, that summons feelings of 
nostalgia (see Robertson 1988). These simulation aspects mirror Japanese contemporary ideals of 
living, and therefore appeal to the player on an emotional level. 
When a character leaves town, the first impression is that the character leaves the player’s 
game world. In some cases this impression might be true, but the game world expands each time 
the player visits another player’s town, or when another player visits the player’s town. Via a local 
connection or an internet connection, two or more players can share their data, and enter each 
other’s town. This I did with a friend of mine. As I explored this friend’s village, I gathered some 
 
21 The Animal Crossing Wikipedia page lists what kind of conversations villagers usually have: 
https://animalcrossing.fandom.com/wiki/Conversation. 
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fruits, bought some furniture, and spoke to some of his villagers. Then I returned to my town. My 
friend did the same in my town: he gathered some of my town’s local fruit, bought some furniture, 
and spoke to some of my villagers. And he returned to his town. Not long after this encounter, the 
character Joey from my village announced he would move. I never really liked him, so I said ‘yes’, 
and he went. A couple of days later, the same friend whose town I had visited told me that Joey had 
come to settle in his town. Joey had announced to my friend that he moved from the town of 
Bloempje—my town—to his town. What had happened was that by exchanging data, the game 
world of my friend and my game world expanded, merged into a single game world. As a result, 
both me and my friend experienced a sense of continuity between the characters in my village and 
the characters in his village: the manifestation of Joey in his town gave the impression it was the 
same manifestation Joey from my town, and not a manifestation of Joey any other player might 
have in their town. 
The characters are containers of the data transferred between the 3DS handheld consoles 
and allow the player to notice the data transaction. The Joey that now lives in my friend’s town 
contains, as a computational agent, data of my town, and sometimes shows to my friend that it has 
this data by specifically talking to my friend’s avatar about me or my town. The transfer of data 
provides a sense of continuity between the character manifestations in one player’s game and in 
the other player’s game. The characters show that they lived at a certain time at a certain place and 
give the impression that they identify with the manifestation that lived in another player’s town. 
Eco’s (1995) statement that “[w]hen fictional characters begin migrating from text to text, they have 
acquired citizenship in the real world and have freed themselves from the story that created them” 
(126) is also applicable to AC:NL’s villager characters. Each villager character has the potential to 
move and appear in another player’s game. When these characters appear in another player’s 
town—on the condition that the players have shared their data—these characters free themselves 
from the game world and therefore from the player and the player’s agency to affect and influence 
the town and its inhabitants. Appearing in another player’s town, these characters give the message 
that they are free, autonomous agents who decide for themselves if they want the player to 
influence their lives. It is from this autonomy that the player infers to these figures a life-like 
existence as quasi-persons, as characters. 
 
In Short 
AC:NL gives the player the impression that its characters have an autonomous, life-like existence. 
The characters show that they have their own will, intentions and thoughts independent from the 
player. They act as if they are aware of the player’s presence in and absence from the game, 
reminding the player that they have not been visiting them for quite a while. They also move 
between towns, popping up in another player’s town when two or more players shared data, and 
express that they previously lived in the other player’s town. This sense of continuity between 
manifestations frees the villager characters from the player, showing that they decide for 
themselves, as quasi-persons, where to live and with which player. 
 
 
7. Summary 
In this chapter, I discussed the different means through which digital games construct characters to 
answer the main question: what are the different means by which digital games construct the game 
character so that the player perceives that entity to be a character? The premise was that the player 
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invokes the characters that the games stimulate using different means to different effects. I began 
with a theoretical explanation for how the constraints and affordances of a medium and its specific 
conventions determine a medium’s presentation of characters, which are both similar to and 
different from other media. 
I followed with a discussion about the challenge of how games present game characters. 
Game characters are the quasi-persons integrated in the game’s mechanical system, which requires 
the player’s non-trivial effort to progress from one state to another. But they are, at the same time, 
subjected to the challenge that games can vary so distinctively from each other in structure and 
modality such that the construction of characters, and therefore also of game characters, cannot be 
reduced to a single core. Therefore, in order to give an impression of the different means by which 
games stimulate the player to invoke game characters, I provided four game works as examples.  
Thomas Was Alone uses personal names, extra-diegetic narration and kinaesthetic motion 
to invoke the characters. Overwatch gives each character separate abilities that make sense in the 
matches of the game world, but the game primarily relies on the developer’s transmedia production 
of the franchise to create the impression that the game’s avatars are characters with a life. Hollow 
Knight subverts game character conventions and allows characters to exist beyond their initial 
functions with an agenda of their own even when that means betraying the player. And Animal 
Crossing: New Leaf gives the impression that its characters have an existence independent from the 
player through actions such as pointing out to the player when they have not visited the game world 
for a while, initiating conversations with the player, leaving the town to settle in another, or visiting 
the player’s town at several points in the year. 
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Chapter Seven 
The Dynamic Game Character 
 
In this chapter, I explain the concept of the dynamic game character, a type of game character with 
a development structure that branches into different outcomes. This chapter is meant as an 
introduction and therefore only presents the topic and the basic conditions needed to consider a 
game character dynamic. In the next chapter, I will discuss the strategies dynamic game characters 
appear in more detail. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section of this chapter is devoted to the 
introduction of the dynamic game character using my experience playing the Mass Effect series. 
Here I will provide a definition of the dynamic game character. This section also addresses the 
possibility space, the mechanical structure of games that facilitate game characters to become 
dynamic, and subsequentially explains the development structure of the dynamic game character, 
which uses the possibility space to provide for the player a non-trivial role in the characterisation 
process of these characters. The second section discusses the existence of rigid game characters in 
order to describe how dynamic game characters diverge from them. I will therefore present a brief 
definition on rigid game characters. The distinction between dynamic game characters and rigid 
game characters is, however, not as strict as it initially might seem, hence why in the definition 
about rigid game character I also set up the first discussion about the grey area, using the example 
of Nier: Automata. I will explain this grey area in more detail in the next chapter. The third section 
ends the chapter by providing the main conditions for a game character to be considered dynamic. 
It further clarifies how a character is considered dynamic in the structure of the game, as well as 
providing the conditions on which I choose the dynamic game characters to be discussed in the next 
chapter.22 
It is impossible to play all games that exist to find dynamic game characters that possibly 
confirm or depart from the definition that I describe in this chapter. As I explain in chapter three, 
‘On Method’, I therefore follow Roland Barthes’ (Barthes [1966] 1995) and Mieke Bal’s (Bal 1978; 
1999) approach to create a deductive method in which the researcher first proposes a general 
theory, and then works gradually down to different species that conform and depart from that 
proposed theory. The works have to conform to the theory in a general perspective, but should 
allow the researcher to determine similarities and differences between each work. Such an 
approach allows me to provide an in-depth analysis of the diversity of the dynamic game character 
over the course of several games in the next two chapters. 
The games I selected accommodate the general overview that this chapter is meant to 
provide. This means that, on one end of the spectrum, I chose games such as the Mass Effect series 
which contain a large set of dynamic game characters, with a combination of prefabricated and non-
prefabricated characters whose development is deterministic. On the other end of the spectrum, I 
chose games such as Kingdom Hearts (2002) with prefabricated characters whose development are 
deterministic regardless of the player’s performance. Other games that I mention in this chapter, 
 
22 Several paragraphs of this chapter are also in my paper ‘Definition and Construction of Dynamic Game Characters in 
Digital Games’ for the academic workshop at the Ropecon conference held on the 26th of July, 2019 in Helsinki, 
Finland. 
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such as Nier: Automata (PlatinumGames 2017) and Red Dead Redemption 2 (Rockstar Studios 2018), 
fall somewhere in between on the spectrum, as they contain prefabricated characters with 
indeterministic development outcomes. I will explain these particular concepts in the next chapter 
as well. It might be that there are games with dynamic game characters which my definition misses. 
They might show characters that depart from my definition of the dynamic game character. I do not 
deny that this could happen. This possibility is not something that I necessarily perceive as a 
limitation, but rather an advantage, because it confirms Barthes’ and Bal’s arguments that from a 
theory one can extrapolate different species that conform and depart from the model, which allows 
for an analysis of the plurality of characters in terms of “their historical, geographical and cultural 
diversity” (Barthes [1966] 1995, 254). As long as I do not find any games that completely contradict 
the existence of the dynamic game character, I believe that the examples that I use are sufficient to 
answer the research question of this dissertation.  
Nevertheless, my theory of the dynamic game character is not based on stories or narrative 
structures, as has been previously the case with character typologies such as those from Vladimir 
Propp (1928) and A. J. Greimas (1966). As I explain within this chapter, the dynamic game character 
depends on the mechanical system of the game instead of on the narrative structure of the game. 
A typology based on narrative will only mean perceiving characters in terms of ‘classical’ narration. 
While that is definitely one means by which characters are communicated, characters also have a 
historical grounding in performance and theatre, where they have been analysed in terms of acting 
rather than in terms of narration. And, as seen with the kyara, characters do not require narrative 
to exist. Nevertheless, if the mechanical structure of the game incorporates a narrative structure, 
then the dynamic game character is also incorporated within that narrative structure. In other words, 
just because the focus of the dynamic game character lies in the game’s mechanic structure, does 
not mean I entirely omit narrative structure, rather that these narrative structures assume a more 
background role. 
Besides the fact that the dynamic game character sidesteps the focus on stories, it also 
provides other advantages to our understanding of characters in games, and in the broader sense 
of contemporary transmedia practices (I explain the latter in more detail in the next chapter). The 
dynamic game character is not limited to the player-character. As seen from chapter two, ‘Theory’, 
game studies has primarily discussed characters in three ways: the difference between avatar and 
character (Bartle 1996; Carr 2002; Isbister 2006; Klevjer 2006; Newman 2002), the dual identity 
between player-character and player (Tronstad 2008; Calleja 2011; Vella 2015; 2016), and a general 
description of game characters (Aldred 2012; 2014; Egenfeldt-Nielsen, Smith, and Tosca 2008; 
Linderoth 2005; Schröter and Thon 2014). The dynamic game character is none of these. The 
dynamic game character diverges from the focus on the player-character, and steps away from the 
supposed dichotomy between player-characters and non-player-characters. 
The player is still at the heart of the game, but a theory of the dynamic game character 
relocates the focus of the player’s agency from being within a single entity, to an agency over a web 
of characters, over which the player (often) does not have any avatarial agency. Such a theory 
sidesteps the underlying focus that when the player controls a player-character their agency is 
limited to the scope of the player-character. Rather, even when the player controls a player-
character, the dynamic game character shows how the player affects different kinds of non-player-
characters. Even when the player controls no player-character at all, the dynamic game character is 
applicable in describing how the player influences a web of characters in a game. These advantages 
become clear in this chapter and the next chapters. 
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1. The Development Structure of Game Characters 
The dynamic game character is a particular manifestation of a character in a game. It is a quasi-
person with a development structure that branches into different outcomes, which are 
undetermined until the player actualises one or more possibilities that influence the direction onto 
distinct paths with a specific outcome. A dynamic game character is inherently ergodic because the 
player has to put in non-trivial effort to affect the development towards a certain outcome. The 
actualisation of these possibilities has structural consequences for the manner in which the player 
continues to traverse the game, as the game will indicate that the player influences the 
development of the character onto a certain path, and thereby the closing of another path. The 
outcome does not necessarily have to be clear to the player until they have actualised it. 
Mass Effect 2 (ME2) (BioWare 2010) presented me with the following choice: will Shepard 
destroy Maelon’s data to cure the genophage23 or will Shepard keep the data? In my naivety I choose 
to destroy the data, because it was corrupted by inhumane experiments on female test subjects of 
the Krogan species. Little did I realise at the time, however, that this choice would lead to several 
consequences, especially for one character: Eve. In Mass Effect 3 (ME3) (BioWare 2012), Shepard is 
tasked with retrieving the female test subjects from Maelon’s project. During the mission, Shepard 
discovers that only one subject, Eve, has survived. Eve is taken aboard Shepard’s ship, but she is 
weak, and she coughs. The ship’s doctor, Mordin, explains that in order to cure the genophage he 
needs Eve. But Eve might not survive the procedures, because of her ill health. Eve insists that she 
wants to undergo the procedures, and dies due to complications. 
‘Was there any way to save Eve?’, I thought. Was it possible for her to have survived the 
procedures, or was this an event that the game had set in stone? My search for an alternative led 
me to discover that in ME2 I had already determined Eve’s future by choosing to destroy Maelon’s 
data instead of keeping it. Without it, Mordin’s knowledge was insufficient and he could therefore 
not keep Eve alive. Had I chosen to retain Maleon’s data, Mordin could have used the data and Eve 
would have lived. My choice resulted in the Krogan faction’s support weakening, and Shepard would 
have to battle the final enemy without their help. This made the final battle a lot tougher than it 
could have been. 
Eve, as well as other characters from the Mass Effect series, is a dynamic game character. 
Her development was undetermined until I, the player, employed non-trivial effort to make certain 
events happen which influenced her development in a certain direction. When I chose to destroy 
Maelon’s data, I did not realise that the choice would affect her—she did not make an appearance 
until ME3—but, regardless, my choice closed off the direction in which she would have lived, and 
only left open the path where she would die. I was surprised. This outcome was not what I wanted, 
but I did not feel up for replaying ME2 and ME3 just to change this outcome. I had to live with the 
consequences of my actions: my Eve died. 
The mechanical system of a game (see Aarseth and Calleja 2015) enables the player to not 
only change the state of the game, but to change the state of the character as well. Some characters 
have a development structure in which the player not only changes their state, but influences the 
direction in which the character will develop as well. These character’s development contains 
different outcomes that depends on the player’s choices and actions throughout the game. I call 
 
23 A biological weapon in the game’s diegetic world that the Turian species developed against the Krogan species to 
reduce their numbers. 
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these kinds of characters: dynamic game characters. 
 
The Possibility Space of Games 
The mechanical system of a game creates a possibility space. Aarseth (1997) addresses the existence 
of this space when he explains that in a cybertext making certain choices makes a part of the text 
more and other parts less accessible to its users. With each decision, players actualise one possibility 
and close another (Aarseth 1997). Tychsen and Canossa (2008) state that a game’s possibility space 
structures the playstyle that players can adopt to facilitate the creation of their player persona. And 
Bogost (2008) mentions that the possibility space of play in general is all the gestures made possible 
by its rules. This makes the possibility space sound restricted, because designers structurally 
determine what is possible and what is not possible, according to Westecott (2009). However, the 
scope of a possibility space depends on the game. It could be infinite for some and finite for other 
games. Take, for example, games with a procedurally-generated open world. In these games, 
players can traverse an endless game world because of the procedural content generation (PCG) 
method implemented so that new (and partially random) content in games is automatically 
generated. Minecraft’s (Mojang 2009) and No Man’s Sky’s (Hello Games 2016) possibility spaces are 
infinite, as new content gets generated in a continuous loop. Nevertheless, not every possibility has 
to be available every time nor do certain rules have to be in effect all the time, because the game’s 
processual nature causes the state of the game to change regularly so that players traverse between 
different segments—or sometimes even different games. 
Let me explain the possibility space with an example. The Legend of Zelda: Breath of the Wild 
(BotW) (Nintendo 2017) is an open world game that allows the player to explore and navigate the 
game world, and generates new content every once in a while. The game is structured in such a way 
that players can decide where they want to go in that world, how, and when, but the possibilities of 
doing this are divided into different segments. The most obvious segment is an area called The Great 
Plateau, which simply functions as a tutorial area that familiarises players with the game’s structure, 
mechanics and rules. Only when the player solves the puzzles in four shrines, scattered around 
various locations on this plateau, will they be able to leave it. Yet, even this area itself is fragmented, 
and not all rules and mechanics apply at the same time. For the Keh Namut shrine, the player first 
has to climb a mountain covered in snow. Soon they will discover that in order to reach the top 
where the shrine is located, they have to keep the player-character, Link, warm or else he will die. 
This can be done by finding warm clothes for Link, or by cooking specific dishes that warm him up 
for a certain amount of time. Once Link is inside the shrine, the player does not have to keep Link 
warm anymore, but they do have to solve the shrine’s puzzle in order to obtain the Cryonis ability 
which allows players to create pillars of ice from a water’s surface. The player cannot perform all 
actions within the game’s possibility space all the time, because the segmented nature of this space 
causes certain possibilities to be available and other possibilities to be unavailable. In simple terms, 
different segments allow for different possibilities. 
I consider the possibility space, the capacity of potential that the player can actualise, to 
belong to the mechanical system of a game, which structures the processes within the game and 
allows the game to change from on state to another. It consists of the rules of the system, the 
mechanics, and affordances provided by the different segments of a game. The player is the core 
ingredient for a possibility space’s potential to be actualised. As game designer Sid Meier once 
stated: “A game is a series of interesting choices” (Juul 2005, 19). Although I do not consider all 
games to have a set of interesting choices, this statement is particularly applicable to the player and 
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dynamic game characters, because the player has to make interesting choices for the potential of 
dynamic game characters to materialise and develop. 
The possibility space creates potential for character development in games that actualises 
when the player engages with the game while making choices and performing actions. The space’s 
shape can be described and visualised by Brenda Laurel’s (Laurel [1991] 2014) flying wedge for 
computer-human interaction. Laurel explains that in a drama play, the potential of the play turns 
into a set of possibilities as the play progresses, and every enactment makes some possibilities more 
or less probable ([1991] 2014, 84). At the climax of the play, all possibilities are eliminated except 
for one, which is the final outcome. This is when, according to Laurel, probability turns into necessity 
(84) (figure 10). 
 
 
Figure 10: Illustration of Laurel's flying wedge. 
 
Unlike scripted plays however, games can vary per gameplay due to the player’s role within the 
game’s mechanical system. As Laurel argues, the shape of potential for computer-human interaction 
is similar to the flying wedge for dramatic plays, but the amount of possibilities changes as the player 
acts and makes choices (figure 11). As a result, the flying wedge can point to multiple directions that 
vary in outcome. In other words, each player can have a different outcome depending on how they 
play—which choices they make and which actions they perform. 
 
 
Figure 11: Illustration of Laurel's flying wedge for human-computer interaction. 
 
The possibility space facilitates the development structure of all game characters. The range of that 
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potential depends on the game’s mechanical organisation that administers each individual 
character’s development structure with its own potential. The bare minimum of that scope is that 
the character must have the potential to manifest in the game. That is, that the game allows the 
player to engage with the character. 
For instance, Octopath Traveler (Square Enix 2018) allows the player to choose one main 
character from eight possible protagonists at the start of the game. The player can choose to 
encounter the seven protagonists who they did not pick as their main character while traversing the 
world, and recruit them into a party of two or more characters, but the player can also choose to 
completely ignore any or all of them. It could be that one player decides not to recruit the character 
Cyrus, and so that character’s potential development will never actualise over the course of the 
game as a result. Yet, another player might choose Cyrus at the start of the game as their main 
character. This opens the opportunity to explore the range of potential development this character 
has to offer. The player can choose to completely pursue the character’s range of narrative 
development, advance the characters abilities, levels and jobs, which help in reaching the end-state 
of the game if the player wishes to pursue that. When a character manifests in a game, it presents 
a development structure with a certain amount of possibilities for how it can develop, even if that 
potential is severely limited. 
At the widest range of the scope, games give the player the impression that the character’s 
development structure contains a plurality of potentials and outcomes. For example, Nier: 
Automata (PlatinumGames 2017) has 26 different endings in total. Each ending is an actualised 
possibility of the development structure of the characters involved. The majority are endings that 
the player receives when they fail or flee from a mandatory quest and it is just a matter of restarting 
the specific quest to continue the game. Around five endings provide alternative end-states which 
are influenced by the decisions the player has made over the course of the game and the completion 
of the main story quests. It is impossible for the player to actualise all of these outcomes in a single 
run: for some endings, the player needs to obtain a certain combination of the other endings or, in 
other cases, a change in decision near the end is enough to change the end-state. It is at the widest 
range of the scope in which the dynamic game character operates. 
 
The Development Structure of Game Characters 
A dynamic game character’s development structure is shaped similarly to Laurel’s flying wedge for 
human-computer interaction. The player makes specific choices and actions in a field of potential 
that, in turn, makes certain outcomes of the development of the character more or less likely. The 
difference between the shape of the dynamic game character and the shape of the game’s 
possibility space is that the games possibility space includes the development structure of all the 
game’s dynamic game characters, while the development structure of a single dynamic game 
character is assigned distinctively to that individual character and could potentially end before the 
game itself has reached its end-state. 
The development itself does not happen within a single continuous state, because games 
change state as they progress over time. The changes of state in games cause characters to switch 
back and forth between different segments continuously. Each segment declares that the player 
should expect something different from the characters, which could be exploration, battle, narrative 
development or something else. In some segments, the character develops more as a game piece, 
while in other segments it might develop rather as a being with an inner life. To use Thomas 
Lamarre’s term (2018, 217), game characters are in a constant state of switching between codes, 
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and we expect something different from them within each segment. These segments function as 
games within the overall game consisting of their own mechanics, rules, and goals that contribute 
to the game’s larger structural process so that players can reach the game’s end-state. The sum of 
the different segments provides players with a plurality of possibilities that not only affect the 
overall progress of the game, but also contain the potential to influence game characters’ 
development in the process towards the end-state. 
A dynamic game character’s development structure operates on those available segments 
that push the character to evolve as a person over time. Kristine Jørgensen (2010), who provides 
one of the few works about dynamic game characters, describes the growth and development of 
characters in Mass Effect 2 (ME2) and Dragon Age: Origins (DAO) (BioWare 2009) through segments 
such as personal quests and loyalty missions of the companion characters that accompany the 
player-characters in both games. One of the mechanics that she identifies is the approval rating in 
DAO that “defines how well a companion gets along with the PC. This rating changes depending on 
the players’ choice and actions, as well as how they treat the companion in question” (317). She 
describes that in ME2 completed quests and personal missions of the companion characters “will 
increase their loyalty level from normal to loyal. Loyalty unlocks special abilities, decides whether 
or not a companion is available for romance, and how that companion will perform during the end 
game mission” (317). 
Her description demonstrates that the procedures the player has to perform are constrained 
within particular segments that allow the player to affect the outcome of the character at the end-
state of the game. The loyalty mission is its own contained segment that the player needs to 
complete for each companion character, such as Garrus, to become loyal to the player-character, 
and unlock any special abilities they have. The completion of this mission also provides the 
opportunity to romance Garrus (on the condition that the player-character is considered a female 
character by the game), which highly improves Garrus’ chances to survive the game’s final mission. 
The player cannot perform all of these procedures at the same time, and nor are all rules, mechanics 
and affordances simultaneously available. Rather, the player operates inside different segments 
which each contain their own combination of mechanics and rules—some of which overlap with 
others—and by doing so contribute to the overall development of the character, opening up and 
closing certain possibilities in the process. 
The complexity is that a game character’s development is integrated as much in the 
mechanical system as in the sign element. Schröter and Thon address the complexity of game 
characters: 
 
The ways in which characters are represented in contemporary video games cannot and 
should not be reduced to either interactive simulation or ‘predetermined’ narration, since, 
on the one hand it is constituted precisely by the complex interplay between these two 
modes of representation, and on the other hand, multiplayer games may also employ a third 
mode, namely that of communication, which entails all forms of communication and social 
interaction between the players of a multiplayer game. (2014, 47 - 48) 
 
They identify three different modes, connected to the three ways characters are represented in 
games: 
 
• The narrative experience where players perceive characters as fictional beings with 
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an inner life. 
• The social experience where players see characters as the representation of other 
players. 
• The ludic experience where players consider the character as game components, 
elements of the game mechanics. (49 - 50) 
 
Schröter and Thon categorise the experience as three different experiences: in the ludic experience, 
the characters function as game pieces with properties such as health points, speed or special 
abilities. These abilities determine how useful the characters are for players to progress the game 
to the end-state. In the narrative experience, the character performs as a quasi-person with a 
personality and a life in which it can die. The game component and the quasi-person are not the 
same experience, but they assemble in the same figure that characters identify as a character. For 
multiplayer games, the characters function as avatars that represent players to other players. It is, 
however, interesting to note that in many cases these experiences are a single experience. In Final 
Fantasy XIV: A Realm Reborn (Square Enix 2013) the player at once experiences the characters as 
an adventurer in the diegetic world, gains experience points in battles to improve the character as 
a ludic component, and plays together with other players who each control their own avatar 
character. These experiences do not occur as three separate experiences, but happen for the player 
as one. 
A game’s possibility space provides dynamic game characters the opportunity to develop as 
a being with an inner life while they also develop as a game piece, and vice versa. The development 
itself is divided into different segments, but these merge in the game’s possibility space where the 
character’s development is influenced towards a specific outcome. In Persona 5 (P-Studio 2016), the 
protagonist’s attributes might structurally be nothing more than numerical value—characterised 
with semantic meaning—but reaching a specific value in the protagonist’s attributes allows players 
to have the character work a part-time job, or have them develop romantic or friendship relations 
with other characters that in turn also contribute to the game’s characters as a game pieces. These 
are possibilities that, once actualised, determine the outcome of the character’s development. 
 
 
2. Non-Dynamic Game Characters 
Not every game character is dynamic. Within a single game, non-dynamic characters can also exist 
and can coexist with dynamic characters. These non-dynamic game characters are a rigid type of 
game character. A game character is rigid when the outcome of the character’s development is 
predetermined regardless of the player’s non-trivial effort, because the character lacks the potential 
to develop in a variety of directions, and its development only follows one path. 
The division between dynamic game characters and rigid game characters might at first sight 
suggest E.M. Forster’s (1927) simple classification of flat and round characters in novels. His 
classification states that flat characters do not change by the circumstances of the story, and just 
move through them. Round characters are shown to be characters that develop throughout the 
story. However, it would be misleading to consider rigid characters identical to flat characters and 
dynamic characters identical to round characters. Forster discussed literary characters appearing in 
novels which rely on narration, whereas game characters as we know them today did not exist when 
he created the distinction. Theoretically, dynamic game characters could be ‘flat’ by Forster’s 
definition, and still dynamic in terms of a game’s structure. But the opposite is more common: 
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‘round’ characters that are rigid are quite common in games. Even if they change over the course of 
the fixed sequences in a game, the game only allows them to develop in a fixed direction towards a 
predetermined outcome, which does not involve the player’s performance within the game. 
Riku from Kingdom Hearts (Square 2002) is a rigid character. When the player starts the 
game, they are introduced to the player-character Sora and his friends Kairi and Riku. Kairi is soon 
kidnapped by a dark force, and both Riku and Sora set out to save her. Sora teams up with Donald 
and Goofy, and they visit all kinds of (Disney) worlds looking for Kairi. Riku, on the other hand, 
disappears, and is later revealed to be collaborating with the evil Maleficent, manipulated by her 
into believing that Sora does not care for Kairi or Riku anymore. The player is forced to battle Riku 
three times over the course of the game, while Riku is under the impression that Sora betrayed him. 
Gradually however, Riku comes to realize Maleficent’s manipulation, and sacrifices himself for Sora 
to save Kairi. 
A dynamic character develops in such a way that its development structure opens up some 
possibilities and closes others. Riku, on the other hand, does neither. He does not open possibilities, 
nor does he close them. The possibility space provides him little development that can be affected 
by players. He follows the script that he has been given and develops accordingly. Defeating Riku at 
the beginning of the game during a friendly match does not affect anything else over the course of 
the game, nor does the order of the worlds that Sora visits to find Kairi affect what will happen to 
Riku. Those possibilities are set in stone. In other words, Riku is a round character using Forster ’s 
classification, because he changes by the circumstances of the game, but despites his ‘roundness’, 
his development would have always gone in the direction as I just described. The player has no 
influence over the direction. 
The distinction between dynamic game characters and rigid game characters is, however, 
not as strict as it initially might seem. I should explain that even if the game gives the impression 
that the player can affect the direction of a character’s development, this character could still be a 
rigid game character as a narrative agent (I will explain the concept of narrative agents in chapter 
eight). Nier: Automata might contain 26 different endings, but there are only a four endings that do 
not lead to a ‘game over’ screen. These endings—named A, B, C, D and E—are also not different 
endings, but rather they announce the end of a certain part of the game. If the player wants to reach 
ending B for example, they first have to finish playing the game once so that they will reach ending 
A before they can reach ending B (figure 12). However, ending B is not a different ending, but is the 
same ending as ending A, but played with a different player-character. In ending A, the player has 
2B as their player-character, whereas in ending B the player has had 9S as their player-character, 
but both characters have the same outcome in both ending A and ending B. 
 
 
Figure 12: Diagram of Nier: Automata’s five endings. 
 
Only ending C and D provide some dynamicity to the characters’ outcome, but even this dynamicity 
is limited. Whether the player receives ending C or ending D is only decided during the final battle 
(which only takes about 10 minutes), and depends on the player’s choice for whether they will 
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control 9S or a third character, A2, during the final battle. In the course towards one of these endings, 
the character 2B will inevitably die before either ending is reached, and therefore she has a linear 
and continuous development that does not change depending on the player’s choices. The player 
has to win the final battle in order to receive either ending, so if they win directly controlling 9S, 9S 
will kill A2 and accidentally falls on 2B’s sword and dies too. This is ending D. If the player wins 
directly controlling A2, A2 hacks 9S to save him from corruption, and sacrifices herself to save the 
world. This is ending C. Despite that these are two seemingly different endings, however, the player 
can achieve the final ending E after they have received both endings C and D. In this final ending, 
characters Pod 042 and Pod 153 voice their wish that A2, 9S and 2B could have lived and decide to 
rebuild them. 
Nier: Automata gives the impression that its characters are dynamic, because the game 
implies that it has several different endings. However, what the game actually does is stack endings 
on top of each other, as certain endings can only be reached when other endings have been 
achieved. When the player reaches the final ending, ending E, the player will have had to play 
through rigid endings and paths (albeit not linear). Both endings C and D are then negated, because 
the player will have to have reached both in order to reach ending E, which will always, inevitably 
and regardless of the player’s choices throughout the game, result in the same rigid scene in which 
Pod 042 and Pod 153 decide to rebuild A2, 9S and 2B. As narrative agents, these characters are 
therefore not dynamic, but rigid game characters, because the game’s structure will always end the 
same when the player reaches the final end. That said, they can be dynamic game characters as 
ludic agents—which I explain in further detail in the next chapter. 
 
 
3. The Conditions for Dynamic Game Characters 
For a dynamic game character to be dynamic, it first of all requires player input. But this does not 
necessarily have to mean that the player needs to have an avatarial relationship with the character. 
Vella (2014) differentiates between two different dynamic mimetic elements (see Margolin 1986)—
actions performed by the character that tells something about their personality—in games: 
character actions and player-induced actions. He discusses distinctively the player-characters. As a 
result, the distinction between character actions and player actions relies on the player’s avatarial 
relations with that character. This means that the character actions describes actions the character 
performs independently of player input, and the player actions refer to actions that the player 
makes the player-character do. The latter is at the basis of the thesis in Vella’s work (2015) on the 
player’s involvement in the body of the playable figure where he discusses whether the player 
actions are the player’s or the character’s actions. For the argument of this dissertation, I assume 
Vella’s statement that the player actions are “being perceived by the player as being her own as 
much as they are the character’s” (2014, 13). The player’s actions could be actions that contribute 
to a player-character’s development structure to be dynamic, however, focusing on the player-
character assumes that only once players have an avatarial relationship with the character can the 
character be dynamic, yet that would put a substantial limitation on how to understand game 
characters in general. 
Player-induced actions also do not necessarily have to affect the game structurally. I could 
choose to have Arthur from Red Dead Redemption 2 (RDR2) (Rockstar Studios 2018) continuously 
eats steak, and therefore I could characterise him as someone who eats steak a lot, but on the 
structural level of the game nothing changes. Indeed, the steak fills Arthur’s core attribute so that 
154 
 
his health stays high, but so do most other foods in the game. These actions do not have the player 
steer the character’s development in a direction that the game structurally acknowledges as a path 
that could be different. 
Actions such as killing an innocent person on the street are taken into consideration by the 
game to structurally affect Arthur’s development and outcome. Stealing, killing or refusing to help 
characters lowers Arthur’s reputation bar which, as a result, makes other characters flee if they see 
him. Killing innocents registers as negative actions, and the response is that characters become 
afraid of Arthur, while actions that the game registers as positive prompts characters to give him 
rewards, prices in stores are lowered, and more outfits are unlocked. 
In RDR2, the character’s dynamicity is measured by a reputation bar that affects how Arthur 
dies (he will die regardless of what the player does). When he has a good reputation, Arthur dies in 
peace while looking at the sunset. With a bad reputation, he will be shot to death by his former gang 
mate. The reputation bar is merely the visual measurement of Arthur’s characterisation process, 
but the responses from characters fleeing and Arthur being shot to death instead of having a 
peaceful death are structural consequences, showing the game acknowledging that the character 
develops in a certain direction. 
Dynamic game characters are not limited to the player-character only. At the beginning of 
this chapter I described the death of Eve in ME2. Eve is not a player-character, but one of the many 
characters involved in Shepard’s journey to save the galaxy. Although Shepard is the player-
character and is the one through whom the player makes decisions and performs actions, these 
actions have structural consequences for non-player-characters as well. My decision to destroy 
Maelon’s data was a decision attributed by the game to Shepard, but resulted in Eve’s death, and 
consequently weakened the Krogan’s support in the final battle. Eve’s death could have been 
avoided, she could have lived, she could have had little Krogan children, and she could have raised 
the support of the Krogan to help Shepard’s mission, but my choice to destroy Maelon’s data 
influence her path towards a different outcome. 
Despite the choices and actions that can affect a character’s characterisation process, most 
games appear to only account for a certain set of outcomes. A game does not just arbitrarily create 
the outcome of a development, the possibilities in which a character can develop and the possible 
outcomes of the character’s development are limited. It is just up to the player to realise which 
outcome they will obtain. In RDR2, Arthur will not survive his tuberculosis, there is no medicine 
regardless of what the player does. How he dies, however, can be influenced by the player, although 
there are only four outcomes in total. 
Visually, each dynamic game character’s development structure can be pictured as a tree, 
but how the tree is structured can be different per character. The tree and its branches are already 
outlined, and contain the outcomes towards which the dynamic game character can develop. The 
player advances the direction with choices and actions they can make in the game, facilitated by the 
game’s possibility space. Whenever the player makes a choice that pushes the development into a 
certain direction, the branch opens up to other branches that the player can pursue. When the 
player makes a choice, they actualise a possibility that directs the development of one or more 
characters towards a certain outcome. In doing so, they can steer the development to alternatives 
with other outcomes, but also close off these possibilities. 
Overall, to consider game characters dynamic they must meet three conditions: 
 
• The player effectuates the direction of the character’s development onto certain 
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paths by her choices and/or actions in the game. 
• The choices and actions the player makes have at least one consequence for either 
the development of the character and/or the state of the game. 
• The outcome of the character’s development is undetermined until the player affects 
the direction towards a single possible outcome. 
 
 
Figure 13: A diagram of Eve’s development structure. 
 
Figure 13 shows a simplified diagram of Eve’s development structure. Eve’s death as a result of 
complications in ME3 is just one of the directions in which she could have developed. Figure 13 also 
shows that she could have lived, on the condition that the player saved Maelon’s data. Alternatively, 
yet another direction is that she could have lived, but die later in the game if the player does not 
manage to dismantle an enemy bomb. The player is the one to steer Eve’s development structure 
towards a certain direction by making a variety of choices and actions (e.g., whether they destroy 
Maelon’s data or not, whether they are successful in disarming the bomb, etc.), and the results 
determine the outcome of Eve’s development as a consequence. 
Combining Eve’s development structure with Laurel’s flying wedge for human-computer 
interaction, figure 14 visualises how my choice to destroy Maelon’s data turned the possible 
towards the probable directly in the necessary outcome in which Eve died due to complications of 
the Genophage. Had I chosen to save the data, I would have stayed longer in the area of the 
probable until I would have failed or succeeded in disarming the bomb. Two out of three outcomes 
would have resulted in Eve dying, albeit in different situations and due to different choices. Which 
outcome eventually becomes necessary is all up to the player. Before that, each outcome, each path 
are all just possible, written in the game’s possibility space before the player takes up their task of 
influencing the character’s characterisation process. 
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Figure 14: Diagram of the path in which I influenced Eve’s outcome with Laurel’s flying wedge for human-computer 
interaction. 
 
4. Summary 
In this chapter, I introduced the dynamic game character: a character that responds to how the 
player plays the game. The player has to act in a certain way so that the dynamic character’s 
development is influenced in one direction and not in another. The player participates in the 
construction of the character through the repetition of actions and choices until the character 
development has reached a certain outcome. The player becomes part of the character’s 
construction—that is, its characterisation process—so that the outcome of the dynamic character’s 
overall development belongs as much to the player as it does to the game. 
In this chapter I mentioned several of these topics that I will discuss in more detail in chapter 
eight. For example, the distinction between dynamic game characters and rigid game characters is 
not as hard-lined as it seems, because game characters can present their dynamicity as ludic agents, 
as narrative agents, and as performative agents. Similarly, I have also not discussed in depth how 
the player influences different kinds of dynamic game characters, and what kind of friction these 
dynamic game characters cause to the character ecology. In the next chapter, I therefore discuss in 
what kinds of different strategies dynamic game characters appear by discussing several examples 
in which the player influences the characterisation process and with that the character’s identity. 
On top of that, I will explain how those different strategies create different kinds of frictions for the 
character’s identity within the broader character ecology.  
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Chapter Eight 
The Characterisation Process of the 
Dynamic Game Character 
 
This chapter describes dynamic game characters appearing in a strategy of contemporary 
transmedial practices. The chapter discusses the player’s creative agency over the characterisation 
process, the migration of the dynamic game character between games and other media platforms, 
and the influence this migration has on the dynamic game character’s identity. The discussion of 
these topics will be carried out through the analysis of several empirical examples: The Legend of 
Zelda: Breath of the Wild (Nintendo 2017), Persona 5 (P-Studio 2016), the Mass Effect series 
(BioWare 2007–2012), Façade (Procedural Arts 2005), Animal Crossing: New Leaf (Nintendo 2012), 
and The Sims 4 (Maxis 2014). 
The chapter is divided into seven sections. The first section explains the selection criteria and 
provides a theoretical background to the concepts and terms I use in this chapter. In parts two 
through six, I analyse the different empirical case studies. This is in order to demonstrate how the 
dynamic game character’s characterisation process involves a variety of media. The seventh part 
explains the consequences of the dynamic game character’s transmedia manifestations for its 
identity and clarifies how the dynamic game character influences the character ecology. 
 
 
1. The Selection Criteria 
As discussed in chapter four, ‘The Immaterial Character’, and chapter five, ‘The Challenges of 
Manifestations and Their Identities’, character manifestations not only derive their construction 
from the character ecology, but each (new) character manifestation also influences that same 
character ecology, so that the ecology is in a constant state of flux. Since dynamic game characters 
have multiple outcomes, unlike character manifestations in non-ludic works, how the identity of the 
dynamic game character is constructed is a question that requires a perspective that takes the 
character ecology in which the character resides into consideration. Therefore, I will discuss in this 
chapter their influence on the character ecology with the question: how does a dynamic game 
character affect the character ecology? 
The aim of this chapter is to contextualise the phenomenon of the dynamic game character. 
That is, it aims to show in which strategies dynamic game characters appear. I specifically use the 
word ‘strategies’ instead of ‘game structures’ to emphasise that although the dynamic game 
characters are initially constituted by games, the construction of their identity can be a process 
designed to occur over multiple media in which the configuration of the character is constantly 
rearranged by multiple invisible hands to control the character’s identity. 
 
Selection Variables 
I show the different strategies in which dynamic game characters appear through a variety of 
empirical examples, games that I have played and analysed according to my reader-response theory 
method, as explained in chapter three, ‘On Method’. 
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I selected the game examples based on two variables: the structure of the dynamic game 
character’s development is either deterministic or indeterministic, and the dynamic game 
characters are either prefabricated or non-prefabricated. 
Deterministic development structures for dynamic game characters follow predetermined 
paths which the designers created manually within the possibility space, allowing players to 
influence the character onto one of those paths. Indeterministic development structures are instead 
shaped by scripts, sets of rules encoded in the game’s possibility space, which provide for a set of 
potential actions and behaviours for the dynamic game characters, according to which they develop. 
Prefabricated dynamic game characters are those whose identity the designers established 
before the start of the game, such as Link from The Legend of Zelda series, or Joker from Persona 5. 
Non-prefabricated dynamic game characters, by contrast, are made by the player before the game 
begins, such as Shepard in Mass Effect, or Sims in The Sims 4. 
I use these variables to demonstrate the different strategies in which dynamic game 
characters appear. The characterisation process of a dynamic game character, that is the 
development of the character’s identity, is a configurative practice in which the player has a certain 
amount of creative agency over the character’s development. But the characterisation process is 
simultaneously an interpretative practice in which the player’s creative agency guides the player in 
their interpretation of the character over the process. 
The creative agency over dynamic game characters is primarily situated in the mechanical 
processes that direct onto which path the player will influence the character. The game structure 
provides the underlying basis that facilitates the characterisation process of the dynamic game 
character. In non-cybermedia, an author creates a character usually within a story before any reader 
consumes that story, hence why characters are usually thought of as schemata existing only within 
stories causally created by their authors (see Brock 2010). However, some games afford the player 
a template, a blueprint that can be ‘filled’ in as a character by the player. Games such as Diablo III 
(Blizzard Entertainment 2012), Bloodborne (FromSoftware 2015) or Stardew Valley (ConcernedApe 
2016) allow the player to configure the playable figure before the start of the game. Or games such 
as The Sims series (Maxis 2000–2019 ) where the player can create human-like figures before they 
play the game. Some of the choices that the player makes in the configuration of the character then 
shape the possibility space such that the space’s potential narrows before the player even starts 
(see Laurel 1991). 
The paths onto which the player can influence the dynamic game character have multiple 
branches, but these branches are either manually prescripted by the designers or prescripted in the 
game’s code to automatically generate potential situations that can affect the dynamic game 
character’s outcome. An otome game such as Hakuoki: Memories of the Shinsengumi (Idea Factory 
2013) has clear prewritten paths on which the player only affects the direction to which the 
characters develop via prescripted choices at certain moments in the game. An open world game 
such Red Dead Redemption 2 (RDR2) (Rockstar Studios 2018) will have non-playable characters 
operating on scripts that prescribe the rules on which they act, and a routine they follow to give the 
player the impression they act independently until the player intervenes so that another script 
activates. 
Too many variables would make the game analysis too complicated. Two variables on the 
other hand provides four categories: [prefabricated/deterministic], [non-
prefabricated/deterministic], [prefabricated/indeterministic] and [non-
prefabricated/indeterministic]. This allows me to discuss: 
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• How games afford the player creative agency over the character’s characterisation 
process within its determined structure. 
• How the dynamic game characters are formed throughout the characterisation 
process as specific kinds of agents (see Pinchbeck 2009).  
 
I do not claim that each game only falls in a single category, but the categorisation is a working 
categorisation and works as a continuum, with [prefabricated/deterministic] on one end to [non-
prefabricated/indeterministic] on the other. I will explain how the dynamic game character develops 
in the characterisation process as a ludic agent in games that contain characters of the 
[prefabricated/deterministic] end of the continuum, and as I gradually go towards the [non 
prefabricated/indeterministic] end, I will explain how the dynamic game characters develop as 
primarily narrative agents compared with how they primarily develop as performative agents. 
Agents, as explained in the literature review, are not characters per se, but entities that act 
and have impact on the progress of a situation. Dynamic game characters are therefore agents as 
well. However, instead of claiming that they are either ludic agents, narrative agents, or 
performative agents, my perspective is that they are all at once. There exist dynamic game 
characters whose characterisation process operates primarily on a ludic structure with a rigid 
narrative that the player cannot affect, such as BotW (2017). There also exist dynamic game 
character whose characterisation process operates primarily on narrative structures so that the 
character develops as a narrative agent but not as a ludic agent, such as Erica (Flavourworks 2019). 
And in cases such as Façade (2005), the characterisation process is dominated by performative 
agents. 
For some categories it is harder to find empirical examples of dynamic game characters than 
others. Every category therefore contains more than one game work to discuss one or two particular 
dynamic game characters. For the [non-prefabricated/deterministic] and [non-
prefabricated/indeterministic] categories, I selected two game series (figure 15). For the [non-
prefabricated/deterministic] category I selected the Mass Effect series. And, for the [non-
prefabricated/indeterministic] category I selected The Sims series, with The Sims 4 as the main game 
generation. For the other two categories, I selected two games in order to demonstrate how even 
within a single category, two games can configure the characterisation process in such a way that 
they emphasise different frictions to depict a dynamic game character. The 
[prefabricated/deterministic] category is the one in which most game characters (and with that 
most dynamic game characters), appear. This is likely due to characters being historically dominated 
by rigid story structures. I therefore selected two games: The Legend of Zelda: Breath of the Wild 
(2017) to show how such a game structure facilitates the characterisation process in which the ludic 
agent primarily develops, and Persona 5 (2016) as a game in which the narrative agent dominates. 
For the [prefabricated/indeterministic] category, I selected two games to juxtapose in order to show 
how developers engage with the friction of a high (creative) agency and unpredictability of the 
player, namely Façade (2005), and Animal Crossing: New Leaf (2012) (see Figure 15). 
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Figure 15: Table of Case Studies 
Story Structures in Games 
As I have argued over the course of this dissertation, characters are not bound to any specific story, 
and can even exist without any story. That is not to say that I do not talk about narrative games at 
all, rather, since even in games characters can be discussed without the necessity of stories, I 
emphasise the continuum of categories in which dynamic game characters develop. One, or perhaps 
two, of these categories could be considered narrative games, but the goal of this chapter—and my 
dissertation in general—is not to challenge the idea of stories in games, but to discuss the 
conceptualisation of dynamic game characters. However, I do not think that narrative and play are 
incompatible. To discuss dynamic game characters that operate primarily as narrative agents, I will 
use Hans-Joachim Backe’s (2012) concepts of the macrostructure and microstructure with which he 
demonstrates how games combine the rigidness of narrative structure with the openness of play. 
Using Mieke Bal’s terminology of the fabula (Bal 1978; 1999), and Roland Barthes’ (Barthes [1966] 
1995) distinction between cardinal functions and catalysers, Backe distinguishes between three 
distinct structural levels in a digital game to explain how computer games combine the rigid 
structure of narratives with the open structure of play: paida (Caillois [1958] 1961), the 
microstructure and the macrostructure. 
Backe explains that games contain a substructural level for free play or paida. This level 
“allows the player to experiment with rules and game-world, which produces endless variety of play 
that constitutes the game’s events and the catalyzers of its fabula” (2012, 254). Free play allows 
players to create a series of connected events (see Bal [1978] 1999) that have the status of fillers 
(Barthes [1966] 1995) in the fabula. These events do not open or close a sequence of events, but 
can provide additional meaning. The second level is that games contain a microstructure that 
provides goals acting as cardinal functions on a narrative level “by identifying singular, meaningful 
situations with potentially relevant outcomes” (Backe 2012, 254). That is, the microstructure 
provides events that consequentially connect to other events in order to develop the fabula. Finally, 
Backe argues that the third level is the macrostructure, which connects the events of the 
microstructure (254). According to Backe, the logic of the rule-based system of the game and story-
logic allows for “goal-oriented play situations (microstructures) in a way that results in a meaningful 
fabula” (2012, 254). 
The distinction that Backe proposes allows me to discuss the narrative structures games can 
adopt, in which the narrative agent dominates the dynamic game character’s characterisation 
process, without needing to discuss the combination of narrative and play in games. 
 
Transmedia 
The characterisation process of the dynamic game character is initially determined by the game’s 
structure. However, when I speak of a strategy in which dynamic game characters appear, this 
161 
 
includes the other media that affect the characterisation process of the dynamic game character in 
the character ecology. After all, in contemporary transmedia practices, the identities of characters 
are, more often than not, developed over multiple works across a variety of media. The dynamic 
game character is no exception. 
For some categories, it is easier to find dynamic game characters than for others. This 
limitation I will discuss in more detail in each empirical case study, since the structure of the dynamic 
game character influences if and how the character becomes transmedial. Since it is nearly 
impossible to keep track of or read all the possible manifestations of a character in a character 
ecology, especially when there is more than one franchise or media mix to include, I selected for 
each case study one or two particular transmedial manifestations of the dynamic game character. I 
discuss the particular reason for their selection in each case study, but in general each manifestation 
was selected according to the following criteria: 
 
• I checked if the dynamic game character had any transmedial or trans-game 
manifestations at all. If it had only had a manifestation in a particular work, I selected 
that work. 
• If the manifestation dominated a particular work or series of works, I selected that 
work. 
• Since games in contemporary transmedial practices, and in particular the media mix, 
emphasise the visual design of characters, I selected manifestations with a visual 
design component. 
• If I could find a manifestation of the character in a non-cybermedia work, I selected 
that work to juxtapose it to its cybermedia manifestations. 
 
I have to note that the games that I discuss take on a prominent spot in the character ecology. 
However, that is not to say that these games are necessarily the original ‘source work’ for all the 
characters that appear in that particular work. Link’s prototype manifestation, for example, was The 
Legend of Zelda (Nintendo 1986), but his manifestation in BotW does influence the character 
ecology in the shape of his subsequent manifestations in Super Smash Bros. Ultimate (Bandai Namco 
Studios and Sora Ltd . 2018), and LoZ: Breath of the Wild 2 (Nintendo forthcoming 2020). Persona 5 
might be the source work for Joker, but it is not for Igor, who initially appeared in Megami Ibunroku 
Persona (Atlus 1996). I therefore sometimes only refer to a certain game as a ‘source work’ when 
the dynamic game character initially appears in that work as the character’s urtext, a term I 
explained in chapter four, ‘The Immaterial Character’. 
There are quite a few advantages to taking the dynamic game character’s manifestations 
into consideration. Analysing dynamic game characters through their transmedial appearances 
allows me to perceive how invisible hands use the three venues of control, as discussed in chapter 
five, ‘The Challenges of Manifestations and their Identities’, to regulate the characterisation process 
of the dynamic game character outside of the game(s) in which it appears. It also provides the 
opportunity to discuss a variety of strategies that attempt to police the identity of the dynamic game 
character. Simultaneously, it shows the influence the dynamic game character has over the 
character ecology in which it appears, how it affects other manifestations, and what kind of 
influence it receives from its other manifestations. 
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Virtual Environments 
The case studies from section two until section four (Legend of Zelda: Breath of the Wild, Persona 5 
and the Mass Effect series) are games with determined cardinal functions (see Barthes ([1966] 1995). 
These cardinal functions will happen no matter what, but their outcome changes depending on the 
choices the player made for the dynamic game character. The case studies in section five and six 
(Façade, Animal Crossing: New Leaf, and The Sims 4) are indeterministic, where the strategy in which 
they appear is undetermined; there is no intrigue (see Aarseth 1997, 112) written in the game to 
which the dynamic game characters have to adhere. There is no macrostructure embedded in the 
game with cardinal functions that will occur no matter what the player does. There exists no 
authored narrative structure in these events, unlike the macro/microstructure in games where the 
player has certain agency over the events and narrative progression in the prescribed narrative 
structure, the player has no influence over the narrative structure where there is none. 
Instead, the case studies in section five and six are the kinds of games that have been 
discussed before as ‘virtual’ environments, game environments that are neither imagined nor 
narrated (Aarseth 2007; Jørgensen 2013; Klevjer 2017). Aarseth (2007) argues that the idea of fiction 
is problematic when it comes to game content. He distinguishes between fictional and virtual 
elements, considering fictional elements made out of signs whereas virtual elements are made out 
of signs and a dynamic model that specifies its behaviour and respond to the player’s input (2007, 
36). Jørgensen (2013) explains that a fictional world can be a “world representation or an imaginary 
construct in the appreciator’s mind based on the presence of props” (64), the latter of which she 
bases on Kendall Walton’s theory of make-believe (1990). Since the world is created by someone’s 
imagination, and thus constructed by the act of imagination, the fictional world is therefore artificial 
(Jørgensen 2013, 64). Regardless, however, Jørgensen points out that this does not make a game 
world and a fictional world identical. She states that “[a]s representations, gameworlds reflect the 
game system and work according to a logic that promotes ludic consistency and not fictional 
coherence” (2013, 65). Whereas a fictional world reflects “an imaginary reality that expects 
appreciators to use their imaginations to complete the reality of the fiction” (2013, 65). This is not 
the case for gameworlds, whose reality the player does not have to fix, although Jørgensen adds 
that a number of game worlds can have features that can work as props, so game worlds could be 
experienced as fictional worlds (2013, 65). 
Against the view that virtual environments are not imagined (Aarseth 2007; Jørgensen 2013), 
Klevjer (2017) proposes that virtual game environments can actually be used as a medium for the 
diegetic imagination, because the position from which one centres oneself transform a non-actual 
possible world in their actual world. According to Klevjer: “In diegetic fiction, we re-center our 
position, thereby evoking an alternative world as being our actual world. The things that we imagine 
are not just pretended events, but pretended real events” (Klevjer 2017, 7). 
Klevjer struggles with the same fallacy as the scholars from the structuralist position and the 
humanistic position discussing characters: he recognises the concept of the character as a quasi-
person, but conflates the idea of a character with the impression that the character has to be 
ontologically identical to a person in order to count as a person. As pointed out in chapter two, 
‘Theory’, Frow explains that the problem to recognizing characters as quasi-human beings is “that 
characters and persons are at once ontologically discontinuous (they have different manners of 
being) and logically interdependent” (2014, vii). Klevjer’s quest to make sense of characters in the 
sense that they could come alive as real people by having the player engage in diegetic imagination 
uncritically assumes the position that persons are ontological givens, instead of being the result of 
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a particular socio-historical construction of personhood that is partially “made out of the same 
materials as fictional characters” (Frow 2014, vii). 
Since characters are ontologically discontinuous from persons, it is not fruitful to discuss 
their status as if they are simulations of persons. Rather, since dynamic game characters are 
influenced by the player’s input, they are already partially virtual. Like any other game character, 
the dynamic game character is simulated in the sense that it occupies a virtual world in which the 
player makes decisions that logically affect both the character and the world. They do not represent 
a person, they represent themselves. That is, a character is always already a representation of itself. 
This counts for characters, game characters and dynamic game characters. 
 
Script 
The case studies of dynamic game characters in section five and six operate on scripts. In 
performance studies, scripts are understood as patterns of doing as “potential manifestations 
previously encoded in manifestations of doing” (Schechner 1988, 69). Dynamic game characters 
embedded in indeterministic game structures, where they live in a simulated environment rather 
than a narrated environment, perform predominantly as performative agents whose behaviour is 
structured by a script. 
Discussing the notion of drama performance, Schechner (1988, 69) explains that prior to the 
current understanding of script as written words on which actors base their acting, scripts were 
generally considered as patterns of doing. He considers them to be “something that pre-exist any 
given enactment” (1988, 68), whereas drama is a specialised form of scripting (1988, 69). Before it 
became encoded patterns of the written word, scripts, as Schechner argues, were understood as 
potential manifestations previously encoded in manifestations of doing (69): actions and behaviours 
that had the possibility to occur, because their potential has been carved out in previous 
occurrences of behaviours and actions. Script guides not only theatre, but also play, games, sports 
and ritual (Schechner 1988). 
I will abstain from discussing the notion of performance within this dissertation. 
Performance studies and the notion of performance stir as huge of a debate as the notions of play 
and games, and it goes far beyond the scope of this dissertation. Instead, I will use Schechner’s 
notion of script to discuss the simulated environment in which dynamic game characters can exist. 
It can be said that digital games always already operate on a script, because they have been 
programmed to function in a certain way, but it is specifically artificial intelligence (AI), the 
simulation of human intelligence in machines, in which scripts are used to determine the behaviour 
of the AI. Some of these AIs are personified, modelled as figures in human form akin to characters. 
The idea behind AI characters is that modeling computer-based agents after dramatis personae, 
characters help users to understand the use of the computer, but also because structuring their 
behaviour and thoughts is already there (Laurel 1991, 145). As Laurel states, every culture has a 
notion of dramatic form where people distinguish between real-world people and characters within 
these dramatic forms (145). Using the notion of character allows designers to select traits 
appropriate for the particular set of actions the AI character has to do (145) without going to the 
uncanny valley (see Mori 1970; 2012) in which the character gives the impression that it should be 
a human person but fails at doing so. 
One of the first man–machine communication programs developed to have the human 
interactor understand the computer is Joseph Weizenbaum’s ELIZA, an experimental computer 
program for natural language processing, in 1966. The persona of this computer program became 
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Eliza, a therapist. Apparently, discussions users held with Eliza were so persuasive, that some users 
feared he created an actual person (Weizenbaum 1976, 189; Murray 1997, 70). ELIZA did not have 
a built-in contextual framework through which it could make sense of what was going on in the 
world. Instead, the program was supplied by what Weizenbaum calls a ‘script’, “a set of rules which 
permitted the actor [ELIZA] to improvise on whatever sources it provided” (1976, 188). According 
to Weizenbaum, ELIZA functioned as an “actress who commanded a set of techniques but had 
nothing of her own to say” (188). ELIZA primarily responded, but did not act on her own, nor did she 
develop as a character, since she was never programmed to do so, her script only involved replying 
to the user in a manner that corresponded to a (female) therapist. 
Weizenbaum’s script can be understood as a specialised form of ‘script’ as patterns of doing 
as proposed by Schechner (1988). Unlike dramatic scripts, AI scripts are not written words to be 
acted out by human actors, but function as a set of pre-written rules that shape the behaviour and 
actions of the computer-based agent to perform. When applied to dynamic game characters in non-
deterministic game structures, scripts function as a set of rules encoded in the game’s possibility 
space, which provide a set of potential actions and behaviours for the dynamic game character 
according to which they develop. The player has the agency to affect the potential for these scripts 
to occur and, in doing so, influences the direction in which the dynamic game character develops. 
The characters dominated by these scripts can be understood as a performative agents. 
 
 
2. The Legend of Zelda: Breath of the Wild (2017) 
This section explores Link in The Legend of Zelda: Breath of the Wild (BotW) (Nintendo 2017) as a 
dynamic game character, who is primarily dominated by his function as a ludic agent. BotW is in 
many ways like its predecessors. As stated in chapter five, ‘The Challenges of Manifestations and 
their Identities’, The Legend of Zelda game series reuse topoi (see Eco 1979, 119), iterative stock 
situations, to provide intertextual support between game instalments that Nintendo carefully 
constructed over the past 25 years. 
In another way, BotW differs from the previous instalments in the game series. Unlike the 
other games, BotW belongs to the open-world genre whereas previous instalments (except for the 
first instalment) were linear in their structure. In previous game instalments such as Ocarina of Time 
(Nintendo 1998), The Wind Waker (Nintendo 2002), or Twilight Princess (Nintendo 2006), the player 
follows a rigid narrative direction which changes relatively little per playthrough. Open world games 
on the other hand supposedly allow the player to move freely through the landscape of the game 
world, not constrained by the rigid structure the player has to follow in order for events to unfold. 
BotW suffers, however, from similar challenges that some games of the open world genre such as 
Red Dead Redemption 2 (Rockstar Studios 2018) suffer from: in order to have the characters and 
the world develop from one state to another, developers tend to integrate quests that the player 
has to carry out (Aarseth 2005). BotW displays this when Link explores the world of Hyrule by moving 
freely wherever the player wants, but the character is also tasked from the beginning of the game 
with a quest to save the world. As Zelda immediately informs him after he wakes up: “Link… You are 
the light—our light—that must shine upon Hyrule once again. Now, go…”. The topoi iterate in this 
game as well: Link needs to save Hyrule one more time—again. 
When the player sets out to save Hyrule, there are a few events that they have to tick off. 
First, the player has to finish the game’s tutorial segment which consists of several objects and 
abilities that Link needs to acquire in order to travel to the rest of the world. Once the player 
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manages to get out of the tutorial space, all they have to do to save Hyrule is to have Link go to the 
castle where evil Ganon hides and defeat him. Little else is necessary, but to defeat Ganon while 
Link is at his weakest with little to no help is extremely difficult, and will likely provide little pleasure 
for the player intending to explore the world of Hyrule. 
BotW is on these two points simply put a quest game. Aarseth (2005) explores the different 
types of quests and how they structure gameplay, which often bear structural similarities to 
‘narrative’. He defines a quest game as: 
 
A game with a concrete and attainable goal, which supersedes performance or the 
accumulation of points. Such goals can be nested (hierarchic), concurrent, or serial, or a 
combination of the above. (2005, 497) 
 
According to Aarseth, quests come in a number of combinations, but primarily in three basic quest 
game landscapes: a linear corridor, the semi-open hub, and the open landscape (2005, 499). BotW 
seems to be akin to the open landscape once the player has escaped the plateau (which instead 
bears similarities to the semi-open hub). Once the player is in the bigger world, they can choose to 
accept and finish quests as they like. There is not necessarily any quest that the player has to do, 
but there are many quests that the player could possibly do. 
BotW’s open landscape structure has a hierarchical structure that contains of one main quest, 
a few secondary quests, and several tertiary quests. The main quest is that Link will have to defeat 
Ganon eventually in order to save Hyrule. Then there are ‘secondary’ quests, important for the 
game’s main quest: Link has to free the deceased champions Daruk, Mipha, Urbosa and Revali from 
the influence of Ganon, since their Divine Beasts (the machines they used prior to their death) now 
wreak havoc on Hyrule.  These five quests make up the game’s cardinal functions: they constitute 
the skeletal framework of the quests of the game and allow the player to change Link and Hyrule as 
they complete the quest. Tertiary quests are quests that do not cause any structural changes in 
Hyrule’s world, and mainly provide Link with additional items, such as protective clothing, weapons 
or food. Despite the hierarchy, the player does not have to fulfil any quest at all. The open-world 
structure of the game allows the player to ignore all quests, even the main quest. However, although 
the player can completely ignore any quest, every event, every mechanic is built around the main 
quest and the secondary quests so that the game will constantly remind the player what they want 
from the player: save Hyrule! 
 
Save Hyrule! 
The most potent method to severely weaken Ganon is to find and free the Divine Beasts through 
the game’s secondary quests. Each Divine Beast has a former champion, a deceased owner who 
helped Link in their first attempt to defeat Ganon but unfortunately failed and paid with their lives. 
As the player sets out to free these beasts from their corruption, they gradually learn of what 
happened to these champions prior to the events of the game via cut-scenes, dialogues with 
characters, and items such as letters or diaries. The order in which the player takes on these quests 
matters not, as the only requirement of the open landscape (Aarseth 2005) is that the player travels 
to the specific places in the game world where the quests are located. 
One such a secondary quest is found in Zora’s Domain, a kingdom of water where the Zora 
species live. Here, Divine Beast Vah Ruta causes chaos amongst the Zora people, threatening to 
flood the lake they depend on. After Link frees the beast from its corruption and consequentially 
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frees former champion Mipha’s spirit from being trapped, Mipha’s spirit grants him with a new 
power called Mipha’s Grace. For Link as a ludic agent, Mipha’s Grace is incredibly convenient, since 
it allows Link’s health to refill when he runs out of hearts. This means, for example, that if the player 
jumps from a place too high, or is unable to take a direct attack that would drain Link’s health bar, 
Link would be immediately revived so that the player can continue without having to start from their 
previous save. However, as a narrative agent, Link does not develop. Although his memories of 
Mipha return to him after he has freed her from Ganon’s claws, these memories are rigid: no matter 
how the player performs, the memories will always be the same. For Link as a narrative agent, the 
only difference between the player completing this quest or not is whether or not Link’s memories 
about Mipha will return, but they do not result in any significant structural changes within the game 
that change the outcome of Link’s characterisation process. 
Abilities that Link receives in the game’s main quests allow the player to play with more ease 
and take on greater challenges. In this perspective, the hierarchy of the game’s quest structure in 
the game aligns with the ludic development of Link: as the player chooses to unfold the game’s 
secondary quests, they obtain greater rewards to develop Link in the ludic structure of the game. 
Tertiary quests, quests that in the game’s overall structure can be considered the 
catalysers—the fillers, so to speak (see Barthes [1966] 1995)—that provide an additional 
enhancement to the development of Link as a ludic agent. At the start of the game, Link’s health bar 
contains three hearts, and the stamina orb is comprised of only a single circle. This circle depletes 
when Link runs or climbs. So, with fewer circles, Link might be unable to outrun an enemy who could 
defeat him with a single hit. The Silver Lynel, for example, is a fast and powerful enemy determined 
to go after Link once it spots him, and is incredibly difficult to defeat. More stamina, and perhaps 
more importantly, more hearts, make it much more likely that the player will succeed in defeating 
such a powerful enemy. 
The player can obtain hearts and stamina primarily by obtaining spirit orbs. These spirit orbs 
can be obtained in shrines, spread out all over the game world for the player to discover. Inside the 
shrines are challenges to complete. Upon completion, the player is rewarded with one orb. The 
player can trade four spirit orbs at a Goddess Statue for an additional heart or additional stamina. 
By continuously completing these challenges, the ludic agent of Link evolves and becomes stronger 
so that challenges like the Silver Lynel or defeating Ganon become more and more probable. 
Furthermore, the player is able via smaller quests to obtain clothing that grant Link extra 
abilities. Link’s clothing, in contrast to weapons, are permanently in Link’s possession and cannot be 
destroyed. The Zora’s Armor, for example, provides Link with the ability to dive in water. The female 
Gerudo clothing makes him resistant to the desert heat, but also grants him passage to Gerudo 
Town—a town that only allows women inside. 
Using Laurel’s flying wedge for human-computer interaction (1991) to describe the 
development that Link as a ludic agent goes through, I argue that with each power that the player 
obtains in the game’s secondary quests, with each spirit orb that the player obtains, and with each 
outfit that the Link can wear, the possibility of what Link could do turns probable, and at some point 
necessary. When the player has finished all secondary quests, there is only the main quest the player 
can undertake: defeat Ganon and save Hyrule. However, the irony is that the final quest will never 
actually be finished. Once the player manages to defeat Ganon, save Princess Zelda and save Hyrule, 
the game places Link in front of the castle right before he entered to defeat Ganon. A star on the 
player’s save file will be the only indication that the player managed to defeat Ganon, but the open 
landscape of the game never acknowledges it. The game world stays in the state of openness, 
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impossible for the player to develop the world beyond the state of being in danger by Ganon. 
 
Link’s Migration 
I have extensively discussed Link’s manifestations in chapter five, ‘The Challenges Manifestations 
and their Identities’. Within chapter five, I concluded that Nintendo attempts to control Link’s 
transmedial identity by structuring the character’s constellation in the shape of a three-branch 
chronology, imposing a linear form of narrative continuity on the character. In doing so, Nintendo 
creates a paradoxical relationship between Link’s manifestations that do not make continuous sense. 
With BoTW, Nintendo tries to avoid the paradox as much as possible. According to the game’s 
director Fujibayashi, the BoTW takes chronologically place at the end of the timeline, but he puts 
the responsibility on the player’s to imagine in which of the three branches the game is set (Famitsu 
2018). 
At the moment of writing, BotW does not have a manga or anime adaptation, unlike previous 
games such as Ocarina of Time (1998), or Twilight Princess (2006). However, a sequel to BotW called 
The Legend of Zelda: Breath of the Wild 2 has been announced (expected, at time of writing, 
probably in 2020), and may give an answer to the open ending of BotW. Additionally, BotW’s Link 
can also be found in Super Smash Bros. Ultimate (Bandai Namco Studios and Sora Ltd. 2018) 
where—as is custom since the Super Smash Bros. franchise’s first instalment—Link serves as an 
avatar with affordances for the player to battle against other players, and the game does not seem 
to have a structure in which Link develops as a ludic nor narrative agent.  Whether BotW’s Link 
manifestation remains only as a character limited to game works, I cannot say; only time will tell. 
 
 
3. Persona 5 (2016) 
In this section, I discuss the nature of Joker and the so-called confidant characters of Persona 5 (P-
Studio 2016). I focus specifically on the game’s system of affection (SA) in which the player creates 
relationships between Joker and the confidant characters in order to demonstrate how the player 
influences these dynamic game characters as narrative agents within the game’s microstructure. 
After an incident in his former hometown during which Joker is unjustly accused of harassing 
someone of high influence, he is put on probation and transferred to Shujin Academy in Tokyo, 
where his criminal past is soon revealed, causing students and teachers to shun him. Soon a 
mysterious application pops up on his phone: the Metaverse Navigator. Joker deletes the 
application, but that night in his dreams, he is transported to the mysterious Velvet Room where 
the room’s attendant Igor tells Joker that destruction awaits him. The only way to avoid this 
destruction is to become rehabilitated into a free man again by getting rid of those corrupted 
persons in the world who deprive others of their much-needed freedom. Joker initially sets out to  
free the world from corrupted persons by himself, but is soon joined by other characters. They call 
themselves Kaitoudan, or, in English, Phantom Thieves of Hearts, a vigilante group that roams the 
palaces of the shadow world with the goal of stealing the treasure from those corrupted individuals 
to reform their hearts. 
Persona 5 contains a rigid narrative structure. The cardinal functions of the game’s 
macrostructure determine certain events in the game that will happen regardless of how the player 
performs. The player cannot determine who actually joins the Kaitoudan, nor can they determine if 
a character leaves the group. For example, the player cannot stop Goro Akechi from joining the 
group, nor can they stop him from betraying and leaving the group. As long as the player progresses 
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through the game, these events will happen no matter what the player does. 
Persona 5 corresponds to the traits commonly associated with Japanese role-playing games 
(JRPG). According to Schules et al. (2018, 114), JRPGs are associated with confinement to the world, 
defined characters, anime/cartoon style art, limited narrative choice/singular story, fantasy world. 
Persona 5 seems to exhibit all of these traits, as it is clear who the characters are, why they do what 
they do. The game also shows a drawing style associated with the fantasy worlds of anime and 
manga, and the player cannot change the game’s macrostructure. Yet, some game characters can 
still be dynamic even when they adhere to a rigid programmed setting. The different segments 
games consist of allow characters to not only be dependent on a game’s narrative structure, but 
also let the player develop these characters within these segments that subsequently affect the 
characters in other segments. Persona 5 deploys segments in which the player developed its 
characters as ludic agents, but the work additionally provides segments that allow the player to 
develop even more characters as narrative agents. 
In tabletop role-playing games (TRPGs), characters are created on a character sheet, and 
their abilities and subsequent skills are generally quantified and change depending on the level 
progression of the character. The TRPG’s digital offspring, computer role-playing games (CRPGs), 
regulate the ludic development of game characters in a similar formal levelling system that 
determines the character’s attributes and skills in terms of numerical value, often with semantics to 
cover the quantified aspect of these ludic elements. In a CRPG like Persona 5, the attributes of the 
player-character (called social stats) characterise him in five different aspects: guts, knowledge, 
charm, kindness and proficiency. The semantics of the ludic attributes pose as characterisation to 
give meaning to the numerical value attached to the character so that it does not only come off as 
a ludic agent. When the meaning that is given to the quantified attribute corresponds to a change 
of state in the game, such as receiving certain accessibilities that players did not have before, it gives 
the impression that the character develops. As Joker’s attributes change value in Persona 5, the 
player obtains accessibility to new segments in which the character can operate: a change in the 
charm attribute from ‘charismatic’ to ‘debonair’ allows players to continue to develop the 
relationship between the protagonist and Makoto Niijima. Or having achieved the combination of 
‘empathetic’ in kindness and ‘masterful’ in proficiency, the player can get a part-time job in 
Crossroad Bar, which gives the most profit in terms of money. Both segments support the player to 
the end-state of the game: the player will receive benefits from these situations, like more in-game 
money to spend for items and gear, or they will obtain more skills for the player-character and/or 
other characters that can help in the battle segments. In other words, as the player develops the 
player-character as a ludic agent, the character’s development is shown as the development of a 
quasi-person. 
 
Developing Confidant Characters in Persona 5’s System of Affection 
This section focuses in more detail on the development of the so-called confidant characters as 
dynamic game characters, the characters with whom the player affects the relationship between 
them and Joker. The specific segments in which the player develops these relationships, I call the 
system of affection (SA). I will explain the SA in detail in the next chapter as a process to make game 
characters dynamic. In the SA, the player is able to affect the individual development of the 
characters as a narrative agent. It provides the player with the opportunity to create the character’s 
individual fabula on the level of the microstructure within the game’s overall dominant 
macrostructure. 
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The SA is a ludic process, procedural in nature, that simulates the establishment of 
relationships between characters. These relationships are embedded in the game’s possibility space 
that the player affects through their choices and actions. Usually the relationships are of a romantic 
nature, but can also be unromantic. I base the SA on Peter Kelly’s (2015) identification of a game’s 
ludic romance system as a system of courtship in Dragon Age 2. Kelly (2015, 47) considers ludic 
romance system one in which the characters are integrated, bound to the game and its rules so that 
the player only has to execute a specific strategy in order to successfully woo a non-player character. 
He argues that the player cannot intrinsically escape this strategy, because it is baked within the 
systematic processes of the courtship. 
Persona 5’s SA presents itself as a so-called confidant mechanic, or koopu24 in the Japanese 
version. The characters embedded within this process are called confidants. As the player-character, 
Joker assumes a primary role within the game: all the relationships that the player can influence are 
the relationship between Joker and the confidants, but not the relationships between the confidants 
since that is rooted in the game’s macrostructure. 
The game’s confidants can be divided into four different types through which the SA 
emerges: optional party members, mandatory party members, optional non-party members and 
mandatory non-party members (see figure 16). When I played the game, I focused mainly on the 
development of the relationship between Joker, Ann Takamaki, Ryuji Sakamoto and Yusuke 
Kitagawa. Here I will focus on the relationship between Ann and Joker. The player can influence the 
relationship between Joker and Ann right after Ann joins the Kaitoudan in which Ann’s confidant 
rank starts—like any other confidant character—at rank one. 
 
 
Figure 16: Persona 5’s mandatory and optional Characters for the SA. 
 
Strategies such as choosing the best dialogue option, progressing their social statistics, or providing 
 
24 コープ, short for cooperation. 
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the confidant characters with items they like enable the player to successfully court a character, but 
they also allow the confidant character to develop as a narrative agent, and simultaneously to 
develop as a ludic agent. If the player wishes to progress the relationship with Ann to the second 
rank, the strategy is that they have to reach ‘considerate’ (the second level) in the Kindness category 
of the player-character’s social stats. As the player progresses through Ann’s ranks, Ann will develop 
simultaneously as a ludic agent and as a narrative agent. She will get past her worries about her 
friend Shiho. She also starts taking her modeling career more seriously, and manages to overcome 
her struggles with a competing model. After rank nine, the player can choose to have Ann become 
Joker’s girlfriend, making the relationship one of romance or one of friendship depending on the 
choice of the player. As the player raises the relationship between Joker and any party member, 
these party members will obtain skills useful for battle segments: they will be able to perform 
follow-up attacks, or save the player-character from fatal attacks. Each party member will also 
obtain their own unique abilities—reinforcing that each character is an individual in their own 
right—such as Ann’s ability to have the player negotiate with an enemy again if they fail. 
Optional non-party confidant characters function similarly to the optional confidant 
characters. Progressing through Tae Takemi’s ranks, Joker takes part in her clinical trials as a test 
subject. As their bond deepens, the player will discover that the trials are an attempt to get her 
credibility as a doctor back that she unjustly lost a few years prior to the start at the events of the 
game. Although Tae Takemi will not participate in the battle segments like any optional non-party 
confidant, deepening the bond with her does provide rewards for the player. The player will be able 
to purchase more healing items, or the prices will drop as the player raises Tae’s rank. All of these 
are beneficial for the battle segments, since the player needs to defeat boss enemies in order to 
reach the game’s end-state. Spending time with her also raises the Joker’s Courage in the social stats 
so that the player eventually is able to perform activities or spend time with characters for which 
Joker’s Courage statistics have to be a particular level (depending on the character and the activity). 
Mandatory confidant characters function like Barthes’ cardinal functions, because they are 
pivotal to the game’s overall macrostructure. The game will progress the ranks automatically when 
the player plays through the game regardless of what the player chooses and how they perform. 
Akechi Goro, for example, will always betray the Kaitoudan, because his betrayal is crucial to the 
game’s rigid narrative. By betraying the Kaitoudan, Joker and the rest of the characters discover 
Akechi’s connection to Shido, the person who harassed Joker prior to the events of the game, which 
in turn sets in motion the Kaitoudan’s final heist to discover the true culprit of the dangerous 
happenings in the game’s story. 
The benefits that the player receives from mandatory characters help the player during their 
gameplay. Progressing through the ranks with Igor gives the player the opportunity to use and 
create more personas, the manifestations of one’s inner thoughts the player uses to battle, but 
these benefits are rigid: the game is designed so that the player will receive these benefits no matter 
how they play. Instead, as mandatory confidant characters, these characters are primarily important 
as narrative agents, crucial to the game’s macrostructure, whereas the optional characters function 
as catalysers who allow the player to influence the game’s microstructure. 
 
Flexibility and Rigidity in the SA 
The game’s SA has a rigid structure, one that the player cannot avoid if they decide to develop the 
confidant characters. At most, the player’s agency to develop Joker and the confidant characters as 
dynamic game character lies within the possibilities of the SA, but even this system has its 
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constraints. As Kelly (2015, 47) also argues about the ludic romance system, the characters within 
the SA are integrated and bound to the game’s structure and rules so the player only has to execute 
a specific strategy to successfully develop the relationships between Joker and other characters. It 
is more about figuring out what each individual confidant character requires and then executing 
those procedures to the extent that the player can potentially try to optimise their strategy to gain 
rank ten for all confidant characters if they play the game once. This strategy is explained by the 
developer, Atlus, in a strategy guide (Kadokawa 2016) (in Japanese) with a chapter entirely 
dedicated to the strategy the player has to execute in order to obtain the maximum rank for all 
confidant characters. 
Within the SA, the player is able to create their own fabula, but even that fabula is hard-
coded within hetero-normative structures. Joker can only have a romantic relationship with the 
female confidant characters, and these characters pertain to the male gaze (see Mulvey 1975). For 
example, confidant character Sadayo Kawakami is Joker’s home school teacher, but works as a maid 
complete with French maid uniform at night, calling those who call her services her ‘master’ in a 
cutesy voice. It is therefore difficult for the player to ignore the game’s preferred reading (see Hall 
1973, 103). The player can only slightly influence the script of the characters. They can influence the 
response of the characters during a bonding event, for example. But even these responses only 
differ in whether the characters are enthusiastic or super enthusiastic. It is still possible for the 
player to maintain a negotiated position against the dominant mode of reading, but that would 
mainly require not developing these relationships between Joker and the confidant characters, 
thereby ignoring the characterisation process of the confidant characters as dynamic game 
characters. 
Despite these constraints, Persona 5’s SA demonstrates that the game’s macrostructure is 
not linear, but simply rigid. In between the cardinal functions, the player is able to construct their 
own fabula via the catalysers that the SA provides them with so that they can influence the 
characters as both narrative and ludic agents. The former manifest in the SA by letting the player 
influence with whom Joker will have a particular bond, what kind of relationship they have with 
certain characters, and how strong that bond will be. The latter manifests as benefits: the stronger 
the bond, the stronger Joker and the optional confidant party member become. 
 
Dynamic Game Characters in Persona 5’s Media Mix Strategy 
This section discusses Atlus’ adaptation strategy of Persona 5 in order to highlight how Atlus, the 
Intellectual Property (IP) owner, influences Persona 5’s dynamic game characters in the character 
ecology by focusing on how derivative works—officially recognized by Atlus—depict the SA. This 
allows me to answer what the nature of Persona 5’s dynamic game characters is. 
  Being in a media mix strategy, the Persona 5 characters proliferate over a variety of 
media. In several chapters in this dissertation, I argue that Western theory on contemporary 
transmedia practices tend to focus on a strive towards narrative continuity, whereas Japanese 
theory tends to focus on character proliferation. As I explain in chapter five, ‘The Challenges of 
Manifestations and their Identities’, the venues of control over characters identities in Japanese 
media mix strategies tend to be established on the characters as intellectual properties. As 
intellectual property, characters proliferate so that fans can choose which product they want to 
consume, while at the same time the IP owner creates “more touchpoints to newcomers to a ground 
of products” (Nakamura and Tosca 2019, 4). Persona 5’s media mix strategy functions according to 
this idea, and maintains multiple touchpoints through which consumers can experience the IP 
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owner Atlus’ products. Simultaneously, as IP of Atlus, Atlus has the control to police the Persona 5 
characters’ identities. 
Atlus recognizes two official Persona 5 adaptations: the Persona 5 manga series (Murasaki 
2017a; 2017b; 2018a; 2018b), and the Persona 5 anime series (Ishihama 2018). I use Linda 
Hutcheon’s (2006) definition of adaptation: a product, somewhat of a re-mediation, that translates 
content from one medium to another “in the form of intersemiotic transpositions from one sign 
system (for example, words) to another (for example, images)” (Hutcheon 2006, 16). Signs that 
indicate that Atlus recognises these series as the official adaptations are for example the word 
gensaku [original source] on the cover of each manga volume, and Atlus’ logo that appears both on 
the manga cover, and in the anime series. 
Both adaptations follow the game’s macrostructure with slight variations—since an 
adaptation is always a modification of the original work. The manga and anime series remain faithful 
and equivalent to the source work, granting the source work the status of “axiomatic primacy and 
authority” (Hutcheon 2006, 16). However, neither the manga nor the anime series show a hint that 
they acknowledge the source work’s SA. Confidant characters are not introduced as confidant 
characters. The adaptations do not even slightly hint at the mechanical nature of the cybermedium 
of the source work at all. They are only adaptations in so far as they follow the game’s 
macrostructure—its cardinal functions—but refrain from showing the SA through which the player 
has the agency to influence the development of the characters. 
Although Atlus’ official adaptations do not seem to acknowledge the game’s SA, Atlus grants 
IP rights to manga magazines that do recognise the game’s SA within their comics. In Japan, 
merchandise stories such as Animate sell fan magazines that received the copyrights to use the 
Persona 5 characters in their manga. The Persona 5 Dengeki Comic Anthology (DengekiComics 2017), 
and Persona 5 Comic Anthology volumes one (DNA Media Comics 2017a) and two (DNA Media 
Comics 2017b) are such a manga magazine. Despite the magazine’s acquisition of copyright to use 
the characters, Atlus does not recognise this magazine as an official adaptation, refraining from 
using Atlas’ logo on the cover or the word gensaku. 
The manga magazines consist of several short comic stories written by a diversity of authors. 
These authors write ‘what-if’ stories, short stories focusing on background explorations, additional 
information about the relationships between Joker and the confidant characters (or between the 
confidant characters) that the game does not provide. These stories function as satellites to the 
game’s cardinal functions. They fill in the narrative space but do not change the game’s 
macrostructure. For example, the Persona 5 Anthology volume 1 presents the story Na mo Shiranu 
Kafetomo [My café buddy whose name I do not know]. This story describes the encounter between 
Goro Akechi and Tae Takemi in café Leblank where Joker lives. This story does not occur within the 
events of the game, and there is no hint of it in the scripted sequences within the source work’s SA 
between Tae Takemi and Joker, and between Joker and Goro Akechi. 
The volumes also contain pastiche and parody stories making fun of the SA, particularly 
about the possibility that Joker can court up to nine female characters over the course of a single 
gameplay, and the requirements he needs to fulfil in order to date all of them simultaneously. 
Yonkama, four panel comics usually used for jokes, are used to make fun of the game’s possibility 
to have Joker date nine female characters. The yonkoma Saigo no Kotoba [Final Words] depicts 
Joker tied up and hanging from the ceiling surrounded by his female teammates, Ann, Makoto, Haru, 
and Futaba. On the right of the first panel is written “Uwaki ga BARE da” [Infidelity EXPOSED]. 
Joker’s infidelity has been revealed. When Ann tells him that he is the worst of all in dating all four 
173 
 
of them, Joker delivers the punch line: she is wrong, he had been dating nine women.25 
It is in magazines like these, which obtained the copyright to use Persona 5 characters, that 
an acknowledgment of the source work’s SA can be found. Nevertheless, the adaptation of the SA 
within these magazines only reside on the level of convention. As Aarseth (2005) concludes about 
the friction between games and media with narrative affinity: “cross-media transfer happens 
relatively smoothly between forms that are alike, such as books and films, and less so between 
forms that have strong structural differences, such as amusement park rides, games, and narratives” 
(210). This friction also occurs between the adaptation of the game to the manga magazines; the 
short stories and yonkoma parodies acknowledge the SA, but as non-cybermedia, they have no 
mechanical system to incorporate the SA in a single work. Instead, the exploration of the character’s 
relationship with Joker is spread over a multiplicity of stories. 
What is striking is that the Persona 5 media mix strategy suggests that when dynamic game 
characters are the focal point of the strategy, that is, when a game with dynamic game characters 
is the original source work, the developer seems to be relatively comfortable with the exploration 
of multiple identities of the character in peripheral non-cybermedia that legally obtained copyrights. 
The distribution of copyright to these magazines allows the developer, in a form of invisible hands, 
to police how these magazines depict the source work’s characters. As catalysers, the stories of 
these magazines fit neatly into the game’s macrostructure and acknowledge the game’s SA, either 
in ‘what-if’ stories or in parodies. That said, these magazines do not defy the game’s macrostructure 
at all. All characters correspond neatly to the identities that the game constructs and allows the 
player to play with. These magazines allow explorations of Joker’s romantic relationships with the 
female confidant characters, but do not depict any queer readings. In case the player wants to see 
an alternative identity, an oppositional reading to the identities that the source work constructs, 
they will have to resort to doujinshi, fanfiction magazines or other derivative works that have not 
obtained any legal copyrights to use the characters. 
Within the constraints of the owner’s reach of intellectual property, the proliferation and 
migration of Persona 5’s dynamic game characters do not cause friction. This accurately corresponds 
to the media mix’ theory where the proliferation of the character is the focus instead of the strive 
for continuity between character appearances as discussed in Western theory. The nature of Joker 
and the other confidant characters are ones in which their identities outside of the original source 
work are only accepted by the IP owner so long as they adhere to the source work. The developer 
demonstrates this condition by refraining from acknowledging the character’s dynamicity in their 
own official adaptations, and only allowing the exploration of the dynamic game characters’ 
identities in peripheral non-cybermedia that have legally obtained copyright use as long as this 
exploration corresponds to the heteronormative identities the player constructs in the game. This 
means that, although the developer allows multiple readings for the dynamic game characters, 
these multiple readings are preferred readings, which assigns to the urtext an almost holy value and 
truthfulness that proclaims character manifestations—even as they proliferate through multiple 
media and have different identities—are only accepted by the owner so long as they correspond to 
the characters’ urtext. 
 
 
 
25 I originally wrote the short analyses on the stories Na mo Shiranu Kafetomo, Morugana Kagehika, and Saigo no 
Kotoba, for the article ‘Manifestations of Characters in the Media Mix’, to be published in the Comics/Games 2018 
open access publication. 
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4. The Mass Effect Series (2007 – 2012): Who is Shepard? 
This section discusses the ambiguous identity of Commander Shepard, the player-character of the 
Mass Effect series (2007–2012). The games that this section covers are Mass Effect (BioWare 2007), 
Mass Effect 2 (BioWare 2010), and Mass Effect 3 (BioWare 2012). I focus on Shepard, a non-
prefabricated and deterministic player-character. Shepard is a narrative agent that the player 
develops over the course of a rigid set of narrative events in the game(s) which influence not only 
the outcome of those events, but the outcome of Shepard’s characterisation process as well. 
The Mass Effect series follows the journey of Commander Shepard, who travels through the 
galaxy with their crew made up of different species, such as the drell, hanar, krogan, salarian, and 
turian. Shepard is a soldier in service of the Systems Alliance, the representation of humankind on 
Earth and its colonies on other planets. The character initially works on the Alliance’s starship 
Normandy as an executive officer, but after they become the first human to join the Spectres, an 
elite group of agents, they become the Normandy’s captain. Over the course of the series, Shepard 
discovers the goal of the Reapers, a secretive machine race that attempts to eliminate sentient life 
in the galaxy in a continuous cycle over many millennia. It becomes Shepard’s mission to save not 
only humankind, but also the other races that populate the galaxy. 
Certain events in this game are rigid and will happen regardless of the player’s actions and 
choices. For example, Shepard will become a Spectre, discover the Reapers, and will have to attempt 
to save all the races of the galaxy. These rigid events are the cardinal functions (see Barthes 1966) 
of the narrative structure of the games, However, the outcomes of these cardinal functions depend 
on the player. As Backe puts it: 
 
In any text that is supposed to produce a coherent story, there has to be the deep structure 
of Barthes’ cardinal functions. Even in a nonlinear campaign, a skeletal structure of narrative 
exists in the form of predetermined key points of the story, i.e. some textons will always be 
used in scriptons at the beginning, ending, or some crucial key point in between. Nonlinearity 
in games manifests itself, structurally speaking, in allowing the player agency over the 
outcome of a cardinal function, in determining one of several possible paths. (2012, 248) 
 
In determining the outcome of the cardinal functions, the player effectively shapes an 
alterbiography of Shepard and other characters (Calleja 2011, 96). Backe adds to his description of 
non-linear narrative structures in games: “While it is true that a non-linear text does not have one 
fabula, it seems more logical to consider it—in allusion to Aarseth—a machine for the selection 
between several fabulas” (2012, 248). The autobiography that the player shapes over the course of 
the Shepard’s characterisation process in turn influences the game’s fabula. And, vice versa, the 
shaping of the fabula creates Shepard’s autobiography. This inter-dependency between fabula and 
identity turns Shepard’s characterisation process into a process that operates on the game’s 
narrative structure so that Shepard develops as a narrative agent.  
Shepard is a character that contains a multitude of potential identities. Using Laurel’s flying 
wedge for human-computer interaction (1991, 72) that I presented in the previous chapter, 
‘Dynamic Game Characters’ (figure 17), from the moment the player starts the game, the game 
confronts the player with possibilities with an abundance of potential and outcomes. As the player 
makes certain choices, that potential turns into probable events, and certain outcomes become less 
probable or are eliminated, and other outcomes become gradually more likely to happen. Shepard’s 
characterisation process is embedded in the game’s possibility space akin a blueprint, a design plan 
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for the narrative agent through whom the player carves the character’s identity over the course of 
the game(s). The game’s possibility space allows Shepard to function as a blueprint. The blueprint 
contains the potential for how Shepard could develop, which requires the player, allowing the player 
to become part of the characterisation process as Shepard’s identity gradually reaches a certain 
outcome. 
 
 
Figure 17: Illustration of Laurel's flying wedge for human-computer interaction ([1991] 2014). 
 
The player starts filling in Shepard’s blueprint from the moment they start the game. In the 
character-creation mode, the player primarily chooses Shepard’s non-ludic attributes: their gender 
(male/female), their first name, physical appearance, their background, their psychological profile, 
and military specialization. These attributes will not change over the course of the game, but some 
of them do influence the game. In ME2 and ME3, the player is offered an additional choice at the 
start of the character-creation mode: they can choose to import data from the previous game 
instalments to the new game. This data is primarily expressed in Shepard’s identity. When I 
transferred data from ME2 to ME3, the game presented me with a list of choices that I made within 
ME2 (see image 5). 
When I chose to import my Shepard from ME2 to ME3, the game transferred her appearance, 
skills, level, reputation and previous plot choices to ME3 (image 5). By importing this data to the 
other game, the choices I made in ME2, unbeknownst to me, bore major consequences across 
games. Destroying Maelon’s data in ME2 resulted in Eve’s death in ME3. Creating a romance 
between Shepard and Garrus in ME2 and rekindling that romance in ME3 provided me a Shepard 
that had hopes in the future to start a family with Garrus once the war against the Reapers was over. 
As the choices I made affected Shepard’s characterisation process, Shepard’s identity became 
gradually less ambiguous and more determined, so that as a result, I, the player, did not only 
determine the game’s fabula, but I also became a structural part of Shepard’s identity. 
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Image 5: The list of choices that I made in ME2 to be transferred to ME3 (in-game screenshot taken by author). 
 
Shepard’s Reputation Mechanics 
Shepard’s development as a narrative agent is supported by Shepard’s integration in the game’s 
possibility space as a ludic agent. I will therefore analyse in this section the main mechanism that 
the player uses to affect Shepard’s characterisation process into a certain outcome in order to 
explain the co-dependency between Shepard as a narrative agent in the game’s macrostructure, 
and Shepard as a ludic agent within these mechanisms. I will explain these mechanics in broad 
terms—unless otherwise stated—since every game instalment contains these mechanics but with 
different characteristics. 
Each game contains a mechanism by which the player affects Shepard’s reputation. In ME 
and ME2, Shepard’s reputation is measured along a so-called morality system that measures 
Shepard’s Paragon reputation on one end, and the character’s Renegade reputation on another. 
Paragon tends to involve dialogue and actions that are considered to be benevolent, while 
Renegade dialogue choices and actions are ruthless and more cold-blooded. In ME3, the system is 
slightly different. Shepard gathers points on two different scales, one for Paragon and the other for 
Renegade. The results are however relatively similar to ME and ME2: a Shepard with a Paragon 
reputation is perceived as honourable and heroic by other characters, in contrast with intimidating 
and fearsome with a Renegade reputation. 
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The player accumulates reputation primarily via the game’s dialogue system in segments in 
which the player alternates between scripted scenes and dialogue trees. A common dialogue tree 
usually consists of tree replies: a Paragon reply, a Renegade reply, and an investigative reply. The 
latter does not forward the scene, but allows the player to obtain more information about the topic 
of discussion. The replies decide Shepard’s action within the scene. If the player chooses a Paragon 
reply, Shepard might deflect a crisis, while a Renegade reply has Shepard intimidate another 
character. 
Each reply adds the amount of Paragon or Renegade points Shepard has. While it influences 
how other characters perceive Shepard, Shepard’s reputation also opens up paths other than the 
usual Paragon, Renegade or investigative reply beneficial to the progress of the game. When 
Shepard in ME2 is asked by Aria to protect the Patriarch, Shepard can put the Patriarch into hiding, 
much to the Patriarch’s dismay, but enough Paragon or Renegade points provides the player with 
another possibility. In my case, as my Shepard had enough Paragon points, I chose an alternative 
option where Shepard offers to handle the assassins that threaten the Patriarch in his name so that 
the Patriarch keeps his reputation. Too few points on either scale does not mean that the player 
cannot progress the game further, but rather, the event might not play out in as beneficial a way to 
the player as it could have. 
Despite the player’s agency over Shepard’s actions, the cardinal functions remain rigid. The 
player can only influence the way in which the events unfold, but they might not have the result the 
player wants. According to Laurel ([1991] 2014, 112), the authorship of the interactors with the 
computer is typically under constraints, because the designers of the game provide for what can 
happen. This is specifically in the case of the ME series in which no event is arbitrary, and every 
choice has a determined consequence. In some cases, the player’s choice bears massive 
consequences, as with Eve’s death. In other cases, certain events becomes particularly hilarious 
because the player’s choice causes the game’s structure to unfold in a path that the player did  not 
intend for it to develop. When I played ME3, I was set on having my Shepard romance Garrus, but I 
almost failed my own goal during an event between Shepard and the ship’s communication 
specialist Samantha. When Shepard was in her own cabin, I chose to have her call over Samantha 
to play a match of chess. In the dialogue tree I chose to have Shepard offer Samantha a shower, but 
I did not understand what that offer implied. During Samantha’s shower, a conversation between 
Shepard and Samantha occurred in which Shepard asked if Samantha was planning on going on a 
hot date with someone, to which Samantha responded that it depends if she is interested. Only by 
that point had I figured out that this was a scene which could create an outcome in which Shepard 
romances Samantha—far, far away from what I had intended. Shepard can only have one romantic 
partner in ME3, and a romance with Samantha would therefore close the path to a romance with 
Garrus. The dialogue tree showed up: does Shepard join Samantha in the shower or decline the 
invitation? I choose to decline the invitation. My Shepard gave Samantha a quick reply: “Good luck 
with that date!”. Samantha looked a bit disappointed, but at least my original goal was still 
attainable. 
Shepard’s characterisation process as a ludic agent feeds their characterisation process as a 
narrative agents, the latter of which dominates the game. As Shepard’s reputation grows in a certain 
direction, the outcomes of that direction become gradually more probable until the player reaches 
only one. In my case, Shepard’s identity was the result of the outcome in which a female Shepard 
had a high Paragon reputation, romanced Garrus, and was implied to survive the war against the 
Reapers. While this outcome is not the only possible identity Shepard could have, it was the identity 
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of my Shepard. 
 
Shepard: A Transmedial Character? 
In this section, I discuss BioWare’s attempts to accommodate the player’s agency in ME series into 
the ME comics to depict how invisible hands such as the developer’s engage with the player’s role 
in Shepard’s characterisation process. The Mass Effect franchise contains several novels and comics 
about the world depicted in the game series. These non-cybermedia lack the mechanical structure 
that the game series contain so that they cannot incorporate the player’s integral role in the 
characterisation process of Shepard. By discussing Shepard’s appearance in the ME comics, I can 
propose how Shepard, as a dynamic game character, influences the character ecology in which they 
reside, while the character is simultaneously under the constraints of invisible hands that attempt 
to influence the character ecology. 
The Mass Effect Omnibus Volume 1 (Walters et al. 2016) and Mass Effect Omnibus Volume 2 
(Walters and Barlow 2017) convey the background stories of the companion characters which occur 
either at the beginning of the events of the ME series, or the events in-between the different game 
instalments. At first sight, the comics follow the rigid structure of Henry Jenkins’ (2006) description 
of transmedia storytelling: the medium of the comic contributes something unique to the overall 
world of Mass Effect by depicting events that the game series only hinted at happening. However, 
these comics do not contribute anything new that the player did not already know from the game 
series. For example, the player knows that Thane’s wife Irikah was murdered in revenge. That is not 
something new, but the comics just answer in detail how she was murdered. And even this 
information is limited, because they only describe the aftermath in which Thane describes his wife’s 
death as: “What they did to her. Unspeakable acts” (Walters and Barlow 2017). In other words, 
although the ME comics flesh out the ME world and make it more detailed, they do not expand the 
world. 
Shepard does not manifest in these comics as the main character.26 In the comics, Shepard’s 
appearance is limited to two constraints: first, Shepard’s body is never clearly depicted and, second, 
Shepard’s gender is never clearly stated. The volumes seem to go to great lengths to avoid any 
indication of Shepard’s gender. I have not found any pronouns that reveal the character’s gender, 
nor does the character’s proper name reveal the gender; Shepard is only addressed by other 
characters as either ‘Shepard’ or ‘Commander Shepard’, or occasionally as ‘my friend’ or ‘the 
commander’. It is the same for the Shepard’s physical appearance, as the comics seem to avoid 
depicting the body as much as possible. An example is in Volume 1, which shows the events of how 
Liara T’soni tries to obtain Shepard’s body after Shepard disappeared in the explosion on the ship 
the Normandy. These events occur chronologically between the end of ME and before the start of 
ME2. When Liara finally discovers Shepard’s body, the body appears to be in a coffin and is not 
shown at all. Although this might make sense in terms of the diegesis, since the body is in the coffin 
in order to be transported, the same avoidance of visually depicting appears all over the two 
omnibus volumes: whenever Shepard’s body is shown, it is either hidden away or the body is beyond 
recognition. 
The comics contain indicators that point to Shepard’s immaterial character, but Shepard 
never becomes a manifestation in the comics. Instead, the indicators only refer to the game’s 
blueprint, to how Shepard can potentially develop through the rigid events in the game, for which 
 
26 The exceptions are Mass Effect: Genesis (Mass Effect: Genesis 2011) and Mass Effect: Genesis 2 (Mass Effect: 
Genesis 2 2013), which are stated to be ‘interactive backstories’ in Electronic Arts’ distribution platform Origin. 
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the player is needed. Without the player, no concrete identity of Shepard will emerge in the game 
series. This means that Shepard’s appearance in the comics requires—even depends on—the player 
to project their Shepard onto the comics’ indicators of Shepard. What the indicators do is stimulate 
the player to substitute the blueprint with the manifestation of Shepard they created over the 
course of the characterisation process in the game. 
BioWare’s omission of a Shepard manifestation in the ME comics is a strategic choice. 
BioWare takes a different approach with the comics of their other game series, such as Dragon Age 
(2009–2014). In Dragon Age: Origins (DA:O) (2009), the player takes the role of the Grey Warden 
which refers to the character’s function as a warrior. Similar to Shepard, the player can control the 
character’s appearance, skills, and influences the character’s overall characterisation process 
throughout the game and, as a result, also controls the events and characterisation processes of the 
Grey Warden’s companion characters Alistair and Morrigan. 
Dragon Age Omnibus (Gaider and Freed 2016) portrays a single outcome of the events in 
DA:O and its sequel Dragon Age II (DAII) (2011). The Grey Warden is completely absent in the 
outcome the omnibus depicts. After the archdemon is killed in DA:O, one of the possible outcomes 
is for Alistair to become king of the world Ferelden, but he can also become a drunk, stay a Grey 
Warden, or be killed in battle.27 This outcome is carried over to the sequel game. The comics portray 
the adventures of Alistair as king of Ferelden, in which he tries to find his father. Alistair is eventually 
able to find his father with the help of his companions Isabel and Varric, but due to the evil doings 
of the wizard Aurelian Titus, his father unfortunately succumbs to his wounds and dies. These events 
are not hinted at in DA:O, nor do they fill in events in between the series’ individual instalments. 
The DA Omnibus expands the world of Dragon Age, because it contributes a new story to a 
particular selected outcome of DA:O and DAII. However, BioWare’s decision to depict one specific 
outcome of this game series canonises the events of the series by which they imply, as authority, 
that Alistair becoming king is the truthful and authentic outcome of that character’s characterisation 
process in the game series. This is something BioWare seems to avoid in the ME comics. BioWare 
does not expand ME’s world, but they also do not force any canonisation on the player of the games. 
To enable the player to substitute the indicator with their Shepard manifestation is a tricky 
business. BioWare avoids any concrete expansion of the world, it does not develop any of the 
characters more than the game already indicates. Shepard is only an imagined character in the 
comics, whose manifestation relies on the player’s involvement over the course of the 
characterisation process in the game, and their capability to project their Shepard onto the indicator 
in the comics. 
The nature of Shepard’s identity is not one that depends on the continuity of the character’s 
identity between the game instalments and comics, but one that relies on the player’s influence 
over Shepard’s characterisation process. The player could go through this process once per game, 
or as much as they want, and create a different manifestation of Shepard each time. The player’s 
involvement in Shepard’s characterisation process in the game establishes concrete manifestations 
whose identity the player then projects onto the comics. This involvement gives the false impression 
that the developer, as some benevolent author, grants the player the agency to imagine Shepard 
into the comics however they want, but what the author actually provides is a preferred reading 
(see Hall 1973), a dominant reading in which the reader can only infer Shepard as a character in the 
comics that they have helped construct in the game series in the first place. 
 
27 For all the possible endings, see 
https://dragonage.fandom.com/wiki/Epilogue_(Origins). 
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The player’s supposed agency comes at the cost of the character’s characterisation process. 
The player’s influence over Shepard’s characterisation process—and subsequently over the 
companion characters of the ME series—causes that these characters and, most of all, Shepard 
cannot develop outside of the game series when the developer chooses not to subject these 
characters to a specific outcome. As a result, the Shepard manifestations that are within the 
authority of BioWare’s invisible hands, do not develop outside of their original game works. As much 
as they are a dynamic game character inside the ME game series, they can be considered dead 
characters outside of these games. 
 
 
5. Façade (2005) and Animal Crossing: New Leaf (2012) 
It is perhaps characters who are premade and in an indeterminate game structure through which 
they develop that are less likely to appear prominently as dynamic game characters. The games in 
which they exist maintain a peripheral position to game genres where the characterisation process 
happens primarily as narrative and ludic agents such as role-playing games or otome games. A 
reason for the lack of prominence of these kinds of dynamic game characters is, as I suspect, because 
the understanding of characters is primarily rooted within non-cybermedia works that have more 
affinity with narratives such as comics, films or novels. These kind of works narrate characters in 
primarily rigid manners in which the development of the prefabricated character is determined 
within that single work. 
To have a prefabricated character with a flexible development within a single work creates 
a certain tension between the understanding of characters as coherent entities within (at least) a 
single work, and the flexibility that a single work allows. I will discuss that tension using Façade 
(2005) and Animal Crossing: New Leaf (2012). 
Premade characters in a flexible structure need to be written in such a way that they can 
adapt to the flexibility required from them within a single work while simultaneously they have to 
maintain an established identity that evolves. Dynamic game characters in this strategy call for 
games in which the above requirements have to be prewritten by the game designers, which is an 
incredible strain on the designers. According to Mateas and Stern (2005), the designers of the “first-
person, real-time, one-act, interactive drama” Façade (2005): 
 
[Agency is] the most challenging to implement, exactly because it requires the system to 
dynamically assemble a story structure that incorporates the unpredictable actions of the 
player. This suggests that stories with looser, sparser event structures (plots) will be easier 
to implement in an interactive medium (require less generativity). (2005, 1) 
 
Their solution to the tension between game and story is to reconstruct the interactions in a world 
in terms of social relations between player and characters, in which the player’s affinity is organised 
around a numeric score (2005, 2). 
The characters in Façade, Grace and Trip, are semi-autonomous. They consist of long-term 
autonomous behaviour (like starting to fix drinks for the player on their own), and, according to 
Mateas and Stern, thousands of joint dialogue behaviours to adapt to the player’s agency within the 
game (2005, 4). In this game, the player has local agency and global agency. Local agency refers to 
the player’s actions which immediately cause a reaction from Trip and Grace (2005, 4). When I told 
Grace I met Vince, her former boyfriend, on my way, Grace immediately responded shocked, before 
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she pulled herself together. Global agency refers to the ending of the game, and particular actions 
by the player that cause a specific ending. When I continued to talk about Vince, Trip ejected me 
from the apartment, which ended the game. 
Designers Mateas and Stern call Façade an ‘interactive drama’ rather than a game, implying 
that it is a drama that responds to the player’s input without the need for human-to-human 
interaction (see Aarseth 1997, 48). However, drama, as Schechner argues (1988, 69), works with a 
specialised form of script, written beforehand and which determines the course of the drama. 
Although Façade works on an encoded script, this script does not determine the direction of the 
outcome. Rather, Façade resonates more with commedia dell’arte, the improvisation theatre not 
dominated by the written word (see Tuomola 1999, 170) but theatre that used predefined rules for 
improvisation that guided how the actors could behave and what they could and could not do 
around the performance’s plot. According to Mika Tuomola (1999, 170) improvisation in commedia 
dell’arte operated on predefined and clear rules of representation. Each character could only do 
certain things. John Rudlin (1994) states that the improvised dialogue (and behaviour) worked on 
known structures called mecchanismi, or mechanisms (55). 
As dynamic game characters, Trip and Grace are semi-autonomous digital entities. Or, rather, 
artificial intelligence-based characters who use scripts that allow the player to interact with them. 
The player can influence which direction the intrigue (see Aarseth 1997, 112) will go, but those 
directions, and the conversations the player will have, are encoded within the game’s possibility 
space. That is, the player will be unable to have the characters behave or act in a way that has not 
been written in the scripts. I tried to tell Trip and Grace three times about a drunken night of mine, 
but they never responded to that input. After the third attempt, Trip told me to leave their 
apartment, staring at me, unresponsive until I left. 
Façade does not take longer than twenty minutes to play through, and the player has to 
restart the game from scratch if they want a different outcome. This might suggest that 
prefabricated dynamic game characters in indeterministic structures can only exist in games that 
quickly end as it requires a tremendous amount of script to account for the unpredictable actions 
of the player. However, as I will discuss in the next section, prefabricated characters in 
indeterministic structures can also appear in games that do not end so quickly when the script runs 
out—on the condition that the game limits the unpredictable actions of the player (or perhaps, 
rather, sacrifices these actions for the AI). 
 
Animal Crossing: New Leaf 
Such a game is Animal Crossing: New Leaf (AC:NL) (2012), which I also discuss in the chapter six ‘The 
Construction of Game Characters’. In that chapter, I argue that AC:NL manages to construct its game 
characters on their autonomy. The characters give the impression that they have a life independent 
from the player, without the player even having to be present in the game. 
AC:NL is not a game that has an ending, it does not have an intrigue around which the 
dynamic game characters will act. The scripts embedded in the game emulate daily life based on 
the idealistic idea of the furusato28 where the dynamic game characters live a rustic lifestyle that 
includes actions such as fishing, catching bugs, shopping on a small street, visiting a museum, and 
celebrating events such as Halloween or Christmas together in a small town. As long as the player 
 
28 As I stated in the chapter on ‘The Construction of Game Characters’, furusato is the idealistic notion of old villages 
where one lives a rustic lifestyle, completely opposite to busy cosmopolitan cities, that summons feelings of nostalgia 
(Robertson 1988). 
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continues to play in the game, the daily life the game simulates will continue. 
Each villager, the AI characters in town, has a predetermined personality, suggesting a 
certain normative behaviour for male and female genders. For male characters the personality types 
include cranky, lazy, jock and smug. The personality types for female characters include: snooty, 
normal, peppy and uchi (blunt and tomboyish) (see Nintendo 2012). Each character only has one 
personality type, which functions as the primary script that determines the character’s behaviour 
and responses to the player. For example, characters with the uchi personality type are scripted to 
wake up at 11AM. Before that time in the morning, the player will not be able to engage with them, 
whereas a lazy personality type will wake up at 9AM. Characters of the snooty personality types will 
find it hard to get along with characters of the jock personality type, due to the latter’s indifference 
to fashion and physical appearance. 
The player is unable to change the personality type of the villager characters. However, what 
the player does have is the agency to change each character’s level of friendship towards the player 
in the game’s system of affection. The player can theoretically befriend every character within the 
player’s village and two special characters, who are always present in any AC:NL version and have 
jobs: Brewster, who tends the coffee store, and Sable, the seamstress who owns a tailor shop with 
her sister Mable. 
The player can increase the villager characters’ friendship towards them through different 
means, such as sending them presents or fulfilling their requests. For example, Lopez in my town 
asked me to request six town signatures from characters in other villagers. However, the player is 
not shown how the characters’ friendship towards them is growing in any statistical way. The player 
can only guess from small social cues that the villager characters warm up to them, such when they 
give the player unexpected gifts. 
The player’s agency over prefabricated performative agents seems to be quite limited. 
Façade shows that there is a tremendous challenge for the game designers to account for all the 
unpredictable actions if the designers want to give a high amount of agency to the players. Façade 
does not account for all the player’s unpredictable actions, and only allows the player to talk about 
those topics that the designers did predict and code in the game, and additionally the game takes 
only twenty minutes to play. AC:NL shows that prefabricated performative agents can exist in an 
open world, but this is at the expense of the player’s agency over these characters: the player can 
only influence the character’s development outcome in the character’s relation towards the player, 
but has little agency over anything else. 
 
Animal Crossing’s Transmedial Appearances 
Façade does not have any official transmedial adaptations, since the game is not part of a franchise, 
but the characters from AC:NL, as is common in media mix strategies, are dispersed over a variety 
of media. The Animal Crossing game series has been around since 2001 since the release of 
Doubutsu no Mori29 (2001). In these games, the player always inhabits a player-character in a town30 
in an open-ended simulation game. Each new AC game iterates characters such as Tom Nook, Sable 
and Mable, and Pompom anew, though the characters do not address the existence of their 
manifestations in the others games. In every game it is as if the player has never met them before. 
The player recognises these characters from previous instalments in the series not only by their 
visual design and their names, but the characters also employ a variety of topoi, recurrent textual 
 
29 Doubutsu no Mori is the official Japanese title of Animal Crossing. 
30 With the exception of the forthcoming AC: New Horizons (Forthcoming March 2020) taking place on an island. 
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stock situations (see Eco 1979, 119). Tom Nook for example is, until AC:NL, the shop owner of the 
town, and in AC:NL he becomes a real-estate agent, who is still trying to sell the player as much 
objects as possible like he did in the previous game instalments of the series. 
Besides several games, the AC series has also been turned into a manga serialisation called 
Doubutsu no Mori: Hohinda Mura dayori [Animal Crossing: It’s Hohinda Village!] (2001–2015), by 
CoroCoro Comics, a monthly manga magazine aimed at elementary school boys. The serialisation is 
drawn by mangaka Abesayori with (currently) twelve volumes. Each of these volumes have been 
officially licensed by Nintendo, the developer and IP owner of the AC games. The AC volumes 
maintain the same strategy as the Persona 5 magazines that are licensed by Atlus and contain 
background stories, parodies and yonkoma jokes. Albeit (seemingly) written by only a single author, 
the AC volumes contain short funny stories and yonkoma based on events in the AC games. For my 
analysis, I look at the most recent publication, volume 12 (Abesayori 2015). The manga fabricates 
Sayorin as the protagonist, who functions as a stand-in for the player-character, in all the stories in 
the volume. 
Several stories depict Sayorin as the mayor of Hohinda town based on the scripts of AC:NL. 
The yonkoma make fun of mechanics and situations in the game. It is, for example, quite a task to 
get enough bells (in-game currency) to upgrade the player’s house, to buy tools or clothes, or to 
build town projects. The yonkoma Ohana no Kisetsu [Flower Season] plays right into this situation: 
Sayorin tries to grow rare flowers. Upon the sight of a floating balloon with a gift attached, she 
becomes tempted to follow it, but holds back and tends to the flowers. Then immediately when she 
spots a rare beetle, she runs right after it, while screaming: “[this insect] is worth 2,500 bells!”. She 
destroys the flowers as she runs straight through them—a mechanic that is also in the game. 
Unlike the Persona 5 magazines, the Doubutsu no Mori: Hohinda Mura dayori magazines do 
not do that much relationship exploration. The story Nakayoshi Barentain [The Valentine of Good 
Friends] hints at the relationships the player can create between the player-character and other 
characters, but the story is primarily written in a funny tone with a moralistic message: do not 
become friends just to get something from them. The reason for the lack of exploration is likely 
because of the target audience. While AC:NL is rated ‘E’ for ‘Everyone’ in the West, Persona 5 is 
rated ‘M’ for ‘Mature 17+’. A magazine aimed at elementary school boys is less concerned with the 
depiction of relationship developments between characters than a magazine aimed at (young) 
adults. 
The character’s visual design and simple personalities—which the player cannot change over 
the course of the game—and topoi, make it easy to transfer the characters from one work to 
another without needing to connect one manifestation of the character to another. The AC 
characters follow a common pattern in media mix strategies: they are recognizable as the same 
kyara but do not appear as the same coherent character (Itô 2005; Wilde 2019, 7). No villager 
character acknowledges their manifestation in the other game instalments, but they do draw upon 
previously established designs and topoi. 
The relationships that the player can create between the player-character and the villager 
characters are barely addressed. This means that the scripts that turn the AC villager characters into 
dynamic game characters do not translate to the character’s manifestations in non-cybermedia. 
However, I have to add that as performative agents, AC:NL’s characters are limited. Whereas Façade 
is unable to accommodate unpredictability of the player’s agency, AC:NL tries to trim the player’s 
agency to such an extent that it limits how dynamic these dynamic game characters can be. It might 
be due to the case studies I was able to find that matched the criteria of having prefabricated 
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characters within an indeterministic game structure, but it seems that this particular combination is 
the most difficult to accommodate due to the unpredictability of the player’s behaviour if the 
designers want to provide the players with a high degree of agency. 
 
 
6. The Sims 4 (2014) 
The Sims 4 (2014) is, as the title suggests, the fourth instalment of The Sims series. Just like AC: NL, 
The Sims 4 is a simulation game where the player controls a neighbourhood of virtual figures, the 
Sims. Sim characters are non-prefabricated and have an indeterministic structure. Series creator, 
Will Wright, calls The Sims an interactive dollhouse, one that parodies consumerism (Seabrook 
2006). The player is capable of influencing semi-autonomous characters as they live their virtual 
lives. There is no particular goal towards which the player has to work; they can decide their own. 
This makes the Sim characters dynamic game characters mostly dominating as performative agents. 
Celia Pearce (2006) states that part of why it is interesting to look at The Sims (Maxis 2000) 
is because it represents “an abdication of authorial control, or more accurately, a shift in the 
definition of author”. As discussed in chapter five, ‘The Challenges of Manifestations and their 
Identities’, the concept of character suffers from its connection to the author-function: the 
character’s identity is not only shaped by the author-function as an invisible hand, but its entire 
existence suffers from the fallacy of creationism. That is, the character is considered to be an 
abstract object that causally depends on authorial intention (see Brock 2010; Friedell 2016). Only if 
an author intends there to be a character, the character will exist. 
If creationism is taken at face-value, then the Sims are not characters because they have no 
explicit author who prefabricates them before they are consumed by the player. It is my premise 
that our understanding of Sims as characters is challenged because of the delegation of authorial 
control. The figures in The Sims series stretch the concept of characters. They can be considered 
dolls, and since dolls can become characters, and characters can—as they are taken out of their 
stories—become dolls, the difference between the two terms is more a matter of perspective than 
a conceptual matter. Therefore, the position that I adopt, and have adopted over the course of this 
dissertation, is that Sims are characters, because they function as “models of an aspect of the world, 
schemata which generalize and simplify human beings in conventional ways and make it available 
to understanding and action” (Frow 2014, 107) from which the interpreter can infer a sense of 
personhood. 
What I discuss in the following sections is not so much whether the Sims are characters, but 
rather how they are characters. And, more relevant to this chapter, how they are dynamic game 
characters. In the following sections, I discuss the idea of authored characters, and the fallacy of the 
causal relation between author and creator through the example of my own Sim character, Sterre, 
who I created in ‘Create a Sim’ mode. I will then turn to a description of my gameplay to describe 
how Sterre is a dynamic game character, functioning as a performative agent. I will end this case 
study with a discussion about the recurring appearances of the Sim characters in the game series, 
reflecting on the friction Sim characters generate in the strive for narrative continuity between 
character manifestations. 
 
The Create a Sim Mode 
Characters are created: they are schemata who are authored. However, as Brock (2010) argues, a 
character’s existence is not the causal consequence of the author’s intention to create an individual 
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that is identified as a character. The Sims series specifically rattles the fallacy of the causal author-
character relationship, because it does not relate the existence of a character to a specific author. 
Rather, the series provides a possibility space that allows the player to create and develop Sim 
characters in combination with and dependent on the game’s script established by the writing and 
the programming. 
For my case study, I created only one Sim.31 The Sims 4, like all instalments in the series, 
allows the player two choices: play with an existing family unit, or create their own Sim characters 
in the Create a Sim mode that each The Sims generation has. The Create a Sim mode is incredibly 
extensive. The player chooses the Sim’s name, their voice, how they walk, their physical appearance, 
aspirations and traits. It also offers LGBTQ-friendly options, which determine the Sim character’s in-
game affordances: the player can not only choose the sex of the Sim (male/female), their skin colour, 
and determine their starting age (toddler/child/young adult/adult/elderly), but—since a patch in 
October 2016—the player can also customise the Sim character’s gender. Regardless of the Sim’s 
sex, the player can determine the Sim’s physical frame (masculine/feminine), clothing preference 
(masculine/feminine), pregnancy options (able to become pregnant/impregnate others/infertile) 
and mode of toilet use (standing/sitting). The player can choose all these different options to create 
Sim characters, thereby becoming their author. 
The Create a Sim mode is at once the most authorial moment the player has, and the place 
where they shape the script for the character’s dynamicity. The player has the power to create a 
Sim, and can adjust their affordances and limitations in such a way that it affects the Sim’s 
development and eventual outcome. A Sim with an aspiration to become a painter extraordinaire 
will have different goals to meet than a Sim character with the aspiration for a big happy family. The 
traits will affect how fast the Sim character will need to engage in certain activities. And the gender 
customisation options allow the Sim characters to have certain inherent traits that influence their 
romantic connections to other Sims. 
For my case study, I had a particular goal in mind: I wanted the character, who I called Sterre, 
to become a spellcaster, The Sims 4’s version of a witch. It was particularly Sterre’s traits and 
aspiration that were most important to me. It was impossible to choose an aspiration that had 
anything to do with becoming a spellcaster, so I chose that Sterre aspires to become a painter 
extraordinaire. I then selected three other traits that I thought would help with this aspiration: 
creative, goofball and outgoing. Based on these traits, the Sim character obtains certain natural 
qualities and aptitude. For example, a goofball Sim will be playful faster, but they also demand to 
do more fun activities or else their needs bar will drain, and they will become grumpy and refuse to 
carry out certain tasks. 
In the Create a Sim mode, the player creates a causal relationship between the Sim character 
and themselves as the author, but this authorship is derivative: the player can only create the 
character within the limitations of the game’s possibility space. Without the Island Living expansion 
pack, I would not be able to create a mermaid Sim character no matter how much I wished to. And, 
even if I do create a mermaid, I cannot create a mermaid/vampire hybrid Sim. Even when I would 
be able to manage to have a vampire Sim character and a mermaid Sim character give birth to a 
baby, the baby will be either a vampire or a mermaid—over which the player has no control either. 
 
 
31 In addition to the basic game, I own three expansion packs: Island Living, Get Famous, and City Living. I also have 
the game packs Vampires, Magic Realms, and Parenthood installed. These additions provide new world in which the 
Sim characters can live, new mechanics, additional clothes, furniture and more. 
186 
 
The Life of a Sim 
The moment the player releases their Sim character into the world, they lose any derivative 
authorship over the character; the Sim’s existence is not causally related anymore to the author-
player. The player’s agency to give orders to the Sim characters gives the illusion that the player can 
decide exactly how the Sim character will develop, but the combination of the character’s 
aspirations, traits, needs bar and scripted events turn the player more into a facilitator of the 
character’s characterisation process than a puppet-master deciding what the character will and will 
not do. I will provide four brief examples for this: my own quest to turn Sterre into a spellcaster, the 
influence of the mood on the character’s willingness to conduct my orders, scripted events the 
player cannot avoid happening, and the response from other Sim characters. 
As soon as I had created Sterre and placed her in an apartment, I sent her out to the portal 
in the neighbourhood Glimmerbrook, which would send her to the Realm of Magic where the sages 
live to turn her into a spellcaster. Sterre’s transformation did not change her drastically. She has the 
same needs as any other normal Sim (vampires and mermaids have different needs), but I gained 
access to the spellcaster perks menu and spellbook. The perks menu gives the spellcaster Sim 
additional advantages depending on their spellcaster level. The Sim can obtain magical experience 
in a variety of ways; the player can order them to practice magic, to ask another spellcaster for help, 
to read tomes and books, and to summon a familiar. In this aspect, the Sim’s characterisation 
process happens primarily when they are functioning as a ludic agent. By developing the Sim’s 
statistics, such as obtaining more experience in a certain skill like magic, the character gains access 
to additional abilities, skills and perks. 
The needs bar plays a nontrivial role in the dynamicity of the character. It tells the player 
what kinds of activities the Sim needs to do in order to stay happy. The player wants to keep the 
meters in the needs bar raised, because unfulfilled needs influence the character’s mood, or worse. 
The script of the game dictates that the Sim’s needs have to be fulfilled otherwise the player will 
face consequences that influence the development of the character. Sterre is particularly inclined 
to become stressed, since her ‘fun’ bar drops fast. If the fun bar is too low, I cannot order her to do 
anything—she simply ignores my orders and either watches television or reads a book. If she goes 
to work stressed, her performance at her job will drop, she will not be promoted, or might even be 
demoted and fired. This in turn could make the character sad, that will also affect their performance 
in other aspects; the player will be denied the orders to kiss the Sim’s lover, and other orders such 
as ‘complaining about problems’ will become available. 
The game’s script become particularly prominent when the player has little to no influence 
at all over the event that manifests. Their jobs calling, festivals happening, or vampires that sneak 
into the apartment are events in the game’s script that the player cannot predict. I had no means 
to predict the arrival of the vampire, sneaking into Sterre’s apartment. I tried to order Sterre to stay 
in bed, but the vampire Sim’s hypnosis powers nullified any order I gave (image 6). After this event, 
I was stuck with a Sim who had not only overslept so that she was late for work, but who also felt 
uncomfortable for the next 24 in-game hours. She did not get that promotion, she did not want to 
practice her magic spells, she did not want to do anything at all but be grumpy and complain. All I 
could do was just wait until she felt better again. 
What the player also cannot influence is how Sim characters react to each other. Sterre 
became intimately involved with spellcaster sage Morgyn. Usually, Morgyn would respond well to 
Sterre, as I ordered Sterre to chat with them, flirt, and encourage them. It was, however, during an 
activity that did not involve Morgyn and Sterre directly that Sterre’s behaviour influenced Morgyn 
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negatively. Sterre had just obtained the spell ‘infatuation’ that allowed her to force to Sim characters 
to become obsessed with each other against their will. I could not resist the temptation to use this 
spell on Sterre’s landlord Ayako. The moment after Sterre put the spell on Ayako, Morgyn responded 
negatively to this mischief—much to my surprise—and started shouting at Sterre, his affection for 
her decreasing. 
 
 
Image 6: Sterre hypnotized by vampire Caleb (in-game screenshot taken by author). 
Authored Characters and Performative Agents 
Pearce (2006) observes that The Sims shifts the definition of ‘author’. The player has in The Sims 4 
a different authorial role depending on the mode they are in. In Create a Sim mode, the player 
becomes the character’s creator, taking on the role of an author and deciding how the Sim 
characters will look like, what their personalities will be like and how they will likely behave. This 
kind of authorial agency is derivative, not almighty. The player can only create a Sim within the 
constraints of the game’s possibility space. In the Play mode, the player loses their derivative agency, 
because the Sim characters are semi-autonomous AI characters that can perform simple activities 
without the player’s involvement, but they do need the player to develop as characters. The 
authorial role that the player in this mode occupies is that of a facilitator. The facilitating agency 
allows the player to influence the Sims to perform certain acts. Although the player can usually 
influence the Sims with orders, the player has no absolute control over the semi-autonomous 
beings: the player cannot prevent certain events from happening, nor can they control how the Sim 
characters respond to events, what they want, need, or how they behave. The Sim characters are 
being authored, but, as Brock (2010) argued, are not causally related to their author. 
No character can exist without being authored, but usually authorial control comes in the 
form of an author who decides the character’s identity without the reader/watcher/audience’s 
involvement over their development. However, no dynamic game character can develop in the 
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game without being authored by the player. The player’s active role in the dynamic game character’s 
development does not provide the player with authorial control, they do not author the dynamic 
game character in the form of an almighty author. Rather, they have agency over the character, and 
that agency is embedded in the game’s possibility space. 
The lack of cardinal functions in The Sims 4 are made up by the existence of scripts, the 
possible manifestations of patterns of doing embedded in the game’s possibility space. The Sims 4 
is not unlimited, and only certain events can occur. I doubt a mermaid Sim would have entered 
Sterre’s apartment to suck her plasma (a reference to blood), because the game’s possibility space 
only allows vampire Sims to perform these acts. These scripts in the possibility space determine how 
the player can act. They can influence the Sims with orders, usually without the Sim character being 
able to protest too much, but the Sim itself is not without agency: scripts allow them to act on their 
own—deviating from the player’s orders—or the script acts on them with vampires or other Sim 
characters working against their wishes. The Sim characters thus function more like performative 
agents: their scripted behaviour is permeated by the player and the possibility space that allows the 
player to influence their development. 
 
Serial Sim Characters? 
Ever since the first instalment in the series was released, The Sims series has contained prefabricated 
Sim characters. For example, I recognised the vampire sneaking into Sterre’s apartment 
immediately as Caleb, one of the prefabricated vampires that came from The Sims 4: Vampires game 
pack. My tentative hypothesis was that Sims in The Sims series were unable to cross transmedially, 
because the player is the initial author of these characters in the Create a Sim mode, however, the 
prefabricated characters do tend to migrate. They migrate trans-game as recurring or, perhaps more 
accurately, as serial figures. In this section, I will reflect on the friction Sim characters generate in 
the strive for narrative continuity between Sim character manifestations. 
For the player who has played all the standard generations of The Sims series (expansion 
packs not included), Bella Goth is a familiar name. Bella Goth, together with her husband Mortimer 
Goth and their first child Cassandra Goth, first appeared in The Sims, and reappear in all the series’ 
instalments.32 Before the start of The Sims 2 (Maxis 2004), Bella and Mortimer had one more child: 
Alexander Goth. However, Bella herself is not playable as she has gone missing after an alien 
abduction. The memories that Mortimer, Cassandra and Alexander have primarily involve Bella. In 
The Sims 3 (Maxis 2009), Bella Goth appears as a child, named Bella Bachelor, and Mortimer Goth—
he too being a child—lives right across the street. Their relationship is that of best friends. 
In The Sims 4, Bella is seen together with her family again. She lives together with Mortimer, 
Cassandra, and Alexander in a large mansion in Willow Creek. According to the The Sims Wiki 
website, Maxis seems to suggest that this Bella is an alternate version of Bella in the previous 
generations (Fandom n.d.). Bella’s different (dis-)appearance in the series before The Sims 4 
suggests a timeline, or rather, a form of narrative continuity, as she never initially appears in each 
game generation in an age that collides with her appearances in other game generations. 
The tension that Bella’s manifestation causes brings to mind Shane Denson’s (2011) 
 
32 I exclude the console installments of The Sims series, since Maxis, the developer, created the series initially for the 
computer. The console installments operate as peripheral stand-alone versions, based on the series. For example, the 
player can buy all kinds of expansion packs for The Sims 2 for the PC, but no additional content packs for The Sims 2 
console version exist. I also exclude the peripheral PC installments such as The Sims Medieval (Maxis 2011) that do not 
function as expansions, but as stand-alone games. 
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description of the tension between the series character and the serial figure. He explains that there 
exist two types of seriality in stories: “1) a linear form of serial progression, continuation, and 
development; and 2) a non-linear form of serial 'concrescence,' snowballing accumulation, or 
compounding sedimentation” (2011, 536). In the former seriality, the series character appears as “a 
figure that unfolds within a continuing narrative (in a soap opera, a novel series, or saga, for 
example), tending to take on an increased psychological depth and/or ever more complex social 
involvements in the course of this development” (536.). In the latter seriality, the serial figure 
appears as “a stock character of sorts, who appears again and again in significantly different forms 
of adaptation, contexts, and in various media” (536). In the case of The Sims series, however, the 
difference between the friction of Bella’s appearances and Denson’s description of the friction 
between the series character and the serial character is that Denson describes the appearances of 
characters within rigid works, works that have already been written by an author, whereas Bella’s 
appearances exist over a series of works that are entirely flexible. Her migration from game to game 
in the series more closely resembles that of a kyara than the serial figure. 
Even when Bella is only considered as a serial figure, Denson’s idea of “the traces of previous 
incarnations” (2011, 573) are not up for scrutiny. Roberta Pearson (2019) uses Denson’s ‘traces of 
previous incarnations’ as ‘points of contact’ to explain the cohesion between character 
manifestations only works for Bella before the player starts playing the basic game of all generation. 
When these games remain untouched by the player, the Bella manifestations between game 
generations give a sense of narrative continuity. But any Bella manifestation that appears in a game 
the player actually plays in the Play mode gradually loses its coherence with the Bella manifestations 
in previous game generations. The moment the player plays the game—any game generation—Bella 
and her family will function the same as any other Sim. The player can leave the family alone so that 
the player becomes barely or not at all involved in Bella’s development, but she still develops 
nonetheless at least in terms of age. Even when the player does not play with them directly, all Sim 
characters will age regardless of the player’s direct involvement with them. They will also appear in 
several places within the game, and the Sim characters that the player controls can still engage with 
the Sim characters the player does not directly control. 
Maxis assumes the author-function to determine Bella’s existence and identity. Her so-called 
‘alternate version’ in The Sims 4 suggests an excuse to keep up the usual strive for narrative 
continuity. Maxis’ attempt to describe that they created an ‘alternate’ version of Bella seems to go 
entirely against the nature of their own game. First, Maxis assumes the paradoxical position that 
there exists a causal relation between them as the author and the existence of Bella. Second, and 
subsequently, their attempt for coherence in Bella conflicts with the nature that the game series 
grants her: Bella’s existence as a character has always already been plural within a single game. Like 
any other Sim character, Bella functions primarily as a performative agent, based on the game’s 
script and the player’s manipulation of that script. The work itself is incredibly flexible—that is, there 
is no rigid way that Bella will develop as a character. Her identity is not rigid, but entirely flexible. 
Her characterisation process differs per player. Maxis’ attempt to give Bella some sort of coherence 
within each game generation thwarts the plural existence she has in each individual game work. 
 
 
7. The Dynamic Game Character in a Character Ecology 
This section explains the consequences of contemporary transmedia practices on dynamic game 
characters in the character ecology. As explained in chapter four, ‘The Immaterial Character’, 
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characters have three aspects to them: the archetype, the immaterial character and the indicator, 
and the plurality of manifestations. In a character ecology, the identities of these characters are 
constantly shifting. Invisible hands attempt to police the configuration of the manifestations of the 
character through three venues of control: canonisation, authorship and ownership. In the West, 
the configuration is preferred to be one of narrative continuity to give the impression that the 
identity of the character makes linear sense. In Japan, the media mix tends towards an approach 
that is based on coherence of character proliferation and intellectual property. So long as the 
manifestations of the character conform to the character owned by the IP owner, the configuration 
of the character does not have to make coherent sense in terms of narrative continuity between 
character manifestations. This difference in tendencies between strategies in Japan and the West 
should, however, not be read as a clear-cut conceptual dichotomy. As I clarified over the course of 
these chapters, exceptions to these tendencies do exist, such as The Sims and The Legend of Zelda 
series. These tendencies are nothing more than inclinations and preferences that the West and 
Japan exhibit in current contemporary transmedial practices, instead of a conceptual cultural 
uniqueness to either. 
 
Summary of the Case Studies 
Link in BoTW as a dynamic game character is primarily dominated by the ludic agent, while the 
narrative agent is rigid. The player develops the dynamic game character by cardinal functions that 
give him extra abilities such as Mipha’s Grace. BoTW has been created within Nintendo’s existing, 
imposed chronology on the different Link manifestations in order to create a form of narrative 
continuity between the different manifestations in the different games. BoTW’s Link is not 
specifically placed within this chronology. Instead, the designers purposefully do not say which of 
the three timelines in the chronology this Link belongs. It seems that the imposed narrative 
continuity on the Link manifestations creates a paradox: now Link’s identity is perhaps more 
ambiguous than before. 
Persona 5 contains the same criteria as BoTW, but the dynamic game characters dominate 
as narrative agents. The game maintains a rigid macrostructure, but, just as with Link in BotW, the 
characters dynamicity comes to the fore in the game’s microstructure. The player is able to affect 
Joker’s characterisation process in, for example, the game’s SA. The microstructure allows the player 
to influence the characters both as narrative and as ludic agents. The narrative agent, for example, 
dominates the game’s SA, in which the player can influence with whom the player will have a 
particular bond. The SA also allows the player to develop the characters as ludic agents: the stronger 
the bond between the player-character and a confidant party member, the stronger Joker and that 
party member will become. 
In a media mix strategy, characters tend to exist independently of any work in particular. 
However, the proliferation of the characters in the Persona 5 media mix strategy paints a different 
picture: the official manga and anime adaptations follow the game’s macrostructure, but 
completely ignore the game’s SA. Although manga magazines with IP licenses that explore the 
game’s SA exist, their explorations of the relationships between Joker and confidant characters 
correspond to the preferred readings of the source work, thereby suggesting that the player has to 
adhere to hetero-normative relationships of the game. Oppositional readings, or queer readings, 
can be found in other derivative works without copyright to use the characters. 
The ME series contains a macrostructure with malleable cardinal functions in which 
Shepard’s characterisation process operates as a blueprint through which the player shapes the 
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character’s identity over the course of the game series. From this perspective, Shepard initially 
seems to function primarily as a narrative agent. However, the ludic agent also shapes what the 
game’s possibility space allows the blueprint as a narrative agent: a female Shepard can romance 
Thane or Garrus, but cannot romance Jack. Furthermore, Shepard’s reputation points 
(Paragon/Renegade) affect the player’s choices to enter, dismiss, or create a conflict that in turn 
affect the outcome of the game’s macrostructure. 
The amount of agency the player has over Shepard’s characterisation process has placed the 
invisible hands in jeopardy. The ME comics depict Shepard only on the level of the indicator. Any 
indicator conceals Shepard’s identity so that no concrete manifestation of Shepard emerges. The 
player has to imagine the character, and substitute the indicator with their manifestation of Shepard 
they created over the course of the characterisation process in the game. 
Hiding any information that could reveal anything about Shepard is in stark contrast with 
Bioware’s other strategy in which they choose to depict specific outcomes for their dynamic game 
characters in the comic book series of their game DA: Origins. Doing so, BioWare canonises the 
series, giving their depiction of the dynamic game characters’ outcome the status of the ‘truthful’ 
outcome. 
The final examples were games with an indeterminate structure, in which the dynamic game 
characters dominate as performative agents whose characterisation processes work on scripts 
rather than on a determined micro- and macrostructure. 
Prefabricated characters in a flexible structure provide the challenge that they have to be 
written in such a way that the player’s agency over this flexible structure accounts for the player’s 
unpredictable moves while, at the same time, the identity of the established identity of the 
character should evolve. Façade handles this challenge by having a script that allows for a potential 
set of actions from the dynamic game characters Trip and Grace that will be activated by the player’s 
input. However, not any kind of player input will work, only those that the designers were able to 
predict. From this perspective, Trip and Grace resonate commedia dell’arte that operates on 
mecchanismi, predefined and clear rules of certain representation. The mecchanismi in the game’s 
possibility space have Trip and Grace dominate as performative agents whose development 
structure goes into a certain direction as they respond to the player’s input accounted for by the 
game’s scripts. 
Since it takes a huge amount of dialogue and scripts to account for the player’s 
unpredictability, another strategy to handle performative agents is to limit the player’s agency over 
the dynamic game characters. Animal Crossing: New Leaf (AC:NL) restricts the player’s agency by 
having the characters pre-defined personalities that the player is unable to influence. What the 
player can influence, however, is the level of friendship between their player-character and the 
other characters to a certain extent. 
The characters from AC:NL are dispersed over a variety of AC games and non-cybermedia—
a common pattern in media mix strategies. The relationships that the player can develop in AC:NL 
are barely acknowledged within the franchise’s manga, so it can be said that the dynamicity of the 
characters in the game does not translate to their manifestations in the existing non-cybermedia 
that I analysed. The characters are primarily recognisable as kyara, but do not give the impression 
that they are the same character manifestation. 
The examples of Façade and AC:NL suggest that prefabricated characters in an 
indeterministic structure are likely the most limited strategies in which dynamic game characters 
currently exist, because it is difficult to accommodate the unpredictability of the player’s agency. 
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Façade is unable to accommodate the player’s agency, whereas AC:NL constrains the player’s 
agency over the performative agents to such an extent that the script does not allow these 
characters to develop any further than their friendship level to the player-character. 
  Our current understanding of characters is primarily rooted within this idea that 
character manifestations within a single work are created by an author-function that determines 
the behaviour and development of these characters within the work. Theoretically speaking, a 
dynamic game character operating with AI that accommodates to a player’s high amount of 
agency—and therefore a high degree of unpredictability—likely goes beyond our current 
understanding of characters in which they are, within a single work, predictable and authored. That 
is, could we say that something is still a character when they are not stipulated by some form of 
authority, and instead seem to adapt onto them their own agency with a will of their own as if they 
are actually living beings? 
It is the semi-autonomous AI characters from The Sims series that demonstrate the tension 
of the supposed causal relation between author and character. The scripts written in The Sims 4’s 
code make up the lack of cardinal functions, and allow the Sim characters to function primarily as 
performative agents over whose characterisation process the player has agency to influence the Sim 
characters’ characterisation process in a specific direction. The game allows the player to take on 
two different authorial roles. In Create a Sim mode, the player becomes the character’s creator, an 
author, but this agency is derivative and the player cannot create Sim character outside of the 
game’s possibility space. In the Play mode, the player’s authorial role is that of a facilitator. Their 
facilitating agency allows the player to influence the characterisation process but does not give them 
full control over the semi-autonomous AI characters. 
Due to their performativity and the agency the player has over the Sim characters, The Sims 
series initially does not seem to police the identity of game characters. However, although the series 
does not transmedially migrate its characters to non-cybermedia, Maxis has been using Bella Goth 
as a serial figure. With points of contact to create a form of cohesion, Maxis attempts to establish 
narrative continuity between the appearances of Bella Goth over the game generations. This forcing 
of a causal relation between her manifestations causes friction with the mechanics of the game and 
alienates the player. The moment the player appears, scripts and the player’s influence over Bella 
Goth cause any points of contact between Bella’s initial manifestations to become less and less 
coherent. From this perspective, Bella Goth functions more akin to a kyara, but Maxis’ attempts to 
police the textual organisation between Bella’s manifestations seems to be much more focused on 
this strive for narrative continuity than on the player’s agency to be a vital part in Bella’s 
characterisation process. 
 
How Does a Dynamic Game Character Affect the Character Ecology? 
Here I will answer the question I posed at the beginning of this chapter: how does a dynamic game 
character influence the character ecology? As discussed in chapter four, ‘The Immaterial Character’, 
without taking dynamic game characters into consideration, the manifestation of a character (M) 
allows invisible hands to organise the character’s identity over multiple works through different 
manifestations (M1, M2, M3 and so forth) (see figure 18). Each manifestation is then structured by 
invisible hands in a specific configuration that promises some kind of coherence in the character’s 
identity. This configuration usually happens over multiple non-cybermedia works, although games 
are also part of the process of this configuration. 
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Figure 18: Model of character manifestations (M). 
 
The dynamic game character trifles with the construction of the character’s identity over multiple 
works, because invisible hands structurally create multiple identities within the game and provide 
the player creative agency to actualise one of these identities. The identity of the dynamic game 
character becomes infused with the player’s influence over the characterisation process of the 
character. From this perspective, the dynamic game character enters the character ecology with the 
promise of flexibility and creative agency for the player who engages with the character. The 
immaterial character becomes infused with the player’s own experiences in the character’s 
characterisation process with the ‘permission’ of the invisible hands. 
Although the player does not have authorship over the characters, the player has become a 
vital part in the character’s characterisation process such that, as a result, it becomes impossible to 
think of the dynamic game character’s identity without taking the player into consideration. The 
player does not just imagine the identity of the character, but effectively shapes the character’s 
identity. This means that digital games are capable of accelerating a dynamic game character’s 
identity within a single work, unlike more ‘traditional’ non-cybermedia in which a character’s 
identity is constructed over multiple works. Instead of having manifestations M1, M2, M3 and so 
forth, whose configuration is spread over multiple works and which determines the coherence of 
their identity within the character ecology, the dynamic game character’s manifestations instead all 
gather within a single work. In other words, the dynamic game character contains a plurality of 
identities of which one manifests in the work only through the player. Therefore, the manifestation 
of the dynamic game character becomes Mx (see figure 19). 
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Figure 19: Model of dynamic game character in a single work. 
 
I would have preferred to stop my analysis with the statement that dynamic game characters open 
up the character ecology to embed invisible hands and consumers within a relationship of equality 
to shape characters sharing the position of the author alike, but my research shows otherwise: the 
player’s agency over dynamic game characters suffers once dynamic game characters become 
transmedial. Since the player produces a concrete manifestation of the dynamic game character, 
there is this idealistic implication that the dynamic game character has no definitive manifestation, 
that there is no official identity. After all, the work itself allows all different kinds of identities and 
grants the player the agency to operate within the characterisation process of the character. 
However, as the analyses in this chapter show, invisible hands have the tendency to create and 
maintain the illusion of coherence in a dynamic game character’s identity, as they try to structure 
the configuration of the dynamic game character over the course of multiple cybermedia and non-
cybermedia works. 
In contemporary transmedia practices, the configuration of the character constantly shifts, 
thereby affecting the identity of the character as if it were a coherent entity. The idealistic effort to 
give the impression that characters are coherent entities, instead of schemata that transform both 
within a single work and over the course of multiple works, stimulates a constant fight of control 
over the characters’ identities. This fight happens across archaic venues of control such as the 
author-function, which takes on, in some cases, a religious aspect (creationism, with the author as 
the character’s creator who determines the path the character walks), ownership and intellectual 
property to determine creative agency over the characters, and the canonisation of these characters. 
The invisible hands’ meddling with the dynamic game character’s configuration to determine 
their identities over multiple media platforms breaks the ‘permission’ of the player’s involvement 
in those characters’ characterisation processes. While the games with dynamic game characters 
promise the player creative agency over these characters, the moment these characters are 
transferred to other works—even other games—the player’s creative agency is sacrificed for an 
illusion of coherency. Although it can be said that this might be because non-cybermedia cannot 
structurally support dynamic game characters, it is necessary to take a step back from the issue of 
media affordances and constrains. Rather, I stress that there is always more than one choice 
involved in transferring dynamic game characters from one work to another. These choices include 
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decisions on how to portray dynamic game characters in other media, which specific character to 
portray, which events from the game to involve in the character’s transfer to other media, which 
outcome of the character’s characterisation process to start a story from, and so on. Yet, the most 
important choice is the decision to transfer the dynamic game character from one medium to 
another at all, thereby taking away the promise of creative agency over the character, reducing the 
player’s experience in the process to fit a dominant reading as determined by an institutional 
authority. That is, I argue, the danger of transmedia. 
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Chapter Nine 
The System of Affection 
 
This chapter presents the system of affection (SA) as a process by which game characters become 
dynamic so that the player obtains creative agency to influence these character’s characterisation 
process into a certain direction until the character has reached a specific outcome. The SA concerns 
the particular segments in which the player creates bonds between characters. This chapter explains 
the processes that shape the relationships between dynamic game characters, and explains the 
strategies—the sets of actions—that the player must execute to create these relationships 
successfully. 
In his article on narrative rules, Backe (2012) presents three means through which the player 
has agency over the game’s macrostructure (as explained in chapter eight): decision-making, 
performance, and the avatar design (255). “[B]ased on the means by which players can participate 
in and influence an interactive story” (2012, 255), he distinguishes between eight different types of 
agency through which the player either has dynamic or static agency on one or more of these three 
means. Although Backe explains the overall outcome of a game, and I discuss the outcomes of the 
characterisation processes of individual characters, the means by which the player has agency over 
the dynamic game characters and the game’s macrostructure are, not surprisingly, similar, since the 
possibility space that the game offers operates on the same means. 
In the previous chapter I showed through the case study of Persona 5 (P-Studio 2016) that 
the player has creative agency over the game’s dynamic game characters not only by the means of 
decision-making, or the performance and design of the avatar, but by a fourth means: the system 
of affection. As I demonstrated using Persona 5, the SA even allows game characters who appear in 
a game with a rigid macrostructure to become dynamic in the segments of the game’s 
microstructure. Therefore, in this chapter, I will explain in more detail how the SA provides the 
player the creative agency to create meaningful bonds between two or more characters. 
The first section of this chapter is dedicated to the explanation of what kind of process the 
SA is and is not. In the second section, I explain the different kinds of dynamic game character 
relations that the player can influence. The third section explains the conditions to which the player 
has to adhere before they can start influencing the relationships. The fourth section describes the 
procedures the player has to carry out to influence the relationships. Finally, the fifth section 
describes the positive and negative implications of the SA on the representation of a relationship. 
 
Limitations 
There are a few limitations to the SA as I present it here. Some of these limitations, I have already 
explained in chapter three, but I consider it necessary to emphasise them here again due to the 
procedural nature of the SA attempting to convey illusive concepts of affection. 
The amount of games that I use as examples is, of course, limited. As presented in chapter 
three, Barthes explains that when faced with millions of narratives, one is “obliged first to devise a 
hypothetical model of description […] and then gradually to work down from this model to the 
different narrative species which at once conform to and depart from the model” (Barthes [1966] 
1995, 253 - 254). It is therefore possible that I do not cover all the procedures, actions or shapes in 
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which the SA can come, but another version of the SA will only invalidate this theory if it fails to 
conform my theoretical description of the SA. 
The theory on the SA covers how the game structurally encourages the player to influence 
relationships between characters. This means that I do not make any formal claims about the 
structure of the SA itself, but rather that I describe how the game motivates the player’s meaning-
making process by giving them creative agency to influence structurally the outcome of the 
characters within a process about creating relationships. 
The body of works that I describe do not include multiplayer games. It includes exclusively 
singleplayer games, because the SA is about the relationships between characters that the player 
influences, and not between empirical players. For example, although the player in Pokémon Go 
(Niantic 2016) can give gifts to other players to increase friendship levels between players, this 
exchange is outside the scope of this dissertation. 
Furthermore, since I do not discuss empirical players, I have not conducted any 
measurements on their emotional investment and experiences. Rather, using reader-response 
theory, I look at how the game structurally motivates the player to obtain or refrain from certain 
emotional investments and experiences. 
The representation of characters in terms of gender diversity, race, queerness and sexuality 
is of high importance, but my dissertation does not cover such a topic, and therefore neither does 
my theory of the SA. That is not to say that the SA as I present it here cannot be used for such topic. 
Indeed, I think that using the SA in an analysis about representation is highly useful to identify how 
the simulation of relationships in character fail or conform to normative standards that exclude a 
variety of representation of characters. I point to these challenges already in this chapter as to how 
they are embedded structurally in the game’s possibility space. 
 
 
1. The System of Affection 
The system of affection is a ludic process, inherently procedural in nature, which allows the player 
to create and shape relationships between dynamic game characters. These relationships are 
embedded in the game’s possibility space, and the player affects these relationships by executing 
specific sets of actions—procedures that differ per game. Peter Kelly (2015) argues that love and 
romance as two esoteric concepts prove too ambiguous for structural systematic game design, but 
that has not stopped game designers from attempting to simulate something so elusive (47). He 
identifies the simulation of love in the game Dragon Age 2 (BioWare 2011), calling the simulation of 
love the game’s ludic romance systems as a system of courtship, but also as a system in which the 
game characters are integrated and bound to the game and its rules so that they only have to 
execute a certain strategy in order to successfully woo a non-playable character (2015, 47). Kelly 
argues that this strategy cannot be avoided, because it is baked into the systematic processes of the 
courtship. 
Kelly’s ludic romance system serves as the springboard for the SA. However, there exist many 
other elusive and complex relationships between humans that games can also present in their 
structural systematic game design, such as friendship, rivalry, hate, companionship, reputation and 
more. Both a character’s reputation and their affection to another character give the impression of 
the character as a quasi-person with a life-like existence. The difference between reputation and 
the SA is that the former affects a group of characters or units (a country, a race, a faction, etc.), 
while the latter concerns the relationships between two characters on an individual level. In World 
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of Warcraft (Blizzard Entertainment 2004) for example, reputation is a prominent mechanic that 
provides or denies players’ access to certain factions and resources. Whereas in Persona 5, the bond 
is always between Joker and another individual out of the group of confidant characters, but never 
the group as a whole unit. The SA is not solely a system of romance, but a structural process that 
can bring about a variety of relationships, which could be love or friendship, but that can also bring 
about the lack of affection, such as rivalry or antagonism. However, because reputation concerns 
factions, the SA excludes games that ask the player to increase their reputation with different 
factions or groups, such as Civilization V (Firaxis Games 2010), and covers only games that presents 
relationships between individual characters. 
The player does not directly control all the characters involved in the relationships even if 
the player has a player-character they directly control. As explained in chapter seven, dynamic game 
characters are only influenced by the player so that their characterisation process moves towards a 
certain direction, but the player does not have the kind of creative agency that allows them to 
command the characters into certain relationships with each other. Instead, the SA is a process for 
which players need to execute a certain set of actions to complete the process. Just giving characters 
the command to like each other does not resemble a process, nor does it give the illusion of 
characters having their own personality and a free will, which is, as I explain in chapter six, vital for 
the player to perceive game entities as characters. 
A distinction can be made between games in which the SA functions as the core mechanics 
and is part of the game’s macrostructure, and games in which the system functions as part of the 
game’s secondary mechanics, in which they are part of the game’s microstructure that eases the 
player’s progression in the game (see Sicart 2008). The former refers to games in which the 
establishment of a relationship with a character is the desired end state of the game. These kinds 
of games include dating simulators such as Tokimeki Memorial Girl’s Side (Konami 2002), Dream 
Daddy (Game Grumps 2017), or Hakuoki: Memories of the Shinsengumi (Idea Factory 2013), but also 
exists in the puzzle-oriented game Catherine: Full Body (Studio Zero [2011] 2019). The latter can be 
found in such as Eiyuu Densetsu: Sen no Kiseki33 (Nihon Falcom 2013), Mass Effect 2 (BioWare 2010), 
Stardew Valley (ConcernedApe 2016), or Fire Emblem: Awakening (Intelligent Systems & Nintendo 
2012). The player does not have to develop relationships in these games, but it will be profitable for 
their gameplay performance if they do. 
The SA is not bound to a particular genre.34 It appears in games that are oriented towards 
character development, and which have at least some role-playing elements. But the SA’s existence 
does not determine the game’s genre. For instance, the genre known in the West as visual novels35  
does not consist of only dating simulators, as the adventure game Phoenix Wright: Ace Attorney 
(Capcom [2001] 2005) suggests. Nor does the existence of the SA in a game transform that game’s 
genre. The Fire Emblem (FE) game series did not have an SA until the introduction of FE: Awakening’s 
‘Marriage and Children’ system (Nintendo 2012b) that revived the series from its slump. This game, 
like the rest of the series, focuses on tactical strategic gameplay combined with developing its 
characters in terms of level, strength and power. The SA became part of the strategies the player 
 
33 In the West, this game is known as The Legend of Heroes: Trails of Cold Steel (Nihon Falcom 2015).  
34 Used here as a set of conventions and expectations (see Ryan 2003). 
35 In Japan, the genre of the visual novel does not exist as such. Games known in the West as visual novels, such as the 
Ace Attorney series or Hakuoki, are categorised respectively as adventure games and romance games. The national 
Computer Entertainment Supplier’s Association in Japan does not mention the existence of visual novels, but places the 
game Phoenix Wright: Ace Attorney – Spirit of Justice (Capcom 2016) under the genre ‘adventure’ (CESA 2017, 154). 
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can utilise to reach the desired end-state, but is not a goal the player has to attain in order to reach 
the game’s end-state—unless desired by the player themselves. That said, the SA has become by 
now such an important element of the FE series that the SA in the latest instalment, Fire Emblem: 
Three Houses (Intelligent Systems & Koei Tecmo 2019), has become a vital part of the characters’ 
characterisation processes from the start of the game. For example, the player has to choose a 
house (faction) to join: Golden Deer, Blue Lions or Black Eagles. The choice of house determines 
whose side the player will be on in the upcoming war, but also influences the characterisation 
processes of all individual characters caught in the game’s SA. It will become more probable for 
characters in the faction who the player did not choose to die in the war, but those within the house 
who the player did choose will (with the exception of one or two of them) survive the war. If the 
player chooses either Golden Deer or Black Eagles, the Blue Lions’ leader Dimitri will not survive the 
war, but choosing the Blue Lions opens the path to have Dimitri survive. 
The brief example of FE: Three Houses shows that the SA is designed to be character specific. 
That is, the characterisation processes of two characters within the SA can vary distinctively per 
character. A game in which one character’s characterisation process within the SA is mandatory can 
also contain characters whose characterisation process in the SA is optional. Persona 5, as discussed 
in the previous chapter, is such a game. While the player automatically levels up Sae Nijima’s and 
Morgana’s confidant rank, the player has to purposefully progress the confidant ranks of, for 
example, Ann Takamaki and Ryuji Sakamoto. Nevertheless, games do have the inclination to have a 
large quantity of characters with the same structural characterisation process within the SA. While 
Dimitri is not a character the player can recruit when they have chosen the Golden Deer or Black 
Eagles as their house, (almost) all members of his house can be recruited into the player’s chosen 
house. In order to develop relationships between the player-character and other characters, the 
player will have to develop the player-character’s skills, complete quests for the other characters, 
and the game’s various segments allow the player to have multiple characters bond with each other 
as they cook, dine and have tea parties together. 
 
2. With Whom Do Characters Form the Relationship? 
Games such as Persona 5 and FE: Three Houses contain a player-character as the player’s locus of 
agency within the game world through whom the player influences the relationships between 
characters. However, the SA does not require the player to have a player-character in the diegetic 
world to progress the relationships between characters. The SA allows the player to influence three 
kinds of entity-relationships: the player-character with another character, the non-diegetic player 
with a character, and a character with another character. 
In this section, I will look closely at these different kinds of dynamic game character-relations 
that the player can influence. 
 
Player-Character and Character 
As discussed in chapter two, the tension between the player and the avatar the player directly 
controls has been a topic of much debate. I keep the theory on this debate very brief in this chapter 
because it is not my intention here to revisit or restructure the concept of the player-character. 
It is not until Rune Klevjer (2006), who considers the avatar as the extension of the player in 
the diegetic game world, that a consensus on the concept of the avatar became relatively stable. 
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However, Klevjer states that the avatar is not a character, as he considers a character to be an agent 
independent from the player, and the avatar anything but that: 
 
The more an avatar takes on behaviours that reflect either its own agency or which emerge 
as passive responses to forces and agents in the environment, the less it functions as a 
prosthesis to the body-subject, and the more its status as an avatar is being weakened. (2006, 
94) 
 
Daniel Vella (2015) takes up the tension between the avatar and the player, and introduces the 
concept of the playable figure, the entity that the player directly controls. This figure becomes a 
player-character when it obtains a dual nature of being the game component the player directly 
controls and a character constructed by the player. He states: “the player-character is the 
textualization of the enacted ludic subjectivity resulting from the player’s engagement with the 
gameworld as determined by the frame of the ludic subject-position” (2006, 384). 
In an SA in which the player influences the relationship between the player-character and 
other characters, there exists a continuous tension between these characters forming a relationship. 
The relationship between the player-character and another character is as double-natured as the 
player-character itself. It is simultaneously a relationship between the player-character and another 
character, and between the player and a character. Certain games gear more towards giving the 
player the impression that the player influences relationships between them and a character, 
whereas other games gear more towards a relationship between the player-character and other 
characters. Persona 5, for example, continuously shows the player-character, Joker, in third-person 
perspective, the other characters continuously address him. This game’s SA is, from this perspective, 
more focused on Joker as a character than Joker as the player. On the other hand, a game such as 
Summiko Gurashi: Koko ga Ochitsukundesu [Corner Dwellers: Here it is Calm] (Nippon Columbia 
2015) engages with the anthropomorphised animals and food times via an avatar in the shape of a 
hand, bringing them food and petting them. Without the presence of a human-like figure, the player 
infers that it is them with whom the pets engage. 
The tension between the SA addressing the player and addressing the character can also 
shift within a single game. In Pokémon: Let’s Go, Pikachu! and Let’s Go, Eevee! (Nintendo 2018), 
played on the Nintendo Switch console, the player normally controls a player-character with very 
little personality who hardly talks (if at all) from a third-person perspective. The player can enter a 
segment called ‘Partner Play’ in which they can bond with either their Pikachu or Eevee Pokémon. 
The third-person perspective turns into a first-person perspective, the player-character disappears 
from the screen, and the Pikachu or Eevee gaze directly at the player, addressing the player instead 
of the player-character. The Partner Play segment is not just a matter of switching perspectives. 
More importantly, the segment allows the player to pet the Pokémon by touching the screen of the 
Switch console—without the presence of an avatar in the shape of a hand—giving the impression 
that the player touches the creature directly without the interference of an avatar replacing the 
player. 
A similar shift in perspectives also occurs in FE: Three Houses during the tea-time segment, 
also on the Switch console. The player, normally controlling player-character Byleth in third-person 
perspective, finds themselves in a first-person perspective when Byleth drinks tea with one of the 
(many) students. The other character will gaze directly at the player without Byleth’s body present 
and, although the player cannot use the touch screen to directly touch the characters, the player is 
201 
 
given the opportunity to perform the ‘observe’ action. During this action, the player controls the 
camera’s gaze—presumably Byleth’s—to look at the other characters from different angles. This 
tends to make the other character slightly uncomfortable, as they make remarks on this action, 
asking if they have something on their face or why their teacher is so close to their face. 
This direct gazing is an aspect common in otome and bishoujo games, dating simulators 
aimed at (heterosexual) women and (heterosexual) men. The characters usually gaze through the 
screen, as if they look directly at the player who takes on the role of the games’ main character, 
with whom these characters are supposed to bond. Especially the design of these games’ main 
characters can stand out. Angelique (Ruby Party 1994), generally considered to be the first otome 
game (Lee 2018), has the main character Angelique visually depicted whenever she speaks. However, 
otome games nowadays tend to visually obscure the main character via the first-person perspective 
in which the player sees the other characters, but not the main character herself. In Hakuoki: 
Memories of the Shinsengumi, the player only sees the main character Chizuru in special static 
scenes, and in Tokimeki Memorial Girl’s Side, the player only sees the main character when they 
have her as a ludic agent level up via club activities, homework or part-time work. The obscurity of 
the main character can go to such an extent that some otome games omit the eyes of the main 
character whenever she is visible. This is for example the case with Tsukiko Yahisa in the original 
versions of the Starry Sky game series (Honeybee 2009). Seeing as how eyes function—especially in 
Japanese popular cultural works (Condry 2013; Lamarre 2009; 2018)—as primary features in giving 
a sense of personhood, the absence of the eyes suggests strongly that the main character is meant 
to substitute the (female) player who fills in the main character’s personhood for her. 
 
Non-Diegetic Player and Character 
Although it is hard to find games that address the player as a non-diegetic entity, one such game 
can be found in the Tamagotchi (Bandai Namco, 1996). The Tamagotchi was originally released in 
Japan, and subsequently in the West in 1996. Now, over twenty years later, the hype has subsided, 
but the Tamagotchi itself has not. New versions of the game are still released—primarily in Japan—
and has more functions than its first version in which the player takes care of the pet by feeding and 
cleaning its faeces. Tamagotchi Mix (Bandai 2017), for example, has features such as fortune telling 
and having the pet characters marry and have a child. 
Allison describes Tamagotchi as “[s]imulating petdom—sprouting a lifelike image of a pet 
that users interact with as if it were alive” (Allison 2006, 164). She states that the designer Yokoi 
Akihiro intended the bond between owner and Tamagotchi to develop over the chores the owner 
has to perform in order to take care of the pet (2006, 166). Since the game is meant to be brought 
wherever the player goes, the player will find the Tamagotchi constantly invading their lives, as the 
pet demands the player to take care of its needs even when the player cannot do so (2006, 175). 
The dynamicity of the pet stems from how well the player takes care of it. If the player 
manages to keep up with its demands, it will develop into an adult with an easy-going personality, 
and approvable characteristics such as high intelligence, cheerfulness and independence. If the 
player does not manage to keep up, they will influence the character into the outcome of having a 
lazy, weird and dull personality (2006, 173). In other words, the bond that the non-diegetic player 
shares through taking care of the Tamagotchi is reflected in the personality the character eventually 
develops. 
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Character and Character 
When the player affects the relationship between two (or more) dynamic game characters who the 
game does not put forward as the player’s player-character, the player’s creative agency is limited 
to the role of a guide. They can influence the direction their relationship will go, but unlike the 
player-character, they do not share their existence with these characters and therefore have no 
control over the will of these characters.  I explained this characterisation process in detail with The 
Sims 4 (Maxis 2014) as the case study in the chapter eight. Since the player is only the facilitator, 
even when they attempt to guide two characters towards a specific relationship, they cannot 
completely control how that relationship will turn out. That uncertainty is what makes the SA a ludic 
process which the player has to manage constantly. 
In FE: Awakening’s SA, called ‘marriage and children system’, the player dons Calleja’s (2011) 
external, omniscient controller who controls these characters as miniatures (60). The player 
influences which character connects to which by pairing them together in combat. If they have done 
this often enough, the player can proceed to raise the relationship in the ‘support’ interface of the 
game in which a scripted narrative scene will play between the characters. The nature of the 
relationships is limited to either friendship or romance. Once the player has established a 
relationship between characters of rank S—which stands for marriage—the player can only raise 
the relationships between characters who are married and other characters to that of rank A, 
friendship. 
FE: Three Houses has extended the player’s creative agency in the SA from FE: Awakening to 
not only be able to stimulate the growth of the characters’ relationships within the battle segments, 
but also to segments in which the player-character has to be present for two other characters to 
bond. Although the tea-time segment is specifically for the bonding between player-character and 
another character, the player invites two characters to participate in the lunch-time segments and 
the choir-singing segments which results in a raise of their bond towards the player-character Byleth, 
and towards each other. Once their bond level has been raised high enough, the player is alerted 
and can activate the scripted scenes between the two characters to proceed their relationship to 
the next rank, rank A. The player can continue to influence this relationship so that it will reach rank 
S (marriage) after the war in the diegetic world is over. 
Another example of the player’s agency over two character’s relationship outside of the Fire 
Emblem series can be found in Mass Effect 3. The ME game series does not provide the player the 
agency to influence the relationship between characters beyond their player-character Shepard, 
except for the romance between Garrus and Tali. All the player has to do is to make sure that 
Shepard will not become romantically involved with either one of them in ME3, so that at some 
point in the game’s progression, Shepard will walk into Tali and Garrus in the ship’s main battery 
discovering them in the act of whispering sweet nothings to each other. 
The effect of the different kinds of relationships is that while in the player-
character/character, and non-diegetic player/character relationship is that the player plays a role in 
those relationships, effectively participating in them. Whereas, in character/character relationships, 
the player is placed outside of that relationship. While they might be the facilitator of such 
relationships, they do not occupy the role of participants in those relationships.  
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3. The Conditions of the System of Affection 
The possibility space determines the possibilities and constraints of the SA within which the player 
can facilitate dynamic game characters’ relationships to occur and develop. In some cases, certain 
conditions apply to some relationships, which the player has to adhere or fulfil first before they can 
influence the relationship between dynamic game characters. These conditions come in the terms 
of parameter, gender and sexuality compatibility, and resources that determine if and how the 
player has creative agency over certain characters within the SA. These conditions are set before 
the player can even execute the procedures to develop a relationship between characters. 
  
The Player-Character’s Statistics 
Certain player-characters have parameters or statistics attached to them as ludic agents. By 
changing the values of these parameters, confidant characters with whom the player-character has 
the possibility of bonding with become available in the SA. For example, in Persona 5 the player can 
raise Joker’s social stats, which include the attributes knowledge, charm, guts, proficiency and 
kindness, through sets of actions such as eating a giant-sized hamburger or studying. Not only are 
the values of these attributes numerically shown, the description of these attributes also changes 
when the player raises the value of them in the parameter. Joker’s knowledge attribute, for instance, 
will change from ‘oblivious’ with numerical value one to ‘learned’ with a value of two. Only if player 
have raised the knowledge attribute to a value of three, so that Joker is characterised as ‘scholarly’, 
will the SA of the character Makoto Niijima become available. The change in value allows the 
parameter to fulfil two functions: structurally, the social stats set certain conditions for specific 
characters to become available, while it simultaneously represents the growth in Joker’s personality. 
In Persona 5, not fulfilling the condition to have a confidant character become available in 
their SA only results in the player not being able to influence the relationship between Joker and 
this confidant character. However, in FE: Three Houses, the consequence of not having high enough 
statistics to recruit a character in their house will result in the death of those characters. The player 
can only influence the relationships between characters when both characters are part of the 
player-character’s house, so the player has to recruit them first. In order to recruit characters, the 
player has to fulfil the required value of the player-character’s attributes. The attribute and the 
required value vary per character. When the player wants to recruit Felix into their house, the 
player-character Byleth needs to have a value of 15 in Speed and a Sword proficiency of level B. 
Meanwhile, Sylvain requires Byleth having a charm value of 25, and a Reason proficiency of level C. 
However, if Byleth is female instead of male, the player can immediately recruit Sylvain into their 
house. This immediate recruitment reflects Sylvain’s personality as a skirt-chaser who is known to 
woo any woman he meets, and in his conversations with the female Byleth tries to do no less. 
 
Compatibility: Gender and Sexuality 
Gender and sexuality often function as statistical values of a character in an SA which determines 
the availability of certain relationships between characters, particularly those of a romantic nature. 
Kim Johansen Østby points out that ME2, for example, does not allow any homosexual romances 
(2016, 407). Østby explains that the Mass Effect series’ heteronormative focus is reflected in many 
of the available romances (2016, 406). He distinguishes between the “public game”, which every 
player will encounter and which portrays a heteronormative reading, and the “private game”, which 
some players choose to see, in which the player moves more into queer territory (2016, 407). 
Although in the first ME (2007) game, the player can romance the character Liara T’Soni regardless 
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of Shepard being male or female, in ME2 Shepard cannot connect in a romantic way with the female 
characters who are available in the SA for the female Shepard. In turn, the male Shepard cannot 
romance any male character within ME2. 
The SA promotes dominant heteronormative readings regarding sexuality and gender when 
these phenomena become structural, statistical values. In games such as Shin Megami Tensei 
Persona 4 (Atlus 2008), Persona 5, FE: Awakening or Eiyuu Densetsu: Sen no Kiseki, the player-
characters can only pursue a romance with characters of the opposite gender, and friendships with 
characters of the same gender. Even in cases in which the player can create same-sex couples, these 
games can structurally punish the player for creating such relations, or never make these same-sex 
romances actually explicit. For example, FE: Fates (Intelligent Systems 2015) has a similar ‘marriage 
and children’ system as FE: Awakening, in which the player will be rewarded with children characters 
from every couple they manage to get married. These children are important to the game, because 
not only do they provide additional narrative experience, they also function as powerful units for 
the games’ battle segments. Although FE: Fates allows the player to develop a romantic connection 
between the character Niles and the player-character Corrin, if Corrin is a male character, Niles’ 
child Nina will never be born. The player will not only miss the narrative experience Nina brings to 
the game, but they will also miss one of the possible strongest archers on the battlefield. 
Some games enable the player to influence a romantic relationship between same-sex 
characters, but the game might not explicitly state the romantic nature of that relationship. FE: 
Three Houses only allows the male player-character to have an explicit romantic connection to one 
male character, while the female player-character has five female characters available for romance 
in the SA. The male player-character can technically reach rank S with one of the other male 
characters, Alois, but the relationship seems to be more platonic than romantic as they do not get 
married and Alois considers himself the player-character’s “most faithful ally” or “big brother”, 
instead of a lover or spouse. 
That is not to say that the SA is aimed towards heteronormative standards only. Dream 
Daddy, for example, only enables the player to influence same-sex couples, but also allows the 
player to choose if their late spouse was a man or a woman. Rather, gender and sexuality, when 
they are implemented in a SA as values that open and close paths, become structural choices that 
designers intentionally put in or leave out that reveals the pattern of preferred readings (see Hall 
1973) stemming from a normative cultural understanding of how relationships work in that society. 
The SA is therefore a mechanism that demands scrutiny with regards to the topic of representation 
of diversity in games36.  
 
Resources 
Games can put a limitation on the availability of a character in the form of resources. In games such 
as Persona 4, Persona 5, Sen no Kiseki, and Tokimeki Memorial Girl’s Side, the player cannot freely 
engage with all the characters without sacrificing the development of a relationship with other 
characters due to a limited number of resources they can spend on the development of a 
 
36 Unfortunately, the topics of (gender) representation and sexual diversity are beyond the scope of this dissertation. In 
order to avoid any generalised statements about the representation of characters in terms of queerness, masculinity, 
feminism, or differences between Japanese and Western games, I kindly suggest works from experts on games and 
representation such as Østby (2016), Shaw (2014), or works such as Feminism in Play (K. L. Gray, Voorhees, and Vossen 
2018), Masculinities in Play (Taylor and Voorhees 2018) or Queerness in Play (Harper, Adams, and Taylor 2018). 
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relationship. In Eiyuu Densetsu: Sen no Kiseki, the player can only influence the same number of 
characters as the number of bonding points. When the player has two bonding points, they can 
spend this on two characters (one bonding point per character) even if there are three or four 
characters available for the player to spend their points on. This game does not allow the player to 
completely develop each character’s bond with the player-character Rean, and instead the player 
has to choose strategically whose relationship they wish to influence and develop. Other games are 
a little less conspicuous in their use of resources. Persona 4, Persona 5 and Tokimeki Memorial’s 
resources are days. In Persona 4 and Persona 5, the player has to decide strategically if they want 
to traverse dungeons in order to progress the games’ macrostructure, raise the player-characters’ 
statistics, or spend their days progressing the player-characters’ relationships with other characters. 
A day not dedicated to these characters is a day lost on the development of their relationships with 
the player-character. 
Another resource is the characters themselves in the SA, based on the normative 
presumption of monogamy. When romance is an available kind of relationship, games tend to either 
allow the player a monogamous relationship with another character, or the games punish the 
character for pursuing more romantic relationships. In Dragon Age: Origins (BioWare 2009) for 
example, the player can pursue a romantic connection with Alistair and Zevran. However, at some 
point the player has to choose between either of them: Zevran will let the player know that he is 
fine with the player having two romances going on, but states that Alistair is not fine with it so that 
the player has no other option but to choose between them. 
The characters themselves are such an important resource in the SA that the attempt of 
getting all romantic connections the possibility space offers can become a goal on its own. Tosca 
and Klastrup (2020) explain that in otome games: 
 
The Otome [sic] reader is not so much choosing different endings and plots but the 
gluttonous desire to explore all the possible character routes. In fact, most players are 
invested in going through a lot of the routes (if not all) and are vocal about discussing 
favourite “renderings” of the same plot points, as well as to whose point of view they 
prefer, since romancing the different men encourages the heroine to show different 
sides of herself. (2020, 106) 
 
Tosca and Klastrup’s argument focuses on the empirical players’ experience and use of the game—
a topic I do not cover, as explained in chapter three. Their argument of the players’ gluttonous desire 
to explore all different kinds of romantic relations with characters can also be found in the structure 
of the game and can even be encouraged by authoritative institutions such as the game’s developer 
or publisher. Persona 5 lets the player to pursue a romantic connection between the player-
character and all female confidant characters. This is hard to pursue, because the player has to take 
into consideration the limited number of days they have to influence the confidant characters. An 
answer to that hardship comes from the publisher Kadokawa—also the publisher of the Persona 5 
manga and anime—which released the official strategy guide of the game with a chapter completely 
dedicated to telling the reader how to bring all the confidant relationships to their maximum level 
(Kadokawa 2016). 
Another example of how games engage with characters as limited resources due to the 
normative standard of monogamy is Stardew Valley, which lets the player engage in serial 
monogamy. The player can only have a romantic connection to one character at a time. Even if the 
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player-character has a spouse, they can divorce them. Thereafter, the player-character will only 
have negative conversations with the ex-spouse, but at least the player can then attempt to 
influence the player-character’s connection with other characters into a romantic connection. If the 
player desires to explore all characters as a romantic option, they will have to invest repeatedly in 
different characters, marry them, divorce them, and repeat the same sets of actions over with 
another one. 
 
 
4. Procedures in the System of Affection 
The procedures in the SA are the sets of actions that the player has to perform repeatedly in order 
to influence the relationship between characters in specific ways to specific effects. These effects 
can vary per character. While some characters might enjoy certain gifts, the same gift might not 
work for another character. The next section discusses which procedures games with an SA offer 
the player to influence the relationships between dynamic game characters. 
 
Transactions 
Transactions come in the form of players giving items or objects in order to change a character’s 
affection. The player gives an object of a certain value to the character whose affection they wish 
to change so that the character’s parameters might rise or decline. This depends on the character. 
In Stardew Valley, the player has to learn by trial and error every character’s taste in specific items. 
If the player wishes to influence the relationship between the player-character and Elliot in Stardew 
Valley into a romantic connection, they will have to consistently give him items such as lobsters, 
duck feathers or squid to raise his affection, whereas leeks, pizza or quartz will have the opposite 
effect. 
The tension between dynamic game characters’ function as a ludic agent and the game’s 
encouragement to perceive the figures as quasi-persons becomes especially visible during 
transactional procedures in the SA.  The minimalism of the transaction procedures simplifies elusive 
concepts such as love and friendship to a simple transaction between subject and object: just put in 
as many things as you can and eventually the object comes to like you. While the player cannot 
completely determine exactly how the character will respond or which direction the 
characterisation process will go, because there are many different procedures influencing the 
dynamic game character, once the player has learned the preferences of the characters, it is simply 
a matter of giving the items on a consistent basis to raise the statistics of the ludic agent. Thereby, 
the impression of the character as a quasi-person decreases, since they do not uphold the illusion 
of being a fickle person-like entity with their own agenda anymore. 
 
Quests 
Quests tend to come in the form of requests by or favours for characters which the player must 
complete in order to influence the relationship between two dynamic game characters. The actions 
the player has to execute can be as simple or as complex as the quests require, but they all share a 
common objective: to progress the relationship between characters in a positive direction. In ME2, 
Miranda’s request involves helping to escort her sister to a safe location by distracting enemies. The 
player traverses a maze-like area and takes down enemies by actions such as running, kicking, 
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shooting and more. These actions do not directly affect Miranda, but after the completion of the 
quest, Miranda’s ‘loyalty’ status changes from ‘neutral’ to ‘loyal’. 
In The Outer Worlds (Obsidian Entertainment 2019), Parvati asks the player to have her meet 
Junlei. In a later quest, Parvati asks the player find her sweetheart cakes for her date with Junlei. 
This specific request is nothing more than a transaction, but obtaining the items requires the player 
to execute further actions. They have to find the place where the cakes are, and possibly fight 
enemies. 
 
Pair-Ups 
The Fire Emblem games FE: Awakening, FE: Fates and FE: Three Houses offer the player a particular 
mechanic to increase the characters’ bonds. Whenever the player pairs two characters in the 
battlefield segments so that they support each other during battles, their affection towards each 
other increases until the game lets the player know the player can activate a scripted scene to raise 
the characters’ bond level. 
 
Character-Targeted Dialogues  
Character-targeted dialogues come in the form of a ‘dialogue wheel’ in which the player has the 
choose options that could lower or raise the character’s affection towards the player-character. 
These options consist of dialogue answers, actions that the player-character can perform, or both. 
In the Mass Effect series, for example, Shepard’s dialogue wheel most often consists of answers, but 
occasionally, the Renegade and Paragon options refer to actions Shepard can undertake, such as 
intercepting someone to avoid a fight. 
In otome games, which have an SA as their core mechanic, character-targeted dialogues 
influence the direction of the macrostructure to a certain outcome. In Hakuoki: Memories of the 
Shinsengumi, if the player wants a positive outcome to their player-character’s relationship to 
Harada, the player is required to choose options that meet Harada’s belief that the man should 
always protect the woman. This means that when the player-character Shizuru is attacked, instead 
of standing up for herself, the player will have to choose the option to give up so that Harada can 
come to her rescue. 
The kind of dialogues that belong to the game’s core mechanics function as decisions that 
open or close a direction in a character’s characterisation process which mean that as the character 
reaches outcome of the characterisation process, so does the game reach its end-state. In Catherine: 
Full Body ([2011] 2019) the player has to respond to questions such as “does life begin or end at 
marriage?” every time after solving a puzzle. To this question they can either select the answer “it 
begins” or “it ends” which will then affect the so-called ‘karma-meter’ in a certain direction. This 
karma-meter provides feedback on whether the player-character Vincent becomes more 
affectionate towards Catherine, Katherine or Rin. The accumulation of these decisions makes some 
outcomes more or less probable until the player has reached the necessary outcome of the game’s 
end-state. 
Games that have an SA as a secondary mechanic, such as the Mass Effect series, have 
dialogue wheels in which the decisions affect the characters only, but not the overall macrostructure 
of the game. When the player-character Shepard talks with Garrus about his time in the navy the 
player can steer the conversation in such a way that the dialogue wheel opens the possibility to 
have Shepard say that she and Garrus “could ease stress together”. Garrus responds that he did not 
expect his commander to want to spar with him. In turn, the dialogue wheel gives the player the 
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possibility to let Shepard respond that she does feel like actual sparring, or they can select to make 
her refer to some action between the sheets. The latter opens up Garrus for a romantic relationship 
with Shepard, but the end-state of the game remains unaffected. 
 
Time as a Procedure: Waiting and Showing Up 
Time translates to two kinds of mechanisms in a SA: waiting, and attending to the character at a 
specific time. Sicart describes mechanics as “methods invoked by agents for interacting with the 
game world”, an instrument of agency that presents a specific set of purposes (2008), but games 
that attempt to convey a concept as elusive as affection by means of time can show the fickleness 
of love by having the player attend to the character’s desires to have the player wait or show up at 
specific moments. I provide examples of these two mechanisms in the following paragraphs. 
Roland Barthes describes poetically the frustration love can bring when he asks: “Suis-je 
amoureux? – Oui, puisque j’attends” (1977, 49). Am I in love? – Yes, because I am waiting. To be in 
love is to wait for the other, to be the one who waits. While waiting in the SA does not only 
encompass romance, waiting in games can occur through two different forms of time: diegetic time 
in the game and in ‘real-life time’ as it passes in the world of the empirical player. The latter brings 
waiting into the player’s daily life, subjecting the player to the whims of the characters when they 
call for attention, such as the Tamagotchi. In games in which the player has to wait in the diegetic 
world, the waiting tends to be bound to the player’s progress of that game. In Heavy Rain (Quantic 
Dream 2010), the player has to progress the game’s macrostructure to obtain opportunities to 
influence the relationship between Madison Paige and Ethan Mars. Any waiting that the player-
characters have to do is simply rigid within the game’s macrostructure. 
In Mass Effect 2, in which the SA occurs on the level of the game’s microstructure, the waiting 
depends on how fast the player proceeds with the characters’ quests. If the player wishes to obtain 
Garrus as Shepard’s boyfriend, they have to finish several priority quests to receive opportunities in 
which they can lead the character to that status. Nevertheless, some of Garrus’ quests do not 
become available until the player has proceeded the game’s macrostructure, so it cannot be said 
that the waiting in the game’s microstructure is entirely independent from the game’s 
macrostructure. 
Barthes hints that waiting for a beloved one means waiting for the other to appear. In games, 
this is translated to game mechanisms in which players are expected to appear at a given time. In 
Animal Crossing: New Leaf (2013), the villager characters may ask the player-character to visit their 
house at a given time. This time is synchronous to the ‘real-time’ of the player in the sense that the 
player’s 3DS console reflects the player’s time in their daily life. 
In the diegetic time of the game world, the player has to appear at the right time of that 
world. In Stardew Valley, time runs continuously: one minute of the player’s time spent playing is 
one hour in the game’s diegetic world. Some characters give the player appointments to show up 
at a specific time if the player wants to unlock scripted scenes to raise the characters’ affection. For 
example, the player can discover that Elliott is usually in the saloon between 3PM and 10PM. If they 
enter the saloon when Elliott has four hearts in their affection towards the player-character, Elliott 
proposes a toast and the player can decide to what they toast. Depending on the player’s choice of 
answer, Elliot’s affection for the player-character can rise or decline. 
By taking away the player’s agency to execute an action, games stimulate in the player an 
experience of the frustration of having to wait for the object of their interest. At the same time, 
waiting and showing up is part of the player’s creative agency to influence the relationship between 
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characters. The player infers the character to be a quasi-person, because this character seems to 
have their own will and fickleness whom the player can only influence by waiting or showing up. 
 
 
5. Positive and Negative Implications 
As pointed out earlier in this chapter, the SA has a tendency to promote preferred readings which 
are dominant in society regarding the relationships between persons, especially when they are of a 
romantic nature. Simultaneously, the SA provides the player with benefits that come in a variety of 
shapes, providing support for the player as they try to reach the end-state of the game, or providing 
them with narrative experiences that they can enjoy. 
In the final section of this chapter, I delve deeper into the benefits and limitations of the SA. 
This is important for the understanding of the characterisation process of dynamic game characters, 
because dynamic game characters give the player the impression that they have creative agency 
over the character. However, the player is actually a facilitator bound to the constraints the 
developers placed on the game such that they might not be able to influence dynamic game 
characters outside of normative standards. 
   
The Good: Meaningful Experiences 
Primarily, the SA is a process that benefits the player’s progression throughout the game. Even when 
the player does not manage to reach the maximum rank of a confidant character in Persona 5, they 
will receive benefits such as new abilities for the ludic agents, or persona monsters to use which 
open up new possibilities to smoothen the progress towards that game’s end-state. Or, even when 
the progression of a relationship with a character does not (immediately) lead to new abilities, the 
SA can still be beneficial in terms of performance and rewards. In FE: Awakening, the better the 
relationship between each character is, the better their performance in battle events. Characters 
will block attacks aimed at the other, and there is a greater chance they will critically hit the 
opponent. 
Perhaps more importantly than simply being beneficial to the player’s progress through the 
game, the SA provides the player with meaningful experiences when they have devoted time and 
emotional investment into a relationship between characters. As explained in chapter eight, 
completing Ann’s bond with Joker causes Ann to become at peace with her inner self, and become 
Joker’s girlfriend in turn (if the player wishes to). Katherine Isbister states that “game designers use 
dynamic and reactive engagement with these other characters who populate a game’s story world 
to add to the emotional palette of games as a medium” (Isbister 2016, 20). Since the player has had 
to invest much time into progressing this connection, the completion of Ann’s connection with Joker 
is meaningful to the player. In games with rigid narratives, the additional scenes the player receives 
through their engagement with the game’s SA gives them a form of creative agency in the game’s 
microstructure. In Eiyuu Densetsu: Sen no Kiseki and ME2, the player-characters share a final 
intimate moment with the character they have the closest bond with before the game enters its 
final segments. These scenes transform the player’s creative agency and the amount of time and 
effort they had to invest using that creating agency into a meaningful experience. 
As Tosca and Klastrup (2020, 106) clarify in their discussion of the players of otome games, 
the relationships on their own are also meaningful experiences to the player. Connecting different 
characters lets the player explore “a network of stories, a myriad of parallel worlds which together 
make sense as a whole and are sources of narrative pleasure and delight” (2020, 106). The player 
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can completely ignore the SA in the Mass Effect series, but having Shepard connect in affectionate 
ways to their crew shows different sides of both Shepard and the characters involved in the SA, 
which can be a pleasure to the player. The downloadable content (DLC) Citadel I bought for my Mass 
Effect 3 game provided me the creative agency to have my Shepard, involved romantically with 
Garrus at the time, in an extra segment in which she and Garrus danced together. This segment 
provides little to no benefit at all to the progress of the game, but it was meaningful to me as a 
player to see them together in what I considered to be a delightful scene. 
The SA also provides the player a means to engage with a form of care towards the characters. 
Just like the Tamagotchi and Pokémon Sword and Shield (Nintendo 2019) simulate petdom, these 
games provide the player the creative agency to foster intimacy with their virtual pets through 
taking care of them. If the player wants to raise a Pokémon’s friendship towards them, they have to 
put effort into making sure the creatures do not faint in battle. This game also provides the player 
with the possibility to set up a camp during which the player can play (in first-person perspective) 
with the creatures, or cook curry meals for them. The meals not only cure any ailments and give 
them their health back, but also give them experience points and raise their friendliness towards 
the player-character. More friendliness in turn provides benefits in battle and special moves, and, 
for Pokémon such as Eevee, high friendliness is even a requirement for the Pokémon to evolve into 
an even stronger creature. 
Tentatively, I would say that dynamic game characters encourage emotional investment 
from the player, because the player not only puts in non-trivial effort to develop the relationship 
between multiple characters, but also has to manage the uncertainty that they might not be able to 
progress a relationship between characters at all, or that that the effort might fail. The emotional 
investment that the player devotes to fostering these kinds of relationships and intimacies between 
dynamic game characters builds ground for meaningful experiences from which the player can 
derive pleasure. 
 
The Bad: Executing the Correct Strategy within Normative Standards 
The SA is a process designed to benefit the player. But, because it systematises elusive phenomena 
such as love, friendship or just connections between human beings in general, the SA has 
unfortunately inherently preferred readings to which it subjects the player. Kelly (2015) argues that 
there is always a ‘correct’ way that simplifies the development of a relationship to a few 
predetermined steps: 
 
Presented as a system of courtship in which the player must select the “correct” dialogue 
options and actions to successfully woo the Non-Player Character (NPC), DA2 essentially 
infers that to romance another character one need only execute this strategy. This inference 
is not at the surface level of the narrative, but rather baked into the systematic processes 
from which it cannot intrinsically escape. (2015, 47) 
 
Games with an SA face the problem that they easily reduce the elusive and unpredictable 
phenomenon of human connection to simply a strategy that the player has to carry out to win in a 
systematic process. As long as the player carries out the correct actions, pushes the right buttons, 
or chooses the right dialogue option, they will win the affection of the other character repeatedly. 
These actions resemble codes developed in society to communicate feelings of affection, such as 
giving gifts or showing up at someone’s birthday party, but, unfortunately, it seems that in games 
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with a SA, the procedures the player performs miss the complexity of these relationships. Giving 
someone a gift might not always make someone like you better, there is not always a correct answer, 
and not everyone can be made to like each other. 
Based on Jenkins’ (1992) observation of masculine fan practices, Kelly argues that a ludic 
romance system is “bound within a set of logical parameters and characterized by strategic 
navigation, ultimately an exercise in masculinity” (2015, 59). The SA too is bound within a set of 
logical parameters that the player influences, which becomes a masculine practice that takes away 
the focus on an emotional experience and replaces it with logic towards elusive phenomena of 
affection. 
The rewards the player receives for making connections between characters to smoothen 
the progress of the game also gives the impression that connections between human beings are 
important simply because one can gain something from them. In games, the relationships between 
characters reward the player often with useful items or new abilities. However, perhaps the worst 
offender of the reduction of human connection in terms of rewards are the achievements some 
games award the player for making (romantic) connections between characters: 
 
Of all the quantifiable measures of romantic shortcomings in the system, the Romantic 
achievement may be the greatest offender to romantic authenticity. The implication here is 
that the experience of love (albeit in a digital context), even if played for its own merits and 
emotional rewards, is capped off with a reward for your time well spent. (2015, 60) 
 
In ME2, the player receives the Paramour achievement once they manage to establish a romantic 
relationship with a compatible partner, and in Sen no Kiseki the player receives the ‘R is for Romance’ 
achievement once the player-character established a strong (romantic) bond with Alisa. These 
achievements do not support the player in their progress of the game; instead, the player collects 
these trophies in their public accounts for other players, showing off their success. The emotional 
investment the player puts into influencing these relationships becomes, then, nothing more than 
a quantifiable reward. 
The process of obtaining a relationship through a systematic process also structurally 
emphasises the obtaining of the relationship above the maintenance of it. Although for otome game 
players the exploration of multiple (romantic) relationships lets them experience more sides of the 
characters, games such as Persona 4, Persona 5, Sen no Kiseki and the ME series demonstrate that 
they are more focused on the process of obtaining a relationship than the process of maintaining 
one. This might be because normative standards in society dictate how a relationship should be 
obtained and proceeded step-by-step into marriage, and even reduce them to universal story 
archetypes like ‘boy meets girl’ (see Cawelti 1976). Or, perhaps because the maintenance of a 
relationship over a long amount of time requires more effort and less romance than achieving one. 
Nevertheless, despite my best assumptions to interpret the reasons for this focus, it is necessary 
that in order to make concrete arguments about this claim, the portrayal of relationships in more 
media than solely games should be taken into consideration. 
The games discussed thus far do not allow for open relationships or polyamorous 
relationships in their SA. These games tend to allow multiple friendships, but do not allow for 
multiple connections of romantic nature. In otome games such as Dream Daddy or Tokimeki 
Memorial Girl’s Side, the game ends once the player has successfully wooed a character. In Dragon 
Age: Origins, the player is forced to choose between either Alistair or Zevran. Stardew Valley takes 
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the player’s gluttonous desire to explore all possible romances to a new level: not only can the 
player-character divorce their spouse, they can also have their ex-spouse drink a potion that make 
them forget their marriage to the player-character so that the player-character can marry another 
character. More strikingly, any children from the previous marriage will turn into doves and fly away, 
making room for new children. 
Despite my belief that dynamic game characters in the SA encourage emotional investment 
from the player, laying the groundwork for meaningful experiences in terms of simulating human 
connections, I am also convinced that the SA demonstrates the limit of the player’s creative agency 
over dynamic game characters. The SA highlights that the player is but a facilitator, only able to 
influence the relationship between dynamic game characters under normative constraints. These 
normative constraints show the preferred readings of the institutional authorities, among which are 
the designers and developers of the game, so that even when the player is promised to have creative 
agency over affectionate relationships between dynamic game characters, this creative agency does 
not extend beyond what a heteronormative society expects from human connections. 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the illusion of creative agency is broken once the 
dynamic game character migrates to a non-cybermedium. In this chapter, I add to that argument 
that the promise of creative agency is already shaking in the SA within game works. Designing the 
relationships between dynamic game characters to conform to normative standards reduces the 
player’s experience to suit the dominant meanings institutional authorities have encoded. 
Therefore, meaningful experiences that can be derived from creative agency but which go outside 
of the normative constraints are being ignored, and the complexity of human connections are even 
further diminished by a systematic, structural process that prizes logic over complexity regarding 
elusive phenomena such as love, friendship and other kinds of human connections. 
 
6. Summary 
This chapter presented the system of affection as a process by which game characters become 
dynamic. The SA is a ludic process, inherently procedural in nature, that allows the player to create 
and shape relationships between dynamic game characters. The player affects these relationships 
by executing specific sets of actions—that is, procedures that differ per game. 
The SA is a good system to create the illusion that dynamic game characters have agency, 
because the player cannot directly control the relationships between them, but can only influence 
them indirectly. I therefore repeat that it is important that the SA resembles a process, because just 
giving characters the command to like each other does not give the illusion of characters having 
their own personality and a free will. 
The SA allows the player to influence three kinds of relationships: the player-character with 
another character, the non-diegetic player with a character, and a character with another character. 
The connection between player-character and another character is simultaneously a relationship 
between the player-character and another character, and between the player and a character. The 
relationships between the non-diegetic player and a character are pervasive, invading the daily life 
of the player, as the character demands attention. And, in the connection between two characters, 
the player has the role of a facilitator, they are not participating in those relationships, but only 
guide them. 
Certain conditions apply before the player can influence the relationships between 
characters. These conditions come in terms of parameters involving the player-character, gender 
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and sexuality compatibility between characters, and resources. These conditions determine if and 
how the player has creative agency over certain characters in the SA. 
The procedures that the player must perform repeatedly in order to influence the 
relationships between characters to different effects include transactions, quests, pair-ups, 
character-targeted dialogues, and waiting and showing up. 
The SA comes with both positive and negative implications. From a positive perspective, the 
SA is not only beneficial to the player in terms of smoothing the progression of the game, but it also 
allows for meaningful experiences in which the player has devoted time and investment into the 
relationship between characters and from which they derive pleasure. Dynamic game characters in 
the SA encourage emotional investment because not only does the player put in non-trivial effort 
to develop these relationships, but they also have to manage the uncertainty of not knowing if these 
relationships will occur. 
The negative implications, however, are numerous. The SA reduces the elusive and 
unpredictable phenomenon of human affection to simply a strategy in which the player only has to 
carry out the procedures in the correct way to win over a character’s affection. It emphasises the 
gaining of a relationship over the maintenance of one. The rewards coming from these connections 
give the idea that relationships only exist to be useful, and can even become trophies that the player 
just uses to show off to other players. Moreover, the SA promotes preferred readings stemming 
from normative standards in society regarding gender, sexuality and the kinds of relationships 
human beings have with each other. These limitations, placed there by design, diminish the player’s 
creative agency over meaningful experiences that go beyond heteronormative standards. 
 
  
 
  
214 
 
Chapter Ten 
Conclusion 
In this final chapter, I reflect on this research by revisiting the aim of this research, repeat the main 
argument of this dissertation, summarise this research’s contributions, and provide several 
suggestions for future perspectives based on this research. 
 
1. Aim of the Research and Research Questions 
The aim of this dissertation was to create a theory of the dynamic game character. I based the 
research question and its constituent sub-questions on Heidbrink’s (2010) general notion of theory 
that “builds a model or draws a set of descriptive explanatory propositions that claim a systematic 
relation to a defined object of interest (85). Her subsequent explanation for the position of 
characters within a theory describes that research on characters repeatedly asks “what characters 
are […], how they can be defined[…], what they are made of […], how they are constructed […], what 
functions they fulfil within different media contexts […], and how to explain the coherence-effect 
that characters reveal” (2010, 85). I therefore proposed the following research question and sub-
questions: 
 
What are dynamic game characters? 
 
1. What is the distinction between game characters and characters in other media? 
2. What are the different means by which a game entity turns into a character? 
3. What constitutes dynamic game characters? 
4. How is the identity of a dynamic game character constructed? 
5. How does a dynamic game character influence the character ecology? 
 
I focused on game works that belong to the general class of cybermedia. These game works are 
digital artefacts with a processual nature that communicate characters, released within the 
discourse of contemporary transmedia practices (2000–2019). I attempted to have as diverse a 
corpus as possible, but because I focused on dynamic game characters for which their 
characterisation process into a certain outcome was of the most vital importance, genres that focus 
on the development of characters dominate my corpus. These kinds of games are primarily designed 
to be single-player games, although, unless specified, I excluded multi-player games completely 
throughout my analyses. Since this dissertation places dynamic game characters within a larger 
character ecology, the sphere in which characters are constantly produced and reproduced, I also 
used non-cybermedia works as an addition to the body of game works to demonstrate how dynamic 
game characters influence the character ecology. 
Based on a reader-response theory approach adapted to suit cybermedia, I used the concept 
of the player to critically assess how they shape the identities of dynamic game characters. Since 
the dynamic game character is dynamic, the challenge is that the player might never be able to 
discover all the possible outcomes and nuances of the dynamic game character’s characterisation 
process. This research focused on the available structures which enable the existence of dynamic 
game characters. It paid attention to the mechanical systems of the game works with the player at 
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its centre taking an active part in shaping the identity of the character. Since the player is at the 
heart of the meaning-making process of dynamic game characters, this research approached 
characters as a player-constructed phenomenon in which the game character requires the player in 
order to be invoked, but the game does encourage the meaning-making with different means and 
to different effects. 
I made several suggestions that follow Heidbrink’s general notion of theory with the role of 
the character in that theory—that is, what dynamic game characters are, how they can be defined, 
how they are constructed, what functions they fulfil in different media contexts, and how to explain 
the coherence-effect they reveal—over the course of the chapters in this dissertation. However, my 
theory of dynamic game characters became a theory that accentuates the relevance of the dynamic 
game character in the struggle over interpretative authority through the definition and construction 
of the dynamic game character, and the challenges it brings to the meaning-making process in 
contemporary transmedia practices. I presented the theory on dynamic game characters in the 
introduction, but I will present it once more here. 
Dynamic game characters are a type of quasi-person in digital games whose development 
consists of multiple outcomes. Digital games accelerate a dynamic game character’s identity within 
a single work, unlike non-cybermedia in which a character’s identity is constructed over multiple 
works. They challenge venues of control, such as the author-function, ownership and intellectual 
property, because the player has creative agency over the dynamic game character’s 
characterisation process within a single work. However, once dynamic game characters transfer to 
other works, authoritative institutions break the player’s participation in their development. These 
transfers sacrifice player participation to create the illusion of a coherent identity between the 
manifestations of the character over multiple works. 
 
 
2. Contributions 
Over the course of this dissertation, I made several statements and arguments which led me to the 
main argument of this dissertation. Because I think these statements and arguments contribute 
theoretically to game studies, media studies and Japanese studies, they are therefore worth 
summarising. 
The concept of the character has been discussed as early as Aristotle. From the beginning of 
the twentieth century, the character has primarily been discussed as a facet of the narrative 
discourse in literary studies. The debate surrounding characters reached its height during the 1960s 
and 1970s when the psychological approach that saw characters as human beings led to a 
structuralist position that saw characters as signs or structures of the text. The structuralist 
approach was then met with a humanistic approach that deals with characters on the basis of 
textual analysis, and hermeneutics that put the reader’s interpretation at the heart of the concept 
of the character. 
At the beginning of game studies, game characters were primarily discussed in terms of the 
difference between the avatar and the character, focusing on the question of whether or not the 
entity that the player controls is a character. This focus eventually shifted towards debates about 
the player-character, where the convergence of the identity of the player-character and the identity 
of the player is the main interest. A reason I believe that this interest in the player-character is 
important is because the player-character seems to be distinct from characters in other media, such 
as literature, comics, films, theatre and more because the player has direct control over them, 
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whereas in non-cybermedia they do not. 
I pointed to three conceptual problems with the phenomenon of the character. First, there 
exists a tension between transmedial perspectives and more medium-specific perspectives on the 
nature of the character. Second, there also exists an assumption that characters are inherently part 
of a story, but as the transmedial perspectives on characters from both Japan and the West show, 
characters are not defined by any story specifically. They migrate from one story to the next, and 
can even exist without stories. Third, in transmedial perspectives on characters, there exists a 
friction about the characters’ identities, because they exist in multiplicity within the character 
ecology. The appearance of a character in one story or medium might seem to be the same character, 
but that does not necessarily mean that this character has the same identity as in its other 
appearance. This focus on identity became especially visible when I juxtaposed Western theories on 
character to Japanese theories on character. Here I wish to specifically point out that Western 
theories focus on a strive for narrative continuity between character appearances to give the idea 
that the character has a single coherent identity, whereas Japanese theory pays attention to the 
proliferation of the character to explain the different identities of the character. 
I drew attention to Frow’s (2014) argument that the tension between thinking of characters 
as pieces of writing or imagining them as person-like entities comes from the prior knowledge of 
what persons are. Since he argues that characters and persons are at once ontologically 
discontinuous but logically interdependent, he roots the understanding of character in the 
taxonomies of personhood, describing the character as constructed in a specific moment of time 
“within terms of an ethical or legal or religious or civic mode of action and understanding” (2014, 
ix). He therefore considers characters to be quasi-persons, established on the recipient’s 
understanding of what a person is while simultaneously constructed within a work (2014, 107). This 
definition of the character is the premise on which I built my theory of the dynamic game character. 
To address the conceptual problems, I proposed the multiplicity model. This model aims to 
represent the meaning-making process of the cultural understanding of the multiplicity of 
characters, their coherence and (lack of) continuity, as well as the medium-specific representational 
material in which characters manifest. The model consists of three interdependent elements: the 
archetype, the immaterial character and the indicator, and the manifestation(s). The archetype 
functions as reoccurring structural patterns in the shape of person-like figures. In the model, the 
archetype is used to describe the different motifs that appear and reappear in characters over 
multiple courses of works. These archetypes are not fixed, but are iterative and evolve as the 
character proliferates. The second element is a bilateral element consisting of the immaterial 
character and the indicator, which I based on de Saussure’s bilateral sign model (de Saussure 1916; 
Nöth 1995). The immaterial character, as the signified, refers to a specific quasi-person who has yet 
to be embodied by representational material. The indicator refers to the discontinuous signifier 
used to refer to the immaterial character. The final element is the manifestation(s) of the characters. 
The manifestation is the character embodied by representational material. It is on the local, tangible 
level of the character’s manifestations that interpreters perceive the multiplicity of the character’s 
existence within the character ecology. 
The configuration of character manifestations over different works and in different 
discourses through which the reader interprets a character’s different identities is inherently a 
question of control over the character ecology. How the reader makes sense of the configuration of 
character manifestations and their identities occurs through a top-down approach via three 
different venues of control: authorship, ownership and canonisation. All three of these venues are 
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in constant negotiation to determine the identity of the character, wrapped up in a continuous 
process to police the construction of the constellation of different identities of manifestations in the 
character ecology. 
Authorship creates specific discourses in which manifestations of the character over a series 
of works are to be interpreted by the reader to be a single coherent identity. This allows particular 
manifestations to be differentiated from character manifestations in other discourses to which 
different authors are assigned. However, issues arise once the authorial intent is considered to be 
causally related to the identity of the character, when multiple authors are involved in the creation 
of a single manifestation, or when the author-function grants multiple different identities the same 
status. 
Ownership in contemporary transmedia practices provides the opportunity to produce and 
control a character’s identity via character merchandising. Character merchandising essentially 
creates a paradox: the character gets dispersed over a variety of media works in the hands of 
multiple parties involved in the character’s characterisation process such that the character ends up 
in different discourses owned by different institutions. Even when the character has a specific entity 
within a specific discourse, the character can only develop so much before they meet their own end, 
and the intellectual property owner must—if they want to continue using the character for profits—
ultimately renew the character in another discourse. 
Finally, the strive for narrative continuity leads almost inevitably to a discussion of canon 
that determines which events ‘actually’ happened, and therefore what a character’s identity 
‘actually’ is within the complexity of discourses in which the character appears. However, a 
character’s identity is in a constant flux, never really determined, never finished as multiple groups 
and individuals negotiate, debate and enforce a character’s identity repeatedly. This results in a flaw 
in which the idea of a canon promises to reduce the complexity of a character’s identity to a single 
coherent existence, but as it is influenced by many invisible hands, authority figures, primarily 
franchises and big corporations containing their own agenda, providing their own version of the 
character’s identity, the canon creates what it promises to avoid: an identity that cannot be brought 
to a core. 
These three venues influence the characterisation process of the character, creating a 
textual organisation in which the character’s identity is policed, controlled and negotiated in an 
ongoing process. In the textual organisation of the character’s identity, I distinguished between the 
urtext and the prototype, the discourse, and the character ecology. The urtext is used to determine 
the character’s origin, its prototype, to which manifestations of that character have to adhere. In 
the discourses, manifestations of the character are presented as the normative character, 
preferably one with narrative continuity between the manifestations within that discourse. Finally, 
in the character ecology, all manifestations gather. This ecology is in constant flux as every new 
manifestation shifts the constellation of character manifestations, and thus the ecology does not 
contain any stable identity of that character. 
Characters are independent from any given media, but always need a medium or 
representational material to manifest. When games encourage the player to invoke a character, 
they use conventions known from media other than games, as well as conventions specific to games. 
This is important for the manifestations of characters, because the reader has culturally learned to 
interpret these conventions to invoke a character, rather than that the conventions make a 
character exist. Characters are therefore constructs invoked not only by works or readers, but also 
by a culture that allows its members to interpret a figure as human-like with thoughts, feelings, 
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intentions and more. 
Game characters, that is, quasi-persons in digital games, are the figures integrated in the 
game’s mechanical system, which requires the player’s non-trivial effort to progress from one state 
to another. But they are, at the same time, subjected to the challenge that games can vary so 
distinctively from each other in structure and modality such that the construction of characters, and 
therefore also of game characters, cannot be reduced to a single core. 
A dynamic game character is a particular manifestation of a character in a game. It is a quasi-
person with a development structure that branches into different outcomes, which are 
undetermined until the player actualises one or more possibilities that influence the direction onto 
distinct paths with a specific outcome. A dynamic game character is inherently ergodic because the 
player has to put in non-trivial effort to affect the development towards a certain outcome. The 
actualisation of these possibilities has structural consequences for the manner in which the player 
continues to traverse the game, as the game will indicate that the player influences the 
development of the character onto a certain path, and thereby another path closes. The outcome 
does not necessarily have to be clear to the player until they have actualised it. 
Dynamic game characters sidestep the focus on stories, and also provide other advantages 
to our understanding of characters in games in the broader sense of contemporary transmedia 
practices. This type of character does not divide game characters in terms of the player’s locus of 
agency within a single entity like the avatar or player-character, but relocates the focus to an agency 
in which the player influences a web of characters. The dynamic game character avoids the implicit 
focus that when the player controls a player-character their agency is limited to the scope of the 
player-character. Rather, even when the player controls a player-character, the dynamic game 
character shows how the player affects different kinds of non-player-characters. Even when the 
player controls no player-character at all, the dynamic game character is applicable to describe how 
the player influences a web of characters in a game. 
In discussing the consequences of contemporary transmedia practices on dynamic game 
characters in the character ecology, I came to argue that our current understanding of characters is 
primarily rooted within this idea that character manifestations within a single work are created by 
an author-function that determines the behaviour and development of these characters within the 
work. Dynamic game characters influence the character ecology by accelerating the character’s 
identity within a single work, unlike non-cybermedia in which a character’s identity is constructed 
over multiple works. The dynamic game character interferes with the construction of the character’s 
identity over multiple works, because invisible hands structurally create multiple identities within 
the game and provide the player with creative agency to actualise one of these identities. The 
identity of the dynamic game character becomes infused with the player’s influence over the 
characterisation process of the character. From this perspective, the dynamic game character enters 
the character ecology with the promise of flexibility and creative agency for the player who engages 
with the character. The immaterial character becomes infused with the player’s own experiences in 
the character’s characterisation process with the ‘permission’ of the invisible hands. What happens 
is that the dynamic game character’s manifestations all gather within a single work through the 
player. 
However, against this sunny view of the player’s agency over the dynamic game character, I 
also criticised this view because the player’s agency over dynamic game characters suffers once 
dynamic game characters become transmedial. There is an idealistic implication that the dynamic 
game character has no definitive manifestation, no ‘official’ identity, because it is the player who 
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produces a concrete manifestation of the dynamic game character. However, invisible hands have 
the tendency to create and maintain the illusion of coherence in a dynamic game character’s identity, 
as they try to structure the configuration of the dynamic game character over the course of multiple 
ludic and non-cybermedia works. Their meddling with the dynamic game character’s configuration 
breaks the ‘permission’ of the player’s involvement in those characters’ characterisation processes. 
While the games with dynamic game characters promise the player creative agency over these 
characters, the moment these characters are transferred to other works, the player’s creative 
agency is sacrificed for an illusion of coherency. 
The system of affection (SA) is a ludic process, inherently procedural in nature, which allows 
the player to create and shape relationships between dynamic game characters. This process is 
beneficial to the player’s progress through the game and provides the player with meaningful 
experiences when they have devoted time and emotional investment into a relationship between 
characters. However, simultaneously, the SA systematises elusive phenomena such as love, 
friendship or just connections between human beings in general, and so unfortunately has 
inherently preferred readings to which it subjects the player. Moreover, to the argument that the 
illusion of creative agency is broken once the dynamic game character migrates to a non-
cybermedium, I added the argument that the promise of creative agency is already shaking in the 
SA within game works. Designing the relationships between dynamic game characters to conform 
to normative standards reduces the player’s experience to suit the dominant meanings institutional 
authorities have encoded. Therefore, meaningful experiences that can be derived from creative 
agency but which go outside of the normative constraints are ignored, and the complexity of human 
connections are even further diminished by a systematic, structural process that prizes logic over 
complexity regarding elusive phenomena such as love, friendship and other kinds of human 
connections. 
 
3. Suggestions for Future Research 
Here I will sketch a few directions in which my research can be taken. 
 
Fanfiction and Derivative Works 
A path purposefully omitted from this dissertation, but worthwhile to explore, is how dynamic game 
characters affect the creation of fan fiction and other kinds of derivative works. I concluded in 
chapter eight that the danger of transmedia is that authoritative institutions take away their 
promise of agency over dynamic game characters from the player. Nevertheless, it is important to 
explore how empirical players and/or fans engage in this struggle for interpretative authority. For 
example, the doujinshi [fan magazine] Perusona 5 Unofficial Fanbook: Futaride Aruita Ano Hi no 
Hoshizora: Joker X Goro Akechi (2017) [Persona 5: Unofficial Fanbook: Walking under that Day’s 
Starry Sky: Joker X Goro Akechi] by Banyu depict a queer reading of the relationship between Joker 
and Goro Akechi, whereas the official manga and anime adaptations of Persona 5—as I explained in 
chapter eight—correspond only to the relationships as originally depicted in the source work. This 
example shows that fans do offer counter-works to the limitations of the player’s creative agency 
over the dynamic game characters, and are therefore important to take into consideration for future 
research on dynamic game characters. 
Another way to explore how fans engage with the struggle for interpretative authority is 
through derivative works other than written texts like fan fiction, such as the practices of 
détournement, in English called remix practices. Fanny Barnabé (2019) offers a study on how 
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creative remix practices use digital games as the materials for derivative works such as mods, let’s 
play videos, machinimas and more. The popularity of, for example, let’s play videos make these 
kinds of derivative works a fertile ground for studying how empirical players and fans engage with 
(their agency over) dynamic game characters. 
 
Artificial Intelligence Characters 
As pointed out by Nicolle Lamerichs (2019), voice assistants, such as Apple’s Siri, Google Assistant 
and Amazon’s Alexa, using artificial intelligence (AI) become increasingly more visible and more 
relied upon in our society. Just like characters, these voice assistants operate on our prior knowledge 
of what persons are. One particular example that blurs the boundaries between AI, voice assistants, 
and characters is Vinclu’s Gatebox, which contains the visual character Azuma Hikari,(Gatebox n.d.) 
who functions as the user’s personal assistant operating on the moe trope of the user being her 
master who she serves in her daily life. What these voice assistants suggest is that instead of there 
being a clear separation between persons, characters and AI, there is a spectrum of human-like 
phenomena that each are used for different purposes and to different effects. I believe that 
exploring voice assistants, or human-like figures using AI, not only helps our understanding in how 
they change the perception of characters, but that, taking dynamic game characters into the 
discussion, dynamic game characters can help us understand how human society perceives and 
engages with human-like artificial intelligence. 
 
Representation of Gender, Sexuality, Race and Queerness 
It would also be highly interesting to study the representation of gender, sexuality, race and 
queerness in dynamic game characters. Especially because the dynamicity of these characters 
suggests that the player has the agency to shape and create them however they want. But, due to 
their limited influence over the characterisation process of dynamic game characters, it would be 
invaluable to see how these characters are represented in terms of gender, sexuality, race and 
queerness, and over which of those aspects the player actually has agency. For example, at their 
initial release, Mass Effect (2007) and Mass Effect 2 (2010) only had a white male Shepard on the 
cover of the hardcopy. Mass Effect 3 (2012) has a reversible cover with on one side a white male 
Shepard, and on the other side a white female Shepard. And, as I pointed out in chapter nine, Østby 
(2016) demonstrates that while there are optional queer romantic relationships, these only exist in 
the private sphere of the game, while the public sphere—the segments which every player 
experiences—the game is heteronormative in terms of its relationships between characters. Despite 
the fact that the player has the agency to influence dynamic game characters onto certain paths, 
the lack of diversity in how these characters are represented, and how the player has agency over 
their representation, shows the limitations embedded in the dynamic game characters’ 
characterisation processes. It is therefore of relevance how more games with dynamic game 
characters represent gender, sexuality, race and queerness. 
 
Emotional Engagement 
Another path to explore is how players engage emotionally with the possibilities, consequences and 
the results of the outcome of the characterisation processes of dynamic game characters. It can be 
said that we care about characters, because they are akin to persons, because they are quasi-
persons. They are schemata of human beings (Frow 2014, 107), and they remind us of ourselves and 
of others. Especially characters that the player has invested time and effort into become important 
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elements about whom the player cares. I am not saying that dynamic game characters are the only 
type of characters players can care about. Of course, the amount of novels, films, televisions series 
and more saturated with characters show that they are not. However, what I do argue is that 
dynamic game characters have the potential to let the player care about them because the player 
is partially responsible for their characterisation process, in which they invested time and energy. 
Eve’s death in Mass Effect 3 affected me to such an extent that I went out of my way to see if there 
was even a slight possibility that I could reverse the outcome. Or, a game such as Fire Emblem: Three 
Houses (2019) has the player invest in its characters and kills the characters who the player did not 
manage to recruit into their house—an outcome the player could have prevented. 
 
Japanese Games 
I initially started this research aiming to bridge the gap between Japanese studies and game studies. 
However, this goal proved too ambitious, and I had to narrow down the scope to the topic of 
(dynamic) game characters. I managed to use Japanese theory on characters and games to inject 
the knowledge into game studies, which can benefit from knowledge about characters and games 
outside of their Western perspective. As Rachael Hutchinson explains, Japanese studies and game 
studies are able to benefit from each other (2019, 254-255). She argues that Japanese studies can 
benefit from research on games because “[v]ideogames provide a wealth of information about 
contemporary Japan, and how ‘Japan’ is represented in art today” (2019, 254). And, she argues that 
game studies benefits from studying Japanese games as Japanese games, because “[v]ideogames as 
objects can be studied for their ludic properties as well as those elements that anchor the game in 
a specific culture and reflect a certain way of looking at the world” (2019, 255). 
Although I might not have been able to bridge the gap between the two fields to my full 
satisfaction, a possible path to take from this research is to see how Japanese games present 
dynamic game characters. Japanese role-playing games (JRPGs), for instance, are described by 
Schules et al. (2018) to be known for their “limited narrative choice”, “defined characters”, and 
“confinement to world” (114). They state that gaming site Extra Credits claims that JRPGs tell a story, 
while Western role-playing games place players in a story (2012; Schules et al. 2018, 114). However, 
my case study on the JRPG Persona 5 (2016) in chapter eight showed that the player does have—at 
least in these contemporary examples—creative agency over rigid stories in the games’ 
microstructures. The dynamic game character allows for much more nuanced descriptions in terms 
of where and how games from Japan and the West grant the player agency, rather than just stating 
it to be a rigid dichotomy in the structure of games from Japan and games from the West. 
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